I am not sure if the abstract notion of procreation itself is really a biological imperative as much as the physical act of sex itself being pleasurable. — schopenhauer1

Pleasure is an outcome; it can't stand in place of a drive. It also can't explain the desire of virgins to copulate. Nor can it explain the common negative emotional side effects of sexually active people foregoing reproduction, e.g. by use of contraceptives, or being unable to reproduce. The drive is to copulate, you're right, but not to experience sexual pleasure, i.e. the urge is not subdued by regular orgasm.

I mean you know the argument is more sophisticated than simply "harming" someone. — schopenhauer1

Yes, but that was your wording and I do feel that the two are conflated.

Real, existing people, not just the possibility of future people. The former is a concern for morality. The latter is not.
— Kenosha Kid

Who says? — schopenhauer1

That's the real question, one I've already touched on a few times, but not one that makes the antinatalist argument one iota more compelling. ("Who says that a generic, abstract, potential future human is a moral subject?" is an equally good question.) If you wish me to accept a moral proposition, there has to be some basis on which to do so.

How people answer the question "Who says?" interests me. Probably the most frequently given answer has been something like "God": a hypothetical moral authority whose moral views are "evidenced" by e.g. scripture, prophets, testimony of divine revelation, etc. But I have no reason to believe God exists either so it's a lame ad hom.

Or the answer might be "Jesus", or "Muhammad", or "Kant", or "Rousseau", i.e. some people who spoke or wrote down their views and some other people did find them compelling and *subscribed* to their views. But then lots of people subscribe to opposite views. Hell, lots of people subscribe to Trump's views.

Or if you yourself are Kant or Rousseau, maybe you believe that we can work this out by thinking really hard about it, i.e. "reason dictates". But reason never dictates. Reason always regresses back to a priori moral truths or God or some such again.

If you're a lawyer, you might say "The law says", but we still need to know if we have the right laws. If you're a relativist you might say "According to this culture" but you accept that no one culture is authoratitive. If you're an existentialist the answer might be teleological: whatever proclaims your freedom, whatever God asks of you personally, whatever proclaims your strength personally. But then we cannot ask who is right in any conflict of interests, therefore we cannot make claims about how someone else should behave.

This is why I reject any such unfounded claim about what morality is. "Who says?" cannot be answered with God or Jesus or Kant or Marx or UK law or local practice. That always leaves more questions or requires unjustifiable assumptions.

I don't believe in the supernatural, which means that morality is, if real, a natural occurrence, i.e. something nature did. The only moral arbiter I can accept then is Nature. Fortunately this does not suffer from the problems enumerated above (although it has many of its own): many moral claims can be derived from non-moral i.e. biological facts.

So TL;DR version: Nature says.

False. We can agree there are cases where having children is wrong. Like severe poverty for example. — khaled

Apparently we cannot agree on that. :) I would never judge someone Ill for having a child in poverty. I would judge the agents of their poverty if there were any. Now, I agree it would be wise to wait if waiting would help. But not morally compulsory.

As I said, we already find having kids wrong in some scenarios. — khaled

I said there are specific scenarios that one can't generalise from. A sadist approaches a couple who do not want or like children and offers them ten million dollars to have a child, homebirth it, not register it, then hand it to the sadist to torture. To have a child under those circumstances would be abominable. But there's no route from that to "You should never have children".

One of the interesting things for me about this conversation is that I am someone who made an ethical decision not to have children :rofl:

We have a capacity and impulse NOT to have children in extreme poverty. — khaled

That is true but not for the unborn child's benefit. Not even for others' benefit, which, given that we do not have children for others, makes it a non-moral concern. We reduce the number of children we have during scarcity because the personal cost of having more is not outweighed by an increased survival benefit of our genome. It is more akin to choosing not to pay $10 for a cookie even though you really want a cookie.

Again, antinatalism isn’t some wacky supernatural belief as much as you’d like it to be. — khaled

I never said it was supernatural. Other reasons for other moral beliefs are supernatural.

we've not just randomly grouped some behaviours together and labelled them all 'good', 'right' or 'moral', those groupings very much appear to have common threads - threads resulting mainly from psychology, culture, and religion, with a very strong emphasis on psychology. — Isaac

This is true, but then I think there are close analogies between moral standards and scientific theories, if you take a Kuhnian position as I do. Cultural definitions of
morality change constantly throughout history, and each one , like a scientific theory, has to begin somewhere, typically with a tiny community, or perhaps a single individual ( Einstein first conceived e=mc2 as a private thought experiment).

Often, the originators of a new language of science or morality are treated as weird or even alarming outcasts. When their movement grows, the size of it is denied by its opponents. When it becomes too large to deny, it’s opponents accuse its followers of being brainwashed ( by fox news or cnn, perhaps). Eventually , what began as fringe becomes the new standard, but the cycle inevitable begins again.

As George Kelly wrote:
“ ...yesterday's alarming impulse becomes today's enlivening insight, tomorrow's repressive
doctrine, and after that subsides into a petty superstition.”

Kant’s categorical imperative hasn’t yet reached the status of petty superstition, except in the eyes of radical
atheists like Dennett, Dawki s and Harris, but it may get there eventually.

The point is that defining the requirements for a claim to moral status by reference to the SEP (my favorite part of that essay wasn’t the part you quoted but the part where it discussed the lack of any consensus on even the most general features of morality. )or any other normative text risks performing an act of violence ( and immorality) against a group who may represent a new normative
community.

How about having a child knowing they will have a severely debilitating disease. If we can’t even agree that’s wrong then you’re a non-starter for me. I would ask you what on earth could justify causing that much suffering.

One of the interesting things for me about this conversation is that I am someone who made an ethical decision not to have children :rofl: — Kenosha Kid

How so?

But there's no route from that to "You should never have children". — Kenosha Kid

Sure because there are many ways to explain that scenario being unethical that do not require you to generalize to having children being unethical. Like: Treating children as tools is wrong. Which still leaves room for having kids being ethical.

That is true but not for the unborn child's benefit. Not even for others' benefit, which, given that we do not have children for others, makes it a non-moral concern. — Kenosha Kid

Sure.

We reduce the number of children we have during scarcity because the personal cost of having more is not outweighed by an increased survival benefit of our genome. It is more akin to choosing not to pay $10 for a cookie even though you really want a cookie. — Kenosha Kid

But false. This is clearly not the only reason. Everyone here except you so far has agreed that having children in extreme poverty is unethical not just impractical. The reason people don’t have kids they can’t afford is not simply impracticality but also a sense of responsibility not to subject someone to “too much suffering”. Now the question becomes how much is “too much”? So it is clearly the case that we have a naturalistic reason to believe in antinatalism (again, I don’t know what a supernaturalistic reason would be) since we find having children in extreme poverty morally wrong. There is a moral instinct behind it.

I never said it was supernatural. — Kenosha Kid

But you said it is “not natural”. So how did it come about?

Anyone who has a duty to alleviate that suffering. — Echarmion

But causing it in the first place is fine? Why? And why is it fine sometimes and not fine in others?

Using predictability seems problematic, because I don't see a clear way to draw the line between "reasonable" and "unreasonable" predictions — Echarmion

Sure. And that’s where lawyers come in.

Rather, the risk is accepted as a necessary part of vehicular traffic. — Echarmion

Exactly. Which is why we send people to jail if they drive without a license. We deem that at their skill level the risk of an accident is not an acceptable trade off for them going to work on time.

And this means that a moral approach that focuses on avoiding the risk of harm must always deal with this normative element somehow. An argument that goes "behaviour X risks suffering of Y magnitude and should therefore be avoided" is incomplete. — Echarmion

I don’t see this as very weird though. That we find different risks morally acceptable is normal. We make laws out of the ones we agree on. Generally speaking though, if X * Y is greater than the suffering alleviated from the person committing the act then the act is wrong. We can debate how big X and Y are in each case, but more often than not it’s clear which is greater (X*Y or the suffering alleviated from the actor)

Lots of actions have a risk of suffering attached. What matters is how good your reasons are. — Echarmion

Exactly. And the reasons aren’t good enough for me. If you discard “the benefit of mankind” I don’t see how you can possibly argue that they are.

