I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

That's not the interesting question though. The interesting question is, if no-one can see it, is there a world as it is?

I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

If we can't see the world as it is, then can we know the world as it is? For instance, you seem to know that we can't see the world as it is, but how did you find that out if not by reading words on a page - by seeing words as they are?

Once you start typing a reply are you seeing the words that you typed as they are? If not, then how do you know that what is on the screen is what you intended to type?

But in a world where most people are not color-blind, the color-blind person has to adapt to the color-normal use (say, learning how to navigate traffic lights by noting the light intensity at a bulb position). With regard to this very specific distinction (and the color-normal standard), they would not be seeing things as they are. — Andrew M

Just seems to define "the way things are" as "the way things seem to most of us" @Andrew M

The interesting question is, if no-one can see it, is there a world as it is? — Echarmion

I would say that's even less interesting. Who cares?

My tetrachromat girlfriend telepathically communicates with her pet robin. I can assure you we most certainly can.

edit. Have a great day!

edit. Have a great day Daemon! How do you feel about panen-psychism or constitutive micro-psychism?

I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

Need we be able to see everything in the world as it is in order to be able to see anything as it is?

You got a candidate something that we can see as it is?

The cat is on the mat? The cup is in the cupboard? The lights are on the Christmas tree? I'm typing on my computer? We're talking about whether or not we can see some things as they are?

I'm working off @Andrew M 's idea (or acceptance) that colour-blind people can't see the world as it is. Fish and birds can see into the ultra violet, and snakes can detect infrared. I think that means they would see all your examples differently to us (they would see some things we can't see). The things they can see that we can't see are aspects of the world as it is, so we can't see your things as they are.

The interesting question is, if no-one can see it, is there a world as it is? — Echarmion

That actually is quite interesting. The world as it is does not necessarily imply observation of it. Just sitting there, all by itself, whilin’ away the hours, chillin’. Seems like that would be the world as it is. But then, what’s to say the world is just sittin’ there, all by itself? Takes an observer to come to that conclusion.

We’re left with nothing but the logic of it:

Good logic: we’re here now along with the world, we weren’t here before but the world was, so there was definitely a way the world was. If we allow the world to be as it was except now we’re in it, the world can’t be the way it was. But it can still be the way it is.

Bad logic: Now we’ve contradicted ourselves, if it is the case that the world as it is doesn’t imply observers, which are the only way to tell the way the world was is different than the way the world is.

Reconcile the bad logic by just saying the observer is the only difference between the way the world was and the way the world is now, therefore however the world is, is because that’s the way it occurs to the observer. Or, which is the same thing, the world is as the observer says it is.

Doesn’t mean he’s right; just means he’s the only one who can say, the world being merely something for him to say things about.

My first response was meant to point out the appeal to omniscience inherent/implicit in so many arguments regarding "seeing the world as it is". My second was meant to point out that we certainly can see some things as they are.

Now I'll point out yet another issue with the idea... it's untenability.

In order to know that we cannot see the world as it is, we must know the world as it is, the world as we see it, and the differences between the two.

The observer is the only difference between the way the world was and the way the world is now, however the world is, is because that’s the way it occurs to the observer. Or, which is the same thing, the world is as the observer says it is. — Mww

Hi Mww,

I don't see why the mere arrival of the observer should change the way the world is in the way you suggest, so that it is now dependent on his views, however misguided they may be.

I don't see why the mere arrival of the observer should change the way the world is in the way you suggest, so that it is now dependent on his views, however misguided they may be. — Daemon

What the world was before us is different from what the world is with us, because of us. That does not say anything about what the world depends on. World still is, just is different.

The way the world is as it occurs to a human, is simply how he describes it to himself. That is the same as him saying the world is as he says it is. I mean.....what other choice does he have? He is necessarily stuck with his own cognitive system, so that system is what he must use when he says stuff about the world.

I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

According to a Platonic (idealized) standard, sure.

But not according to a standard that arises from what is observed in the world.

This idea can be extended to animals that perceive colors differently. Are they seeing the world as it is? Yes, in relation to their perceptual capabilities. But not necessarily in relation to ours as human beings.
— Andrew M

What about in relation to as things are, or at the very least, as modern science describes those things? — Marchesk

That is as things are. It takes into account what grounds the language being used, namely, the prominent features of the environment. Hence the reference to focal points.

That relationalism is very much a part of modern science. Most obviously with Einstein's relativity where the characteristics of observables can vary depending on the frame of the observer (length, time, mass/energy, simultaneity).

A natural extension of this idea is that a reference frame for a person fixes not just the relative spatiotemporal features of the environment, but also the relative qualitative features of the environment.

So two people travelling at the same velocity will perceive the same length for an observed object. Similarly, two people with the same perceptual systems will perceive the same color for an observed object.

But in a world where most people are not color-blind, the color-blind person has to adapt to the color-normal use (say, learning how to navigate traffic lights by noting the light intensity at a bulb position). With regard to this very specific distinction (and the color-normal standard), they would not be seeing things as they are.
— Andrew M

Just seems to define "the way things are" as "the way things seem to most of us" Andrew M — khaled

No, that's a naturally arising distinction. For example, we learn to distinguish a straight stick from a bent stick. But then a scenario arises, such as the straight stick partially submerged in water, where the straight stick seems bent. So things aren't always as they seem.

The key point to note here is that there is a natural standard in play. That is, we are comparing one human-observed scenario to another. We are not applying an idealized (Platonic) standard about what constitutes a straight and a bent stick.

