conflating perception with reality stigma — creativesoul

You lost me. Nobody’s a Kantian because that’s what they do, or that’s what he did?

Cats do not have belief. — creativesoul

Indeed.

conflating perception with reality stigma
— creativesoul

You lost me. Nobody’s a Kantian because that’s what they do, or that’s what he did? — Mww

The way things are, in and of themselves, serves as a basis. It is distinct from the way things appear. We only have access to the latter.

Something like that.

Cats do not have belief.
— creativesoul

Indeed. — Banno

Ok. I didn't think you were willing to say that that statement is true.

That is a new statement of contention.

:brow:

Surprisingly.

if we could only find the right topic. — Banno

I’m game. You’re inclined to more modern thought than I, so....there is that.

Yes. As long as we keep in mind that a human being is not just a body, but how it is organized (just as a university is not just a set of buildings, but how they're organized). That is, we predicate experiences, beliefs, perceptions, actions, etc., of human beings, not bodies (or brains).
— Andrew M

This doesn't seem quite right to me; a body is not a separate thing from "how it is organized"; so there would seem to be no problem involved in saying a human being is a (minded, organized) body, in which case "experiences, beliefs, perceptions, actions etc.," can indeed be coherently predicated of (enbrained) bodies. To say that they cannot is to introduce another, differently nuanced layer of separation which begins (again) to look like dualism. — Janus

Human beings and their bodies are not separate, but we predicate them differently. I have a body (as do other animals). But my body doesn't have beliefs, or experiences. Instead, I do. What a human being is, in contrast, is an animal. In this case an animal that has particular capabilities that distinguish it from other animals (such as the capability for rational thought and language).

Whereas Cartesian dualism does literally separate mind and body. For the Cartesian dualist, experiences and beliefs are in the mind, and "I" is identified with that separable mind.

I didn't think you were willing to say that that statement is true. — creativesoul

It isn't.

Of course cats have beliefs. It's just that they cannot be propositional attitudes in cats, although we can set them out as propositional attitudes.

...all we need is a topic.

So, then some belief is not an attitude towards a proposition, and we've arrived at incoherence and/or self-contradiction.

Belief is an attitude towards a proposition(propositional attitude). Cats have beliefs. Cat's beliefs are not propositional attitudes.

Human beings and their bodies are not separate, but we predicate them differently. I have a body (as do other animals). But my body doesn't have beliefs, or experiences. Instead, I do. What a human being is, in contrast, is an animal. In this case an animal that has particular capabilities that distinguish it from other animals (such as the capability for rational thought and language).

Whereas Cartesian dualism does literally separate mind and body. For the Cartesian dualist, experiences and beliefs are in the mind, and "I" is identified with that separable mind. — Andrew M

To say "I have a body" instead of "I am a body" is precisely the way of thinking/ speaking that leads to Cartesian dualism. So, yes, you're right; according to that dualistic way of thinking, the body does not have beliefs, but according to the monistic ways of thinking myself as a body, the body does indeed have beliefs; or perhaps better expressed beliefs are embodied, they are modes or dispositions of the body.

seems to hold a position very similar(the most similar, I think) to my own. — creativesoul

On a second reading... it seems that the similarity may end sooner than I thought.

Oh, ok. Yes, that’s the Kantian representational system. Nowadays folks tend to think what we perceive is just the way things really are.

But the philosophical challenge is to then get literal again. Lest your poetry be seized on. — bongo fury

The main issue for me is that a description of a human being at a physical level should not contradict descriptions at other levels of abstraction. — Andrew M

Ok, it seems you can't agree about the philosophical challenge. You want to settle: for different levels of description, not literally commensurable. Then, unfortunately, I have to dispute your continual claims to have risen above dualism.

Are you asking me to justify my asserting what the content of the cat's conscious experience is?
— creativesoul

Apparently, the content is that which exists in its entirety, and so far, that’s the extent of the assertion. Maybe not asking so much the justification for asserting content, but asking instead, what the something’s content actually is. — Mww

But I answered that already in the longer posts about the cat's experience.

