In this sense, the shoelace question is not a moral consideration: it has nothing to do with our social biology. However, "One ought to wear black shoelaces to the market", as espoused by the elder, is a moral claim in the sense that it is a claim about what our morality should be, even if it has nothing to do with what our morality is. — Kenosha Kid

I think you're conflating "morality" in general and the specific morality we have going on at the moment in particular. Point is you can't walk up to that elder and say "You are not making a moral claim". He is. It is just a very stupid one (he would beg to differ but I wouldn't care). Which is why I don't see where the whole social biology thing plays in.

The society and biology determine which moral positions become most prevalent. However they do not determine what is or what is not a moral claim. As you said:

You can make an ethic of what you like — Kenosha Kid

Moral claims that don't match the majority do not lose their status as moral claims.

Moral claims that don't match the majority do not lose their status as moral claims. — khaled

Exactly. Look at modern day Saudi Arabian practices of punishment and women's rights, All European Empire tactics towards non-European peoples, 400 BCE-400 CE Roman conventions of war, punishment, and intimidation, 1930s Germany, 1930s Japan, China's current political persecutions, 1830s USA, 1490s Spain, 800s Scandinavia, 1090s Christendom in general, 1200s Mongolia, All these societies seemed to have a majority of the population agree with what we would find appalling in our particular society, or were tolerated back in that time but not today.

Let us take the question: Ought I to wear black shoelaces or brown shoelaces to the market? I would say this is 100% not a moral consideration. However an elder of the Latter Day Church of Black Shoelaces might strongly differ with me on this. — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, that's pretty much how I see it. The only way we can even make sense of what the elder means when he uses the word 'moral' is that we know roughly what he's trying to get at (in this case, something like "God wants you to...". We might disagree on the grounds that God doesn't want us to, or on the grounds that such a criteria makes no sense because of a lack of referent.

What would make no sense is if a non-elder just said "you ought to wear black shoelaces to the market" is a moral claim, but "you ought to use a double bow to tie them" is not a moral claim and can offer nothing by way of properties pertaining to either which might distinguish them.

I think that my definition of a moral premise perfectly fall within that range. At least one other guy here thinks so: — khaled

So far your definition seems to be literally any instruction not contingent on a prior objective. I've not come across that definition anywhere.

I think you're conflating "morality" in general and the specific morality we have going on at the moment in particular. — khaled

No, it was rather more than that. The bases by which a moral proposition can be well- or ill-grounded are not just those "we have going on at the moment". What I was getting at was the distinction between the word "morality" as an umbrella term for theoretical concepts and its more fundamental, pre-theoretical, natural meaning.

So I'm attempting to clear up an existing conflation, not add a new one. Failed by the looks of it. :D

Moral claims that don't match the majority do not lose their status as moral claims. — khaled

And that's my point: a moral claim is a claim about what a person should do, either generally or in specific circumstances. It may be true or false. So antinatalism is a perfectly coherent false moral claim. But it is not a claim about what morality is.

The society and biology determine which moral positions become most prevalent. — khaled

Well no, they don't, that's the shame of it. I would say they seem to be largely sculpting the trend of morality in some places to some extent at the moment. We are tending toward egalitarianism in most countries (not the middle east which has largely moved away from it) and I think people are encouraged to be more empathetic. We are increasingly progressing toward responsible social behaviour in many quarters.

But that's in the background of history of slavery, military expansionism, genocide, and other injustices, and it's not difficult to see how antisocial behaviours are again becoming not just normalised but lionised, i.e. ethics are made out of them. Likewise any arguments for such are not well-grounded, not because they fail to meet the theoretical criteria for a moral theory, but because they are contrary to what morality really is in its pre-theoretical sense.

Well no, they don't, that's the shame of it. I would say they seem to be largely sculpting the trend of morality in some places to some extent at the moment. We are tending toward egalitarianism in most countries (not the middle east which has largely moved away from it) and I think people are encouraged to be more empathetic. We are increasingly progressing toward responsible social behaviour in many quarters.

But that's in the background of history of slavery, military expansionism, genocide, and other injustices, and it's not difficult to see how antisocial behaviours are again becoming not just normalised but lionised, i.e. ethics are made out of them. Likewise any arguments for such are not well-grounded, not because they fail to meet the theoretical criteria for a moral theory, but because they are contrary to what morality really is in its pre-theoretical sense. — Kenosha Kid

Yeah, your argument is slipping. If history is the battleground of human ideas playing out, it's got a lot of horrible examples of what humans do. Thus this argument that some particular set of morality is "the" true or essential human biological behavior just seems cherry-picking. So I would move on from the biological aspect of it and just move to the idea itself. Reduction of harm seems a good place to start, as I think both parties agree that in some respect, this makes sense. It is more about the context and circumstances and thresholds of how much that difference start taking place.

