That this will involve suffering on the part of the children. — Echarmion
I think it's sufficient that you want to have children and honestly judge that you can give them the necessary love and resources in order to allow them to become active members of a free and equal society. — Echarmion
I think I'll just not be convinced that the suffering is simply bad. — Echarmion
To think that antinatalism is any different than any other moral principle in this regard, would be special pleading to make antinatalism seem extraordinarily out of place with ethical principles. — schopenhauer1
It’s tiring seeing all these “You didn’t give me a reason to believe your premise” arguments. That’s true of every moral theory, why do you expect it here? — khaled
Oh. Interesting. So you’ll actually consider it as a harm. So then: what is the justification? — khaled
So why is it in this case you find it acceptable to cause harm as long as the harm causer is confident he can help out after the fact? What’s the justification? — khaled
That’s not what’s being said. What’s being said is that inflicting suffering without justification is simply bad. — khaled
You haven’t actually given any examples where you think it’s acceptable short of birth itself which makes me suspect you agree — khaled
And moreover, this principle does NOT result from or result in “suffering is always a negative”. I agree with you that suffering is sometimes required (I make a distinction between suffering and pain, and think pain is required, but that’s nitpicky and out of scope of the reply) and that it is necessary for growth. That does not give me the privilege to go around causing it Willy nilly. — khaled
What I find good, and what I am justified in causing to others are two separate things — khaled
I said suffering, not harm. And as I already wrote, I consider this merely a statement of fact, not a moral issue. — Echarmion
I did give you the reason. What else is necessary to turn this reason into a justification? — Echarmion
That seems to be saying the same thing. — Echarmion
I did. Causing heartbreak. Doing risks sports. Driving a car. — Echarmion
The principle I recognise here is "don't do things willy nilly", not "do not cause suffering". — Echarmion
"Good" is a label I attach to actions, not outcomes, so I don't really agree. — Echarmion
Any other situations where someone can cause another to suffer and it’s not a moral issue? — khaled
That the reason should not be useable to make ridiculous things moral. As I said, if A is thinking of causing B to suffer, it is not enough that that A intends to help out B after the fact in order for A to be justified in causing the suffering. — khaled
They’re not at all the same. “Suffering is not always bad” is entirely consistent with “Inflicting suffering without consent is always bad”. Therefore they cannot be the same. — khaled
Again, what you find good and what you’re justified in doing to others are two different things — khaled
Where is the line that defines when causing suffering is Willy nilly and when it isn’t? — khaled
It's not willy nilly if you act according to a principle that can be universalised — Echarmion
I answered this question a couple of times now. Not sure what else I can say. — Echarmion
If you're thinking about morality as a set of general reasons that can be applied to any given situation regardless of circumstance, like the 10 commandments, what you and I think of as morality is nothing alike. — Echarmion
Which is? I honestly don’t remember and I can’t find it. — khaled
So.... you DON’T have a principle that can be universalized now? I’m confused. — khaled
If one disregards the concept of consent in procreation that’s fine I guess (depending on what bullets you want to bite) but people are going to be affected. I don’t see why it’s popular here — Albero
I have a method to check principles. — Echarmion
There is no one principle that can be universalised. You figure it out by using something like Kant's categorical imperative, or Rawls "veil of ignorance". You ask yourself whether or not you can imaginge all of humanity as acting as you do, and then see if this results in a) an obvious contradiction and b) a world you would want to life in regardless of how and where you lived. — Echarmion
It is also wrong to unnecessarily deny pleasure (or happiness or whichever feel good term you prefer) to others. — Pinprick
I think the asymmetry argument fails to do so. — Pinprick
And which of those does mine produce? — khaled
There is no cutoff to causal chains, so you're never going to be able to predict the suffering you cause with any certainty. — Echarmion
If we're going with something more malleable like "never take actions that will cause forseeable suffering greater than the forseeable suffering they prevent" — Echarmion
and if we applied that rigorously we'd be forced to do whatever the most emotionally unstable people wanted in order to avoid causing them any distress, unless and until your distress overrules theirs. — Echarmion
So if you want a PS5 I have a moral duty to buy you a new PS5 as a complete stranger? — khaled
But even if we were to say people have a duty not to deny others pleasure, AN would not violate this (incredibly weird) duty. — khaled
If you have a child you cause harm, as the result will be the existence of a child and that child will be harmed. Notice how there is actually a person being harmed in this case. However, if you do not have a child, there will be no child to deny anything. So no violations. — khaled
you just have no right to stop me from buying a PS5. — Pinprick
What makes this any weirder than preventing unnecessary harm? — Pinprick
I do see that, but you can’t claim one the one hand that not having a child prevents harm, and on the other that it doesn’t prevent pleasure as well. — Pinprick
