Why isn't it always our job to minimize suffering? — Echarmion

Why would it be? You keep asking these questions that seem to imply a "default position" where there is none.

If you admit the question is meaningless, you cannot then go ahead and require it answered. — Echarmion

I don't require it answered. You're the one asking "What does it mean to have consent from from non-existence", not me. Why would I require that answered?

I don't know where you live, but where I live we absolutely do pull the plug if there is sufficient evidence that this would be what the person wanted. — Echarmion

Same here. More importantly, what do you do if you have no idea that that is what the person wanted or didn't want? You don't pull the plug do you? If you already knew the person would want the plug pulled then you DO have consent.

So if consent is not available, we then default to least harm? Then why do antinatalists bring up consent? — Echarmion

To say that it is unavailable. Therefore the conservative course should be taken. Which is not to have kids.

We default to figuring out what the person would want, their interest, which is the same as asking what is the least harm to them. — Echarmion

I wouldn't conflate what a person wants with what's least harmful to them. For example, the comatose patient may have wanted people to pull the plug if he went comatose but never told anybody.

But regardless, if this is what we do, why would having kids be ethical when we know for a fact that not being born is less harm than being born?

You have figured out what the best thing to do would be, but then you go out and do something else, because why pick the best option? — Echarmion

Because the best option is too difficult to be expected regularly.

I don't remember anyone making arguments from objectivity. — khaled

There have been, but that's not the point. I said that there either needs to be such arguments, or there needs to be an acceptance of the relativistic framework. It's one or the other. What we actually have is equivocation between the two when it suits the argument. It starts with "you wouldn't do X would you?", as if a moral naturalist, then when we say "we wouldn't end the human race either" it turns to "well, your feelings are wrong here, paternalism and/or humanity are not allowable moral goals now". Either we're moral naturalists, or deontologists, or moral relativists, but we can be whatever suits the argument at the time.

You've argued strongly that you should not impose a chore or trial on another without their consent, yet doing so (for the purposes of continuing the human race, among other things) is considered morally acceptable by most moral systems. So if you're going to argue for a moral principle which is not upheld as such by any moral system you need to argue from moral objectivity (all those systems have made some mistake), or else you're just writing the equivalent of your favourite flavour of ice-cream, which is pointless on a public philosophy forum.

there needs to be an acceptance of the relativistic framework. — Isaac

There is. And I've repeatedly said there is. On multiple threads.

It starts with "you wouldn't do X would you?", as if a moral naturalist — Isaac

The intention is not to seem like a moral naturalist, but to see if you share the same relativistic framework.

How would one argue as a moral relativist in your book if "you wouldn't do X would you?" is somehow indicating moral naturalism. I would think a moral naturalist would say "You shouldn't do X". He won't ask what you think because that is irrelevant to him, within his framework he already knows he's right.

I don't think there is anything that implies that the speaker there is a moral naturalist. I think you have a bad habit of reading what you want into what others write.

yet doing so (for the purposes of continuing the human race, among other things) is considered morally acceptable by most moral systems. — Isaac

Great, you have a premise I don't. That the continuation of the human race has anything to do with morality. Whereas I think it has to come out of the morality. As I said on the other thread: You're welcome to your view, but I don't share it. And that is the extent to which I care to talk about this topic with you provided you don't keep replying claiming I said things I didn't say.

or else you're just writing the equivalent of your favourite flavour of ice-cream, which is pointless on a public philosophy forum. — Isaac

Or maybe it's not so binary. Maybe despite being relativistic, I am trying to see whether or not there are people who share the same premises but don't end up with the same conclusion, and if so how they do it, just out of personal interest.

I don't think that needs to be argued. The argument is simply that one should not purposefully put an individual in a situation that they did not (or cannot) consent to.

There's no protection of another's will. It's the prevention of violating another's will.

Are we referring to inherent or contingent? If inherent then, being born is the direct reason why someone is alive which, if inherent suffering exists, is a directly entailed with being alive. What brought about this inherent suffering? Birth. I see inherit suffering as similar to the Eastern version I discussed several posts ago.

Contingent suffering is contextual. It technically is not entailed in being alive, but mine as well be based on the material circumstances. For example, almost everyone will get sick, and that's just a basic example. Then there are just daily challenges great or small to overcome. Somehow this is seen as "justified" by the paternalistic types that think people should be born, to overcome challenges so they can experience the higher "meaning" in overcoming them.

