I don't follow you. You're not engaging with the argument, it seems to me. You're just expressing a confused view.

For example, who here is 'taking an empirical object, abstracting it from time'? Nobody. So who are you addressing with that comment?

Then you say it is pointless to ask of something "it is necessary or contingent?" Well, that's obviously question begging. Avicenna thought that by asking this question we could learn something of staggering importance, namely that God exists. If you think he's mistaken, then you need to engage with his argument and say where the mistake occurs. He wasn't a fool. Why is Avicenna's argument debated to this day? Is it because it is a) rubbish, b) profound?

Then you say "it is subjective deception" What do you mean? I have no idea. And then it just disintegrates into nonsensical pseudo profundities ("Even Satanism is just an aesthetic"- what does that mean? And where's your argument?)

she is an omnipotent, .., omnibenevolent being - that is, God. — Bartricks

I'd be interested in reading how you reconcile omnipotence and omnibenevolence. I can attach meaning to omnipotence, but what (per you) does omnibenevolence mean? The (my) problem is a being who can do anything, but cannot do harm. Very likely you know I'm not the author of this problem, but rather that it is ancient.

There seems to me to be nothing inconsistent in the idea of a being who is all powerful and also perfectly good. For being perfectly good does not mean being incapable of doing bad. A perfectly good being would, after all, be fully praiseworthy for being good, yes? Otherwise she'd not be as good as she could be, for it is better to be praiseworthy for being good than not to be. If she was not capable of being bad, then she wouldn't be praiseworthy for being good - or at least, that's what my reason tells me about the matter.

So there's not even the beginning of a tension between the idea of a being who is omnipotent and omnibenevolent.

I've been admiring the heck out of your reasoning and arguments so far in this thread. But. Cannot you taste the flavor of the spice of anthropomorphic bias here and at least some of its attendant paradoxes? In concrete terms, if God is perfectly good, then there is much on earth that seems pretty close to perfectly evil that in turn, in terms of God's perfect goodness, must in fact be perfectly good. Maybe, but then what is the good?

You never provided an argument of any kind. Saying the universe doesnt have the reason for its existence in itself is sheer poetry

Not really. I just see people introducing necessity where there is none.

Let's say that John is a bachelor. Does that mean that John is incapable of having a wife? No, of course not. It just means that he doesn't actually have one. John's being a bachelor does not operate as some kind of a constraint on him. Of course, if he acquires a wife, then he will no longer qualify as a bachelor - that is, he will no longer answer to the concept. But the fact that, if he acquires a wife he will no longer be a bachelor does not mean that his being a bachelor is stopping him from acquiring a wife.

Yet when it comes to thinking about God and God's attributes there is tendency to think otherwise. So, for a person to be God, that person has to have certain attributes, namely omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence (just as, to be a bachelor, one has to be male and lack a wife). But that doesn't mean that the person of God is constrained - that would be akin to thinking that 'John-the-bachelor' is incapable of having a wife.

So, God is omnipotent, meaning that he can do anything. That includes, of course, destroying everything including himself (thus if God exists, nothing is necessary). And it includes creating stones he can't lift and doing evil. He - the person of God - can do those things. If he were to do them, then it would seem he would no longer answer to the concept of God, just as John would not answer to the concept of a bachelor if he acquired a wife(though this is not strictly true, as if God can do anything he can also do things that we think impossible, such as doing things inconsistent with being God and still answering to the concept of God - but let's put that aside). But he can do them.

So God's attributes are properties he has, but they don't bind him - that is, they do not operate to constrain him in any way. That applies as much to omnibenevolence as anything else. God is perfectly good. But that doesn't mean he 'has' to do what's right and good, it just means he 'does' do what's right and good.

As for what the quality of goodness itself is, well as God is omnipotent it must be down to God whether or not somethin is good, for if it were not then God wouldn't be omnipotent. The laws of Reason are God's to determine and the moral laws are among them, and so moral goodness is constitutively determined by God's will. That is, 'to be good' is to be being approved of by God, or something like that.

What does God's moral perfection consist in, then? Well, it consists in God fully approving of himself. That doesn't mean he 'has' to approve of himself - that somehow there is some cosmic law or force impelling him to do so. No, it just means he does, in fact, fully approve of himself.

Does this mean he's incapable of disapproving of himself? No, he can disapprove of himself, he just doesn't.

So I do not yet see any hint of tension between omnipotence and moral perfection. I just see people mistakenly thinking there is a strange force called 'necessity' at work in the world and thinking that somehow God could be subject to it - which is, of course, demonstrably confused.

I don't think you know what an argument is or what poetry is. You're correct, though, that I have not made an argument for God's existence as this thread is about Avicenna's argument.

I don't understand what you mean when you say this:

Saying the universe doesnt have the reason for its existence in itself is sheer poetry — Gregory

I could list hundreds of poetic ways of looking at the world if I wanted to take the time. They are indistinguishable from Avicenna's "argument". Even William Craig said this was the weakest argument of the arguments he uses for God. If it means something to you to believe in an omnipotent girl, that's your right. Don't be mad if others mock it as Super Girl. I would only mock it because you say I don't know God because I never searched for him\her\it. That's just like Christians who blame doubters instead of blaming Jesus for him not existing. That's messed up.