Having a child doesn’t just cause harm, it also causes pleasure, but AN seems to want to ignore this side of the equation. — Pinprick
Non sequitor. "With any certainty". Really? Be reasonable. With some certainty. — khaled
That is literally the same thing as the above. You just changed "be sure" to "forseeable". Again showing that you can predict these things with some certainty. I don't understand why you insist on pretending we can't. — khaled
We already do that. Unless they are dependents or they consent to it we do not interfere with others, furthermore we consider it immoral to do so. Doctors don't go around forcefully "curing" people, people instead come to doctors. And if a doctor was going around forcing people to exercise for their health, we'd think he's being immoral, and he'd immediately get his license revoked. It's none of his damn business. — khaled
NOT having this principle would mean that if I deem you "unstable" I am allowed to do whatever to you to "stabilize" you without your consent, and without you being my dependent. Give me one situation where we consider that acceptable. — khaled
And "foreseeable" was the word I used to denote exactly the things we can predict. — Echarmion
You can predict the outcome of an indefinite chain of events with "some certainty"? I don't see how you could. — Echarmion
Police patrols interfere with people traveling. — Echarmion
Casting someone a sideways glance is interfering with their emotions. — Echarmion
We expect people to abide by all kinds of laws and social norms regardless of how they personally feel about doing so. — Echarmion
Mentally ill patients. — Echarmion
Is there a situation where we do something that does NOT minimize suffering of others (including yourself) and find it acceptable unless it’s dependents and it’s being done for their own good? — khaled
because you deem it to minimize suffering. — Echarmion
it seems to me you can justify any arbitrary result. — Echarmion
I don't just deem it arbitrarily. You haven't actually engaged with the argument. When do we label people as "mentally ill"? It is precisely when they start becoming a danger to themselves and others. For cases of mental illness where we find it appropriate for forcefully intervene, we are interfering because the person in question is threatening someone or is being suicidal due to impairment.
Find me a situation where we find it acceptable to label someone mentally ill and forcefully intervene in their lives when they are:
A- Not dependents.
B- Not being harmful towards anyone or themselves.
C- They did not ask us to do it. — khaled
False. Try using my system to justify murder or theft. You will fail. — khaled
I didn’t. This doesn’t violate your principle though. I have to not stop you from seeking pleasure. Sure. But that does NOT mean I have to provide anybody pleasure. Not having children isn’t stopping anyone from seeking pleasure. So this principle has no bearing on the discussion — khaled
Point is that “risky acts” (risk causing both pleasure and pain) require consent or justification normally and neither is given in the case of birth. — khaled
Well, it depends on the scenario. AN treats the unborn as potential sufferers, so you could argue that they are also potential happy beings. By not allowing them to be born, you are denying their potential happiness, just like you are denying their potential suffering. — Pinprick
Also, if you want to have a child, then doing so will likely bring you pleasure. But if you are not permitted to have a child, then your happiness is also being denied — Pinprick
I want to have a child so they can experience love, happiness, etc. — Pinprick
...So that life will continue. — Pinprick
So that I’m not made to feel like a failure. — Pinprick
Because the vast majority of people find life worth living, so the risk that my child will not is very small. — Pinprick
For murder: someone might really enjoy murdering someone, and painlessly murders a homeless person with no relations. — Echarmion
But I admit this is a fanciful and unrealistic example. — Echarmion
A hungry person steals bread from a large company store. It seems pretty evident that the suffering of being hungry outweighs any suffering anyone who works for the company feels due to the theft. — Echarmion
My point is that you don't show how any of this is related to "suffering" in the usual sense of the word. — Echarmion
Why is there no reference to the actual suffering of the person in question? — Echarmion
The way I define “harm” is “Doing to someone something they wish isn’t done to them”. And “suffering” is simply the thing you don’t wish is done to you. Idk if that answers your question.
So you are harming the homeless person even if it’s a painless death (because they don’t want to die I presume) — khaled
For one, the suffering you outlined isn't quantifiable, since it's a binary relation (something is either what you wish or it isn't) — Echarmion
some hierarchy of interests to resolve conflicts. That isn't necessarily a problem - a lot of legal systems work that way - it's just different from merely tallying up empirical suffering. — Echarmion
More to the point of the decision, if suffering and harm are ultimately about a violation of your will, and your will is how your self realizes itself in the world, then what you seem to be concerned is not so much suffering, but freedom or dignity. — Echarmion
Not really. The extent to which I wish not to die easily trumps the extent to which I wish it doesn't rain tomorrow. — khaled
How so? Sounds practically like the same thing to me. — khaled
You take it too far. Just apply the principle as it is. — khaled
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