To say you are definitively aware of experiencing your thoughts, to physicalist, is no different from saying there is an effective method for being certain about the existence of your thoughts.
That is to say that thoughts are decidable.
If they are not decidable that poses problems for physicalism sure, it would mean that we cannot
logically determine if we experience intentional states. — m-theory
No I am saying it is not possible to abstract anything from elusive subjective access. — m-theory
We have to draw a line somewhere.Do we draw a line in the sand and deny that color, sounds, smells, etc are really being experienced? — Marchesk
If we can do that, then why stop there? What makes the objective world that we experience any more real? Why not deny that we experience shape, number, etc? — Marchesk
It potentially undermines itself, or at the very lest, is inconsistent. What is being done is deciding that certain experiences are real, and the rest are not even experienced. — Marchesk
Except that physicalism explains reality with formal logic. — m-theory
I must admit I do not follow you here.
I don't understand why how this is the case? — m-theory
ou said physicalism has nothing to do with formal logic. — m-theory
will be honest, I have no interest in why you believe that what you said is valid. — m-theory
You are silly if you think there is no formal logic that justifies the position of physicalism ontology. — m-theory
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