@khaled I think you've already had this little chestnut, but did you already answer the bad arguments for consent in regards to adoption or forcing to go to school or vaccines? So a person cannot consent to be adopted, or be forced to go to school (at least early years), and get vaccines or no vaccines.. and thus it is equivalent to not getting consent to be born. If one can't get consent than the other is the same, according to this false equivalency.

If they know what they are doing, it's a red herring. — schopenhauer1

That seems right to me. What is family planning after all? A conscientious potential parent will at least consider what kind of life they can offer that possible child as a parent. Does this make sense to everyone? Humans have vivid imaginations. We project into the future constantly. It's easy to imagine a person who on some level would love to be parent worrying about whether creating that child would be a selfish act.

That seems right to me. What is family planning after all? A conscientious potential parent will at least consider what kind of life they can offer that possible child as a parent. Does this make sense to everyone? Humans have vivid imaginations. We project into the future constantly. It's easy to imagine a person who on some level would love to be parent worrying about whether creating that child would be a selfish act. — five G

Of course. I tend to agree.. Red herring it is. They pick and choose when this "no actual child" makes a difference it seems. For universal antinatalism.. it does apparently, but not for other considerations.

I think resistance to antinatalism is more of a gut-level thing that finds reasons after the fact. But I don't see how the issue in general escapes being dominated by an overall judgment on life.

I can imagine a character bent on the elimination of suffering. He would wipe out not only humanity but also all life on earth. It would be best to destroy the planet too, in case life were to evolve again. There's a kind of 'insane' rationality at play in this idea. Put everything to sleep, out of...love?

I'm not this character, but I do have an antinatalism streak. Lately it occurred to me that a contempt for vulnerability might be at play. Also an outraged tenderness. The genius of traditional visions of afterlife is that they ultimately negate all suffering. Temporary pain (which may be intense and long-lasting) is intuitively-emotionally if not logically justified by an eternity of safety, dignity, pleasure. It makes sense that the original Schopenhauer with his atheism would also see the guilt in reproduction.

Well maybe "When X happens it's ok but otherwise it's not". Any sort of condition at all. Instead of "just decide on a case by case basis". — khaled

Well I consider morality to be on a case by case basis. There is a general principle according to which you decide, but there isn't a canon of commandments like in the Bible. You just look at a situation and apply the categorical imperative to your best ability.

That's exaclty what my quote was saying. We find different amounts unacceptable. But there is large agreement on them. — khaled

It's not just about amounts though. Causing heartbreak is more acceptable than slapping someone across the cheek, even if the latter is a much shorter amount of much less severe pain.

This. And we decide slightly differently but largely similarly. — khaled

But then the question you'd have to ask yourself is why, in this specific case, you decide significantly differently from the vast majority of people.

If you agree there is a value judgement involved here, you'd have to ask yourself why we shouldn't treat the suffering entailed by living the same as the suffering entailed by heartbreak. Unfortunate, but not morally wrong to inflict outside of very narrow circumstances.

I don't see what the self has to do with anything. — khaled

The self is the reason we consider killing a cow to eat it morally permissible so long as the cow doesn't unduly suffer, but killing a human isn't.

In other words the self is exactly the reason why morality is not simply about avoiding suffering.

No, you're free to experience as much suffering as you want to. So it just becomes "You should inflict as little suffering as possible". I don't really think that's a new or unreasonable view. Heck I'd say you'd agree with it if it wasn't put in this context. — khaled

I do think it's unreasonable though, because I can clearly come up with plenty of examples where I'd value other concerns higher than the suffering involved. "Inflict as little suffering as possible" is a purely instrumental command, it only tells you how to go about doing things, not what things to do.

We put people in jail not based on some calculation of the suffering this will avoid, but based on more abstract notion of respect for the law. We may dress this up as a decision to avoid some vague amount of suffering in the future, but I consider that an ex-post rationalisation.

Because humans suffer but "mankind" doesn't. Often when we say something bad happened to "mankind" we mean that something bad happened to certain people. But sometimes not. Sometimes we forget that "mankind" is just a concept that can't suffer. Like in the case of birth. If everyone decides tomorrow to have as few children as possible so as to lead to the extinction of mankind slowly while maintaining quality of life, then "mankind" certainly suffers, but people don't. It is in these scenarios where I find appeals to "mankind's suffering" disgusting. When no person is actually suffering and the concept is treated as a person. — khaled

Fair enough, I can see your point. But I do think that in order to consider empathy more than just an emotional response to perceived suffering, you must consider there to be some shared quality that all humans have. Something that binds you to humans in general not just to specific humans you might know. Otherwise, why worry about them?