As to...

it's literally just you trying to say that antinatalism is not a moral theory. — khaled

This is the entry I've already cited from the SEP, my position is pretty much the standard one in ethics.

Any definition of “morality” in the descriptive sense will need to specify which of the codes put forward by a society or group count as moral. Even in small homogeneous societies that have no written language, distinctions are sometimes made between morality, etiquette, law, and religion. And in larger and more complex societies these distinctions are often sharply marked. So “morality” cannot be taken to refer to every code of conduct put forward by a society.

In the normative sense, “morality” refers to a code of conduct that would be accepted by anyone who meets certain intellectual and volitional conditions, almost always including the condition of being rational. That a person meets these conditions is typically expressed by saying that the person counts as a moral agent. However, merely showing that a certain code would be accepted by any moral agent is not enough to show that the code is the moral code. It might well be that all moral agents would also accept a code of prudence or rationality, but this would not by itself show that prudence was part of morality. So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.

As we’ve just seen, not all codes that are put forward by societies or groups are moral codes in the descriptive sense of morality, and not all codes that would be accepted by all moral agents are moral codes in the normative sense of morality. So any definition of morality—in either sense—will require further criteria.

Yeah, your argument is slipping. If history is the battleground of human ideas playing out, it's got a lot of horrible examples of what humans do. Thus this argument that some particular set of morality is "the" true or essential human biological behavior just seems cherry-picking. — schopenhauer1

If my argument was simply that the nice ones in history are true and the nasty ones false, it would be, yes. But that's not my argument, which is grounded on scientific evidence.

Reduction of harm seems a good place to start, as I think both parties agree that in some respect, this makes sense. It is more about the context and circumstances and thresholds of how much that difference start taking place. — schopenhauer1

No, not at all. Reduction of harm makes absolutely no sense whatsoever unless there is someone to benefit from that reduction. That's the whole point. Moral rules have some broad set of unifying properties (as per the SEP article I cited). Reduction of harm without anyone to benefit from that reduction meets none of the publicly held criteria, not religious, not social, not biological... none of them. It's just a wierd arbitrary objective held by a small number of people for various non-moral reasons.

I’m assuming your formulation of moral consensus based on natural
grounds wouldn’t be accepted by someone like Rorty because he would consider the notion of the natural
to be itself ungrounded in anything but contingent pragmatic use. But I’d have to refresh my reading of him to be sure.

I’m assuming your formulation of moral consensus based on natural
grounds wouldn’t be accepted by someone like Rorty because he would consider the notion of the natural
to be itself ungrounded in anything but contingent pragmatic use. — Joshs

In that he'd be against the essentialism, I think yes, but I'm not that familiar with Rorty.

The point I was making though was not so much about grounding answers to moral questions in naturalism (I think most such attempts are post hoc to that which has already been decided by deeper psychological processes). It was more that the word itself has a public meaning which has arisen partly from our biology, but also from shared culture, religion etc. What I object to here is the idea that one can come up with any objective whatsoever and claim it to be a 'moral' one. It's simply a misuse of the word. It's no different to if I were to consistently use the word 'angry' to describe my satisfied sigh at my first sip of evening whiskey. It's not that I'm 'redefining' anger, I've just misused the word. That's not the right word to describe such behaviour.

'Moral' is just not the right word to describe a desire to remove all suffering even at the expense of there being no one to benefit from having done so.

'Moral' is just not the right word to describe a desire to remove all suffering even at the expense of there being no one to benefit from having done so — Isaac

You’re probably aware that anti-natalist movements have cropped up numerous times in different cultures
through history.

From Wiki:

The Manichaeans,[13][14][15] the Bogomils[16][17][18] and the Cathars[19][20][21] believed that procreation sentences the soul to imprisonment in evil matter. They saw procreation as an instrument of an evil god, demiurge, or of Satan that imprisons the divine element in the matter and thus causes the divine element to suffer.

Julio Cabrera,[30] David Benatar[31] and Karim Akerma[32] all argue that procreation is contrary to Immanuel Kant's practical imperative (according to Kant, a man should never be used as merely a means to an end, but always be treated as an end in himself). They argue that a person can be created for the sake of his parents or other people, but that it is impossible to create someone for his own good; and that therefore, following Kant's recommendation, we should not create new people. Heiko Puls argues that Kant's considerations regarding parental duties and human procreation, in general, imply arguments for an ethically justified antinatalism.

