Can you explain to me what the difference between substance and being is?
For example, is being not "what is in itself" and "conceived through itself" ? — John

Being is taken to be static, whereas substance is active. The ocean is active - it generates waves. Anyway, I've had enough of you and your refusal to engage. You can play by yourself from now on. Your lack of tact has already been called out by others as well and you take no notice. Good luck at that.

You haven't understood what I've said all this time.

I understood that you said there can only be one substance and that God must be that substance. This is all I have commented on, it's not difficult to understand, it amounts to Pantheism as John has pointed out. Now I don't know if Spinoza has proved this using his logic, as I have not studied his work. This is however irrelevant, because I have attacked logical intellection itself, which Spinoza relies on. So whatever argument he provides cannot in principle determine that there is one substance, or anything about God.

Yes and using substence in a way that doesn't follow the use of it that has been philosophically established. You're just redefining words.

My point is equally valid using Spinoza's definition as you have provided it, ""By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself" (E1d3) Spinoza".

I can see of no reason why a substance that is in itself and is conceived through itself, is necessarily a universal, or absolute, unity. I.e, there can/must only be one such substance. This cannot be established, there either are more than one, or only one such substance and there is no way to determine it in the absence of a thorough understanding of the basis of our existence. Which sadly we do not have at this time.

How are they unfounded? Can you explain this when I just provided you the reasons for why there is only one substance, and the reasons for why this substance must be God? :s

I'm sorry but I can't see a logical justification in what you wrote. It only contained some ideas about substances and their attributes. Just because you can define a substance as Spinoza does, or that it is in some way necessary, doesn't establish that it is the only substance. This cannot be established because we are woefully ignorant of the means of our existence, so have no grounds from which to work.

Yes unfortunately Spinoza's ontological argument works - unlike that of Descartes or St. Anselm. Your only option is to retreat into irrationalism if you want to deny Spinoza's point.

So there is a proof in there, is there?

I have nothing against ontological arguments, but I do realise that they don't prove anything. They are useful thought experiments, nothing more.

Reason itself demands that we adopt such a conception if reality is to be intelligible at all.

Nonsense, just by accepting the degree of our ignorance does not mean that what we are ignorant of is unintelligible, merely that we are not in possession of the knowledge of it, for whatever reason.

Of course you can say "fuck it, reality isn't intelligible", but that's your only option. And if you choose that, you're not really doing philosophy anymore. So if that's what you want to do, be my guest.

This "reality isn't intelligible" has not been said, I don't know where you pulled it from.

I understood that you said there can only be one substance and that God must be that substance. This is all I have commented on, it's not difficult to understand, it amounts to Pantheism as John has pointed out. — Punshhh

Right I see how good your understanding is :-d

Now I don't know if Spinoza has proved this using his logic, as I have not studied his work. — Punshhh

That too is evident.

This is however irrelevant, because I have attacked logical intellection itself, which Spinoza relies on. — Punshhh

Good if you attacked logical intellection itself, then you have resorted to unintelligibility, so there's no point of arguing with you.

I can see of no reason why a substance that is in itself and is conceived through itself, is necessarily a universal, or absolute, unity. I.e, there can/must only be one such substance. — Punshhh

Have you read why there cannot be more than one substance? The reasons are because a substance can be conceived through any of its attributes, there cannot be substances sharing attributes, neither can there be independent substances with different attributes - thus there must be one substance. All these reasons were provided and detailed in my reply to you. I suggest you go back and read it.

This cannot be established,d there either are more than one, or only one such substance and there is no way to determine it in the absence of a thorough understanding of the basis of our existence. Which sadly we do not have at this time. — Punshhh

This is not an empirical matter - it's a strictly logical matter.

I'm sorry but I can't see a logical justification in what you wrote. It only contained some ideas about substances and their attributes. — Punshhh

:-} read it again...

So there is a proof in there, is there? — Punshhh

An argument IS a proof - if it's sound and valid. It remains for you to show how it is not sound or invalid.

Nonsense, just by accepting the degree of our ignorance does not mean that what we are ignorant of is unintelligible, merely that we are not in possession of the knowledge of it, for whatever reason. — Punshhh

Confusion of logical and empirical matters.