But we have things like mandatory school attendance, so forcing people to do something for their own benefit isn't exactly unheard of. One can debate under what circumstances, if any, this is ok, but it's not prima facie absurd. — Echarmion

Sure. I would say dependents are special. Because it is the job of the parent to make sure they suffer as little as possible, since they’re the ones the brought them here. And so they’re allowed to force them to do things for their benefit.

But what I was getting at was forcing people to do things that YOU like, without knowing whether or not they will. In the example I assume the person tied up is not your dependent and you do not know if they’ll like the game or not. Sure, they may end up enjoying it, but we don’t just take that risk with people who are not our dependents. Ever. And even with dependents we are very careful.

And you cannot argue in the case of having children that existing is good for the non-existent potential child (because they don’t exist!). So you are taking a gamble, like with the tying up example. Sure the game is pretty good and has few complaints, but is that a good enough reason to force people to play it? Not unless you want to bring in the survival of mankind as a good in itself I don’t think you can argue it is.

But what you absolutely cannot say in both cases is “This is not an imposition because they can just kill themselves if they don’t like it”.

My approach though would be to look at the duties the parents accept if they wish to have children and then see if the likely circumstances are conductive of those duties. — Echarmion

And what would those be? The duties.

And I never get why people are always willing to claim that having children is wrong sometimes but never actually go into detail on when. It happens every time around here.

How about having a child knowing they will have a severely debilitating disease. If we can’t even agree that’s wrong then you’re a non-starter for me. — khaled

Well that's hardly surprising since you're arguing for antinatalism and I against. :)

It's an interesting question though. One can't generally know, so we can't generalise from this. Not knowing the future is part of what makes antinatalism so wonky, since it is preoccupied with current moral culpability for potential future events one is not responsible for. More realistically the situation would be a couple having a child while aware of a significant risk of such a disease. In that case, no, I would not judge them for it.

But taking the further-fetched scenario for the sake of argument, yes I would agree. It would, if the disease were certain and debilitating, not be accidental if the child then had a debilitating disease. I would inevitably find myself responsible for its suffering after it suffered.

But since this is a fanciful scenario, I wouldn't worry about it.

By the way, environmentalism is the closest I can think of to the sort of logic you apply, insofar as the point of environmentalism is to provide a habitable world for people not yet born.

How so? — khaled

Overpopulation is a factor. While I'm not antinatalist, I do think we should breed much less. I would have campaigned for adopting under different circumstances, but ended up stepfathering which amounts to much the same thing.

Also tbh my parents weren't great and I occasionally catch glimpses of them in me and I don't like it. I think I would have a low opinion of myself as a father, and why do something if you don't enjoy it? :) And it pisses my parents off because I'm an only child; that's a bonus.

Everyone here except you so far has agreed that having children in extreme poverty is unethical not just impractical. — khaled

As we've discussed, anything is unethical wrt a suitable ethic. I would be surprised if people genuinely did judge such parents thus in practice, rather than in some theoretical moral playground. But I was addressing your point that people in poverty in poor countries have fewer children, which is true. It is *not* true that people in poverty in poor countries have NO children. There have been an uncountable number of poor people throughout history, including today, and most that lived to sexual maturity will have had a child.

So how did it come about? — khaled

It didn't. It is neither natural nor supernatural. It is simply mistaken.

But taking the further-fetched scenario for the sake of argument, yes I would agree. It would, if the disease were certain and debilitating, not be accidental if the child then had a debilitating disease. I would inevitably find myself responsible for its suffering after it suffered.

But since this is a fanciful scenario, I wouldn't worry about it. — Kenosha Kid

Damn. Ok let me ask you this. Is pointing a gun at innocent people and pulling three trigger for recreation wrong? After all, the gun might jam, so:

One can't generally know, so we can't generalise from this. Not knowing the future is part of what makes “shooting people is wrong” so wonky, since it is preoccupied with current moral culpability for potential future events one is not responsible for. After all, we don’t control whether or not the gun jams so we’re not responsible right? — Kenosha Kid

I just don’t understand how you can seriously require 100% knowledge of the future for an action to be wrong. It is a demonstrably ridiculous requirement. Nothing can ever be wrong with it.

Also this is not a fanciful scenario. Genetic counseling is a thing and you can easily know the likelihood of your child having this or that genetic disease. A lot of times you can be certain.

I would be surprised if people genuinely did judge such parents thus in practice, rather than in some theoretical moral playground — Kenosha Kid

I would be surprised if they didn’t. I’d be outraged if I heard someone I knew had a child knowing they have a high chance of having a severely debilitating disease. And I know I’m not the only one who would react that way.

It didn't. It is neither natural nor supernatural. It is simply mistaken. — Kenosha Kid

Sorry but this is just word salad. It didn’t? Antinatalism is not a belief? Wot?

Still, what is a “natural reason” to adopt a belief. I am still waiting on an answer to that question. What would be the natural reason to adopt utilitarianism as an example?

But I was addressing your point that people in poverty in poor countries have fewer children, which is true — Kenosha Kid

Correct. But not purely because of impracticality but because of a genuine desire not to cause suffering as well. That’s what I’m getting at. There is a moral instinct behind AN. Maybe one you don’t share from reading your comments but one that is definitely not unpopular seeing as how everyone here except you agrees that having children in poverty or with a severe illness is wrong.

Sorry to hear about your parents though good thing you’re pissing them off

do you just unquestioningly follow every whim that pops into your head? If no, then why follow this particular one? — Isaac


Because it works everywhere else and I don't like making exceptions for something because it is "natural". — khaled

What do you mean "it works". What would it not working look like? This is a fundamental axiom we're talking about here so there's supposedly no more fundamental one to check it by.

invalidates the ad populum argument. — Isaac


I am not making an ad populaum argument. — khaled

You are - frequently...

The majority seem to think it is — khaled

the public think it is a moral theory — khaled

everyone here except you considers antinatalism a moral theory. — khaled

everyone here (the public) thinks it does. You're the one that has to explain that. — khaled

Whatever your positions is it results in “Antinatalism is a moral theory” computing to false which makes it very much not standard as demonstrated by the number of antinatalism posts on this site under the category “ethics”. — khaled

...come on!

But the point is that with the caveats your maxim is not at all what people commonly consider 'moral' or 'right'. — Isaac


Agreed — khaled

Right. That's literally all I'm arguing here. Your maxim is not a moral one. It's just a thing you want to achieve - an objective - for...seemingly...no reason at all.

I reason with someone from some premises we can agree on. Upon reaching a premise or caveat we do not agree on, I stop. — khaled

It really doesn't sound like it. are you not familiar with the meaning of the word 'stop'?

I am saying that our shared ideas of right and wrong are arbitrary. Again, arbitrary =/= there is no natrualistic reason we believe them. — khaled

No this is not all you're saying. Your claim requires the additional feature that these naturalistic reasons are sufficiently wide to derive absolutely any maxim whatsoever. It's that part of the claim I'm questioning. By analogy, the weather is a result of naturalistic forces, but what the weather will be like tomorrow is somewhat arbitrary (we could say for sure). It can't, however, be just anything - being caused by natural forces limits the options to those resulting from a causal chain initiated by those natural forces, it can only be some kind of weather. Admitting (as I hope we have) that your moral imperatives derive from naturalistic forces means that the range of possible moral imperatives is constrained to those which can feasibly result from those naturalistic forces. as far as the evidence we have is concerned, that means that they will be overwhelmingly the result of some biological broad constraints fine-tuned by the culture an religion you've been brought up in. Since unconstrained probability spaces are the exception rather than the rule, the onus is on you to support such an extraordinary claim.