Negative utilitarianism is a form of negative consequentialism that can be described as the view that people should minimize the total amount of aggregate suffering, or that we should minimize suffering and then, secondarily, maximize the total amount of happiness. It can be considered as a version of utilitarianism that gives greater priority to reducing suffering (negative utility or 'disutility') than to increasing pleasure (positive utility).[

are you saying that you would not accept any of these historical justifications for anti-natalism as a proper
moral argument, or are you focusing exclusively on the the ones in this thread?

He is trying to circle a square to make a non-argument; making a definition that will exclude antinatalism as moral so as to not even consider it debatable in ethical theory. Clearly your examples are some of the many formulations over the years, that do indeed take antinatalism as the basis of a moral theory, whether meta-ethical, normative, or in practical ethics. But, it is a fact that anyone can deny anything and with contemptuous phrasing to make it seem as if it is a matter of fact. Shrug

I found an interesting counter-argument to Benatar’s position that clearly respects it as a legitimate moral
stance.

https://philosophy.osu.edu/news/archive/2014-logos//brian-mclean

The bases by which a moral proposition can be well- or ill-grounded are not just those "we have going on at the moment". — Kenosha Kid

Agreed but that’s not what I’m saying. All I’m saying is that moral propositions remain moral propositions no matter how well or ill grounded they are. That’s it.

So antinatalism is a perfectly coherent false moral claim. But it is not a claim about what morality is. — Kenosha Kid

I don’t get the purpose of the second sentence there, seems to be included in the first the way you use it. But all I wanted to get at was “antinatalism is a coherent moral claim”. I’m not going to try to convince you of it.

Reduction of harm makes absolutely no sense whatsoever unless there is someone to benefit from that reduction. — Isaac

Agreed. Which is why antinatalists don’t see not having children as a good thing (most don’t). They see having children as a bad thing. The latter does not imply the former.

my position is pretty much the standard one in ethics. — Isaac

Whatever your positions is it results in “Antinatalism is a moral theory” computing to false which makes it very much not standard as demonstrated by the number of antinatalism posts on this site under the category “ethics”.

So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.

And I already proposed that the extra thing is that the instruction has not ulterior practical motive. You may disagree with that, that’s fine, but “makes it possible for people to live together” is demonstrably not standard as, again, you’re the only guy here trying to say that AN is not an ethical position. I’m still curious what this “public” from which you get your consensus on the definition is, because it’s definitely not the members of this site.

I don’t get the purpose of the second sentence there, seems to be included in the first the way you use it. — khaled

No, one can have a false belief about morality. Human sacrifice to make crops grow is such a belief. It is about social interactions and social group benefits. Antinatalism isn't about morality. It is an antisocial belief based not on moral considerations but on personal entitlement: I should never have had to suffer, not even so much as a stubbed toe. And, indirectly, it's a messed up value system. But it has nothing to do with how we treat others in our society, and therefore nothing it presents as a problem is a moral consideration.

And, indirectly, it's a messed up value system. — Kenosha Kid

Of course, antinatalists can say the same of natalism...

Not sure how "Not harming a future person" doesn't count as moral. The whole social group benefit definition is too narrow a claim regarding ethics, and it's purposely created to exclude antinatalism, and then post-facto made to seem like some abstract consensus just annoints your exclusionary definition as of course, fact.

The most basic definitions usually read something like this: concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character. That's just from a quick Google search even. Don't have to go too far to see this is a mischaracterization of what moral means.

Of course, antinatalists can say the same of natalism... — schopenhauer1

By natalism do you mean normal people just naturally procreating without theorising about it? Because I can't imagine much more redundant than a moral theory that says it's okay to have kids.

Not sure how "Not harming a future person" doesn't count as moral. — schopenhauer1

First, creating a person that might one day be harmed is not the same as harming that person. Second, if a person does not currently exist, one cannot behave immorally toward them.

The whole social group benefit definition is too narrow a claim regarding ethics, and it's purposely created to exclude antinatalism — schopenhauer1

That's a tad paranoid, isn't it? I'm quite sure they didn't have antinatalism in mind.

The most basic definitions usually read something like this: concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character. That's just from a quick Google search even. Don't have to go too far to see this is a mischaracterization of what moral means. — schopenhauer1

That "concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character" is not what moral means? We can take it for granted we'll disagree on what morality is just on the basis of the fact that you believe antinatalism addresses moral concerns, but I'll confess I'm curious.

By natalism do you mean normal people just naturally procreating without theorising about it? Because I can't imagine much more redundant than a moral theory that says it's okay to have kids. — Kenosha Kid

Fair enough, natalists and typical views on procreation.