This "reality isn't intelligible" has not been said, I don't know where you pulled it from. — Punshhh

If you reject Spinoza's system, without finding fault in his arguments, that is equivalent to affirming that reality isn't intelligible. Spinoza is just drawing out the logical conclusions that ensue from the attempt to make reality intelligible.

Being is often considered as analogous to the ocean : "the ocean of being" . The waves generated by the ocean are analogous to the beings generated by being, so I'm not seeing a cogent difference. Heidegger though of being not as a noun signifying something static, but as a dynamic verb; 'a doing'.
Substance is equally often considered to be something static, that is in itself unchanging, in any case.

Who's refusing to engage now? You also haven't offered a counter-position to my point that being is in itself and is understood in itself. If you cannot do so then being corresponds to your definition of substance.

Anyway, I've had enough of you and your refusal to engage. — Agustino

By "engage" I presume you really mean "engage on Agustino's terms" or "agree with Agustino". You're correct in thinking that I will not engage that way. To be honest, I'm perfectly happy to have no further "engagement" with you. There's not a lot to be gained from it, it seems.

Right! Which is why I am of the view that physics has torpedoed materialism. — Wayfarer

Why was physics ever necessary? If what I'm saying is right, then no physics was necessary to make the metaphysics of atoms and void possible (and indeed the metaphysics was there before the physics, already worked out). Metaphysics is a matter strictly of logic. That's why all metaphysics end up with an uncaused cause, etc. the name they give to this uncaused cause is less interesting as the fact that they end up with one.

As for Buddhism - what it means to me is a practical philosophy and way, grounded in meditative insight into the nature of the self. It is at its best a meta-cognitive discipline, it is all about 'knowing how you know'. — Wayfarer

That's all good, indeed I have no problem with that :)

There are indeed many forms of Buddhism and Buddhist organisations that I have no interest in, there are Buddhist cults and Buddhist dogmatists and fundamentalists. There are even Buddhist atheists. Zero interest. — Wayfarer

Okay I see. Why do you have no interest in them? Don't you think it is important to guard truth and prevent it from being corrupted? Or how do you approach this matter?

By the way, this conversation is much better than before because you're attempting to answer questions directly, and so it's more enjoyable and productive. You can see I hope how avoiding questions or not answering them would anger and annoy the person you're conversing with right? That's not productive because a conversation presupposes that we're honest with each other and we'll answer each other's questions.

The reasons are because a substance can be conceived through any of its attributes, there cannot be substances sharing attributes, neither can there be independent substances with different attributes - thus there must be one substance. — Agustino

Bearing in mind that I think substance, unless it is simply equated with being, is an incoherent, inconsistent notion, can you answer these questions to convince me otherwise:

You say a substance can be conceived through any of its attributes, and yet earlier you said a substance can only be "conceived through itself". Seems contradictory.

What is the actual argument to support the claim that substances cannot share attributes? Isn't it only that Spinoza defines God as the one substance containing all attributes, and that therefore any other purported substance cannot possess any attribute which is not possessed by God and thus cannot be a separate substance. (That's how I remember Spinoza's argument, anyway, but it's been a very long while since I read him).

The thing I don't see is why there could not be subsidiary substances with God as the master substance, so to speak. For example, " we are made in the image of God". Why couldn't God's creation be both separate and not separate, in different senses, from God. Does "separate" have just one privileged sense? The problem I have with Spinozism is that it posits that all our notions and terms have such priveleged univocal senses, that can become axiomatic, and from which a system such as Spinoza's can be derived along analogous lines to Euclid's geometry. This is obviously not so, and Spinozism is thus really an incredibly naive philosophy, however brilliantly conceived it might be as a system.

I'm not going to address John, I'm done with him in-so-far as this thread is concerned (he is free to remain stuck in his pseudo-philosophy, thinking he understands when he does not). If anyone else has questions regarding Spinozism please feel free to ask, and I will respond to you (even if you happen to be stuck with the same misunderstandings and facile misreadings as John).

Talk is cheap.

Talk is richer than silence, though O:)

Not always Heister, not always...

This question is loaded with correlationist expectations. Substance is thought to be a matter of properties found in the world-- something defined how might speak about a "large rock" or "tall tree"-- or else not qualify as a concept with any substance.