But antinatalism does not lead to a flourishing community so how come it is a moral claim by your definition? What makes a "moral claim" exactly for you because you seem to me to be hedging. — khaled

Let me try and be clearer then. There's two issues which you seem to be getting confused over. There's the meaning of the word 'moral' and there's the things I personally consider to be my morals. Two sets. the one is necessarily a subset of the other. Like {all the clothes in the world} and {the clothes I wear}. One is necessarily a subset of the other. I can say "I wear trousers, but skirts are an item of clothing" without contradiction. What I can't say is "I don't happen to wear them myself, but elephants are an article of clothing". Whether I personally wear them is irrelevant here - elephants are not an article of clothing. Us debating whether elephants are an article of clothing doesn't mean I'm committed to wearing them if it turns out they are.

I'm arguing that "do not risk harm where consent is impossible to obtain no matter what the consequences" is not a moral claim by definition. "Risk no harm to others where you cannot obtain their consent", however, is a moral claim, but not one I subscribe to. The question of which maxims are 'moral' ones and which I personally subscribe to are two different questions.

I'm arguing specifically that the maxim used here as an axiom leading to antinatalism is not a moral one. — Isaac


Which one would that be exactly just so we're on the same page. Consent? Asymmetry? Not causing unwarranted harm? Something else? All of those seem like moral claims to me, and I suspect everyone here except you (not that I agree with all of them being valid). — khaled

As above "do not risk harm where consent is impossible to obtain no matter what the consequences". Morality is about people. No people, no morality, It's not about reducing some poorly specified platonic form to zero. I doubt you'd get a single person to agree that reducing the number of bananas in the world is a moral imperative, or ensuring that there's no electricity, or no number 7... What do all these patently ridiculous examples have in common, that moral imperatives to reduce something do not. They all have nothing to do with people.

This is true, but then I think there are close analogies between moral standards and scientific theories, if you take a Kuhnian position as I do. Cultural definitions of
morality change constantly throughout history, and each one , like a scientific theory, has to begin somewhere, typically with a tiny community, or perhaps a single individual ( Einstein first conceived e=mc2 as a private thought experiment). — Joshs

I disagree with this framing. I can see where you're coming from, but moral theories are not like scientific theories. Firstly, our moral theories are trying to frame something post hoc. We already have moral imperatives, before we're born in some case, but certainly by the time we're old enough for serious reflection, so, unlike scientific theories which we're free to incorporate into our behaviour or not, moral theories are our behaviour. We're not so free to choose to incorporate them or not.

Secondly, with scientific theories we're trying to model the world outside of our own minds and those models have to at least be slightly useful. One can navigate assuming the world is s cylinder, or even a flattish square (so long as one sticks to equatorial routes) but presuming the world is a triangle simply wouldn't work. It's a non-starter. Moral theories likewise must model our feelings and interpersonal relationships at least slightly accurately. That limits the range of possible moral theories to those which have at least a feasible change of being accurate.

That said, I can certainly see the merit in having a broad enough definition to allow the exploration of new ideas. But then, that's what we're doing here. I'm not simply declaring that these maxims are not moral, I'm actually presenting quite a lengthy argument to that effect, so I've not kicked "Such maxims are 'moral' ones" out of the 'marketplace of ideas', we're very much discussing the notion here.

What do you mean "it works". What would it not working look like? — Isaac

Not matching my moral intuitions. So if it leads to shooting people being right for example.

You are - frequently...

The majority seem to think it is
— khaled

the public think it is a moral theory
— khaled

everyone here except you considers antinatalism a moral theory.
— khaled

everyone here (the public) thinks it does. You're the one that has to explain that.
— khaled

Whatever your positions is it results in “Antinatalism is a moral theory” computing to false which makes it very much not standard as demonstrated by the number of antinatalism posts on this site under the category “ethics”.
— khaled

...come on! — Isaac

Each and every single one of those is talking about whether or not antinatalism is a moral theory. I have never made an ad populum argument FOR antinatlaism, only for it being a moral theory. I have never said something along the lines of "everyone agrees that having kids is wrong" because that is just false. And when I have made similar claims it was only in response to people who define what is moral by what is widely accepted. Every quote there is me telling you that the "public meaning" of moral theory clearly includes antinatalism and that it is on you to explain why you're using the word differently.

Right. That's literally all I'm arguing here. Your maxim is not a moral one. It's just a thing you want to achieve - an objective - for...seemingly...no reason at all. — Isaac

An objective that I want to achieve for its own sake is a moral maxim. That is what I find the public meaning of "moral maxim" to be and what most people here also seem to find it to be. No one so far has agreed with you that AN is not a moral theory. And at least one (KenoshaKid) has stated unambiguously that you can make an ethic about anything which agrees with my definition. You may disagree with my definition of the public meaning, but you cannot pretend that the public meaning does not include AN as a moral theory, because it does.

What I know for a fact is that "A moral maxim is one which creates a harmonious community" is NOT the public meaning of moral maxim because it is literally just you insisting that it is. Demonstrably, everyone here agrees that AN is a moral theory, showing that the public meaning of moral theory does NOT require its application to create a harmonious community so your definition is wrong.

It really doesn't sound like it. are you not familiar with the meaning of the word 'stop'? — Isaac

Every single time I have talked with you we reached a point where you resort to "The survival of the human race is a good in itself" or another maxim that I disagree with and I stop there. The reason I am not stopping now is because you are making a completely ridiculous claim that "antinatalism" does not fall under "moral theory" by virtue of people supposedly not referring to antinatalism as a moral theory, but that is demonstrably false, yet you hold onto the claim for no reason.

No this is not all you're saying. — Isaac

False.

Your claim requires the additional feature that these naturalistic reasons are sufficiently wide to derive absolutely any maxim whatsoever. — Isaac

The naturalistic reasons ARE sufficiently wide to derive absolutely any maxim whatsoever. Someone crazy enough might think that it is wrong to wear socks on christmas. However such a belief will likely not be adopted on a societal level because it is useless.

I'm arguing that "do not risk harm where consent is impossible to obtain no matter what the consequences" is not a moral claim by definition. "Risk no harm to others where you cannot obtain their consent", however, is a moral claim — Isaac

What makes the first not a moral claim and the latter a moral claim? Because you are the only one making a distinction here. Which suggests you're misuing the word "moral claim". And I've shown how your "definition" is inadequate, because no one else is using it.

As above "do not risk harm where consent is impossible to obtain no matter what the consequences". Morality is about people. — Isaac

And not risking harm is not about people? What would "do not risk harm" in the absence of people even mean? Don't be ridiculous. Or are you suggesting that if the act that does harm is taken before the person harmed exists that that somehow makes the act ok?

I doubt you'd get a single person to agree that reducing the number of bananas in the world is a moral imperative, or ensuring that there's no electricity, or no number 7 — Isaac

Agreed. But I also doubt that you can get a single person to agree that "We are morally obligated to reduce the number of bananas" is NOT a valid moral claim, though a ridiculous one. Yet you are attempting to redifine what "moral claim" means by referring to the public use of the word even though you are literally the only one going against the public use which I find funny.

There is a distinction between whether or not something is a moral claim and whether or not you agree with it. "We are morally obligated to reduce the number of bananas" is a moral claim. But not one I think anyone will agree with. "You shouldn't have kids" is a moral claim (as much as you'd like it not to be, everyone here agrees it is), but one most don't agree with. That's what I'm saying.

Damn. Ok let me ask you this. Is pointing a gun at innocent people and pulling three trigger for recreation wrong? After all, the gun might jam, so: — khaled

Yes, it's wrong. Even if the gun does jam, it's still wrong imo. The intent is to harm others greatly for some small and perverse satisfaction. If successful, it is no accident if someone is harmed, rather it is accidental (i.e. fortunate) if no one is harmed.

