We cannot speak of the world as it is in itself. Then how can it have any significance? — Banno
So far I've taken "see" to be roughly understood as "perceive". But it might mean something like "discern". — Banno
What I've writ so far is along the analytic tradition, breaking the question down into pieces and seeing if, by finding answers for each, we can answer the original question. — Banno
The idea is that there is a world that stands outside our perceptions of it, and hence is outside of our capacity to discern. — Banno
". The idea is that there is a world that stands outside our perceptions of it, and hence is outside of our capacity to discern. Further, this world, beyond our keen, is the actual thing. Since we cannot discern the goings on in this world as it is in itself, we cannot make statements about it, let alone true statements. On this view, there is precious little that we can say that is true. — Banno
Well, there ya go: your analytical way finds answers to questions, the other, and dare I say all the more fundamentally significant, way seeks the conditions which must have been involved, in order for questions to even be asked in the first place. — Mww
We might profit form the approach taken in the SEP article on the problem of perception, which sets up the issue by contrasting naive realism with internationalist theories of perception. The final sentence sets up the issue clearly:In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are. [Wikipedia] — Bitter Crank
For my part I oscillate between these two views, but find myself tending at present towards the notion of representations; however this seems to be at odds with views on belief I have expressed elsewhere, and hence is an area for further consideration.Is it that some such experiences are themselves in their nature non-representational relations to ordinary objects? Or is it that they are in their nature non-relational representations of ordinary objects?
However, your last sentence in unwarranted: — Olivier5
Well, there ya go: your analytical way finds answers to questions, the other, and dare I say all the more fundamentally significant, way seeks the conditions which must have been involved, in order for questions to even be asked in the first place. — Mww
Hence, Olivier, I agree with your comment, there is an awful lot of truth we can say about the world. — Banno
If you say you can see the world as it is, period, then you are confused about your fallibility and biases right from the start. Or course, regardless of where one weighs in on this issue one can still be susceptible to biases. But we do see the world as it is to some degree. You seem to see this professor and his biases, for example.If you assume that you know the world as it is, then you are totally oblivious to the possibility that you may have biases. — Olivier5
But we do see the world as it is to some degree. You seem to see this professor and his biases, for example. — Coben
But we do see the world as it is to some degree. You seem to see this professor and his biases, for example. — deletedusercb
In its relation to ourselves and in our relation to it, yes. But we can’t say much about the world as it is in itself. — Olivier5
Not perceiving the world as it is is different from it being impossible to know the world as it is, which seems to be the charge leveled. — Marchesk
Granted, as Wayfarer would point out, that does mean we have to take into account how our intellect understands the world in theory formation and what not. We investigate the world given the kinds of minds, bodies, tools (and language) we have. — Marchesk
It follows that breaking the question down doesn’t have near the explanatory power as would breaking down the logic under which the question was constructed. And because logical constructions are metaphysical without regard for language, which has only to do with expressions representing such constructions, the disassembly of that logic should be metaphysical as well. Nothing can be re-stated that hasn’t been re-thought. — Mww
you spoke (....) of the world as a "euphemism for whatever there is on the input side of our senses"; but for the analytic tradition (...) the world is that of which we make true statements - the world is all that is the case.
IS this difference at the root of our disagreement? — Banno
things about which nothing can be said — Banno
There are things that if anything is said about them, such saying will be irrational, nonsensical, absurd, meaningless, and so on, but theses are still somethings that can be said. — Mww
I'd like to see this filled out: an example, perhaps. — Banno
It's just making noise. — Banno
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