Because for dependents you are partially responsible for all their suffering. So it is your responsibility to mitigate it as much as possible. For non-dependents you are not responsible for their suffering so it is not your responsibility to mitigate it. — khaled

Where does that responsibility come from though? Biological children are not the only kind of dependent there is. So it can't be merely that the suffering was caused by the biological parents.

False. "Forcing" maybe not the right word, but whatever word you want to use it must include: Putting them in a situation where they might suffer that is very difficult to get out for selfish reasons without asking. I find "forcing" fits the bill the best. If you don't like the word then just replace it with "Putting them in a situation where they might suffer that is very difficult to get out for selfish reasons without asking" — khaled

I don't think it must include that at all. The word "them" refers to nothing here. Noone is "put into a situation" by existing. Existing is the situation.

It's as wrong as saying a stone is forced to obey the laws of gravity. It's not. The stone is part of the laws of gravity, it's not in some way separate.

If the discussion of the specific scenario leads to a counterintuitive conclusion that may be a sign that the answer might have to be changed. So if your answer makes it so that having children is wrong on tuesdays, then maybe the answer has to be changed. — khaled

This doesn't follow though. It's only true for your position, because your position is absolute - having children is always wrong. It is this refuted if we can find a single example where having children is not wrong.

The same isn't true for the reverse. If having children is wrong on Tuesdays, that doesn't affect my position at all. I only need a single second of a single day to make the point.

But I don't see what's weird about participating in that discussion because it is exactly how we test any moral premise ever. We test it till it breaks then we find a better one. Idk why no one is willing to do that from your side. — khaled

Because it's irrelevant whether or not any specific justification of having children holds up to scrutiny. You'd have to establish that no justification is possible. This cannot be done by going through examples, because the number of examples is indefinite.

I can imagine a character bent on the elimination of suffering. He would wipe out not only humanity but also all life on earth. It would be best to destroy the planet too, in case life were to evolve again. There's a kind of 'insane' rationality at play in this idea. Put everything to sleep, out of...love? — five G

Nah.. there are crazies on all sides I suppose, but most antinatalists are person-affecting in some way. That is to say, it is the individual (who would have been born) who one is preventing from suffering and not an aggregated mass of suffering being prevented. I agree, aggregate utilitarianism (I guess the most cliched version) can lead to these kind of conclusions, but most antinatalists again, are person affecting. For example, much of my view rests on the dignity of the individual that would be born that is compromised by overlooking the suffering one is unnecessarily causing for them, the imposition/game that is "forced" (use whatever word you want there for this notion) on them, and the consent that can never be gained (vial not existing prior to birth). These are things overlooking the dignity of the future individual, and usually for either a selfish reason (I prefer to have kids) or an abstract cause (this is good for the country, humanity in general, etc.).

We put people in jail not based on some calculation of the suffering this will avoid, but based on more abstract notion of respect for the law. We may dress this up as a decision to avoid some vague amount of suffering in the future, but I consider that an ex-post rationalisation. — Echarmion

If you can prevent the suffering that the crime induced, would you? Or is the "game" of crime and punishment just something that should be played out to get a "higher meaning"?

I like the dignity theme, and I remember it occuring to me many years ago that 'life is an indignity.' One is thrown absurdly into an unchosen situation with responsibilities that one could not consent to.

But we learn to think that way as part of a human community, so that our culture allows us to articulate the violation in a way that other animals can't. And we have to have the fantasy or goal of dignity in the first place.

If we were less proud, we might not notice the indignity. If we weren't future-and-status-oriented individuals, we'd probably forgive a certain amount of pain. With humans there is humiliation.

Difficult question for some: If one could somehow know that one's child would be gloriously happy and successful for 30 years and then die suddenly and painlessly (without expecting it)...would one consent to the birth? I'd be tempted to consent. His or her life could be known ahead of time as a dream worth having. (Implicit here is an aesthetic justification of existence, and of course what is promised is well above the expected value of the random variable that we actually have to work with.)

I like the dignity theme, and I remember it occuring to me many years ago that 'life is an indignity.' One is thrown absurdly into an unchosen situation with responsibilities that one could not consent to. — five G

Exactly! You can stop right there :).