I just don’t understand how you can seriously require 100% knowledge of the future for an action to be wrong. — khaled

I don't. But there has to be a direct consequence of my acted-on intentions for which I am culpable. They needn't necessarily be foreseen, for instance negligence: a failure to consider the direct consequences of my actions before performing them.

What I can't be morally culpable for is unforeseeable events that eventually hurt somebody that could have been trivially avoided had I acted not to remove the harmful event but the harmed person. If someone asks me for directions and I provide them with a shortcut and, on their way, a piano falls on their head, I am the cause of their being under the piano but not the cause of their death: that blame lies with the negligent person who failed to properly secure the piano, even though they might not have foreseen the potential consequences of their negligence.

Genetic counseling is a thing and you can easily know the likelihood of your child having this or that genetic disease. A lot of times you can be certain. — khaled

Can you give an example of a 100% certain debilitating disease?

I would be surprised if they didn’t. I’d be outraged if I heard someone I knew had a child knowing they have a high chance of having a severely debilitating disease. And I know I’m not the only one who would react that way. — khaled

We could take the time to look at e.g. media coverage of such events but I'm not sure what that would give us. You obviously know about liberals and could probably predict they would side with the parent. I know about tabloids and would guess they would react with outrage, real or faux. But if one of us has the time, it would be interesting to know.

Sorry but this is just word salad. It didn’t? Antinatalism is not a belief? Wot? — khaled

It was a typo or autocorrect: I didn't. The moral proposition in question is not supported on naturalistic or supernaturalistic grounds: it is not grounded at all.

Still, what is a “natural reason” to adopt a belief. — khaled

This isn't about general belief. There is no natural reason to become a Christian. There are *cultural* reasons. However there are natural reasons to adopt some of Mr. Christ's arguments, insofar as they accord with the specific drives and capacities that nature has selected for us to make us social, and in turn moral.

There are neither natural nor cultural reasons to accept the antinatalist argument.

But not purely because of impracticality but because of a genuine desire not to cause suffering as well. — khaled

I think you'll find this extremely difficult to argue. For one thing, what you're describing is not a human trait but a trait across a vast range of animal species who do not make decisions in the way you describe. As for humans, the biological reasons for reduced fertility are sufficient. They do not have to be ratified by reason. But they will likely be *rationalised* by reason, which isn't the same. Statistically it seems probable that people have decided to limit the number of children they have on a purely rational basis during times of scarcity. But I'd have to see some pretty compelling evidence, e.g. an absence of any biological markers, to accept that this is at all significant.

This actually ties into why I would never judge someone having a child during poverty. Moral philosophy has a tendency to fall into the rationalist fallacy: that humans are principally rational agents acting on the outputs of rational processes and therefore are expected to conform to some ideal moral schema in which they are either good because of their actions or bad because of them.

Humans aren't like this at all. For the most part we are reacting unconsciously according to learned rules, and only use our reason for problems unsuitable for those rules or sometimes to ratify the application of those rules. The urge to have a child is mediated through e.g. libido, but regulated by many other factors, scarcity being one, but childlessness being another. Childlessness itself can be a form of suffering and, just as I would perfectly understand why a starving man would steal a loaf of bread, I would perfectly understand why a childless person in poverty would have a child.

An important aspect of real morality (as opposed to theoretical or religious morality) is our capacity for empathy. This is why psychopaths might not be held morally culpable for their actions: they lack the ability to make moral decisions in the way that normal people do, so we should not expect them to conform to some ideal of moral agent. To judge harshly someone for having a child at all during scarcity would seem to me a total failure to empathise with the plight of that person, as well as a disregard for science and the primacy of that person's biological nature. We are centuries past the idea that morality is binary precisely because we have codified more and more of what makes us moral, including our ability to understand why a social being might understandably behave in a self-centred way, not because they do not care, but because there are ample circumstances in which the selfish need is overwhelming to the detriment of both reason and sociality.

What I can't be morally culpable for is unforeseeable events — Kenosha Kid

And your child suffering is an "unforseeable event"? Seems pretty forseeable to me. Sure you can't forsee exactly what form of suffering awaits but you know in all likelihood some form does. And that's never stopped things from being wrong.

Is dumping someone in a jungle full of predators in their sleep wrong? I think we can agree it is, even though we can't predict if they'll be eaten by a lion, a hyena or a leopard, or if they will survive. Simply subjecting someone to a risk requires some justificaiton normally. What would be that justification in the case of children?

Can you give an example of a 100% certain debilitating disease? — Kenosha Kid

If both parents have a hereditary genetic disease their child will have a hereditary genetic disease. You would have to rely on a mutation for that not to happen so fine, it's not 100%, but maybe 99%

This isn't about general belief. There is no natural reason to become a Christian. There are *cultural* reasons. However there are natural reasons to adopt some of Mr. Christ's arguments, insofar as they accord with the specific drives and capacities that nature has selected for us to make us social, and in turn moral. — Kenosha Kid

So a "natural reason" would be if I adopt a belief because I have a specific drive that nature selected for me to make me social and in turn moral.

And I am claiming that there is a specific drive coded within us to be able to project into the future and not subject someone to harm. For example, couples that don't have children upon being informed that they have hidden genes which could result in debilitating illnesses. How do you explain that behavior? It is not scarcity that is making them not have the child there. So I think it is reasonable to claim that we have this instinct. Giving a natrual reason to adopt AN.

As for humans, the biological reasons for reduced fertility are sufficient. — Kenosha Kid

See above. It is not.

Childlessness itself can be a form of suffering and, just as I would perfectly understand why a starving man would steal a loaf of bread, I would perfectly understand why a childless person in poverty would have a child. — Kenosha Kid

But if the starving man produces another starving man by stealing said loaf of bread I think we can agree the starving man (original) is wrong. Understandble? Yes. I might (probably, actually) even have done the same thing. But still wrong.

I am not saying that having children is not understandable. I am saying it is immoral.

but because there are ample circumstances in which the selfish need is overwhelming to the detriment of both reason and sociality. — Kenosha Kid

Sure. We call those cases moral failures. I did not say that they do not deserve empathy or that they should be punished for it. We are debating purely on a moral level here, not on the level of what people actually end up doing. For all my talk of ethics I do wrong things sometimes. However, when I do something wrong but understandable, it is still wrong.

And your child suffering is an "unforseeable event"? — khaled

My child suffering is not an "event" at all. My child suffering a car crash when she is 17 at a particular time and place due to a drunk driver coming the other way is an event.

Is dumping someone in a jungle full of predators in their sleep wrong? I think we can agree it is, even though we can't predict if they'll be eaten by a lion, a hyena or a leopard, or if they will survive. — khaled

If my intention was that they be eaten by a predator, then it is not accidental if they are eaten by a predator. If they are not eaten by a predator, my actions were still immoral because that's what I intended, whether I was successful or not. If my intent was to save their life before the plane crashed, then the plane landed safely and that person was eaten by a predator, it is extremely unfortunate but I would not consider myself *morally* culpable. My actions were morally sound (save the life of this person by removing them from *this* harm) even if the outcomes were far from ideal.

And I am claiming that there is a specific drive coded within us to be able to project into the future and not subject someone to harm. — khaled

That should be based on scientific evidence.

See above. It is not. — khaled

See above: it is! ;)

But if the starving man produces another starving man by stealing said loaf of bread I think we can agree the starving man (original) is wrong. — khaled

I would not. I would not consider a starving man a moral agent at all. If they had the wherewithal to, say, kick a random child in the face, they clearly aren't that starving. The question for me would be: is it reasonable to assume that their drive to survive was sufficiently overriding to consider them incapable of moral decisions?

That someone else starved is unfortunate, but I wouldn't consider the thief morally culpable even though the existence of that thief was clearly a causal factor because, as I said, such a judgement demonstrates a failure to be a moral being.

