It's neither moral nor amoral — Outlander
It's a means not an end to a means, one that can result in either outcome. — Outlander
But that's my point, friend. You may choose not to participate and create a person who you will raise to not only not do that but do everything in their power to prevent that. Not because they're "forced to" simply because you raised them to view doing so as beneficial and bringing joy to their person. Meanwhile, those who are raised without said belief will continue to do so and thanks to your non-participation will continue this unabated and unrestricted. — Outlander
The child will undoubtedly do what the child wants. The assumption that a child raised to receive joy from selflessness is "sacrificed" or otherwise forced to do something against their will is on par with the same idea toward a child raised to feel joy from selfishness, is it not? — Outlander
Again, people will continue to be born, and without proper guidance, continue to be subject to the scenarios you provided. Until, someone with knowledge and perhaps guts, decides to raise others in opposition to this. — Outlander
What future individual? You're an anti-natalist! — Outlander
See above. People will continue to be born, either with the mission or at least inclination that they should or perhaps could better their fellow man and thus future selves in the process, or not. Regardless, births will continue. So. Do you, as someone who recognizes or at least identifies the current state of society and the world as "in need of improvement" enough to imply it needs to be improved have kids who may be taught to do so, or do others who either don't realize or couldn't care less have kids that just contribute to the degeneracy. The choice is and has always been yours. — Outlander
It's not a job if the standards are arbitrary. There's nothing to be done. Plucking a rule out of thin air is not a 'job' in any normal use of the term. — Isaac
I think the standards are arbitrary. Moral objectivists think they're not. Also there is no job called "ethicist" for this reason. — khaled
It's so bizzare to me that we are 17 pages in and you keep saying "Well actually, your view and my view are both caused by natrualistic means therefore there is nothing to talk about". — khaled
The mere fact that antinatalist premises make claims to be moral and that we can understand what those claims mean does not make then automatically right about that claim. — Isaac
Agreed. Now, we check the premises and check the reasoning. If we agree with the premises and reasoning then the conclusion must be true. — khaled
We also have a natural drive to take what we want. Yet we pronounced one drive good and one drive bad. — khaled
All I’m trying to get at is that the mere fact that we have different, often contradictory drives is not in any way useful when talking about morals. — khaled
But that’s not what Isaac and Benkei are trying to do. They are trying to find a contradiction even after accepting the premises, and failing. — khaled
First off, do you think there are situations where having children is wrong? — khaled
I don't think we can describe any drive, including the drive to procreate, as either moral or immoral. How we act, yes. Perhaps even how we think. But one cannot be responsible for one's biology or one's upbringing. — Kenosha Kid
On the contrary, I think it is the crux of morality. Were we a solitary species, the question would not arise. Likewise were we of a hive mind. It is the competition between impulses that gives us ambiguity, without which there's nothing to talk about at all. — Kenosha Kid
if there's no naturalistic reason to accept that premise then, in the absence of any other moral authority, the resultant moral rule is arbitrary. — Kenosha Kid
There are biological drives and responses that act as the angels of our better nature, as well as selfish ones. — Kenosha Kid
If we cannot accept the premise on grounds of common experience, nor on grounds of biology, nor by extending existing in-group morality to out-groups — Kenosha Kid
Of course! And situations where it's fine to let someone die, and ones where it is morally compulsory to give to charity. But none of them are generalisable. — Kenosha Kid
that that statement cannot be concluded from the mere fact that we have a drive to take what we want or from the fact that we have a drive to cooperate. — khaled
Which should be favored when? That's an interesting question. But restating that we have different impluses over and over again (like Isaac is doing) is not adding anything to the conversation. — khaled
At some point we determined some drives and responses as "better nature" and others as "selfish". This was not done by looking at our impulses. — khaled
What they were trying to do is find an inconsistency within the system itself. Failing to do that — khaled
If we did not have a drive to co-operate, for example, there'd be no material cause for us to "decide that acting on the drive to steal is wrong". — Isaac
It must be something to do with living co-operatively because if that weren't an issue we'd have no morality at all. As such, any purported 'moral' objective which cannot claim to be working toward such an end is not moral, by definition. — Isaac
Given that you seem to agree, what purpose to you suppose a drive to avoid imposing suffering on others without consent might serve? — Isaac
At some point we determined some drives and responses as "better nature" and others as "selfish". This was not done by looking at our impulses.