With either example, a future person can be prevented from going through this. Why, someone might ask, would we not just end humanity? And my response, for the thousandth time, is that consent is a huge factor. I give the example usually of veganism. Maybe veganism is correct. Maybe it is best not to eat or use animal products. However, to force this on people would violate that consent idea. — schopenhauer1

As to suffering entailed by life, see the OP. I'm not going to repeat myself.

As to sickness, that's mostly caused by bacteria or viruses. Not life.

There's no protection of another's will. It's the prevention of violating another's will. — Tzeentch

I don't see how there could be a "violation" if there is nothing protected.

Why would it be? You keep asking these questions that seem to imply a "default position" where there is none. — khaled

I am asking to find out what your "default positions" are, because it seems to me that you want to minimize suffering in one situation, and then in another you say that the important question is consent, and suffering is only relevant as a proxy.

I don't require it answered. You're the one asking "What does it mean to have consent from from non-existence", not me. Why would I require that answered? — khaled

If it's not answered, you have no idea what you actually demand.

Same here. More importantly, what do you do if you have no idea that that is what the person wanted or didn't want? You don't pull the plug do you? If you already knew the person would want the plug pulled then you DO have consent. — khaled

Yes, if you have no idea you keep the person alive (so long as the effort is reasonable, you wouldn't do CPR forever), on the off chance that they might wake up again. The principle here is again to preserve the possibility for choice.

I don't think you have consent even if you have a written declaration for medical procedures. It's always possible they changed their mind since writing it.

To say that it is unavailable. Therefore the conservative course should be taken. Which is not to have kids. — khaled

What's conservative about it? You're not conserving anything.

I wouldn't conflate what a person wants with what's least harmful to them. For example, the comatose patient may have wanted people to pull the plug if he went comatose but never told anybody. — khaled

Well we take an educated guess. But I don't think a meaningful definition of harm that doesn't refer to individual will somewhere is possible.

But regardless, if this is what we do, why would having kids be ethical when we know for a fact that not being born is less harm than being born? — khaled

But we don't know that. You said so yourself:

And I already told you that life is not "overall" objectively more harmful or good. — khaled

Because the best option is too difficult to be expected regularly. — khaled

Doesn't that just mean you'll sometimes fail to live up to your expectations? That's not really a reason not to have expectations.

I don't see how there could be a "violation" if there is nothing protected. — Echarmion

Protection implies more parties are involved (AKA, parent protects their would-be child from a third party). I am arguing from the viewpoint of the parent in relation to their would-be child. 'Protecting' one's future child from one's own desire of having children can be more easily understood as making the choice not to potentially violate one's would-be child's will.

But this is getting overly fuzzy, while the objection of anti-natalists is very straight forward. What justifies the act of forcing an individual to experience life without knowing whether they want to or not?

It's not a complicated matter at all.

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent?

It's not about getting consent from some individual after they have been born. That'd be ridiculous. The point is realizing that consent is based on respect for an individuals freedom. It'd be entirely backwards to protect freedom by taking it away. — Echarmion

From whom?

So your approach to this discussion is to just use whatever argument is convenient? What's the point is you're putting the conclusion first and select arguments according to happenstance?

Can you name the first principles you base your view on? — Echarmion

It's always been do not cause unnecessary suffering on behalf of someone else. I will admit I went down a consent rabbit hole with you, but I still think after debate this can also be an principle because I see this is about forcing other people into impositions unnecessarily without consent as well.

You cannot simply combine utilitarian and deontological approaches to the problem. The assumptions underlying them are fundamentally incompatible. If you're talking about suffering, you are talking about some kind of state of affairs. Something that exists "out there". If you're talking about consent, you're talking about a relationship between subjects, an idea.

If it is "something about suffering itself" then how does it then matter about how it's imposed? Suffering is either bad in and of itself or it isn't. — Echarmion

I don't abide to a utilitarian that is aggregate. There is a mix because it is causing suffering unto an individual, not how much aggregated suffering in the abstract. I see the locus of ethics at the individual level. Most utilitarian principles try to look at some aggregate abstract notion.

We put people in jail against their will, do we not? The justification is that putting them in jail is necessary to preserve the freedom of everyone. — Echarmion

Absolute vs. instrumental. Already born, vs. no need to impose at all, period.

And who judges what is and isn't necessary? Whose goals define instrumentality? — Echarmion

If people should not be exposed to suffering or imposed upon unnecessarily, that principle is the judge. If you don't believe in it, see my idea about how meta-ethics works.