Our morals are derived from biological traits evolved in small hunter-gatherer groups a long time ago. Those groups were egalitarian. If they ate, they ate together. Starvation would likely have destroyed the coherence of that group, putting it on a pre-social basis. This seems reasonable to me: there is no point in every individual starving if the fittest can survive.

However, if the cause of the poverty that kills one or other of the men is one or more human agents, i.e. not just an environmental fluke, then moral culpability is likely to be found. This is the case in my society in which people are kept poor by a privileged minority who remove capital from circulation for personal benefit (power) and the legislators who enable them. If such an event occurred in my society, that's who I'd point the finger at, since their behaviour is antisocial through choice, not through desperation.

One can argue that this is true in almost every society where it is possible to help the poor, even societies not our own. The logical conclusion in the application of natural moral instinct in an international society is to treat everyone as part of your group, treat them how you would wish to be treated. What we see generally is a willingness to exploit the advantages of globalisation while snorting at the responsibilities. I see this as no different to a person exploiting someone from their own village or family.

I am not saying that having children is not understandable. I am saying it is immoral. — khaled

I did not say that they do not deserve empathy or that they should be punished for it. We are debating purely on a moral level here, not on the level of what people actually end up doing. — khaled

And I'm saying that empathy is not separable from morality. It is irrational to understand that, in their shoes, you would have likely done the same and at the same time say they were wrong. And if you fail to do the former, the immorality is yours, not theirs.

If my intention was that they be eaten by a predator, then it is not accidental if they are eaten by a predator. — Kenosha Kid

What if your intention was to teach them survival. No they are not you dependents nor is there any reason to do so, but your intention is not malicious, you never intended for them to get harmed. Now what? Is it wrong or not?

If my intent was to save their life before the plane crashed, then the plane landed safely and that person was eaten by a predator, it is extremely unfortunate but I would not consider myself *morally* culpable. My actions were morally sound (save the life of this person by removing them from *this* harm) even if the outcomes were far from ideal. — Kenosha Kid

Sure no one is disagreeing there. You took them from a position where they were definitely dead to a position where they might still be dead. That's good. But what if your intent was never to harm, but you put them in harm's way anyways (as in in a position that is worse that the one they were in). Does that make it acceptable?

See above: it is! ;) — Kenosha Kid

That should be based on scientific evidence. — Kenosha Kid

I was referring to the couples that don't have children after learning that they are likely to have a severe genetic illness. Even if they can afford to care for them. How do you explain that behavior?

If such an event occurred in my society, that's who I'd point the finger at, since their behaviour is antisocial through choice, not through desperation. — Kenosha Kid

But if they're psychopaths, which many are, then they're not culpable per your own words... So now what? Are they no longer doing anything wrong?

It is irrational to understand that, in their shoes, you would have likely done the same and at the same time say they were wrong. — Kenosha Kid

There is no contradiction there so there is nothing irrational about it. I am not a perfect being. I do wrong things. That doesn't make the wrong things not wrong. I don't see why you want to join the ideal that is morality with the reality. If you want to say that arguing about ideals is impractical, people will still have kids, and starving people will still steal, sure, I don't really care though. I am talking about it because it's fun to talk about is all.

What if your intention was to teach them survival. No they are not you dependents nor is there any reason to do so, but your intention is not malicious, you never intended for them to get harmed. Now what? Is it wrong or not? — khaled

For the actor to intend them not to be harmed, they would have to be mentally deficient enough to not consider that the lesson was more lethal than that which the subject might expect to face. Or, alternatively, belong to a culture in which teaching this lesson is held as crucial. In the former case, we're likely not describing a moral agent; in the latter, there are other examples.

Human sacrifice is one I've brought up before, in which the belief is that the disputed act is essential to the survival of the group as a whole and all of the individuals within it. Homicide was a grave (haha) crime in Aztec law, so this matches Kierkegaard's description of a teleological suspension of ethics. The root error is not a moral one, but one of fact.

Another pertinent example is how religions propagate. Parents usually indoctrinate their children almost from birth, which hugely skews the child's ability to determine the validity of their own beliefs, which in turn makes it harder to discern reality from fiction. Religion is hardly alone in this, but it is the most pronounced example, especially given the fears often instilled in those children for even questioning their beliefs in the face of contrary evidence, sound argument, or a disagreeable consensus.

I would consider both cultures bad in the sense that they are antisocial: they lead to the pointless murder and brainwashing of innocent people respectively. However the individuals perpetrating the acts are themselves products of the cultures that insist upon them, and thus are blameless.

I have heard of cultures in which adolescent boys are sent into the wild for a spell of time to learn how to survive, however I'm not sure how accurate these are. One example I've heard of is some Australian aboriginal tribes, where there is definite risk, such as spider or snake bites, but not the sort of risk where one might expect the lesson to be more lethal than real life. I could only conjecture on this because I'm not sure it's accurate. It seems to me illogical to send an inexperienced person out alone to face dangers that they are likely to overcome later based on experience and safety in numbers. It seems, therefore, contrary to what it is to be social, but then cultures often are. Were it true, I would not judge them morally, but like the other two examples, I wouldn't mourn the loss of the culture.

I can't think of any other scenario in which it can be logically possible for a person to drastically reduce the odds of another person surviving in order to teach them survival. It seems such a stupid idea, either the person involved is a moral idiot, or they emerge from a stupid culture I'd rather see perish.

But what if your intent was never to harm, but you put them in harm's way anyways. Does that make it acceptable? — khaled

I'm not sure what you mean. Can you flesh out the example? Or does the above cover it?

I was referring to the couples that don't have children after learning that they are likely to have a severe genetic illness. Even if they can afford to care for them. How do you explain that behavior? — khaled

Oh I see. That's not too mysterious. If you can make a rational decision, then you are not that desperate. For instance, if you are starving but think, "No, I shouldn't steal that load in case my victim also starves to death" than you are clearly capable of rational decision making. That's admirable, but it doesn't follow that every starving person is in the same state.

But if they're psychopaths, which many are, then they're not culpable per your own words... So now what? Are they no longer doing anything wrong? — khaled

It's a good question. Psychopaths are edge-cases, and edge-cases depend all the more on specifics. We cannot have evolved to handle psychopaths precisely because they are edge cases. Nature has nothing to say about them and so in a way are also not moral objects as well as not being moral subjects. I assume that, in pre-agricultural times, psychopaths would have been treated exactly the same as any other antisocial element and been promptly killed or exiled.

What do we do with the knowledge about psychopathy? It seems to me that we cannot generally hold them morally culpable for the actions they take (although see below), and so we cannot in good conscience punish them beyond that which is strictly necessary to safeguard society. What say we put them under house arrest, but in a grand penthouse suite with the best luxuries of life? Instinctively, it seems abhorrent, but that's because, like our ancestors, we struggle to see them as anything other than moral agents. In a way, it's the equivalent of not being able to comprehend death or the void. But there's no moral or rational reason to punish them.

However, I did say it depends on specifics. A person capable of cognitive empathy but incapable of emotional empathy is hungry (not starving) and steals the bread of another starving man... It seems reasonable to me that the psychopath could not be expected to understand that his need (hunger) was less than his crime (theft). If he then killed someone who was about to report him to the police in order to safeguard his liberty, that is horrific but still understandable: his ethical crime, from his point of view, was simply to break a social rule for the sake of something vital to himself (a teleological suspension of entirely abstract ethics). I see no moral culpability.

But if he pushed a child of a cliff to enjoy the sound of her screams... There we might have common ground on. There is no perceived need, and he knows that's wrong on an intellectual level. That has more in common with a normal person hurting others for pleasure, so we might have common ground there. Such a person would certainly be a monster, and the question of the extent of his moral culpability seems rather moot. Happy to talk it out though.