Spinoza's point is this correlationist account is incohrent. Substance doesn't rely on something else for its defintion. The act of a transcendent being, the presence of experience, etc., etc., are NOT required to define substance. Substance is substantial all on its own-- the logic of self, the it-in-itself, the logical truth of self-defintion.

Kant was wrong. The thing-in-itself is intelligible and we may know it perfectly. Useless to emprical description for sure, but such description was never at stake in understanding the thing-in-itself. The mistake Kant (or at least many of his followers)made was to think that the thing-in-itself was some empirical state we might to know. Since it's not (as Kant himself pointed out, that we can't know the it-in-itself in emprical description), there's no emprical description to discover about it. The appeal that we can't know the it-in-itself because it has no emprical form falls.

I didn't mean that in some monkish sabbatical sense, but more that ignoring someone isn't more productive than to talk it out, :D

True enough, I guess, provided it is actually possible to talk it out in terms that are satisfactory to both parties.

Yes, but I wasn't asking for substance to be identified as some empirical phenomenon, obviously. I'm just asking for an explanation of what you say it is beyond the ordinary usages of the term, both philosophical and everyday. If you can't say what it is in terms of its philosophical significance, then what use is the concept?
I understand the ordinary logical understanding of substance as being that which predicates are predicated of, but which is not itself any kind of predicate and that which undergoes change but which remains the same 'beneath' its changing attributes. This kind of modeling of things and their relations and qualities has obvious practical significance, but that is not relevant to this discussion; which is about the ontological status of substance(s).

People have pointed out it's philosophical significance several times: self-definition. The unchanging logical expression of self. A predicatless and unchanging substance is exactly the topic of the discusion. The whole point of substace is that it doesn't exist. If it were to exist, it would be finite and subject to change. Substance cannot be "ontological" and no-one here claimed it is.

This is why I say you are giving a correlationist account that equivocates substance with states of the world. You expect substance to have "ontological" (i.e. existing) consequences.

That's incorrect, I am expecting an explanation of why we should think of substance as being real, as opposed to merely formal or imaginary. The equivocation is yours not mine, you are conflating 'ontic' with 'ontological'; ontology concerns what is real, and its scope of enquiry is not restricted to ontic or empirical entities.

The acomist's point is the ontological/ontic (finite) is illusionary. Only the infinite is Real, so any existing state is outside the Real. I'm not equating the ontic or ontological with the Real. I'm saying the opposite: existing states are never Real. The enquiry excludes ontic and emprical entities (and their realness under ontology)-- hence that which is not finite and existing (substance) is Real.

Its quite simple, given Spinoza's definition not only can we not conclude that there is only one substance. I don't see how we have any knowledge of a substance in itself and self sustaining. There is no such thing in our world to observe and test, so it can only be conjecture.

"Have you read why there cannot be more than one substance? The reasons are because a substance can be conceived through any of its attributes, there cannot be substances sharing attributes, neither can there be independent substances with different attributes - thus there must be one substance. All these reasons were provided and detailed in my reply to you. I suggest you go back and read it."

This is merely conjecture, we don't know if there is such a substance, or a multitude of substances.

Good if you attacked logical intellection itself, then you have resorted to unintelligibility, so there's no point of arguing with you.

Nonsense, I have said that logic can't conjecture what we are considering, that's all.

This is not an empirical matter - it's a strictly logical matter.

Oh so it's a thought experiment, that's ok. But what does it tell us about reality then? ( or substances, or God)

An argument IS a proof - if it's sound and valid. It remains for you to show how it is not sound or invalid.

Oh, so it is a question of whether a thought experiment is logically consistent. If it is then, what can this tell us about God, for example?

If you reject Spinoza's system, without finding fault in his arguments, that is equivalent to affirming that reality isn't intelligible. Spinoza is just drawing out the logical conclusions that ensue from the attempt to make reality intelligible.

There's that "isn't intelligible" again, where did you pluck that straw man from? I am rejecting the the use of logic in addressing such questions about reality. Spinoza might have come up with an amazing complex all encompassing logical theory, but what does it tell us about reality? diddly squat.