As to sickness, that's mostly caused by bacteria or viruses. Not life. — Benkei

Yet it's something which almost all people born experience.

I am asking to find out what your "default positions" are, because it seems to me that you want to minimize suffering in one situation, and then in another you say that the important question is consent, and suffering is only relevant as a proxy. — Echarmion

You do not have to minimize anyone else's suffering unless they're dependents. But what you must not do is act in such a manner that they suffer more due to your actions as opposed to if you just weren't around then.

If it's not answered, you have no idea what you actually demand. — Echarmion

I know what consent is. And I know I don't have it in this case.
What does "consent from an unconscious person" mean?
And yet you talk of consent.

I don't think you have consent even if you have a written declaration for medical procedures. It's always possible they changed their mind since writing it. — Echarmion

At that point it's their fault. They should have changed the declaration if they changed their mind.

Yes, if you have no idea you keep the person alive — Echarmion

Agreed. But I don't think the principle is "maximization of choice". I think the principle is simply: You can't kill people without their consent

What's conservative about it? You're not conserving anything. — Echarmion

If you have a child you risk someone getting harmed. If you don't, no one gets harmed. Therefore the latter is obviously more conservative.

But I don't think a meaningful definition of harm that doesn't refer to individual will somewhere is possible. — Echarmion

Agreed. I define harm as simply "Doing something they don't want done".

But we don't know that. You said so yourself:

And I already told you that life is not "overall" objectively more harmful or good. — Echarmion

Even IF their life is overall good, they definitely had more harm due to being born than they would have had they not been born (because then they would have had NO harm).

But this is getting overly fuzzy, while the objection of anti-natalists is very straight forward. What justifies the act of forcing an individual to experience life without knowing whether they want to or not?

It's not a complicated matter at all.

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent? — Tzeentch

Exactly. Well-stated and concise. It isn't that hard. I called it the Argument Against Paternalism. At base, the answers here is that the parent thinks that it is best for the child, even if it is causing suffering, which is why I say, it is still wrong to cause unnecessary suffering unto another even if one has good intentions to do so.

Does living cause you to eat? Or is it your decision to move that fork into your mouth? How about falling asleep last night? Life, habit or because you were tired? And waking up? Life or your circadian rhythm? Everybody eats, sleeps and wakes too but nobody is so confused in their use of language or understanding of causality that they blame life for it.

Does living cause you to eat? Or is it your decision to move that fork into your mouth? How about falling asleep last night? Life, habit or because you were tired? And waking up? Life or your circadian rhythm? Everybody eats, sleeps and wakes too but nobody is so confused in their use of language or understanding of causality that they blame life for it. — Benkei

Actually, those are exactly the de facto impositions I am talking about. So, when you project things about life, are these not things that factor in?

No, because as is clear these aren't caused by life.

Edit : Or to put it more clearly, life is not a sufficient condition for any of these situations. Without tiredness, there would be no sleep. Without hunger, no eating. It's always something else and that something else is always the proximate cause of suffering. Nobody using "cause" in any sensible way, will blame this on life. I stubbed my toe today and it hurt like hell. It was carelessness that caused it.

What about a more practical look at an argument for antinatalism that could work for you?
I don't think such a philosophy would ever be strong enough to convince every human to stop having babies right? But it would stop the people that believe not having babies is the right thing to do thus removing them from the gene pool. Boom, problem solved.
So in fact you should probably be trying to promote antinatalism to get any people unsure of their stance to make sure you get rid of as many people as possible that are not into being baby makers.
It's a long term win. Everyone will be happy.

Boom.

Protection implies more parties are involved (AKA, parent protects their would-be child from a third party). — Tzeentch

I don't see how this is the case. Parents can also protect their children from objects.

I am arguing from the viewpoint of the parent in relation to their would-be child. 'Protecting' one's future child from one's own desire of having children can be more easily understood as making the choice not to potentially violate one's would-be child's will. — Tzeentch

But this implies that the child that doesn't yet exist already has a will we are protecting.

What justifies the act of forcing an individual to experience life without knowing whether they want to or not? — Tzeentch

What individual is being forced? You're only an individual after you have already experienced life.

Let's say I had the power to make you experience something that you may or may not enjoy. Why should or shouldn't I use that power without your consent? — Tzeentch

You should use your power if doing so follows a maxim that you can will to be universalised. Usually, asking if you yourself would want to experience it is a good first approximation. But the details depend on the experience and the relationship we're in.