There is no contradiction there so there is nothing irrational about it. I am not a perfect being. I do wrong things. That doesn't make the wrong things not wrong. I don't see why you want to join the ideal that is morality with the reality. If you want to say that arguing about ideals is impractical, people will still have kids, and starving people will still steal, sure, I don't really care though. — khaled

And this is why I think we have very different ideas of what morality is. Yours is quite old school, in which if you broke the law you're immoral and that's that. Mine is somewhat more new-school, in which one considers a broader range of factors in determining culpability (e.g. self-defence laws). I think that progression in law is an effect of our natural morality refining less sophisticated approximations to what constitutes moral culpability. We are becoming more understanding, not just as to the causes of immoral behaviour, but even about the nature of moral culpability itself.

Or we were, until Trump started executing mentally handicapped offenders again.

I am talking about it because it's fun to talk about is all. — khaled

Yeah man, and interesting too.

For the actor to intend them not to be harmed, they would have to be mentally deficient enough to not consider that the lesson was more lethal than that which the subject might expect to face. — Kenosha Kid

But it is not any more lethal. What if the kidnapper believes that a man's worth is measured by their ability to survive in the wild and therefore if you die there he didn't kill anyone because you are not a man. Or some other such insane notion. Is he now blameless?

Or does the above cover it? — Kenosha Kid

It does.

It seems such a stupid idea, either the person involved is a moral idiot, or they emerge from a stupid culture I'd rather see perish. — Kenosha Kid

Either way, blameless though, right? Damn I don't know what to do with that. I think you might just be a non-starter for me. I don't think you can ever say anyone did anything wrong with your system.

But if he pushed a child of a cliff to enjoy the sound of her screams... There we might have common ground on. There is no perceived need — Kenosha Kid

The line between a need and a want is very very blurry. It is not clear he did not have a need. A good enough lawyer can drum one up. Which is why I'd be terrified if your system was more widely adopted.

Oh I see. That's not too mysterious. If you can make a rational decision, then you are not that desperate. For instance, if you are starving but think, "No, I shouldn't steal that load in case my victim also starves to death" than you are clearly capable of rational decision making. That's admirable, but it doesn't follow that every starving person is in the same state. — Kenosha Kid

So in the case of food, we show an ability to emphasize and therefore we do not steal other people's food so they don't starve since we don't need it ourselves. But when I propose that similar reasoning is being employed in the case of birth, you insist that no, we do not have any drives there. That makes no sense. If we truly couldn't care less about the state of the child after they were born. If that were truly not a factor at all, as you claim, then couples should not care at all about genetic counseling results. But they do. Showing that there is, in fact, a natural instinct behind AN.

Yours is quite old school, in which if you broke the law you're immoral and that's that. — Kenosha Kid

Not exactly the law but I get what you're saying.

Anyways I don't think this is going anywhere anymore and will likely fizzle out. I don't think I can talk about AN with a guy that thinks ritualistic sacrifice is blameless and having chidlren with severe handicaps is ok. The only outstanding point we may reach a consensus on is whether or not AN has a natural instinct behind it. I made my case here.

For my view: I recognize the psychopath may have not known any better when he killed the guy trying to report him. I recognize there is no moral ground on which I can stand on to claim that he should be imprisoned or executed. I still think he should be imprisoned or executed. You attempt to "meet people at their level" both in the principles involved and in the reaction to those principles. As in, in the absence of shared moral premises, no one can be blamed, and no one should be punished. I don't think so. I am fully aware that the psychopath would see this as an injustice and I don't care. Tribal? Barbaric? Unjust? Maybe.

Anyways I'm going to bed now.

@Isaac Observe how I stopped upon finding premises we don't agree on.

But it is not any more lethal. — khaled

Then what is the difference in risk between that and sending them to the shops?

What if the kidnapper believes that a man's worth is measured by their ability to survive in the wild and therefore if you die there he didn't kill anyone because you are not a man. — khaled

This again sounds like the teleological suspension of ethics of a deranged individual. Again, if there is no cultural explanation, I would presume the culprit to be out of their frickin gourd. By your own description, the culprit believes themselves to be doing good by their victim. He's clearly a monster, but too insane to be held morally culpable.

Either way, blameless though, right? — khaled

Morally, not causally or lawfully. A moral idiot by definition cannot be held morally responsible, it would be paradoxical to do so. And people are not to blame for being raised in a given culture. There are lots of horrid practices in many cultures. Genital mutilation is abhorrent, but you cannot hold that a person raised in a culture in which it is seen as morally obligatory is immoral for enacting it.

The line between a need and a want is very very blurry. — khaled

Differentiating them from a third person perspective, yes it is. Unless we start monitoring everyone's biological markers at all times, it's difficult to say whether someone's biological needs were overriding. I'm in favour of the benefit of the doubt. Or monitoring everyone's biological markers at all time. :)

Which is why I'd be terrified if your system was more widely adopted. — khaled

It is widely adopted. We have the presumption of innocence and concepts like diminished responsibility and temporary insanity for this reason.

So in the case of food, we show an ability to emphasize and therefore we do not steal other people's food so they don't starve since we don't need it ourselves. — khaled

If we are not driven by an overriding need to eat, yes. A person who has their full faculties at their disposal naturally has their social faculties at their disposal, and acting against them would be wilfully antisocial, with their full culpability. But we should not pretend that this is always the case. A starving person will often not have their full faculties at their disposal and cannot therefore be held as culpable as if they did. This seems as perverse to me as making a limbless pupil swim.

If that were truly not a factor at all, as you claim, then couples should not care at all about genetic counseling results. But they do. Showing that there is, in fact, a natural instinct behind AN. — khaled

The above is tantamount to saying that because a starving person has diminished responsibility, we should see everyone stealing food whether they're starving or just peckish. That's clearly not logically defensible.

The only outstanding point we may reach a consensus on is whether or not AN has a natural instinct behind it. — khaled

That is quite trivial to treat. Nature cannot have selected for a drive to not reproduce. At best it has selected to reduce, not eliminate, reproduction when the cost of reproduction outweighs the benefit to the genome, which is not a social trait.

I recognize there is no moral ground on which I can stand on to claim that he should be imprisoned or executed. I still think he should be imprisoned or executed. — khaled

There is a watertight pragmatic case for the former. I think most people these days would view the latter as barbaric and immoral. But this the constant battle, isn't it?

It's been interesting talking with you. The great thing about sites like this is that, in day-to-day life, we tend to assume we have typical opinions and beliefs because they shape who we surround ourselves with and they in turn shape those opinions and beliefs.

We seem equally startled by each others' beliefs and assumptions, a good consciousness raiser if nothing else.

@khaled I still think the game scenario is the best analogy. It's as if after being kidnapped into the game, the person was like "But I prepared you for the game, didn't I?" This seems to be enough to go ahead and create a new player for the game.

The rest is pretty much semantic mumbo jumbo.. Consequences for a future person are seen as not legitimate because you cannot know the proximate cause for each and every harm. I'm not sure why aggregating "All Harm in an Individual's Lifetime" doesn't compute. That someone was not put in a position where a lifetime's worth of harm could take place is one formulation of the principle. That someone was not put into a game that cannot be consented is another principle in the same realm. Both are valid. The excuse that the parent is preparing the person to play the game well, and that reasonable amounts of harm are okay to inflict unnecessarily on someone underlies a lot of this too.

@khaled On a deeper, existential level, a lot of people put stock in the game itself. Thus, it's not the dignity of the person being compromised by overlooking harm created on its behalf, but an "opportunity" to experience the game, for good or bad. And somehow that's all that matters. It's quasi-religious, even if not based on religion. There is a cause here of some higher "meaning" in playing the game and trying to withstand whatever the game has to offer. This game must be played, don't you see?

Then what is the difference in risk between that and sending them to the shops? — Kenosha Kid

That you need to send them to the shops to buy food because you're busy. If you're not busy you should do it yourself. Sending kids to random places for no reason is wrong and irresponsible.

