I have not claimed that beliefs are in the mind.
— creativesoul

?
I didn’t say you did. I said you try to dismantle that. — khaled

Actually, if you re-read the debate, I've ignored it altogether along with all sorts of other problematic stuff Banno's (mis)attributing to me.

So if belief was a movie, the protagonist's having an attitude toward a proposition is just one scene.

There are also moments in a garden where, having lost all grounding in belief, he enters into a state of paralyzing panic by a rustling sound. He eventually loses track of space and time and the spirit of Constraint comes upon him, locking down absurdity and zeroing in on birds.

"But what is a bird?" he asks, "If not a deadening label for the endless mystery of rustling and flashes of light amidst the humid aroma of moss and dirt?

We could get Nils Frahm to compose the soundtrack.

So if belief was a movie, the protagonist's having an attitude toward a proposition is just one scene. — frank

Yes. The "where are they now" montage at the end.

"But what is a bird?" he asks, "If not a deadening label for the endless mystery of rustling and flashes of light amidst the humid aroma of moss and dirt? — frank

I imagine it's like Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency; the plot seems linear once you've already watched the show.

I understand what you're saying. Belief can't be neatly isolated the way the propositional account wants to do.

:lol: Is Tarkovsky still alive? I want some endless shots of seaweed floating by.

Do be careful with computational logic. It doesn't work the same as propositional logic, because instructions are not statements. "A= A+1" Contradiction as statement, simple commonplace instruction. — unenlightened

Just in case this wasn't picked up, this is not right. If the programming language is such that = is the assignment operator, which I think is what you had in mind, then the above simply means that different languages might use the same symbol for different things. In languages in which = is the equality operator, A = A + 1 equates to false. In languages in which it is the assignment operator, such as Java and Python, there exists another equality operator such as == such that A == A + 1 equates to false and means exactly the same as A = A + 1 in propositional logic.

My reply to unenlightened showed that A needs to be defined prior to A = A + 1, or else the statement is false (it returns an error). You can't use a variable that wasn't previously defined to define a variable. Its like defining a word with using another word that hasn't been defined.

The assumption that he meant A to have some numerical value appears reasonable. Null pointer errors aren't very relevant to the discussion.

Do either of you dispute my claim that the logic of propositions is not the same as the logic of commands?

Either way, arguing about the trivial illustrative example I offered is irrelevant.

Eg, I grasp the cup; my body and mind are directed towards the cup in a specific way, to grasp it, to reach for its handle, to lift to to my mouth etc. This state is directed towards the cup. The content will include the location of its handle, the type of liquid in the cup, that the cup is to be grasped for drinking and so on. SEP characterises intentionality as: — fdrake

One's intention is shown in one's acts. This I believe is partly the point of Wittgenstein's remarks about how beliefs are also shown in one's actions. For example, the act of picking up the cup or opening a door shows that we have particular beliefs about cups and doors. Moreover, these actions are quite apart from propositions or statements. Language came later, as something we attached to our mental states.

Mental content or mental states is necessarily reflected in one's actions. If there were never any corresponding acts, it would be difficult, if not impossible to ascribe a mental state to a person. This is true of beliefs, intentions, anger, love, etc. We don't ascribe mental states to trees, because trees don't exhibit the corresponding actions.

One's intention is shown in one's acts — Sam26

I think I agree with you.

What I'm illustrating is that because intention is shown in acts; including speech acts; one's intention forms part of its content. eg, Asserting "It is raining but I don't believe it is raining" is a performative contradiction because one shows one believes a statement by asserting that it is so.

Ya, I think we agree.

Ya, I think we agree. — Sam26

Would you agree that it shows that whatever the intentional content of belief is, because it is expressed (perhaps with some transformation/mutilation) through assertions it forms part of the content of assertions? But remains distinct from the content of the assertions?

Would you agree that it shows that whatever the intentional content of belief is, because it is expressed (perhaps with some transformation/mutilation) through assertions it forms part of the content of assertions? But remains distinct from the content of the assertions? — fdrake

Yes, which is why, if I understand your point, I believe that although language expresses one's belief, it's not a necessary component of that belief.

Yes, which is why, if I understand your point, I believe that although language expresses one's belief, it's not a necessary component of that belief. — Sam26

I think we're close then. I didn't want to say language in general was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content; I think there are good reasons to suspect that language use informs what we believe and how we believe it; but that declarative sentence content was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content.