It remains firmly within the remit of ontological arguments, great thought experiments, but they don't actually answer any questions about reality etc.

So to conclude that there is only one substance and to claim that it is in some way a truth, or to conclude that God is this one substance and to claim in some way that there is any truth in the assertion doesn't follow, is unsupported and is susceptible to the charge of solipsism.

Why was physics ever necessary? If what I'm saying is right, then no physics was necessary to make the metaphysics of atoms and void possible (and indeed the metaphysics was there before the physics, already worked out). Metaphysics is a matter strictly of logic. That's why all metaphysics end up with an uncaused cause, etc. the name they give to this uncaused cause is less interesting as the fact that they end up with one. — Agustino

As you're no doubt aware, the term 'metaphysica' was coined by an editor of Aristotle's works, who gave that name to the volume 'after Physics' in the sequence of texts. However, as you're also aware, 'meta' is not a term for 'after' as much as 'about'. For example, if we were to have a conversation about this conversation, it would be a 'meta-conversation' - 'what do you think this conversation is about?' If you and I arrived at really different answers to that question, then we would have something resembling what most people mean when they get into a debate about 'metaphysics'. X-)

IN ANY CASE, the striking feature about 'atoms and the void, is that it is binary. Something either is, or it is not; every point in space is either occupied (=is) or not occupied (=is not). Marry that to Cartesian algebraic geometry, and you have an amazingly powerful model. I'm sure that is a large part of the intuitive appeal of materialism; that is very close to the spirit of Lucretius (an essay on which, I might add, I got a High Distinction for.)

But, notice that the whole basis of the Buddhist 'madhyamika' (middle-path) analysis, is that nothing either 'truly is' or 'truly is not'. It regards both of these as reifications or abstractions, which are beguiling but illusory. The ramifications of that analysis are profound and wide-ranging.

There are indeed many forms of Buddhism and Buddhist organisations that I have no interest in, there are Buddhist cults and Buddhist dogmatists and fundamentalists. There are even Buddhist atheists. Zero interest.
— Wayfarer

Okay I see. Why do you have no interest in them? Don't you think it is important to guard truth and prevent it from being corrupted? Or how do you approach this matter? — Agustino

My interest in Buddhism came from spiritual books I read in my youth, and also (in hindsight) a visit to Sri Lanka in late childhood. I read a lot of spiritual books and the two that had the biggest impact were First and Last Freedom, Krishnamurti, and Zen Mind Beginner's Mind, Shunryu Suzuki.

Later in life, I started to think that publicly acknowledging Buddhism was a way of making a declaration and a commitment, even though culturally I am obviously not Buddhist (I'm far more Anglican in terms of cultural archetypes). But perhaps that commitment is like a guide-rope up a mountain - some way of charting a path into unknown territory. (Interesting to reflect that in Krishnamurti's famous 'pathless land' speech, he refers to 'climbing a mountain'.)

So my view of 'religion' is instrumental - that it's the record of those who have gone before, which you can use to trace a pathway. It is only useful insofar as it guides actions, your 'footsteps on the way'. Of course, often times the record of 'those who have gone before' will either ossify into dogma, or evaporate into platitudes. But that is what motivated my search in the first place.

Now, of course, Buddhism is a global religion, with many institutions, teachings and teachers. I have no doubt that some forms of it have deteriorated or are pernicious or corrupted. But what can I do about that? I have no public platform, what I write here or say to the people I know is the only platform I have. So I will give anyone who asks fair and frank advice as to whom I think is worth knowing about in the Buddhist world. I try not to be malicious or to gossip, as those are both wrong speech. And also I try to honour the attitudes and values of the Western philosophical tradition.

As you're no doubt aware, the term 'metaphysica' was coined by an editor of Aristotle's works, who gave that name to the volume 'after Physics' in the sequence of texts. However, as you're also aware, 'meta' is not a term for 'after' as much as 'about'. — Wayfarer

Actually in Greek meta is better translated as "above" or "beyond" (in the sense of presupposed) than either after or about.