Crucially, they need the thing you're sending them to buy. If they don't then sending them to buy it is wrong. You can ask them as a favor but you can't force them to. Unlike in the hunting example where you can't really argue people need to be able to survive.

He's clearly a monster, but too insane to be held morally culpable. — Kenosha Kid

That's the non starter bit for me. I would say he is a monster, and so we will hold him morally culpable.

A moral idiot by definition cannot be held morally responsible, it would be paradoxical to do so — Kenosha Kid

I don't see the paradox.

but you cannot hold that a person raised in a culture in which it is seen as morally obligatory is immoral for enacting it. — Kenosha Kid

Watch me :cool:

I wouldn't hold them accounable if they never gave it any thought. However if they did think about it, and chose to ignore good arguments against it just to maintain their culture, I would hold them accountable.

monitoring everyone's biological markers at all time — Kenosha Kid

Idk what this means but ok. What's the biological marker for "Satan forced me to do it"

We have the presumption of innocence and concepts like diminished responsibility and temporary insanity for this reason. — Kenosha Kid

But if a terrorist blows up a store because God told him to we don't spare HIM do we? Just saying that we do not forgive everything, even though by your model, we should forgive that terrorist because of his culture.

A starving person will often not have their full faculties at their disposal and cannot therefore be held as culpable as if they did. — Kenosha Kid

But you can never know that. What if they did have their full faculties and CHOSE to be evil? I know I used to do that occasionally as a kid. Even now sometimes in small doses, like flaming teammates in online games despite knowing that they're not actually trolling.

Nature cannot have selected for a drive to not reproduce. — Kenosha Kid

It is not a drive not to reproduce. We have a drive to reproduce. And a drive to empathise, or to not do harm or whatever you wanna call it. I am arguing that that drive to empathise is what is behind AN. The couple that chooses not to have a disabled kid despite being able to afford it are not doing so because of a drive not to reproduce but because of a drive to empathise. And they are not doing so out of practical scarcity as you claim.

This drive to empathise extends to people who don't yet exist. Which is why I bet you would find someone who genetically modifies their child to be blind despite them having been fine otherwise because "I want a blind child" disgusting. Our capacity to empathise can be projected into the future, for better or worse (I think better), and that is what leads to AN.

The above is tantamount to saying that because a starving person has diminished responsibility, we should see everyone stealing food whether they're starving or just peckish. — Kenosha Kid

What do you do when peckish people insist they are starving? Maybe in that case it's not too hard to disprove. But what do you do when the lawyer uses that insistence to claim madness?

I don't think we're diametrically opposed or anything. I think we are just on different points in a spectrum of moral culpability. I think people have their capacities intact most of the time, and when they don't I think people that treat others unfairly relinquish their right to be treated fairly. That's perhaps where we disagree.

The psychopath did not think about the guy he killed, so I won't think about the psychopath. And the psychopath has no moral ground to stand on to claim I should do otherwise. Same with the starving man. I think forgiveness is a virtue, not a necessity. One I try to have as much as often but I don't think I can forgive a psychopath who kills someone close to me. I don't know if I really want to. There must be SOME reason nature selected for the "revenge instinct" right? Maybe it's just an artifact in the modern world. Sounds like a new OP.

In a sense though, your view seems somewhat self-defeating now that I think about it. We know people have an instinct to take revenge. So when a psychopath kills someone out of not being able to understand that his actions are wrong, why is he excused, while if we can agree to execute said psychopath because we do not have our full faculties at our disposal (due to aforementioned desire for revenge) we cannot be excused? If you take this desire for revenge into account, then it seems that your view is practically no different from mine. I am not morally culpable in wanting the psychopath dead (holding him morally culpable) because I do not have my full faculties at the time.

There is a cause here of some higher "meaning" in playing the game and trying to withstand whatever the game has to offer. This game must be played, don't you see? — schopenhauer1

:up:

As I said to echarimon:

The idea that "mankind" and other such concepts should be favored over a single human's actual concrete suffering. Things like "For the country" "For mankind", etc always rubbed me the wrong way. If you can't point me to a person getting harmed, then I couldn't care less about "the country being harmed" or "going against mankind's interests". — khaled

That seems to be what it comes down to as usual. I give it a month before we get another thread and do the same song and dance again though. At least the dance is fun, sometimes...

I wouldn't hold them accounable if they never gave it any thought. However if they did think about it, and chose to ignore good arguments against it just to maintain their culture, I would hold them accountable. — khaled

I don't think this is an apt description of culture. You seem to characterise cultural modes as suspended pending justification. Rather, the justification is presumed. The believer has already been taught, over and over, that the mode is right.

Idk what this means but ok. — khaled

If a person has an overriding biological need, e.g. starvation or childlessness, it ought to be biologically evident.

But if a terrorist blows up a store because God told him to we don't spare HIM do we? — khaled

So here we're in the terrain of bad ideology. The terrorist and I disagree on what the moral thing to do is. Jihad is not a teleological suspension of ethics: it is an ethic in and of itself. Within a jihadist culture, there's no moral ambiguity. They are at war with western capitalism.

There seems to me little point in pointing one's finger at the jihadist individual when such individuals are an inevitability because of a broader culture they are not responsible for. The fault lies with that culture, which is not a moral agent.

The culture is antisocial for a large number of reasons. Such a culture could arise spontaneously but I'd wager that, when you see an antisocial culture, there is a corresponding power that accounts for it. Power is intrinsically antisocial, since it is intrinsically non-egalitarian, but also inevitable in post-agricultural society. Those who employ their power for grossly antisocial ends are immoral imo.

Again, this isn't a new idea. With the exception of the Holocaust, we have typically *not* held the violent actor morally culpable for the decisions of their leaders. The hijackers who downed the WTC were likely not immoral people: they did what they thought was good. The moral culpability lay with the persons who used their power to corrupt the "martyrs'" minds imo.

Nonetheless, terrorists are are danger to our society and many others. Irrespective of who is to blame, it is our social duty to at protect ourselves against them.

What do you do when peckish people insist they are starving? — khaled

If you know they are peckish then you have evidence they are behaving immorally. Do you presume the accused guilty until proven innocent or vice versa? I'm of the latter persuasion. If it is reasonable that the thief was desperate, they should not be considered morally culpable.

The psychopath did not think about the guy he killed, so I won't think about the psychopath. — khaled

It's not an unreasonable conclusion, but it is wilfully inconsistent with what makes us moral in the first place. But like I said, part of what makes us social is an intolerance toward antisocial elements. Psychopaths can be considered antisocial elements by default, insofar as they can't behave sociably. (Well, they can, it's just a lot harder and therefore less likely.)

We know people have an instinct to take revenge. So when a psychopath kills someone out of not being able to understand that his actions are wrong, why is he excused, while if we can agree to execute said psychopath because we do not have our full faculties at our disposal (due to aforementioned desire for revenge) we cannot be excused? — khaled

I did not say we could not. If a psychopath killed my partner, I likely would try to kill them because that asocial desire for retribution would be overriding. And I think that would be a deciding factor in my trial, in my country at least.

If a person has an overriding biological need, e.g. starvation or childlessness, it ought to be biologically evident. — Kenosha Kid

Those two things are are far from the same category of dire need, and one is affecting the whole lifetime of another person. The other simply means one needs to eat something

Those two things are are far from the same category of dire need — schopenhauer1

How so? We're not talking rational decision-making here, we're talking biological imperative.

Cool but I'm more interested in your response to this

This drive to empathise extends to people who don't yet exist. Which is why I bet you would find someone who genetically modifies their child to be blind despite them having been fine otherwise because "I want a blind child" disgusting. Our capacity to empathise can be projected into the future, for better or worse (I think better), and that is what leads to AN. — khaled

But causing it in the first place is fine? Why? And why is it fine sometimes and not fine in others? — khaled

That seems to be a weird question, honestly. I don't think you want to discuss individual scenarios and decide whether this or that is moral or immoral. But apart from that I can't think of a meaningful answer to your question other than "because my moral philosophy says some things are fine and others are not".