— khaled
Then how do you suppose it was done? Randomly? And the massive levels of correlation between disparate cultures are what...just coincidence? — Isaac
If you just stick to avoiding harm, you end up with contradictions (such as surgery) — Isaac
such a maxim cannot really count as 'moral' because it is not focussed on living together better, the need for which is the only reason we have morals in the first place. — Isaac
Sure, we would need some sort of drive to do something to ever consider it moral or immoral, but simply having such a drive doesn't make the thing moral. — khaled
All he says is that were we a solitary species, the question of whether or not to steal would not arise. In that I am agreed. However, this does not indicate at all how a communal species (like us) should act. — khaled
it does NOT follow from that that the goal of morality is to establish such a community. — khaled
To think that since moral impulse X arose naturally due to [insert explanation here] therefore we must all believe in moral impulse X is textbook naturalistic fallcy. — khaled
Definitely not randomly. But that is different from having a justfication. All moral premises are by definition unjustified. Some work better than others at preserving the society. The societies that adopted the ones that work better have survived longer. — khaled
What does then make a thing 'moral'? Our agreement that it fits in some loose category. What causes us to agree on such a loose category? Our shared experiences. Why do we assign normative force to the behaviours in that category? Because we have some drive to do so. — Isaac
This leaves you in the bizarre position of claiming the moral rules have no purpose at all, that we're inclined to add such normative force to them for no reason. — Isaac
the fact that we evolved moral sentiments to enable a more harmonious community that moral sentiments would be aimed at the maintenance of such a community. That's just how evolution works. — Isaac
"x lacks features a, b and c (which moral impulses share)" — Isaac
Frankly, I find your whole "Let's follow this moral rule purely because it makes better societies" repulsive. — khaled
why do you make these features definitional instead of circumstantial? That's really the crux of the matter. — khaled
We are evolved and culturally embedded creatures. We simply do not have random wants en masse. So why would anyone have an otherwise unfounded desire to avoid risking harm to others without consent? — Isaac
The first would be an argument from popularity. — khaled
Likewise deeming something to be a moral consideration or not on the basis of its ubiquity is not about popularity: that ubiquity speaks to the presence of an evolved characteristic. — Kenosha Kid
a) what features of certain normative claims make them 'moral' ones — Isaac
My claim is that it is community co-operation. Efforts to support it are what unite certain normative claims we call 'moral', and the normative force is the maintenance of such co-operation - 'if you want {community co-operation}, then you should [moral rule]'. — Isaac
Your claim seems to be that there is no 'if you want...' component at all — Isaac
So you need to fill in the blank 'if we want to...we ought to avoid risking harm to others without consent'. What is in the blank? — Isaac
Or...you're arguing that avoiding the risk of harm to others without consent is the contingent part - 'if you want to {avoid risking harm to others without consent}, then you ought to [not have children]' — Isaac
But here you're faced with the naturalistic argument. We are evolved and culturally embedded creatures. We simply do not have random wants en masse. So why would anyone have an otherwise unfounded desire to avoid risking harm to others without consent? — Isaac
a) what features of certain normative claims make them 'moral' ones — Isaac
If they are about how you should act. — khaled
So I guess "ethical egoism" is not about morals then? — khaled
A fourth argument against ethical egoism is just that: ethical egoism does not count as a moral theory. — SEP - Egoism
And neither was whatever Kant was doing. — khaled
I think your claim is ridiculous because many (if not most) things we call "moral theories" do not have the community co-operation as an end goal, and often have cases where they favor other values (freedom, sanctity of life, whatever) over the community. — khaled
No, my claim is that the "if you want..." component is arbitrary. "If you want community cooperation" works. So does "If you want to respect the freedom of the individual". etc. — khaled
How is this a natrualistic argument? I didn't say "We should not want to harm others without their consent because it is natural".
If you mean to say that we have no reason to favor "Avoid risking harm to others without consent" over "Ensure the harmony of the community", I'd agree with you. — khaled
In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups. — SEP - The Definition of Morality
So "you should use a 10mm spanner if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is a moral claim? — Isaac
Secondly, you still have not resolved the issue of what makes claims 'moral'. As the SEP quote clarifies not all values basing a moral theory are properly countable as 'moral'. It's insufficient to simple say that other moral frameworks have slightly different values and therefore any value equally counts as moral. A multiplicity is not the same as arbitrary. — Isaac
In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups. — SEP - The Definition of Morality
descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior — SEP - The Definition of Morality
Firstly, It's not my claim - I'm using it as an example (one I have a good deal of sympathy with, mind). — Isaac
My claim is that it is community co-operation. — Isaac
If you mean to say that we have no reason to favor "Avoid risking harm to others without consent" over "Ensure the harmony of the community", I'd agree with you.