But we learn to think that way as part of a human community, so that our culture allows us to articulate the violation in a way that other animals can't. And we have to have the fantasy or goal of dignity in the first place. — five G

I mean, that is simply how humans operate in general. Humans use linguistic-conceptual frameworks and socio-cultural enculturation to be able to function in the world. So this is just a truism of how we operate, not a declaration of how humility is some sort of arbitrary concept.

Difficult question for some: If one could somehow know that one's child would be gloriously happy and successful for 30 years and then die suddenly and painlessly (without expecting it)...would one consent to the birth? I'd be tempted to consent. His or her life could be known ahead of time as a dream worth having. (Implicit here is an aesthetic justification of existence, and of course what is promised is well above the expected value of the random variable that we actually have to work with.) — five G

I would argue that any existence that is not a perfectly ideal world (for that individual being born) is probably a decision one person shouldn't make on another's behalf.

Humans use linguistic-conceptual frameworks and socio-cultural enculturation to be able to function in the world. So this is just a truism of how we operate, not a declaration of how humility is some sort of arbitrary concept. — schopenhauer1

OK, but here we are within language appealing to concepts like dignity. Let me zero in. Human suffering has an extra dimension, made possible by abstract thought. We can experience the world as a meaningless nightmare, where 'meaningless' names a recognized absence of some kind.
We develop human notions of fair play and justice, and it's only then possible to see life itself as a kind of injustice or foul play. Other animals just hurt, but humans can see the absurdity of their pain, perhaps as they look forward to an inescapable personal death. For people in our culture, the 'point' is to become an Individual, which is to say irreplaceable and therefore genuinely mortal --unlike the interchangeable beavers who repeat, repeat, repeat the beaver destiny.

OK, but here we are within language appealing to concepts like dignity. Let me zero in. Human suffering has an extra dimension, made possible by abstract thought. We can experience the world as a meaningless nightmare, where 'meaningless' names a recognized absence of some kind.
We develop human notions of fair play and justice, and it's only then possible to see life itself as a kind of injustice or foul play. Other animals just hurt, but humans can see the absurdity of their pain, perhaps as they look forward to an inescapable personal death. For people in our culture, the 'point' is to become an Individual, which is to say irreplaceable and therefore genuinely mortal --unlike the interchangeable beavers who repeat, repeat, repeat the beaver destiny. — five G

Yes I can agree with this. Humans have an extra "layer" of suffering based on our conceptual framework way of operating.

I would argue that any existence that is not a perfectly ideal world (for that individual being born) is probably a decision one person shouldn't make on another's behalf. — schopenhauer1

I can see where you are coming from. Any pain chosen for another is a violation in some pure theoretical sense.

My response is just the suggestion that human thinking is deeply probabilistic and approximate. So I can see that you are right in some sense, but an almost perfect life still pulls my heartstrings. That suggests that humans are willing to pay for pleasure with pain, and I project that onto this possible child. It's as if I am shopping for them and decide that I found a good enough deal.

Of course we don't get such assurances.

If you can prevent the suffering that the crime induced, would you? — schopenhauer1

Yes, though not, of course, at any price. But this is because causing the suffering is a crime, so we have already established that it has special significance.

I wouldn't try to prevent suffering by heartbreak.

Yes, though not, of course, at any price. But this is because causing the suffering is a crime, so we have already established that it has special significance. — Echarmion

I'm not sure what you are saying, because based on this response, you are indeed agreeing with the sentiment (at least) of antinatalism. Surely you can at least see how antinatalists see creating the unnecessary suffering as the crime that is being prevented. They don't see the logic in some deeper "meaning" in letting the "crime and punishment" be carried out.

I can see where you are coming from. Any pain chosen for another is a violation in some pure theoretical sense.

My response is just the suggestion that human thinking is deeply probabilistic and approximate. So I can see that you are right in some sense, but an almost perfect life still pulls my heartstrings. That suggests that humans are willing to pay for pleasure with pain, and I project that onto this possible child. It's as if I am shopping for them and decide that I found a good enough deal. — five G

Haha yes! Good analogy.

I can see where you are coming from. Any pain chosen for another is a violation in some pure theoretical sense. — five G

Including breaking up with someone that loves you, for example?

Surely you can at least see how antinatalists see creating the unnecessary suffering as the crime that is being prevented. They don't see the logic in some deeper "meaning" in letting the "crime and punishment" be carried out. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I can see how you arrive at the conclusion. It just seems to me you're thereby forgetting just why suffering matters. You're treating suffering like metaphysical evil, that needs to be eradicated "just because".