First, creating a person that might one day be harmed is not the same as harming that person. Second, if a person does not currently exist, one cannot behave immorally toward them. — Kenosha Kid

So here is the little game you and that other guy on this thread play.. First you want to discount antinatalism as not even in the realm of morality because it doesn't have to do with "social groups". I already addressed this by pointing out that "social groups" is too narrow a definition. But, then when antinatalism does actually address issues of "other people" you then wan to discount that because "other people" is deemed as an illegitimate move. But it isn't. I have mentioned before that it doesn't matter when the decision was made, if the a person is born, and that person will then have a lifetime of X amount of suffering, that is the result. It is about "other people" very much.

That "concerned with the principles of right and wrong behavior and the goodness or badness of human character" is not what moral means? We can take it for granted we'll disagree on what morality is just on the basis of the fact that you believe antinatalism addresses moral concerns, but I'll confess I'm curious. — Kenosha Kid

Sorry, "this" in that quote was your mischaracterization by too narrowly defining morality. That Google quote was to show contra your opinion, it concerns principles of right and wrong behavior, and goodness and badness of human character" or similar such definitions.

Fair enough, natalists and typical views on procreation. — schopenhauer1

So "natalists" (i.e. regular humans going about their business) almost certainly do not make such value judgments at all. I've never come across anyone who said, "Well we pondered whether or not it's right to bring a child into the world but agreed in the end that everyone, future people, has a right to see Succession." In place of such value judgments, "natalists" have biological imperatives (and nagging mothers).

if the a person is born, and that person will then have a lifetime of X amount of suffering, that is the result — schopenhauer1

Sure, among other things (there's more to a life than suffering) but that is not equivalent to harming someone.

But, then when antinatalism does actually address issues of "other people" — schopenhauer1

Real, existing people, not just the possibility of future people. The former is a concern for morality. The latter is not.

Sorry, "this" in that quote was your mischaracterization by too narrowly defining morality. — schopenhauer1

My definition of what morality really is is based on what capacities and impulses we have as a species to behave socially. Anything else is fiction.

So "natalists" (i.e. regular humans going about their business) almost certainly do not make such value judgments at all. I've never come across anyone who said, "Well we pondered whether or not it's right to bring a child into the world but agreed in the end that everyone, future people, has a right to see Succession." In place of such value judgments, "natalists" have biological imperatives (and nagging mothers). — Kenosha Kid

Ha, understood. Notice I said natalists AND typical views on procreation. The nagging mothers and biological imperatives falls into that. However, I would debate biological imperatives. I am not sure if the abstract notion of procreation itself is really a biological imperative as much as the physical act of sex itself being pleasurable. Procreation being a concept prior to birth is more of an outcome that people desire to have. It's about maintaining a lifestyle, tradition, and other values and notions (from communal traditions, the circumstances of one's relationship, or one's own preferences or both).

Sure, among other things (there's more to a life than suffering) but that is not equivalent to harming someone. — Kenosha Kid

I mean you know the argument is more sophisticated than simply "harming" someone. I usually define it as creating the conditions for all other harm to follow. As far as non-harm related experiences- no person is actually missing out if not procreated. For the antinatalist ethic, there is no obligation to create beings with good experiences, but simply preventing beings having any negative experiences. Not creating unnecessary suffering and impositions on another person is what counts here. The question is, "Is that taking place with birth?" Yes? Don't do it.

A question for the typical-view is, why does any experience have to take place at all, if there is collateral damage involved? Why must this "other" reason be carried out on someone else's behalf? I don't believe there to be a good answer which doesn't overlook the dignity of the person that is supposedly benefiting from these experiences. I simply see people not thinking it all the way through- especially the part of no actual person missing out on anything, and not future person suffering. That is why antinatalists see a win/win with this ethical principle. There is no hangup about no one who experiences in the first place. So what? Is someone not going to be put in conditions of X amount of a lifetime of harm? That is the important question. I can go further for the basis of this, but I leave it at that.

Real, existing people, not just the possibility of future people. The former is a concern for morality. The latter is not. — Kenosha Kid

Who says? Will a person be affected (and most certainly negatively) when born? Then that person who will come into existence does have some consideration. What I think is interesting is then when typical-viewers don't consider the inverse notion. That is to say, they don't consider that since there is no "real" actual person now, there is no person who is "missing out" or "needs this or that" from life. Only the parent's need for a person to exist.