If causing suffering were somehow absolutely permitted, noone could function. We'd all have to lock ourselves into rooms for fear of stepping on someone's toes. Perhaps you mean some specific, qualified kind of suffering?

I don’t see this as very weird though. That we find different risks morally acceptable is normal. We make laws out of the ones we agree on. — khaled

I just think it's important to be aware that this is not a mathematical operation. There is no quantifiable amuont of risk that is automatically unacceptable.

Generally speaking though, if X * Y is greater than the suffering alleviated from the person committing the act then the act is wrong. We can debate how big X and Y are in each case, but more often than not it’s clear which is greater (X*Y or the suffering alleviated from the actor) — khaled

I don't think this works. Not least because I see no way to quantify suffering unless you have already decided - based on some other system - what importance to attach to different kinds of suffering. We don't consider heartbreak the same as we consider physical pain, and this isn't based on the actual consequences or the experienced severity of either kind of suffering.

This approach seems to elevate suffering to the ultimate moral arbiter - life is about inflicting as little suffering as possible while experiencing as little as possible yourself. I don't find that a very convincing view, because it makes one the slave of circumstances. Everything turns into an optimization problem, leaving no room for the self.

Exactly. And the reasons aren’t good enough for me. If you discard “the benefit of mankind” I don’t see how you can possibly argue that they are. — khaled

This seems slightly contradictory to me though. If you don't accept "mankind" in some form as having moral weight, why care at all about the suffering we cause for others, especially those that otherwise would not even exist?

Sure. I would say dependents are special. Because it is the job of the parent to make sure they suffer as little as possible, since they’re the ones the brought them here. And so they’re allowed to force them to do things for their benefit. — khaled

I don't really follow the logic here. Why would dependents have some special moral status where you are allowed to do thing to them in the interest of reducing overall suffering, but you cannot do the same thing for non-dependent people?

But what I was getting at was forcing people to do things that YOU like, without knowing whether or not they will. In the example I assume the person tied up is not your dependent and you do not know if they’ll like the game or not. Sure, they may end up enjoying it, but we don’t just take that risk with people who are not our dependents. Ever. And even with dependents we are very careful. — khaled

That's assuming a very specific motivation for having kids though, which strikes me as constructed. I am not saying having children for any arbitrary reason is fine. And as with all examples of this kind, it runs into the problem that it's not the parent taking away the choice to either experience something or not. The experience is necessary and unavoidable.

And you cannot argue in the case of having children that existing is good for the non-existent potential child (because they don’t exist!). So you are taking a gamble, like with the tying up example. Sure the game is pretty good and has few complaints, but is that a good enough reason to force people to play it? Not unless you want to bring in the survival of mankind as a good in itself I don’t think you can argue it is. — khaled

If you want to argue that creating people is "forcing" them to exist, you have to treat non-existant potential children as if they exist. This is a "have your cake and eat it" scenario.

And what would those be? The duties. — khaled

For example to provide your children with the emotional support they need to fully develop their own self, and to provide the necessary material support that your children will not be so preoccupied with survival that they cannot develop their own interests.

And I never get why people are always willing to claim that having children is wrong sometimes but never actually go into detail on when. It happens every time around here. — khaled

I kinda consider it a trap question. There is no way to answer it in a way that cannot be then criticised on the details, and that would lead to discussion of some specific scenario in place of the general question. It's also going to be impossible to give a list of scenarios that is in any way exhaustive, so I prefer to stick to general and vague principles when the discussion is about antinatalism as a general stance - i.e. having children is always bad, regardless of the circumstances.

This drive to empathise extends to people who don't yet exist. — khaled

It simply doesn't. Cognitive empathy is driven by the activation of mirror neurons throughout the brain in response to stimuli before the person in question. An abstract potential future human can not be an object of empathy.

An abstract potential future human can not be an object of empathy. — Kenosha Kid

Then why do we find someone who genetically engineers their child to be blind repulsive? What's the drive there? Or are you saying we don't?

But apart from that I can't think of a meaningful answer to your question other than "because my moral philosophy says some things are fine and others are not". — Echarmion

Well maybe "When X happens it's ok but otherwise it's not". Any sort of condition at all. Instead of "just decide on a case by case basis".

I just think it's important to be aware that this is not a mathematical operation. There is no quantifiable amuont of risk that is automatically unacceptable. — Echarmion

That's exaclty what my quote was saying. We find different amounts unacceptable. But there is large agreement on them.

you have already decided - based on some other system - what importance to attach to different kinds of suffering — Echarmion

This. And we decide slightly differently but largely similarly.

Everything turns into an optimization problem, leaving no room for the self. — Echarmion

I don't see what the self has to do with anything.

life is about inflicting as little suffering as possible while experiencing as little as possible yourself. — Echarmion

No, you're free to experience as much suffering as you want to. So it just becomes "You should inflict as little suffering as possible". I don't really think that's a new or unreasonable view. Heck I'd say you'd agree with it if it wasn't put in this context.

If you don't accept "mankind" in some form as having moral weight, why care at all about the suffering we cause for others — Echarmion

Because humans suffer but "mankind" doesn't. Often when we say something bad happened to "mankind" we mean that something bad happened to certain people. But sometimes not. Sometimes we forget that "mankind" is just a concept that can't suffer. Like in the case of birth. If everyone decides tomorrow to have as few children as possible so as to lead to the extinction of mankind slowly while maintaining quality of life, then "mankind" certainly suffers, but people don't. It is in these scenarios where I find appeals to "mankind's suffering" disgusting. When no person is actually suffering and the concept is treated as a person.

The concept was designed as a shorthand, but when it becomes its own thing you get situations where people do things for "mankind" or "for the country" even though not a single member of mankind or the country actually wants the things. And those are bad situations.

I don't really follow the logic here. Why would dependents have some special moral status where you are allowed to do thing to them in the interest of reducing overall suffering, but you cannot do the same thing for non-dependent people? — Echarmion

Because for dependents you are partially responsible for all their suffering. So it is your responsibility to mitigate it as much as possible. For non-dependents you are not responsible for their suffering so it is not your responsibility to mitigate it.

If you want to argue that creating people is "forcing" them to exist, you have to treat non-existant potential children as if they exist. This is a "have your cake and eat it" scenario. — Echarmion

False. "Forcing" maybe not the right word, but whatever word you want to use it must include: Putting them in a situation where they might suffer that is very difficult to get out for selfish reasons without asking. I find "forcing" fits the bill the best. If you don't like the word then just replace it with "Putting them in a situation where they might suffer that is very difficult to get out for selfish reasons without asking"

I kinda consider it a trap question. There is no way to answer it in a way that cannot be then criticised on the details, and that would lead to discussion of some specific scenario in place of the general question. — Echarmion

If the discussion of the specific scenario leads to a counterintuitive conclusion that may be a sign that the answer might have to be changed. So if your answer makes it so that having children is wrong on tuesdays, then maybe the answer has to be changed. But I don't see what's weird about participating in that discussion because it is exactly how we test any moral premise ever. We test it till it breaks then we find a better one. Idk why no one is willing to do that from your side.

I'm starting to see similarities of these bad arguments with Trump supporters who by saying something a certain amount of times somehow makes a claim true. So, Trump keeps saying the elections were stolen. Pro-natalists keep saying that one cannot consider the harms that may befall a future individual because they will only exist in the future and don't exist currently. If they know what they are doing, it's a red herring. If they don't, it's simply a denial that one can affect a person in the future (that "will" exist rather than someone that "does" exist now). Somehow future tense doesn't compute with these people and their arguments suffer for it. I suspect it's more of the former.. they know it's true, but red herring is easier to obfuscate and put up a smokescreen for a couple posts to not argue the heart of the suffering/consent argument.