From where I stand, suffering (and perhaps even more importantly the fear of suffering) matters insofar as it keeps individuals from realising themselves.

Yes, I can see how you arrive at the conclusion. It just seems to me you're thereby forgetting just why suffering matters. You're treating suffering like metaphysical evil, that needs to be eradicated "just because".

From where I stand, suffering (and perhaps even more importantly the fear of suffering) matters insofar as it keeps individuals from realising themselves. — Echarmion

And this indeed is the heart of our difference. I don't presume to "teach" another person a lesson of suffering as a goal that needs to be played out by that other person.

You just look at a situation and apply the categorical imperative to your best ability. — Echarmion

Whoa whoa whoa. Where did the categorical imperative come from. Didn't take you for a Kantian.

But see? You were able to specifiy a bit more than "Oh you just decide on a case by case basis". Now we know that you think lying is always wrong for example (categorical imperative).

Causing heartbreak is more acceptable than slapping someone across the cheek, even if the latter is a much shorter amount of much less severe pain. — Echarmion

And we tend to largely agree on which "types" are more prominent than others too.

If you agree there is a value judgement involved here, you'd have to ask yourself why we shouldn't treat the suffering entailed by living the same as the suffering entailed by heartbreak. Unfortunate, but not morally wrong to inflict outside of very narrow circumstances. — Echarmion

Because one is justified and one isn't. And I already went into what justified means.

In other words the self is exactly the reason why morality is not simply about avoiding suffering. — Echarmion

I don't see how they contradict. Why can't you have your self and ALSO think that one ought to inflict as little unjustified harm as possible?

We put people in jail not based on some calculation of the suffering this will avoid, but based on more abstract notion of respect for the law. — Echarmion

I'd say the latter comes from the former. If putting people in jail caused more harm than not putting people in jail, we wouldn't have a law that puts people in jail. And I'd say "respect for the law" is precisely the kind of dangerous concept as "mankind". It is a shorthand, not a thing to be treated as its own entity.

Or else you get situations where you're "respecting the law" by putting people in jails that radically increases chances of repeat offences and doesn't actually reform behavior at all. Forgetting that the whole point of jail was to reform and to protect the population, people choose to instead "respect the law" and mistreat inmates resulting in repeat offences and no one benefiting. and A lose-lose situation, and why I hate appeals to "respecting" or "preserving" fictions over people.

you must consider there to be some shared quality that all humans have — Echarmion

Sure. But that's not "mankind". And saying that all humans share a certain quality does not lead to the conclusion that mankind should survive. Putting value in "mankind" itself is required to say that.

Where does that responsibility come from though? Biological children are not the only kind of dependent there is. So it can't be merely that the suffering was caused by the biological parents. — Echarmion

For the case of biological parents it's pretty clear. I would say you can also take on responsibilites for yourself. So for example, a life guard has a responsibility to save drowning people even though those people would drown if left alone and the lifeguard wasn't around. But a pedestrian doesn't. The difference is that the lifeguard has taken on a responsibility the pedestrian didn't. And I think these responsibilities are socially mediated. If you want the benefits the society gives you (in the case of the life-guard, money) then you have to respect the responsibilites it places upon you.

having children is always wrong. — Echarmion

Not really for me but the situation required to say that having children is wrong is basically impossible. It would be when someone would suffer so much from being childless that their suffering is comparable to the suffering of their children across their entire lifetimes.

I don't think it must include that at all. The word "them" refers to nothing here. Noone is "put into a situation" by existing. Existing is the situation. — Echarmion

Sigh, I'm so tired of this argument. Ok let's take this to its logical conclusion. There is no "them" to put in any situations. Therefore if a parent genetically engineers their child to be blind even though they would have been fine otherwise that parent did nothing wrong. Since they didn't harm anyone. Since there was no "them". You and I both disagree with this. I don't want to keep going around trying to find the metaphysical setup that you will find acceptable so I'll ask you to resolve the conflict.

Malicious genetic engineering is wrong, yet there is no one being harmed. How? Why is it wrong then?

The same isn't true for the reverse. If having children is wrong on Tuesdays, that doesn't affect my position at all. — Echarmion

But if you think that having children should not be affected by the day of the week and at the same time you find that having children on tuesday is wrong, then something is wrong with your system. And I am sure we can agree that whether or not having children is wrong should not depend on the day of the week. Therefore it must be some other principle gone whack.