If you and I arrived at really different answers to that question, then we would have something resembling what most people mean when they get into a debate about 'metaphysics'. X-) — Wayfarer

>:O

The idea is that any physics (empirical) necessarily necessitates and presupposes metaphysics (logical). The further idea is that you don't need to know the contents of physics (which are empirical) to generate metaphysics (which is logical and has to apply to whatever the contents of physics happen to be).

IN ANY CASE, the striking feature about 'atoms and the void, is that it is binary. Something either is, or it is not; every point in space is either occupied (=is) or not occupied (=is not). — Wayfarer

However this is to misunderstand the logical role played by "atoms and void". Atoms and void are not fundamentally two different things - they are one substance. One substance formed of "atoms and void". This is the most significant point of the metaphysics, and in this sense it is the same as Schopenhauer's, and the same as Spinoza's, and the same as Heidegger's, etc. You're busy quarrelling with the content of metaphysics (but guess what, there is no content, because it's strictly logical) - the content is the illusion. That's why Spinoza kept it as abstract, because he understood this point. Metaphysics is required to make sense of reality - for reality to be intelligible - regardless of what that reality actually is empirically. The Atomists were doing both metaphysics and physics at the same time, which is why some of the notions are intertwined and confused even to this day.

But, notice that the whole basis of the Buddhist 'madhyamika' (middle-path) analysis, is that nothing either 'truly is' or 'truly is not'. — Wayfarer

Even Nirvana? X-)

My interest in Buddhism came from spiritual books I read in my youth, and also (in hindsight) a visit to Sri Lanka in late childhood. — Wayfarer

How did the visit to Sri Lanka draw you to Buddhism?

Of course, often times the record of 'those who have gone before' will either ossify into dogma — Wayfarer

Do you think that dogma isn't important to guide the hoi polloi towards truth? Do you think that dogma plays no important political role in society's cohesiveness?

Let me give you an example that I've used before. If I am a liberal, and I read "The Meet the Real Dragon", the chapter "Not to do Wrong", and I read all the precepts I will go on thinking that according to Buddhism there's nothing wrong with casual sex or sex between two men, and so forth. Now do you agree with that statement or not? If not, can you explain why you don't think the statement is true? Moving on, in case you agree with it - doesn't this mean then that I will be deceived in my error and will therefore proceed in it by, for example, having sex with other men with a clean conscience? If you don't agree why not? If you do agree, then does that mean that the study of Buddhism via that book has deceived me because it has failed to alert me of my own presuppositions and unquestioned assumptions?

I have no public platform, what I write here or say to the people I know is the only platform I have. — Wayfarer

You also have a blog, which has quite a lot of content and you could probably use it as a means to spread your thoughts more easily and widely if you organised it, improved graphics, and added information to it, say, weekly. You have been a member of the community here for a long time - you are well known - some of the new people here are quite possibly looking for guidance from you, you could be actively helping them in certain issues such as overcoming nihilism and so forth. And I'm not saying this as criticism for you, but in some threads of people struggling with nihilism and nihilism produced depression you sent them to get professional help (which they probably were already getting), instead of trying to offer them a new perspective which you could have done. Personally I think you're selling yourself far too short, but that may just be me. It's one thing being prudent and humble, and being afraid to make a mistake, and it's a different thing not helping for fear that you'll do more harm than good.

I try not to be malicious or to gossip, as those are both wrong speech. — Wayfarer

True - however - is there not a tension between being honest with someone and being malicious? Certainly being honest with someone could be interpreted as malicious but it isn't necessarily so. For example, when you say that you'll leave the forums and you are reminded not to talk with strangers, etc. you're obviously angry. Now you don't express that anger except in this subtle way, probably to uphold the precept of proper speech. Fair enough, but that doesn't change the fact that you were angry, and I think it would be much better if you communicated that in a non-conflictual way like "what you're saying makes me feel very angry because I feel that you're misrepresenting me" or whatever you think. That's certainly a way of being honest without improper speech - indeed when I went to mindfulness training/therapy like 3-4 years ago that was one of the things the guy taught me. You should express your emotions and let others know how you feel - without obviously creating conflict. If you just talk about the feelings that you find inside yourself and why you think they're there (focusing on anger as a whole), that's obviously a lot more useful than focusing on the content of your anger.