From whom? — schopenhauer1

The same person we're otherwise imposing life on.

It's always been do not cause unnecessary suffering on behalf of someone else. I will admit I went down a consent rabbit hole with you, but I still think after debate this can also be an principle because I see this is about forcing other people into impositions unnecessarily without consent as well. — schopenhauer1

The word "unnecessary" seems to do all the work here. I already argued above that suffering that's necessary to exist in the first place cannot reasonably be called unnecessary.

Absolute vs. instrumental. Already born, vs. no need to impose at all, period. — schopenhauer1

You were asking about what I do in general, so this answer seems out of context.

If people should not be exposed to suffering or imposed upon unnecessarily, that principle is the judge. If you don't believe in it, see my idea about how meta-ethics works. — schopenhauer1

Principles cannot judge, on account of not having minds.

You do not have to minimize anyone else's suffering unless they're dependents. But what you must not do is act in such a manner that they suffer more due to your actions as opposed to if you just weren't around then. — khaled

Ok, thanks. I'll just take this as given for now.

I know what consent is. And I know I don't have it in this case.
What does "consent from an unconscious person" mean?
And yet you talk of consent. — khaled

I specifically said there is no such thing as consent from someone who isn't conscious, so I think you misremember. Anyways you have already admitted that you can't answer the question, so your claim to know now seems rather flimsy.

At that point it's their fault. They should have changed the declaration if they changed their mind. — khaled

Regardless of fault, the possibility means it's not the same as actually having consent.

Agreed. But I don't think the principle is "maximization of choice". I think the principle is simply: You can't kill people without their consent — khaled

"Maximisation of choice" is the answer to the question: why can you not kill people without their consent.

If you have a child you risk someone getting harmed. If you don't, no one gets harmed. Therefore the latter is obviously more conservative. — khaled

I still do not see what is being conserved, the word "obviously" notwithstanding.

Even IF their life is overall good, they definitely had more harm due to being born than they would have had they not been born (because then they would have had NO harm). — khaled

I don't quite see what "having more harm" means if harm is "doing something to someone they don't want done". Grammatically, you can't have more doing.

You have defined harm from the perspective of the subject, the part that acts. But you're now using it in a passive sentence from the perspective of the object that is acted upon.

I specifically said there is no such thing as consent from someone who isn't conscious, — Echarmion

And yet we act as if consent is required.

Regardless of fault, the possibility means it's not the same as actually having consent. — Echarmion

Fair enough but it's as close as we'll get. If a written document doesn't imply consent then idk what will.

"Maximisation of choice" is the answer to the question: why can you not kill people without their consent. — Echarmion

I don't think any more justification is necessary. You cannot kill people without their consent. Period. And if further justification was needed I'd hesitate to say it was because of "maximization of choice".

I still do not see what is being conserved — Echarmion

What do you mean what is being conserved? That is not how the word is used clearly. "Conservative" just means less likely to do harm.

Option A: Can cause harm
Option B: Cannot cause harm

Option B is more conservative.

I don't quite see what "having more harm" means if harm is "doing something to someone they don't want done". Grammatically, you can't have more doing. — Echarmion

Cmon now I'm sure you can guess. People have more things they don't want done unto them when they exist than when they don't exist. This is trivially true since when people don't exist there is nothing that can be done to them nor is there anything that they don't want done.

You have defined harm from the perspective of the subject, the part that acts. But you're now using it in a passive sentence from the perspective of the object that is acted upon. — Echarmion

No I'm not. Explanation above.

But this implies that the child that doesn't yet exist already has a will we are protecting. — Echarmion

What individual is being forced? You're only an individual after you have already experienced life. — Echarmion

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth.

You should use your power if doing so follows a maxim that you can will to be universalised. Usually, asking if you yourself would want to experience it is a good first approximation. But the details depend on the experience and the relationship we're in. — Echarmion

If it is acceptable to use one's power at one's own subjective discretion to force one's will onto others, we enter a slippery slope that inevitably leads to "might makes right."

And yet we act as if consent is required. — khaled

I think this is mostly down to interpretation.

I don't think any more justification is necessary. You cannot kill people without their consent. Period. — khaled

I mean if you don't care about whether rules like "you cannot kill people" can be derived from more basic principles, that's fine. But it is kinda the point of moral philosophy.