Because it's irrelevant whether or not any specific justification of having children holds up to scrutiny. You'd have to establish that no justification is possible. This cannot be done by going through examples, because the number of examples is indefinite. — Echarmion

False. I can justify having children by saying "The preservation of mankind is the ultimate goal". Boom, done. Problem is, I don't agree with that premise. All I'm trying to find out is whether or not you have an internally consistent system. As in, by applying your principles we don't end up with ridiculous things like "Murder is ok" or "Theft is good".

You have tried repeatedly to find faults in my system by saying things like "What about surgery" etc. So far I think I've shown it's internally consistent. What I'm trying to find out is whether or not yours is internally consistent WITHOUT relying on premises that I disagree with such as "The preservation of mankind is the ultimate goal". Because I have failed at finding such a system so far.

Then why do we find someone who genetically engineers their child to be blind repulsive? — khaled

Some people dislike it because it's 'playing God', some because it might lead to a form of genetic cleansing, but I think mostly we're supposed to love our children for who they are, not make them what we love.

Some people dislike it because it's 'playing God', some because it might lead to a form of genetic cleansing. — Kenosha Kid

And no one is actually concerned with the consequences for the child themselves? Sure....

By that logic we should be just as disgusted by someone who genetically engineers their child to get rid of their genetic illnesses and to make them geniuses with perfect athletic genes as the guy who genetically engineered his child to be blind. But we're clearly not. So, again, I believe we have a natural instinct to project onto the future and actually care about potential future people. How else do you explain the difference in reaction?

And this indeed is the heart of our difference. I don't presume to "teach" another person a lesson of suffering as a goal that needs to be played out by that other person. — schopenhauer1

You seem fine with presuming to put words into other people's mouths though.

Now we know that you think lying is always wrong for example (categorical imperative). — khaled

This often misunderstood example was not actually about the categorical imperative at all, but about responsibility for unforseen consequences.

Because one is justified and one isn't. And I already went into what justified means. — khaled

You'll have to forgive me for not remembering the specifics.

I don't see how they contradict. Why can't you have your self and ALSO think that one ought to inflict as little unjustified harm as possible? — khaled

I didn't say that they were necessarily contradictory. But there are situations where they lead to clearly incompatible results. Someone who is concerned about self-realization will allow people to make certain decisions, even if others find them stupid, and even if they involve the risk of suffering. We do allow people to engage in very dangerous sports for example, even though the overall suffering of the world might be much reduced if everyone refrained from doing it.

I'd say the latter comes from the former. If putting people in jail caused more harm than not putting people in jail, we wouldn't have a law that puts people in jail. — khaled

Just historically speaking, this is manifestly false. You can maybe claim this about some especially well working justice systems, like in the nordic countries. You certainly can't make the claim for the US, or any early 20th-century european country.

Or else you get situations where you're "respecting the law" by putting people in jails that radically increases chances of repeat offences and doesn't actually reform behavior at all. Forgetting that the whole point of jail was to reform and to protect the population, people choose to instead "respect the law" and mistreat inmates resulting in repeat offences and no one benefiting. and A lose-lose situation, and why I hate appeals to "respecting" or "preserving" fictions over people. — khaled

But there is also an opposite danger involved here: "reforming behaviour" can also be understood in the way China does it - turning into people into nice, conforming parts of society. An approach to justice that is solely concerned with protection and rehabilitation leads to this as a logical consequence - a consequence some early 20th century criminologists actually arrived at. So while I agree that one of the goals of criminal justice should be to prevent repeat offenses, another goal needs to be to have sentences that are commensurate to the crime. And that of course implies that the sentence is more than merely a tool for rehabilitation, and instead an actual punishment - intentionally inflicted suffering for the purpose of re-establishing equality.

Sure. But that's not "mankind". And saying that all humans share a certain quality does not lead to the conclusion that mankind should survive. Putting value in "mankind" itself is required to say that. — khaled

True. But it is suggestive of the idea that the whole of interconnected humans is more than just the sum of it's parts, and that in some way, it ought to continue. Perhaps that's just the biological imperatives speaking though. The actualy justification for having children does not need to be so lofty. I'd consider it sufficient if your children can contribute to a future society of freedom, irrespective of whether they're necessary for the survival of the species.