Its quite simple, given Spinoza's definition not only can we not conclude that there is only one substance. I don't see how we have any knowledge of a substance in itself and self sustaining. There is no such thing in our world to observe and test, so it can only be conjecture. — Punshhh

So you are expecting to find such a thing empirically? Don't you see that this is precisely what Substance is NOT?

This is merely conjecture, we don't know if there is such a substance, or a multitude of substances. — Punshhh

Substance is a logical category. It doesn't correspond with anything in empirical reality. Its truth isn't granted by correspondence. So in vain you're looking for it and claiming we don't know if there is such a thing and so on so forth. Rather it is a logical category that is necessary in order to be able to conceptualise reality and make it intelligible - it's truth is granted by its function in thinking and for thought about reality. In other words, substance is the only way to think about reality coherently. You cannot think about reality coherently unless you use the concept of substance - and if you don't use the concept of substance then you'll use a concept which is almost identical to it by virtue of having the same function in your thought (indeed it is this function which makes it true). That's why you see Schopenhauer's metaphysics having an uncaused cause - the Will, and Plato's metaphysics having an uncaused cause The Agathon, and Aristotle's metaphysics having an uncaused cause - the Prime Mover, and so forth. If you're going to be pedantic and start saying "Huurr hurrr where is the prime mover?" and other such nonsense, you don't understand anything of what I'm saying. The prime mover isn't anywhere - it's a logical category of thought. If you want to explain how any kind of empirical world works, it is presupposed. There is no experiment that you can do that will reveal substance - indeed your very ability to do an experiment presupposes substance.

Oh so it's a thought experiment, that's ok. But what does it tell us about reality then? ( or substances, or God) — Punshhh

No it's not a fucking thought experiment at all.

There's that "isn't intelligible" again, where did you pluck that straw man from? I am rejecting the the use of logic in addressing such questions about reality. Spinoza might have come up with an amazing complex all encompassing logical theory, but what does it tell us about reality? diddly squat. — Punshhh

If you expect it to tell you something about empirical reality you're deluded. It can't do that precisely because it can say everything about empirical reality (no empirical reality conceivable could fail to be outside of it - or could fail to be accounted by it) and thus it has no means of distinguishing how the world actually is empirically. If you want to do that, go do physics. Simple. Now this is the last time I go over this, if you can't understand it and we can't progress, then I'm just wasting my time repeating the same things that you refuse to engage with time and time again.

I didn't mean that in some monkish sabbatical sense, but more that ignoring someone isn't more productive than to talk it out, :D — Heister Eggcart

Well there's nothing much to talk about. John doesn't understand Spinoza, he's not interested to understand Spinoza, and on top of that he's also an arrogant prick. So there's not much point discussing anything with such a person, especially under his terms. So he's free to beg for an answer as much as he wants, he won't get it. Indeed that's the thing about him - he's used to people biting his bait. So I will educate him to behave and cooperate if he wants a proper answer.

Its quite simple, given Spinoza's definition not only can we not conclude that there is only one substance. I don't see how we have any knowledge of a substance in itself and self sustaining. There is no such thing in our world to observe and test, so it can only be conjecture. — Punshhh

The absence of anything to observe and test is exactly how we can conclude there is one substance. Since it is not an empirical state, the question of showing its presence through observation and measurement is incoherent. Substance is purely logical, an aspect of reality "beyond" the empirical, which cannot be identified or measured by observing the empirical world.

What you are attempting to argue here is reductionism. You take substance and insist that it is a state of the world we observe and measure-- much like the reductionist who claims the meaning of experiences are "just brains"-- as if knowledge and understanding were only about giving empirical measurements.

We can be sure about substance because we know substance is not subject to change. Since we know it's not an empirical state, not even one we don't know about, we know it is beyond the question of being an actualised possibility in the contingent world. For substance, there is no "might be" or "might not be," based upon what states of the world do. One cannot coherently "conjecture" about substance.

Ok, I agree (for the sake of argument) that there is an uncaused cause, or prime mover and that this is the substance we are considering, fine. This is what I use in my metaphysics, I agree that one has to, to a certain degree, to conceptualise reality. Also that we can't identify it as a thing objectively.

However I don't think we can say, it isn't anywhere(it might be somewhere in a way we can't understand), also yes we can deal with it as a logical category, but this does not mean that an actual substance isn't out there, as you say, it is "presupposed" to be out there.