And even if the something’s content is some ubiquitous or pervasive correlation, I still have no more understanding of that, than I had with understanding merely the ambiguous something.

Understanding that conscious experience consists of correlations drawn between different things is just the start of a very disciplined practice.

Nowadays folks tend to think what we perceive is just the way things really are. — Mww

Anyone who does that is truly naive, both philosophically and scientifically. One might be a direct realist, but it does take more work than just "things are exactly as they look". Or at least I hope they bother to do the work.

Because if not, their lack of philosophical rigor will be called out. Lazy bastards!

Nowadays folks tend to think what we perceive is just the way things really are.
— Mww

Anyone who does that is truly naive, both philosophically and scientifically. One might be a direct realist, but it does take more work than just "things are exactly as they look". Or at least I hope they bother to do the work.

Because if not, their lack of philosophical rigor will be called out. Lazy bastards! — Marchesk

Because that's how it is!

Anyone who does that is truly naive, both philosophically and scientifically. One might be a direct realist, but it does take more work than just "things are exactly as they look". Or at least I hope they bother to do the work. — Marchesk

Kids these days and their direct realism. Jeese!

Because that's how it is! — creativesoul

Nonsense. Unless you can taste wavefunctions and see X-Rays.

I bet you can't even do sonar!

It was so much better back in the day. We walked indirectly to school and ideally home afterwords.

Because that's how it is!
— creativesoul

Nonsense. Unless you can taste wavefunctions and see X-Rays.

I bet you can't even do sonar! — Marchesk

Sarcasm doesn't translate well into written word alone.

all we need is a topic. — Banno

Of course cats have beliefs. — Banno

We know beliefs to mean a certain something, and we come by them is some certain way. If cats don’t come by their beliefs in the same way, what right do we have to claim they have them?

It was so much better back in the day. We walked indirectly to school and ideally home afterwords. — Marchesk

.
:cool:

Maybe.

Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.

Beliefs range over propositions. (arguably, they might be made to range over statements: Fred believes the present king of France is bald.)

Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition. This relation is such that if the agent acts in some way then there is a belief and a desire that together are sufficient to explain the agent's action. Banno wants water; he believes he can pour a glass from the tap; so he goes to the tap to pour a glass of water.

The logical problem here, the philosophical interesting side issue, is that beliefs overdetermine our actions. There are other beliefs and desires that could explain my going to the tap.

The issue you want to develop is how we attribute beliefs to others, including those of the feline persuasion.

Understanding that conscious experience consists of correlations drawn between different things is just the start of a very disciplined practice. — creativesoul

Absolutely. And you’re the only current participant that even attempts an exposition of some form of the discipline, even if it’s your own personal creation. I’m down with the attempting the discipline, but promise nothing regarding the practice of it.

Absolutely. And you’re the only current participant that even attempts an exposition of some form of the discipline, even if it’s your own personal creation. I’m down with the attempting the discipline, but promise nothing regarding the practice of it. — Mww

You look?

Nowadays folks tend to think what we perceive is just the way things really are.
— Mww

Anyone who does that is truly naive...... — Marchesk

Yep, for even without all the -isms and -ists so prevalent these days, that kind of naive rationality cannot explain how it is we don’t have immediate knowledge of everything upon its being presented to us.

For as long as we can say, “WHAT WAS THAT!?!?!?”.....is as long as naive realism will be a less than sufficiently explanatory paradigm.

So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition — Banno

What id I add, “In some possible universe, the present king of France is bald.”?

You look? — creativesoul

Not at what you mentioned, no. Just regarding our conversations.

The issue you want to develop is how we attribute beliefs to others, including those of the feline persuasion. — Banno

I’d be interested in how someone else might develop that issue, but I’m of the mind beliefs are far too subjective to attribute to any intelligence other than the singular intelligence arriving at them.
—————-

Beliefs set out a relation of a particular sort between an agent and a proposition. — Banno

Perhaps, but that’s what beliefs do. If we want to know what a belief is, in order to then know what a belief can do, we need to delve a lot deeper than language.

I’d count that as obvious and wonder why we would bother.