What do you mean what is being conserved? That is not how the word is used clearly. "Conservative" just means less likely to do harm. — khaled

I only really associate "conservative" with a political movement and an approach to social questions. In that sense it's very much associated with the root "to conserve". I don't know where you take your usage of the word from, but if that's the definition you wanna go with, I am not going to argue.

People have more things they don't want done unto them when they exist than when they don't exist. This is trivially true since when people don't exist there is nothing that can be done to them nor is there anything that they don't want done. — khaled

It's trivially true only if you suppose that people that don't exist nevertheless exist, because otherwise the comparison doesn't work. You can also say "grass is greener than freedom", but while it's true that grass is (often) green, I have no idea what it would mean for freedom to be green.

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth. — Tzeentch

My line of reasoning would only say that the interests of the child are not the issue. There may be other reasons why doing so is immoral. For example, it might be immoral on the side of the parents to enter into obligations that they know they cannot fulfill.

This kind of question is actually something I have been wondering about, more in regard to how to deal with the (possible) interests of generations far in the future. Questions like "does it matter if the planet dies after everyone currently living is gone?" I haven't found a satisfactory conclusion yet. But I don't think it can be found by attributing a will and interests to nonexistance.

If it is acceptable to use one's power at one's own subjective discretion to force one's will onto others, we enter a slippery slope that inevitably leads to "might makes right." — Tzeentch

Whose discretion do you suppose I apply? I only have access to my own.

My line of reasoning would only say that the interests of the child are not the issue. — Echarmion

If the interests of the child aren't important, then whose interests are? The desires of the parents?

And doesn't your mention of obligations imply that the interests of the future child should be taken into account preceding the act of putting it into existence?

Whose discretion do you suppose I apply? I only have access to my own. — Echarmion

I'd take it a step back and argue that one should avoid forcing one's will upon others against their will altogether. Voluntary and consensual interaction seems to me the basis of moral conduct.

If the interests of the child aren't important, then whose interests are? The desires of the parents? — Tzeentch

They're not so much unimportant as they are nonexistent. Apart from that, you just apply whatever moral principles you would otherwise. If you think desires have moral weight, then yes the desires of the parents would be relevant.

And doesn't your mention of obligations imply that the interests of the future child should be taken into account preceding the act of putting it into existence? — Tzeentch

No, because the obligation of the parents is one sided. It applies regardless of the interests of the child, so there is no need to try to divine their interests before they can have any, much less ascribe some kind of will to nonexistence.

I'd take it a step back and argue that one should avoid forcing one's will upon others against their will altogether. Voluntary and consensual interaction seems to me the basis of moral conduct. — Tzeentch

But even if I grant that for the sake of discussion, it'd still be the case that I need to decide, for myself, whether or not an interaction is voluntary on the other side. Even if I am being told directly, that only ever constitutes a certain amount of evidence for or against an underlying will.

They're not so much unimportant as they are nonexistent. — Echarmion

So are they important or not?

You seem to be beating around the bush here.

No, because the obligation of the parents is one sided. It applies regardless of the interests of the child, so there is no need to try to divine their interests before they can have any, much less ascribe some kind of will to nonexistence. — Echarmion

If not the interests of the child, from where do these obligations stem?

And if we cannot divine what the child's feelings are about being forced to live, isn't that a great reason to refrain from forcing it to?

But even if I grant that for the sake of discussion, it'd still be the case that I need to decide, for myself, whether or not an interaction is voluntary on the other side. Even if I am being told directly, that only ever constitutes a certain amount of evidence for or against an underlying will. — Echarmion

Sure.

Seems like all the more reason to be extremely careful when interacting forcefully with others, even more so when it concerns (literally) life-changing matters.

So are they important or not? — Tzeentch

You're missing the point. There is no "they". You're asking whether nothing is important and pretending that something exists that doesn't exist.

Edit : Or to put it more clearly, life is not a sufficient condition for any of these situations. Without tiredness, there would be no sleep. Without hunger, no eating. It's always something else and that something else is always the proximate cause of suffering. Nobody using "cause" in any sensible way, will blame this on life. I stubbed my toe today and it hurt like hell. It was carelessness that caused it. — Benkei

I just don't buy this move you are claiming. You deny two things that humans can do very easily:
1) Project future outcomes. We know what life's sufferings can be and can predict that others can also experience this. Thus all the sufferings known to man are at our finger tips.

2) We can generalize. We can look at all instances of suffering in a life and generalize them to suffering that will most likely happen to someone born. We don't need to know every case to know suffering will occur.