My definition of what morality really is is based on what capacities and impulses we have as a species to behave socially. Anything else is fiction. — Kenosha Kid

I mean, that would be convenient when debating antinatalism. I will stick to the broader definition. I think you are actually at the wrong level when debating this, which is causing the confusion. Morality can be extremely diverse, and disagreements about the right conduct, behavior, beliefs, etc. are within the broader scope of "right conduct/behavior/character". Once we are debating this realm, then we can argue which actual conduct/behavior//belief/character is the right one. The definition is the arena, the different values are the participants in the arena itself. But even if we were to use your narrow definition, since antinatalism is indeed about the consideration of people in future states of being, it is indeed social as well, so fits under both. Is it about consideration for other people? Yep. Certainly is. Even if it is about what will happen to a person rather than the current state.

based not on moral considerations but on personal entitlement — Kenosha Kid

It could be. Even then it would be a moral theory though.

But it has nothing to do with how we treat others in our society, and therefore nothing it presents as a problem is a moral consideration. — Kenosha Kid

False. We can agree there are cases where having children is wrong. Like severe poverty for example. Antinatalism is an expansion of that. Having kids is entirely free of moral considerations? Stop being ridiculous.

First, creating a person that might one day be harmed is not the same as harming that person. — Kenosha Kid

Agreed. Both can be wrong though. As I said, we already find having kids wrong in some scenarios.

Second, if a person does not currently exist, one cannot behave immorally toward them. — Kenosha Kid

Why is it wrong to have children in extreme poverty then? Note, I’m not disagreeing with this claim, I’m just asking how you would explain with it why having children in poverty is wrong. Because I don’t want to waste time trying to find the metaphysical setup you find acceptable

My definition of what morality really is is based on what capacities and impulses we have as a species to behave socially — Kenosha Kid

We have a capacity and impulse NOT to have children in extreme poverty. And furthermore we find having children in those scenarios wrong. Now it’s just a matter of determining what the acceptable conditions are for having children.

Again, antinatalism isn’t some wacky supernatural belief as much as you’d like it to be. There are real, natural, moral instincts behind it. But you don’t want to even give it a real chance so you chalk it all up to entitlement. You sound like you’re just arguing in bad faith.


And you haven’t even explained what you mean by “natural reason” yet. Still waiting on that. What would be the natural reason to adopt utilitarianism?

are you saying that you would not accept any of these historical justifications for anti-natalism as a proper moral argument, or are you focusing exclusively on the the ones in this thread? — Joshs

I couldn't possibly say that, I've not read most of those. No doubt some fail on that count, maybe others don't. I can only argue against positions which I've read. It can't possibly be the case that simply by declaring something to be a moral theory it thereby is one. It must be possible to be in error in this regard - as I repeatedly mention, the private language argument already makes this case.

The point still stands, and @schopenhauer1's move of kicking the can down the road to 'right' and 'wrong' does nothing to change it. 'Moral', 'Right', 'Wrong'...these are all terms in a common language. In order for them to function they cannot have private meanings. As such the question of what is 'moral', what is 'right', what is 'wrong', must have an answer (at any given time) and that answer must be in the public use of these terms.

The alternative is that language is somehow delivered to us by some supernatural force (what is 'right' has been defined, not by our use of the term but by some outside force compelling us to use the word a certain way), or that there's no relationship at all between all the things we use 'right' for and they are each just individually labelled thus by fiat at the time.

The former is ridiculous. The latter is at least plausible, but I think it's a trivial matter to point to commonalities between the things we call 'right' which suggests more than a case-by-case christening.

What is evident is that individuals are not placed to simply declare what is 'right' or 'moral' from their own private opinion on the matter. 'Right' and 'moral' are both words in the English language - their meaning is a public matter.

It follows then that any discussion about what is 'right' or 'wrong' is a discussion about language use. Which things are understood by using those terms.

What I'm arguing here cannot possibly cover all of anti-natalism (there are other good arguments against other aspects). I'm arguing here against the specific claim that "do not risk harm to another when you cannot obtain their consent no matter what the consequences" is a 'moral' or 'right' objective in the normal use of those terms. I can't think of a single other maxim we count as 'moral' or 'right' which adds '...no matter what the consequences', and it's trivial to find many maxims and duties which break that rule but are nonetheless considered 'moral' or 'right' so it seems a very poor candidate for inclusion in the use of those terms.

That's the only reason why I've invoked any sort of naturalism (which shouldn't be taken in isolation - I've also invoked culture and religion). It's because such naturalism (together with the other influences I mentioned) gives a very good model for what sorts of things are meant by those terms. we've not just randomly grouped some behaviours together and labelled them all 'good', 'right' or 'moral', those groupings very much appear to have common threads - threads resulting mainly from psychology, culture, and religion, with a very strong emphasis on psychology.