For the case of biological parents it's pretty clear. I would say you can also take on responsibilites for yourself. So for example, a life guard has a responsibility to save drowning people even though those people would drown if left alone and the lifeguard wasn't around. But a pedestrian doesn't. The difference is that the lifeguard has taken on a responsibility the pedestrian didn't. And I think these responsibilities are socially mediated. If you want the benefits the society gives you (in the case of the life-guard, money) then you have to respect the responsibilites it places upon you. — khaled

And I just continue that thought to conclude that, since responsibilities are sociall mediated, rather than attaching to mere physical fact, causation is a common starting point for responsibility, but it's not a necessary or even a sufficient one.

Not really for me but the situation required to say that having children is wrong is basically impossible. It would be when someone would suffer so much from being childless that their suffering is comparable to the suffering of their children across their entire lifetimes. — khaled

How would someone ever know?

Sigh, I'm so tired of this argument. Ok let's take this to its logical conclusion. There is no "them" to put in any situations. Therefore if a parent genetically engineers their child to be blind even though they would have been fine otherwise that parent did nothing wrong. Since they didn't harm anyone. Since there was no "them". You and I both disagree with this. I don't want to keep going around trying to find the metaphysical setup that you will find acceptable so I'll ask you to resolve the conflict.

Malicious genetic engineering is wrong, yet there is no one being harmed. How? Why is it wrong then? — khaled

It's wrong because it's malicious. The intention makes it wrong. Not the result. The child is indeed not harmed, because this child was always blind and will always be blind and could never, under any circumstances, be any other way.

Whether or not some act is moral cannot be answered without knowing according to what intention, based on what guiding principle, it was taken.

But if you think that having children should not be affected by the day of the week and at the same time you find that having children on tuesday is wrong, then something is wrong with your system. And I am sure we can agree that whether or not having children is wrong should not depend on the day of the week. Therefore it must be some other principle gone whack. — khaled

Yes, but this kind of reductio only works so long as we're on common ground, which we're not for the most part in this discussion. You consider things absurd that I don't, and vice versa.

You have tried repeatedly to find faults in my system by saying things like "What about surgery" etc. So far I think I've shown it's internally consistent. What I'm trying to find out is whether or not yours is internally consistent WITHOUT relying on premises that I disagree with such as "The preservation of mankind is the ultimate goal". Because I have failed at finding such a system so far. — khaled

Internal consistency is not the same as disagreeing with a premise. It would be a sign of lack of internal consistency if you would agree with my premises but still disagreed with the result. You won't find a system that has premises that you agree on and is internally consistent, because if this were the case, we'd have the same opinion.

You seem fine with presuming to put words into other people's mouths though. — Echarmion

Not sure what you are saying.

Not sure what you are saying. — schopenhauer1

I am saying your representation of what I said was either mistaken or dishonest.

So what is your position then?

You already quoted it. It just didn't say anything like what you then wrote.

You already quoted it. It just didn't say anything like what you then wrote. — Echarmion

You said:

Yes, I can see how you arrive at the conclusion. It just seems to me you're thereby forgetting just why suffering matters. You're treating suffering like metaphysical evil, that needs to be eradicated "just because".

From where I stand, suffering (and perhaps even more importantly the fear of suffering) matters insofar as it keeps individuals from realising themselves. — Echarmion

I don't get how I can't take from this that it is okay to enable conditions of suffering of the future individual to occur. Also, what I think to be wrong is to put some issue like "realizing themselves" is some principle for which needs to take place above and beyond the indignity of causing conditions of someone else's suffering. Unnecessarily putting someone else in a position of suffering so they can "realize themselves" is a strange position to me. It using people for what YOU deem to be "good" for that person. Simply not procreating doesn't impose anything on anyone and certainly keeps in mind the dignity of the person who one would have enabled the conditions of suffering.

This indeed goes back to that paternalistic idea that other people need to live life out for YOUR idea of what is valuable for THEM to experience.

I don't get how I can't take from this that it is okay to enable conditions of suffering of the future individual to occur. — schopenhauer1

That's not, however, what you initially said.

Also, what I think to be wrong is to put some issue like "realizing themselves" is some principle for which needs to take place above and beyond the indignity of causing conditions of someone else's suffering. Unnecessarily putting someone else in a position of suffering so they can "realize themselves" is a strange position to me. — schopenhauer1

I did not say that people need to be born in order to realize themselves. Though if I did say that, then the suffering would be literally necessary, so I don't understand your criticism either way.