I think we're close then. I didn't want to say language in general was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content; I think there are good reasons to suspect that language use informs what we believe and how we believe it; but that declarative sentence content was a distinct phenomenon from belief's content. — fdrake

I think we're close too. I only want to say that there are certain base or foundational beliefs that arise quite apart from language content. However, there is no doubt that language plays an important role in how and what we believe. We use language to expand our beliefs, so I don't want to say that language in general is separate and distinct from all beliefs. I'm not sure about your last sentence. For example, what about declarative sentences that arise as we expand our beliefs using language?

Either way, arguing about the trivial illustrative example I offered is irrelevant. — unenlightened

Begs the question why you offered it. Perhaps you can muster a better one?

I think we're close too. — Sam26

:up:

I only want to say that there are certain base or foundational beliefs that arise quite apart from language content.

Putting aside the foundational issue if we can. I'll agree that "hinge propositions" are a thing, hopefully not much turns on our possible foundationalist/anti-foundationalist dispute. I'm also quite happy to grant that some (many) beliefs are proximally due to environmental stimuli (events in the "form of life").

However, there is no doubt that language plays an important role in how and what we believe.

:up:

We use language to expand our beliefs, so I don't want to say that language in general is separate and distinct from all beliefs.

I don't either.

For example, what about declarative sentences that arise as we expand our beliefs using language?

I think it depends on the sense of "arise as we expand". Whether it's the declarative sentence that we've learned or invented doing all the work of expansion or whether there is an interplay between the expansion of intentional content and what our declarative sentences can express.

An example might be that a doctor's trained eye can look for abnormalities in an x-ray scan, the intentional state is abnormality seeking, Asserting "This is an abnormality" would be derivative of finding an abnormality. What I'm trying to highlight is that the content of the abnormality finding state is expressed somehow in "This is an abnormality", it would also be expressed in whatever description of the abnormality occurred.

An example might be that a doctor's trained eye can look for abnormalities in an x-ray scan, the intentional state is abnormality seeking, Asserting "This is an abnormality" would be derivative of finding an abnormality. What I'm trying to highlight is that the content * of the abnormality finding state is expressed somehow in "This is an abnormality", it would also be expressed in whatever description of the abnormality occurred. — fdrake

Do you see this as different from what I've expressed in other threads about beliefs states, say the act of opening a door, shows your beliefs about doors, expressed or not?

Someone else might express "This is an abnormality," as you exhibit the "abnormality finding state." Or, someone else might say he believes X, by observing some intentional act or another. This it seems to me (your e.g. as well as mine) shows that the belief is quite separate from the expression.

Do either of you dispute my claim that the logic of propositions is not the same as the logic of commands? — unenlightened

What are you trying to accomplish when using the logic of propositions vs. the logic of commands? Do both not express some sort if belief?

The assumption that he meant A to have some numerical value appears reasonable. Null pointer errors aren't very relevant to the discussion. — Kenosha Kid

but then it wouldn't be a contradiction, like they claimed.

Do you see this as different from what I've expressed in other threads about beliefs states, say the act of opening a door, shows your beliefs about doors, expressed or not? — Sam26

I don't know the specifics of your worldview enough to comment. By the sounds of this thread we seem to agree on things in context.

Someone else might express "This is an abnormality," as you exhibit the "abnormality finding state." Or, someone else might say he believes X, by observing some intentional act or another. This it seems to me (your e.g. as well as mine) shows that the belief is quite separate from the expression. — Sam26

That sounds right to me. I have the sneaking suspicion that we disagree a lot on some nearby issues, but it's hidden by how you've used the words "separate" and "expression".

To a first approximation, let's imagine what a speech act expresses as a kind of inverse of interpretation. Call the process by which (speech) acts are mapped by people to interpretations "interpretation". Expression's then the process by which interpretations are mapped by people to speech acts.

Interpretation takes an act and gives it an interpretation. Expression takes an interpretation and puts it in a speech act.

In that view, if we look at the assertion "It is raining but I do not believe it is raining", the performative contradiction in it can be explained with: assertions of fact (speech acts) express that their asserters believe what they say is so. The intentional content of belief expressed in "It is raining" is that it's raining, which is contrary to what is expressed by the latter part of the phrase; another assertion of a fact, that the asserter does not believe it is raining.

"It is raining..."->(the asserter believes that it is raining), the -> is expression/showing.

I'd have it that because speech acts can (and indeed routinely) express intentional content in that manner, they should be considered as part of what speech acts mean.