Reduction of harm makes absolutely no sense whatsoever unless there is someone to benefit from that reduction. — Isaac


Agreed. Which is why antinatalists don’t see not having children as a good thing (most don’t). They see having children as a bad thing. The latter does not imply the former. — khaled

The argument there wasn't about the label, it was about the objective. It makes no sense. why would you want to reduce harm if no-one benefits from the world thus freed from it?

my position is pretty much the standard one in ethics. — Isaac


Whatever your positions is it results in “Antinatalism is a moral theory” computing to false which makes it very much not standard as demonstrated by the number of antinatalism posts on this site under the category “ethics”. — khaled

Simply claiming something is a moral theory does not make it one. so the mere existence of such claims can't be held to show such a definition is flawed. A definition is not required to encompass each and every use. it has to be possible to misuse a word, otherwise words have no meaning. you keep avoiding the private language angle here. I can go through the argument if you're not familiar with it.

So something else must be added; for example, that the code can be understood to involve a certain kind of impartiality, or that it can be understood as having the function of making it possible for people to live together in groups.


And I already proposed that the extra thing is that the instruction has not ulterior practical motive. — khaled

The article points out how that is insufficient. It does not eliminate maxims which are not considered 'moral' by anyone.

I’m still curious what this “public” from which you get your consensus on the definition is, because it’s definitely not the members of this site. — khaled

again, simply declaring something to be the case cannot be held as sufficient argument that it is, that would render all discussion pointless. That the anti-natalists here claim to be falling back on such relativistic axioms is not sufficient to show they in fact are. You regularly invoke such emotive judgement s as 'disgusting' to lend weight to your position. @schopenhauer1 has used 'smug'. Regardless of your protestations to the contrary, you are both expecting a common sense of right and wrong which you are appealing to to carry your arguments. That is the 'public' sense of the terms. It's only when your position is shown to be contrary to them that you resort to some faux claim of the arbitrariness of moral axioms.

The argument there wasn't about the label, it was about the objective — Isaac

The objective is not to reduce harm. The objective is to not cause unwarranted harm. The reason you do not cause harm is because causing harm makes things worse than not causing harm.

Simply claiming something is a moral theory does not make it one. — Isaac

Agreed. But everyone claiming that something is a moral theory does make it one. And that is what is happening. Everyone agrees that antinatalism is a moral theory. Some disagree with it, but even they recognize it is a moral theory. But it is only you that thinks it is not a moral theory in the first place. So you are misusing the word, by your standard.

you keep avoiding the private language angle here. I can go through the argument if you're not familiar with it. — Isaac

I think I am and I don't think I'm avoiding anything. I have not proposed private language. It is just the case that the public meaning of "moral theory" clearly includes antinatalism. You think it doesn't, even though everyone here (the public) thinks it does. You're the one that has to explain that.

It does not eliminate maxims which are not considered 'moral' by anyone. — Isaac

They are clearly considered "moral" by the group proposing them as moral, and maybe others. And it happens to be the case that everyone here except you considers antinatalism a moral theory.

You regularly invoke such emotive judgement s as 'disgusting' to lend weight to your position. — Isaac

Wrong. I always say "I find that disgusting". I make sure to always include the "I find that", specifically so that people don't say what you're saying here. If you are emotionally affected by my opinion that's on you not me. And since when is emotive judgement a basis for a moral argument anyways?

Regardless of your protestations to the contrary, you are both expecting a common sense of right and wrong which you are appealing to to carry your arguments. — Isaac

I'm not. I repeatedly said that I know people here have different moral premises. That is why I don't go around pushing the belief. That would be a waste of time.

It's only when your position is shown to be contrary to them that you resort to some faux claim of the arbitrariness of moral axioms. — Isaac

Wrong. I always resort to the claim that moral axioms are arbitrary. Find me a quote where I did not.

Again arbitrary =/= there are no natural causes for them. It means there is no objective metric by which we can judge one to be better than the other. However some are clearly more suited for creating thriving communities, and so those become popular by evolution.

The reason you do not cause harm is because causing harm makes things worse than not causing harm. — khaled

But it absolutely evidently does not. Surgery being the obvious example where causing harm does not make things worse than not causing harm. Which is why you have to go through all these additional caveats and addendums to make your position fit your pre-determined conclusion.

Notwithstanding that, you've still not answered the charge of there being no reason to follow the maxim. Even if we were to accept your claim that moral maxims are arbitrary (which seems very obviously not the case given the very broad agreement as to general topics within the range)...do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one?