— khaled
No. I'm saying the exact opposite. We simply do not have arbitrary desires. — Isaac
What "evolved characterisitc" is antinatalism missing that other moral theories have? — khaled
So unpopular moral theories are no longer moral theories? — khaled
Sure the ubiquity speaks to the presence of an evolved characteristic, but it is your choice to make that characteristic definitional or circumstantial. — khaled
We can call it an ethic insofar as you can personally subscribe to it, but it has zilch to do with human morality — Kenosha Kid
Characteristics are always definitional though: that's why they're called characteristics. — Kenosha Kid
What’s “human morality” if not codes of conduct you personally subscribe to? — khaled
The question is why do you make it a characteristic of a moral theory to ensure the survival of the society in which it is used? That’s what you seem to be doing. — khaled
Human morality concerns biological and cultural adaptations to allow humans to live together in social groups and allow social groups to co-exist. — Kenosha Kid
Individualism is an antisocial moral philosophy — Kenosha Kid
Merry Christmas!!!! — Kenosha Kid
If anyone can provide any further ideas.. this scheme of creating people who can evaluate the very givens of life as negative and then re-educating to "get with the program".. why does this seem immoral, not right, fishy, wrong? I think it has something to do with using individuals, but I'd like other ideas for why this intuitively seems wrong. — schopenhauer1
Then I honestly don't care. I don't care about "embedding" moral premises in other moral premises. Why is creating someone who might hate life wrong? Because it just is. OR because it is "using people". OR because it is "disrespecting the freedom of the individual". OR because it is "unwarranted suffering". Or because all of the above. Or because of the first, which is because of the second, which is because of the third.
I can embed the premise (make it a conclusion deriving from another premise) in a large number of other premises but I think doing that is just distraction. The question then becomes "Why is using people wrong?" or "Why is causing unwarranted suffering wrong?" etc. This "embedding" is just a waste of time, it doesn't give any new information or any new answers.
People certainly seem to like it though. The best moral theories have 2-3 "layers" of redundant embedding at least so that when someone asks "Why X?" you answer "Because Y" and then they ask "Why Y?" up to 3 times at whichpoint you can pretend that they're being ridiculous. That is tip number 1 in the "Moral Objectivist's Guidebook to BS". "Embed your moral premises in many layers so that when people keep asking 'why' you can call them children and not actually have to justify anything" — khaled
people think that simply living must be good in and of itself and antinatalism is preventing this — schopenhauer1
At some point, you either agree or disagree with the axiom. I have maintained for a long time now that at that point it is more about appealing to a person's emotions on why exactly that premise is so important, not embedding it in another principle that is some sort of air tight case. That will never be the case. — schopenhauer1
At some point, you either agree or disagree with the axiom. — schopenhauer1
That's really been the whole crux of the disagreement with literally everyone here.
For them we should live, and we make morality to live better. For me, we make the morality first, and if "we should live" doesn't come out of it then so be it. — khaled
So "you should use a 10mm spanner if you want to undo a 10mm nut" is a moral claim? — Isaac
If you were to also propose some moral duty to undo 10mm nuts, then yes that would be a moral claim. Otherwise it is instructions. — khaled
moral rules are followed for their own sake — khaled
Ah so that's where the misunderstanding is. I've been using "moral" in the descriptive sense. — khaled
Firstly, It's not my claim - I'm using it as an example (one I have a good deal of sympathy with, mind). — Isaac
My claim is that it is community co-operation. — Isaac
Sure.... — khaled
There are clearly reasons (natrualistic explanations) for why we favor this or that moral premise but there are no justifications to favor any. To say those are the same things would be a naturalistic fallacy. — khaled
you keep loosing the thread of the argument and so it's become very tiresome. — Isaac
as now you're defining a rule as moral that is only followed for the sake of undoing a 10mm nut, not for it's own sake. — Isaac
Descriptive morality isn't about that. — Isaac
Otherwise, again, every single thought counts as a moral one and the term becomes useless. — Isaac
agree that moral premises are not arbitrary — Isaac
That one should use a 10mm spanner (or indeed that one should undo 10mm nuts) cannot be reasonably shown to fit either. — Isaac
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