And in the context of the bone I picked with @Banno, I was trying to expand declarative sentence content (what they express) to include the intentional content of the speech acts which assert them, which I imagine goes against the grain of taking belief's content to be an assertion. Butchering it a bit for clarity: assertion's content is a belief vs belief's content is an assertion.

but then it wouldn't be a contradiction, like they claimed. — Harry Hindu

I think you misunderstand what unenlightened was saying. In propositional logic, A = A + 1 is always equal to false, '=' being the equality operator. In Java or Python or such, A = A + 1 is true (if A is defined). But this is just because '=' is not the equality operator but the assignment operator, and assignments always either error or yield true: you cannot have false. Same symbol, different meaning.

An error is a fallacy.

Even without error, it equates to true in computational logic and to false in propositional logic. That was his point. A being null or undefined or non-numerical is not relevant.

So what? Different languages have different rules for the same symbols. We can still translate the meaning and end up saying the same thing in different ways. Computational logic can be translated to propositional logic and vice versa. The point is that the rules for using symbols to refer to beliefs is arbitrary.

So what? Different languages have different rules for the same symbols. We can still translate the meaning and end up saying the same thing in different ways. — Harry Hindu

That was my counterargument, yes.

Right. So, computational logic and propositional logic only differ in the rules they use to refer to, or express, beliefs. You can still make commands with propositional logic and make propositions with computational logic, just using different symbols, like you do when using other languages. Proposition also means a program or plan about how to go about doing something.

So, unenlightened hasn't shown us any meaningful distinction when talking about what symbols and rules can be used to refer to, or express beliefs. It seems that symbol use and beliefs may be inherently related. After all, you need to have beliefs about how some symbol is to be used when using them.

So, unenlightened hasn't shown us any meaningful distinction when talking about what symbols and rules can be used to refer to, or express beliefs. — Harry Hindu

Which is why I suggested to him:

Perhaps you can muster a better one? — Kenosha Kid

You got there in the end, well done!

That sounds right to me. I have the sneaking suspicion that we disagree a lot on some nearby issues, but it's hidden by how you've used the words "separate" and "expression". — fdrake

I'm sure that's true.

To a first approximation, let's imagine what a speech act expresses as a kind of inverse of interpretation. Call the process by which (speech) acts are mapped by people* to interpretations "interpretation". Expression's then the process by which interpretations are mapped by people to speech acts. — fdrake

Are you saying that even our own speech acts are mapped to interpretation? So, that as I write these words I'm mapping my thoughts through the given speech acts? On the other hand, if I'm reading or listening to someone else's speech act/s it seems truistic that I interpret them, or as you say, the speech act is mapped to "interpretation."

Interpretation takes an act and gives it an interpretation. Expression takes an interpretation and puts it in a speech act. — fdrake

Okay, so, an interpretation takes any act (speech or otherwise) and applies the interpretation, or overlays an interpretation onto the act. I take it that not all interpretations are speech acts. I may, for example, interpret an order given to me by going from point A to point B without any speech acts.

As to the latter part of this quote, any expression involving interpretation necessarily (my words) commits itself to a speech act.

In that view, if we look at the assertion "It is raining but I do not believe it is raining", the performative contradiction in it can be explained with: assertions of fact (speech acts) express that their asserters believe what they say is so. The intentional content of belief expressed in "It is raining" is * that it's raining, which is contrary to what is expressed by the latter part of the phrase; another assertion of a fact, that the asserter does not believe it is raining. — fdrake

This seems rather obvious, unless I'm missing some finer point.

"It is raining..."->(the asserter believes that it is raining), the -> is expression/showing. — fdrake

Are you saying that the expression "It is raining." shows or expresses that he/she believes it is raining? If so, it seems obvious, unless they are trying to deceive or mislead.

I'd have it that because speech acts can (and indeed routinely) express intentional content in that manner, they should be considered as part of what speech acts mean. — fdrake

I'm not sure about this, maybe.

And in the context of the bone I picked with Banno, I was trying to expand declarative sentence content (what they express) to include the intentional content of the speech acts which assert them, which I imagine goes against the grain of taking belief's content to be an assertion. Butchering it a bit for clarity: assertion's content is a belief vs belief's content is an assertion. — fdrake

I definitely don't agree that belief content is necessarily an assertion. I've said this time-and-time again. And, I definitely believe that an assertion is a belief, in the main, providing the intention is not to deceive or mislead.

I'm not sure that I've interpreted everything correctly, but I gave it a try.