I am not expecting Spinoza's metaphysics to tell me anything about reality, as such. I am more concerned about what is being denied in its name, or what Spinoza denies about reality.

The possibility of more than one substance is denied, I see no justification for this.

The possibility that God is transcendent of this substance is denied, I see no justification of this.

Well, that's the point about Spinoza's metaphysics: it tells you about metaphysics, rather than the world (for that use physics, observation, etc.,etc.).

In this respect, it's the opposite of most other metaphysics. Most metaphysics claim (or at least are understood to) to tell you about the world-- follow/believe/understand this god or force, and you will finally grasp how the world really works.

By breaking with this tradition, Spinoza takes out the transcendent because it is, more or less, the position that metaphysics describe or account for the world. The transcendent God is the metaphysical (outside the world) which nevertheless defines the world. Spinoza is pointing out this is a contradiction. Since metaphysics are never the world, they cannot give the world.

The absence of anything to observe and test is exactly how we can conclude there is one substance. Since it is not an empirical state, the question of showing it's presence through observation and measurement is incoherent. Substance is purely logical, an aspect of reality "beyond" the empirical, which cannot be identified or measured by observing the empirical world.

Provided it is accepted that there may be a substance out there, a necessary being, which is not necessarily being addressed, then yes it can be discussed logically. But due to our limitations we cannot conclude anything about the real substance, it might be from our perspective, illogical.

What you are attempting to argue here is reductionism. You take substance and insist that it is a state of the world we observe and measure-- much like the reductionist who claims the meaning of experiences are "just brains"-- as if knowledge and understanding were only about giving empirical measurements.

No I am not arguing reductionism, what I will argue, if we get that far is that we know this real substance, we are it.

We can be sure about substance because we know it is not subject to change. Since we know it's not an empirical state, not even one we don't know about, we know it is beyond the question of being an actualised possibility in the contingent world. For substance, there is no "might be" or "might not be," based upon what states of the world do. One cannot coherently "conjecture" about substance.

We only know that it is not subject to change in our experience, our world. We can't necessarily say it is not in some way in this world, as I point out, we do know it, so it has some presence in this world. I agree we can't conjecture.

By breaking with this tradition, Spinoza takes out the transcendent because it is, more or less, the position that metaphysics describe or account for the world. The transcendent God is the metaphysical (outside the world) which nevertheless defines the world. Spinoza is pointing out this is a contradiction. Since metaphysics are never the world, they cannot give the world.

Agreed. Although, as I say, I don't see a justification that "the transcendent" cannot have some presence in the world, albeit via an unknown process.

It's a contradiction in terms. That which is present in the world is, by definition, not transcendent. Unknown processes can't even allow this because that is just some action of the world we don't know. When is logic applied, any "transcendent" force or being merely becomes another worldly actor-- the "supernatural" is shown to be incoherent. The beings of another realm are just part of nature we don't know about. They are worldly with worldly consequences, rather than metaphysical.

However I don't think we can say, it isn't anywhere(it might be somewhere in a way we can't understand), also yes we can deal with it as a logical category, but this does not mean that an actual substance isn't out there, as you say, it is "presupposed" to be out there. — Punshhh

How "might" it be somewhere? The same way the sun "might" not rise tomorrow? :-} Don't you see that you can't even conceive how it "might" be somewhere? If you can't even conceive it, what grounds do you have for claiming it "might" be that way?!

You need to have reasons to think that it might be somewhere, just as you need reasons to think that the sun "might" not rise tomorrow. You can't doubt in the absence of reasons to ground your doubt in. What reasons do you have for thinking this? Where could it be? You don't know. And the fact that it "might" be different is not a reason. You need positive reasons. To think that the sun will not rise tomorrow you need reasons for this. You have some reasons, however weak, for thinking that the sun will rise tomorrow (it has always been the case, you understand the laws of physics, etc) but you have utterly no reason at all to think or even conceive that the sun will not rise tomorrow. Thus you cannot suspend judgement - if you are to be rational you MUST believe it will rise tomorrow.