Perhaps there are other creatures that don't perceive things in that same way (perhaps they see things in a distorted way compared to us, and us to them). So they would have a different standard. But, again, not an idealized standard, but a creature-specific standard.

My tetrachromat girlfriend telepathically communicates with her pet robin. I can assure you we most certainly can. — Outlander

Ha!

That's not the interesting question though. The interesting question is, if no-one can see it, is there a world as it is? — Echarmion

Yes, but not one which is perceived. A mathematized world is the best we can do. Even if there are limits to our knowing the world as it is, this doesn't mean there is no way the world is. Epistemology and ontology need not be conjoined at the hip.

Object Oriented Ontology is one such effort under speculative realism which attempts to flesh out things as they are. It starts by noting that all objects are correlated to one another, which means the exact nature of the object is never transmitted, only as it is correlated to another object.

I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

It's not binary. I mean, even color blind men can often run through a field with holes, grass lumps, and cow poop and thistles and reach the other side, even after running at great speed, with no injuries and still shiny nikes. It sure seems like to some degree they are seeing the world. And to that degree or in those ways also incredibly well.

and as a tangent, if you believe that we do not see the world as it is (period), then you must think that art, in fact all art, is creative (at least I think so)...re:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9835/can-art-be-called-creative/p1

The sparrows dancing from one bit of snow to another are real. Being able to observe that is real.
I am not sure what is being asked for beyond that.

All that anybody ever sees is the world as it is, because there is nothing to the world but what it looks like. But nobody can ever see the entirety of the world, only small low-resolution band-limited parts of it at a time, that we piece together in our minds into as close an approximation of the whole thing as we can manage.

The key point to note here is that there is a natural standard in play. That is, we are comparing one human-observed scenario to another. — Andrew M

a creature-specific standard. — Andrew M

Which is to say that "the way things are" is "the way they seem to us" (creature specific standard). I am not saying that a stick that looks bent in water is actually bent, but that whether or not the stick is "actually bent" is found out by employing a creature specific standard. That there is no "direct access" if that makes sense, we see things through fallible senses and fallible reasoning. I find people forget this often.

I am not saying that a stick that looks bent in water is actually bent, but that whether or not the stick is "actually bent" is found out by employing a creature specific standard. — khaled

:up:

That there is no "direct access" if that makes sense, we see things through fallible senses and fallible reasoning. I find people forget this often. — khaled

OK. The way I would put it is that we are capable of being mistaken about what we perceive.

OK. The way I would put it is that we are capable of being mistaken about what we perceive. — Andrew M

I would say we are capable of being mistaken about anything.

I would say we are capable of being mistaken about anything. — khaled

Yes, that's been my conclusion from observing humanity too...

There's an old parable wherein three blind men each feel different parts of an elephant (the trunk, a leg, the tail), and each concludes that he is feeling something different (a snake, a tree, a rope). All three of them are wrong about what they perceive, but the truth of the matter, that they are feeling parts of an elephant, is consistent with what all three of them sense, even though the perceptions they draw from those sensations are mutually contradictory.

Though our perceptions -- our filling in of the gaps and extending of patterns and attempts to correct for distortions of our senses, in other words our interpretations of our senses -- can be wrong, our senses themselves cannot, and there is nothing more to the actual truth than the sum of what all kinds of senses (of any beings, not just us) could potentially sense.

The discussion about human tetrachromacy is irrelevant to the issue of seeing the world as it is.
Whether or not women with two different cones for perceiving reds can see more shades, the simple fact is that the EM spectrum is much wider than the human eyes' gamut, and indeed many animals can see out of our range.
It would be possible to set up a game like in the OP where a trained animal picks a square based on its color despite all the squares appearing black* to a human.

Or echolocation or whatever...it's pretty clear we don't sense everything that's capable of being sensed, let alone every phenomenon "out there".

* What's "black" anyway? Since we see black where there is a comparative dearth of cone cell activation, is black "out there"?

When you talk about seeing the world as it is as in the material manifestation or in it's more subtle invisible aspects? That is where it gets so complicated, and the limits of our senses is apparent in some ways, but even the most materialistic thinkers would not deny invisible aspects, especially those in daily life, such as electricity and wifi.

The philosophy of Plato and Kant spoke of forms and transcendental aspects, which would could gain some grasp of, but were, nevertheless, beyond our awareness.

So, the whole question of seeing the world, which does involve the whole question of what is reality, is so complex, and one of the most profound philosophy questions. I would say that at most, each one us with the limits of our sensory faculties, and reason, can only say that our perception of the world is an interpretation.

In saying that, I do not wish to undervalue our perception and at least we can communicate with others to go beyond the limits of our iindividual minds. And of course, we are not, at the present time, able to know how the world is seen by other lifeforms.

I conclude that nobody can see the world as it is. — Daemon

So, your argument is that other folk, including robins, see things differently to you, and hence... no-one sees the world as it is.

Why hasn't anyone pointed out that this conclusion does not follow from the premiss?

Interestingly, we know what magnetic fields are, and we know that the robin sees them. We are in agreement with the robin. We are seeing the same thing, but in different ways.

The same point holds for the other examples given. We know the colourblind person does not see red. They and we are in agreement as to what is the case.

So the question that should be addressed is, can the argument be made complete? What would be needed to make the conclusion follow from the agreed fact that different folk see different things?

Until and unless Daemon completes the argument, there is nothing to address.

Hi Banno, I was picking up Andrew M's suggestion about colour-blind people (see quote in my first post) and running with it.

With regard to this very specific distinction (and the color-normal standard), they would not be seeing things as they are. — Andrew M

I don't have very clear views myself as yet about "seeing things as they are".