Wrong. I always say "I find that disgusting". I make sure to always include the "I find that", specifically so that people don't say what you're saying here. If you are emotionally affected by my opinion that's on you not me. And since when is emotive judgement a basis for a moral argument anyways? — khaled

Yeah...bullshit. That sort of thing might carry elsewhere, but not here. "I'm just mentioning that I find your behaviour disgusting out of idle interest, I don't mean to influence you in any way by such a choice of words...". Sorry, but that's just disingenuous.

Wrong. I always resort to the claim that moral axioms are arbitrary. Find me a quote where I did not. — khaled

'Faux', as in an affectation.

Notwithstanding that, you've still not answered the charge of there being no reason to follow the maxim. — Isaac

Agreed. I keep saying this. Moral premises are arbitrary. The only reason you see this as a "charge" is because you believe I'm trying to sell the belief no matter how many times I tell you I'm not and I don't understand why. All I'm trying to establish is that there is nothing wrong with the belief. That it is internally consistent. And that is the best you're gonna get (this is more meta-ethical and likely needs its own OP).

But it absolutely evidently does not. Surgery being the obvious example where causing harm does not make things worse than not causing harm. Which is why you have to go through all these additional caveats and addendums to make your position fit your pre-determined conclusion. — Isaac

There is a difference between harm and unjustified harm. I don't wanna get into it again unless you want me to. And you've summarized the position well already so you know what I mean. I don't see a reason to do the same song and dance again. We've gone over surgery before I think.

Yeah...bullshit. That sort of thing might carry elsewhere, but not here. "I'm just mentioning that I find your behaviour disgusting out of idle interest, I don't mean to influence you in any way by such a choice of words...". Sorry, but that's just disingenuous. — Isaac

I assure you it is not. But you're free to believe what you want. Echarimon for example didn't seem to take it personally:

Sure. I don't think so though. And I find that justification disgusting.
— khaled

I think that disgust has a lot to do with the disagreement we have. Can you elaborate on what you find disgusting? — Echarmion

A philosophy forum seems PRECISELY the place where once can say things like that genuinely. If someone says "I find vanilla ice cream disgusting" do you think they trying to convince you of the merits of chocolate ice cream? No, so why are you doing that here.

'Faux', as in an affectation. — Isaac

If you're just gonna keep saying I'm being disingenuous go ahead but I see no reason to continue the discussion if that's your argument. You seem already set to believe I am trying to spread an ideology no matter what I say or do.

You completely dodged all of what I said about antinatalism being a moral claim though. Is it or is it not? The majority seem to think it is, you think it is not. Furthermore, you think the public meaning of morality does not allow it to be, (even though the public think it is a moral theory). Why? Or did you give up on that demonstrably false claim?

Agreed. I keep saying this. Moral premises are arbitrary. The only reason you see this as a "charge" is because you believe I'm trying to sell the belief no matter how many times I tell you I'm not and I don't understand why. — khaled

No, it is explained in the rest of that paragraph which you've ignored.

do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one? — Isaac

I don't see a reason to do the same song and dance again. We've gone over surgery before I think. — khaled

It's because your argument fails without them, but including them invalidates the ad populum argument. On the one hand you want to say "harm is bad - everyone agrees with that" to lend this popular weight to your argument, then when pressed on the details (such as surgery), you add all the caveats. But the point is that with the caveats your maxim is not at all what people commonly consider 'moral' or 'right'. So it's crucial they are mentioned.

You seem already set to believe I am trying to spread an ideology no matter what I say or do. — khaled

It's not about spreading an ideology. It's about recognising our shard social experience. You choose a word like 'disgusting' because you know I'll know what you mean by it. You rely on our shared social experience to communicate, and then, in the same paragraph you try to pretend we've no shared ideas of right and wrong and it's all just arbitrary. That's what I find disingenuous. Using emotive language to describe arbitrary emotional reactions is a performative contradiction.

You completely dodged all of what I said about antinatalism being a moral claim though. Is it or is it not? The majority seem to think it is, you think it is not. Furthermore, you think the public meaning of morality does not allow it to be, (even though the public think it is a moral theory). Why? Or did you give up on that demonstrably false claim? — khaled

I'm not argueing that all of antinatalism is not a moral claim. In fact, in my reply to @Joshs I've explicitly said that such an argument would be impossible to make. I'm arguing specifically that the maxim used here as an axiom leading to antinatalism is not a moral one. The mere existence of antinatalism within the topic of ethics does not impinge at all on that argument. If one were to show, for example, that antinatalism arose from following some scripture from an accepted religious text, that would indeed be a moral claim (not one I'd agree with), because concordance with common religious scripture is one of the common public meanings of 'moral'.

do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one? — Isaac

Because it works everywhere else and I don't like making exceptions for something because it is "natural".

invalidates the ad populum argument. — Isaac

I am not making an ad populaum argument.