I've provided you with reasons why it can't be anywhere - in fact you're saying it is "out there" - where the fuck is out there? If substance is all there is, where the hell is "out there"? As if substance was "out there" and not also "in here".... as if you could look at it from outside of it...

The possibility of more than one substance is denied, I see no justification for this. — Punshhh

There is no possibility of more than one substance. There have been reasons provided for why this isn't the case. Positive reasons. You have no reason to justify why you think this isn't the case. As you yourself have admitted you can't find fault with the argument. You say "Oh it might be otherwise"? So? That's not a reason. Until you come up with a reason - you can't protest against it. And if you can't come up with a reason, then you have to accept it, because I've provided you with positive reasons for accepting it, so you can't just suspend judgement and still be rational. If in the presence of reasons for holding a certain belief you still refuse to hold it, without having any reason for holding the opposite (and "it might be otherwise" isn't such a reason), then you're irrational.

The possibility that God is transcendent of this substance is denied, I see no justification of this. — Punshhh

There is no possibility that this is the case. If God is "transcendent", then automatically you have imagined another "bigger" substance which includes the transcendent God and this world in it. (I'm sorry that I have to so brutalise Spinoza's system but it seems you don't want to understand it otherwise, and these metaphors are useful). So you're only under the illusion that God is transcendent, even in that scenario. You're not actually conceiving a situation in which God is transcendent, because to conceive it, then you need to conceive this world, and an outside of this world. But what is that which contains both this world and the outside if not substance (the whole of reality)? And if it is so, then with reference to substance there is still no transcendence, but only immanence.

what Spinoza denies about reality. — Punshhh

Spinoza doesn't deny anything about reality. Transcendence, etc. aren't denied. They're simply inconceivable. Nobody has ever conceived of transcendence, and no one ever will. You can't even imagine them, much less experience them. That's why I said the only retreat is irrationalism. Sure, the world may be such that you can't even imagine it, nor experience it, even in principle. But you have no reason, and in fact no POSSIBLE reason, for ever believing this possibility.

The acomist's point is the ontological/ontic (finite) is illusionary. Only the infinite is Real, so any existing state is outside the Real. I'm not equating the ontic or ontological with the Real. I'm saying the opposite: existing states are never Real. The enquiry excludes ontic and emprical entities (and their realness under ontology)-- hence that which is not finite and existing (substance) is Real. — TheWillowOfDarkness

You seem now to be equating substance with the in-finite, and contrasting it with the empirical (the finite). I can relate, as I said earlier, to the idea that the empirical or the ontic is not ultimately real, it seems to be natural to think this and many philosophers, both Eastern and Western, have had this very thought, although they have obviously expressed it in many different forms. Substance is said to be "conceived in itself", but 'Being' and 'identity' are also conceived in themselves; they are also in-finite.

So how is what the acosmist saying different than what, for example, Kant says about the 'in itself'. The noumenal signifies what things are in themselves, which might be paraphrased (although Kant would not use this kind of language) as what is real in itself.

You have said in the past many times that metaphysics is merely a matter of logic. W use the logic of identity or substance to make sense of the world in the terms of entities which relate to one another, undergo changes, and yet remain substantially the same. Entities (which are the basis of the notion of id-entity) were thought by Aristotle as substances.

You can't say what substance is because substance is not a determinate, empirical thing; it is a logical idea. Likewise you can't say what being or identity is, because they are not determinable empirical things. So how is the notion of substance really substantially different than, as per the above example, Kant's notion of the 'in itself'? The word 'substance' seems to consist of 'sub' which suggests 'under' and 'stance' which suggests 'standing'. It is precisely this idea that we use for under-standing, as I said earlier.

But beyond our use of it to understand (as we also, in similar ways, use the notions of being and identity) what are we to say about its ultimate ontological status? If we say, with the acosmist, that only substance is ultimately real, what is it precisely that we are actually saying? The status of substance as a logical tool for understanding cannot be its status as ultimate reality can it? If it were it would follow that our own understanding is ultimate reality. If you want to say that substance has a Real (ontological) status that is more than merely its use for our understanding, then why would that not be the same as to say that the conditions of our understanding and experience are transcendent (or transcendental in Kant's sense of 'beyond the empirical) to our experience and understanding?