The same person we're otherwise imposing life on. — Echarmion

So you are now saying we are taking freedom away from the thing that does not exist yet? "Who" is being deprived of this freedom? Here's the move you miss: once born, the freedom was by default taken away... now it is de facto live (via usual means, hack in wilderness, or die slowly), or kill yourself. Prior to this there was no person with impositions, there was no freedoms to be taken away. At instant X when that person is born, there was a decision made that affected it, that it could not possibly make. Yep.

The word "unnecessary" seems to do all the work here. I already argued above that suffering that's necessary to exist in the first place cannot reasonably be called unnecessary. — Echarmion

I don't know what that means.. suffering that's necessary in the first place. Again, no one "needs" to exist just so they can realize suffering exists. If a baby is 99% sure to get tortured if born, we don't need it to be born to have torture, so that torture exists so that we can then say it is wrong. Clearly all cases of suffering can be prevented, but were not if procreation occurs. Same odd thinking as Benkei to not be able to generalize all instances of suffering and then realize that this can be prevented, and not initiated on someone else's behalf.

Principles cannot judge, on account of not having minds. — Echarmion

Clearly I meant if you believe that you should follow it. Yes, very good.

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth. — Tzeentch

Yep, similar example to what I had.

They're not so much unimportant as they are nonexistent. Apart from that, you just apply whatever moral principles you would otherwise. If you think desires have moral weight, then yes the desires of the parents would be relevant. — Echarmion

This is the ridiculous move Benkei also makes.. You don't believe in future outcomes. There is no actual person now, but there will be in the future. It is the person who will be in the future that has the suffering you are preventing. Stop with the sophistry.

Problem is that's going to be a miniscule portion anyways. — khaled

Maybe, but I’m not really sure. First, the question of whether or not to have children really only matters to people who feel strongly one way or the other. If you’re indifferent, then you don’t care enough either way to make the issue a moral one. It isn’t like everyone that procreates carefully deliberated one whether or not to use birth control. So I toss out the people who don’t seem to care one way or the other (which I presume to be the majority of people since most people don’t seem to put much thought into it). So I would assume we’re dealing with a minority to begin with; antinatalist’s and those who feel having children is a major purpose in life. I don’t think it’s clear that the former outnumbers the latter.

My argument doesn't deny either of those things.

So are they important or not?

You seem to be beating around the bush here. — Tzeentch

The question is meaningless.

If not the interests of the child, from where do these obligations stem? — Tzeentch

Good question. Perhaps the obligation is also self-contradictory. But on the other hand we could say that the obligation rests on the abstract needs of children, not on any personal interest.

And if we cannot divine what the child's feelings are about being forced to live, isn't that a great reason to refrain from forcing it to? — Tzeentch

This implies that there is a child with feelings, floating around as a disembodied soul or something, before the decision to even have a child is made.

Otherwise, the sequence of events doesn't work out, because by the time there is a child, it's already living, and the relevant decision is in the past.

So you are now saying we are taking freedom away from the thing that does not exist yet? — schopenhauer1

That's the implication of following your logic.

At instant X when that person is born, there was a decision made that affected it, that it could not possibly make. Yep. — schopenhauer1

What decision is made "at the instant a person is born"?

I don't know what that means.. suffering that's necessary in the first place. Again, no one "needs" to exist just so they can realize suffering exists. — schopenhauer1

Everyone needs to exist. If you don't exist, you're not part of everyone.

If a baby is 99% sure to get tortured if born, we don't need it to be born to have torture, so that torture exists so that we can then say it is wrong — schopenhauer1

Torture already exists. It's the individual child that does not.

Clearly all cases of suffering can be prevented, but were not if procreation occurs. Same odd thinking as Benkei to not be able to generalize all instances of suffering and then realize that this can be prevented, and not initiated on someone else's behalf. — schopenhauer1

This isn't the same argument though. This goes back to what I said earlier. You can avoid the problem of causality and attributing a will to nonexistence by committing to just eradicating suffering as a phenomenon. The problem is that you then have to answer why we're not nuking the planet into oblivion.

Clearly I meant if you believe that you should follow it — schopenhauer1

But then it's me who gets to judge, isn't it?

This is the ridiculous move Benkei also makes.. You don't believe in future outcomes. There is no actual person now, but there will be in the future. It is the person who will be in the future that has the suffering you are preventing. Stop with the sophistry. — schopenhauer1

I do believe in future outcomes. The problem is that you want us to act as if the outcome has simultaneously happened and not happened.