On the one hand you want to say "harm is bad - everyone agrees with that" — Isaac

I never said this. I said "harm is bad - we can agree on that". As in you and me. And we can reason from there. So I am not, in fact, lending popular weight to my argument at all. That would be stupid seeing as how unpopular antinatalism is.

But the point is that with the caveats your maxim is not at all what people commonly consider 'moral' or 'right'. — Isaac

Agreed which is why I don't go around spreading it. I reason with someone from some premises we can agree on. Upon reaching a premise or caveat we do not agree on, I stop. Because I am not interested in changing people's moral view over the internet, just what those views are.

in the same paragraph you try to pretend we've no shared ideas of right and wrong and it's all just arbitrary. — Isaac

Wrong. I am saying that our shared ideas of right and wrong are arbitrary. Again, arbitrary =/= there is no natrualistic reason we believe them.

I'm not arguing that all of antinatalism is not a moral claim. — Isaac

Sounded like you were. But antinatalism does not lead to a flourishing community so how come it is a moral claim by your definition? What makes a "moral claim" exactly for you because you seem to me to be hedging.

I'm arguing specifically that the maxim used here as an axiom leading to antinatalism is not a moral one. — Isaac

Which one would that be exactly just so we're on the same page. Consent? Asymmetry? Not causing unwarranted harm? Something else? All of those seem like moral claims to me, and I suspect everyone here except you (not that I agree with all of them being valid).

The idea that "mankind" and other such concepts should be favored over a single human's actual concrete suffering. Things like "For the country" "For mankind", etc always rubbed me the wrong way. If you can't point me to a person getting harmed, then I couldn't care less about "the country being harmed" or "going against mankind's interests". — khaled

Yeah, that makes sense. I think I fall more on the community side of things myself. I think that explains some of the difference in outlook on an emotional level.

It does. I should go into more detail. The test is more like "Had X not been around would Y have still suffered and if not could X have predicted this?". If the answer is yes then it's not X's responsibility to help. If the answer is no-no then again, not X's responsibility. You have to judge people actions based on the info they had at the time. There are other rules but I don't want to overcomplicate things for now. — khaled

That works. I don't agree with making the core of your test a negative rule, but apart from that I don't have any fundamental disagreement.

Had the driver known that he was going to run over a kid by speeding out of town, then he is responsible. However, he did not know that. Furthermore, it is just as likely that that child would have ran behind the parked car 10 minutes later, meaning if the driver did NOT speed up out of town he would have ran him over.

In other words: At no point did the driver commit an act he could reasonably predict would harm someone, as speeding out of town and NOT speeding out of town have a basically equal chance of causing an accident as far as the driver can predict. — khaled

I think the "lesson" here is that we always accept certain risks when we act, and thus those general risks don't come with moral responsibility attached.

Using predictability seems problematic, because I don't see a clear way to draw the line between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" predictions. Freak accidents are predictable. That's why we can create thought experiments like this in the first place. It's not that the driver lacks the information to predict that the accident is possible. Rather, the risk is accepted as a necessary part of vehicular traffic. There is a normative element in what risks we think should be avoided.

And this means that a moral approach that focuses on avoiding the risk of harm must always deal with this normative element somehow. An argument that goes "behaviour X risks suffering of Y magnitude and should therefore be avoided" is incomplete.

Agreed. But from where comes the justification to create happiness at the risk of suffering for others? — khaled

Your moral philosophy will either consider it moral to have children or it won't. We can of course debate the merits of different moral philosophies, but this isn't a special case where we do things we never do otherwise. Lots of actions have a risk of suffering attached. What matters is how good your reasons are.

No matter how much I like a videogame for example, I can't go around taping people to chairs and forcing them to play it. And I definitely can't justify it by giving all these people a button they can press to instantly kill themselves then saying "I'm not even forcing them to do anything, if they don't like it they can just kill themselves. The pleasure and suffering are two sides of the same coin". I find it apphaling how often I hear that as a legitimate argument by otherwise rational people. Heck with life, you don't even get the "quit button" and have to make your own. — khaled

But we have things like mandatory school attendance, so forcing people to do something for their own benefit isn't exactly unheard of. One can debate under what circumstances, if any, this is ok, but it's not prima facie absurd.

You still haven't answered my question though. — khaled

I am not sure I can make a good moral argument on when it is wrong not to have children. My approach though would be to look at the duties the parents accept if they wish to have children and then see if the likely circumstances are conductive of those duties.

I don't know who parents think is responsible for suffering. — Andrew4Handel

Anyone who has a duty to alleviate that suffering.