What I said is that what is moral and what is not is not based on some quantification of suffering caused by a given course of action. Avoiding suffering is only an instrumental goal. The ultimate goal is a state of freedom, not a state of no suffering.

Simply not procreating doesn't impose anything on anyone and certainly keeps in mind the dignity of the person who one would have enabled the conditions of suffering. — schopenhauer1

Obviously it imposes duties on people - not to procreate. But more to the point, I don't see how someone who will never exist can have dignity.

This indeed goes back to that paternalistic idea that other people need to live life out for YOUR idea of what is valuable for THEM to experience. — schopenhauer1

Having a moral philosophy and acting on it isn't paternalistic.

I did not say that people need to be born in order to realize themselves. Though if I did say that, then the suffering would be literally necessary, so I don't understand your criticism either way. — Echarmion

That is my criticism.. Using people's suffering for some other goal that you have for them.

What I said is that what is moral and what is not is not based on some quantification of suffering caused by a given course of action. Avoiding suffering is only an instrumental goal. The ultimate goal is a state of freedom, not a state of no suffering. — Echarmion

This sounds like doublespeak.. work sets you free shit. One avoids suffering if one has to chose between suffering or non-suffering (unless one is a masochist I guess). But intentionally putting people in positions where you know they will suffering X amount (a lifetime's worth of individual instances actually) in order for some abstract cause of "freedom" is what I am saying is wrong to do on someone else's behalf.

Obviously it imposes duties on people - not to procreate. But more to the point, I don't see how someone who will never exist can have dignity. — Echarmion

Oh this one again.. the person who will exist if you procreate won't exist? II guess you can say the indignity of being caused to suffer. That you did not enable suffering, thus violating the dignity of the person that will be born, by overlooking the fact that you are also causing the conditions for their suffering on their behalf, if they were to be born.

Having a moral philosophy and acting on it isn't paternalistic. — Echarmion

Having a moral philosophy is fine. Acting on a philosophy that affects others, by causing them to suffer for an abstract cause like, "realizing themselves" and "freedom" is not.

That is my criticism.. Using people's suffering for some other goal that you have for them. — schopenhauer1

Ah, then i think the misunderstanding may be that you think I want other people to suffer so they can self-realize, but all I am saying that self-realisation is more important than suffering.

This sounds like doublespeak.. work sets you free shit. One avoids suffering if one has to chose between suffering or non-suffering (unless one is a masochist I guess). — schopenhauer1

Neurologically simple Animals avoid suffering if they can. Humans do sometimes, but hardly all the time.

But intentionally putting people in positions where you know they will suffering X amount (a lifetime's worth of individual instances actually) in order for some abstract cause of "freedom" is what I am saying is wrong to do on someone else's behalf. — schopenhauer1

Yes, well, I knew that. But that doesn't convince me that my own position is wrong.

Oh this one again.. the person who will exist if you procreate won't exist? — schopenhauer1

No. The person who will exist if you procreate - will not exist if you don't. So, if you don't procreate, they won't exist. And hence they won't have a dignity to protect.

Having a moral philosophy is fine. Acting on a philosophy that affects others, by causing them to suffer for an abstract cause like, "realizing themselves" and "freedom" is not. — schopenhauer1

Then stop writing posts that talk about your moral philosophy, including anti-natalism, this instant, or be branded a hyporcite.

Ah, then i think the misunderstanding may be that you think I want other people to suffer so they can self-realize, but all I am saying that self-realisation is more important than suffering. — Echarmion

No I don't think you want that necessarily, I still think it is wrong to put any cause above unnecessary (unprovoked) suffering when it comes to making decisions on other people's behalf.

Neurologically simple Animals avoid suffering if they can. Humans do sometimes, but hardly all the time. — Echarmion

Yeah, I don't care if you do it to yourself. And obviously now that you created a being, you have to make decisions for it not to suffer a lot more. Certainly starting the suffering cycle all together was the wrong part though, not the "taking care of once born".

No. The person who will exist if you procreate - will not exist if you don't. So, if you don't procreate, they won't exist. And hence they won't have a dignity to protect. — Echarmion

That's okay..then dignity wasn't violated. All that matters there.

Then stop writing posts that talk about your moral philosophy, including anti-natalism, this instant, or be branded a hyporcite. — Echarmion

I am not forcing you to follow or read them. Certainly I didn't cause your very existence where this suffering for you has taken place ;). Don't worry though, you'll suffer again and again and again..