But, you should though look up Meister Eckhart's ideas on God. They seem similar to yours and you might enjoy reading on it. Have a good one

it is worthy to note that as humans - a contingent entity of the chain we are explaining or require explanation of our contingency with reference to the chain itself. It’s like the arc of a circle desiring to explain the necessity of the arc as a contingency of the whole - the circle.

Ultimately for an arc to question why it may be contingent of a circle is as pointless as a circle questioning its contingency when it is composed of arcs. In the end the contingency of either the arc or the circle is mutually contingent on One another. You cannot have the Arc of a circle without the circle and you ca not have a circle without its composing arcs.

It is a circular argument. Nature shows that causes and effects can be one and the same in the sense of natural cycles. A closed loops suggests that contingency is self contained.

Perhaps the origin of a chain requires as a prerequisite the end of that same chain. This is what we speak of when we understand frequency or vibration. I now point to the understanding that energy cannot be created or destroyed. This means whatever contingency energy Has was born by the potential of energy. Is discrete but ever cycling.

Thank you for suggesting I read Meister Eckhart and that his ideas are similar to mine. I have had a cursory look at Eckhart's views - I must say that I do not see any strong similarity between his views and mine.

Well...I disagree with you and I'm sure logic does too...because unless you believe that logic is imperfect or that it's not always correct you have to see that the chain is either truly and externally exist or it's somehow an illusion....if it's an illusion then it certainly can't be necessary because it doesn't even exist and if it's real then logic will treat it the same as every other existent which leads us to look weather it's necessary or not keeping in mind that there are multiple valid proofs of the impossibility of it being necessary by proving it must have a starting point depending on the logical impossibility of infinite regress.

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And in addition to the above ...your whole thing approaches and revolves around a single idea which is logic being somehow not so correct in all cases or that questioning the existence of ourselves is somehow illogical !!

the necessary existent is necessary if an only if there is at least one chain of contingent existents — Daniel

Actually no...the necessary existent is a necessary existent even if it exists alone and I can't see why you're thinking otherwise.

if the existence of contingent existents causes the chain of existents to exist, why would it need an additional cause to exist (the external cause)? — Daniel

I can not not agree with you... actually Avicenna's strategy for proving the existence of the necessary existent was trying to put the the idea of infinite regress on the possibilities' table while he could have easily eliminated the infinite regress depending on it being a fallacy or a logical impossibility...and if he did so he could just say that the starting point of this chain is contingent and needs a cause which of course not contingent.....so... after all, Avicenna did an extra unneeded work on his proof which could easily be avoided.

What do you say to my claim that if a necessary existent exists, then God doesn't?

If a necessary existent exists and is God, then God can't not exist, in which case he is not omnipotent and thus not God.

And if a necessary existent exists and is not God, then God can't destroy that thing, in which case God is not omnipotent and is thus not God.

So, if Avicenna's argument goes through - and it doesn't, for not all contingent things need causes - then Avicenna has disproved God, not proved him.

(Wayfarer) It's very impressive you know what kalaam is but actually no... — BARAA

I have encountered reference to the term 'Kalaam cosmological argument' in Internet discussions, only now I learn that 'kalaam' refers to Islamic scholasticism. Hence your distinction, thanks for that, my knowledge of Islamic philosophy is sketchy (limited to Will Durant's discussions in Age of Faith).

Actually, as you seem theologically literate there's a distinction I would like to run by you. There is much chatter about 'God's existence'. In fact, 'existence' could not be a predicate of a necessary being, because all existing things might not exist. In other words 'to exist' is 'to be contingent'. What is not contingent, could not not exist, as existence is of its essence (per Aquinas).

This does not mean 'a necessary being does not exist', but is 'beyond existence or non-existence', in other words, does not come into or go out of existence. You see this discussed in many texts of classical philosophy as meaning that the necessary being is 'beyond being'. But I think what such texts are trying to express is the idea that God is 'beyond existence', i.e. beyond the vicissitudes of coming and going, being born and dying (except, a Christian would say, in the instance of the Incarnation.)

Instances of this understanding, which is basic to apophatic theology, can be found in Paul Tillich, in a more contemporary form:

Existence refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy (Greek: 'autos' - self, 'nomos' - law) and heteronomy (Greek: 'heteros' - other, 'nomos' - law) abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from yet also dependent upon ('In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite'. Therefore 'existence' is 'estrangement'."

'....What Tillich is seeking to lead us to is an understanding of the 'God above God'. ...The Ground of Being (God) must be separate from the finite realm (which is a mixture of being and non-being) and that God cannot be 'a being' [i.e. a particular]. God must be beyond the finite realm. Anything brought from essence into existence is always going to be corrupted by ambiguity and our own finitude. Thus statements about God must always be symbolic (except the statement 'God is the Ground of Being'). Although we may claim to know God (the Infinite) we cannot. The moment God is brought from essence into existence God is corrupted by finitude and our limited understanding. In this realm we can never fully grasp (or speak about) who God really is. The infinite cannot remain infinite in the finite realm. That this rings true can be seen when we realize there are a multitude of different understandings of God within the Christian faith alone. They cannot all be completely true so there must exist a 'pure' understanding of God (essence) that each of these are speaking about (or glimpsing aspects of)...."

This also leads to an understanding of why medieval scholaticism, before Duns Scotus, insisted on the 'analogical' meaning of language in reference to the necessary being - because any statement 'is', 'is not', 'is good', etc, is not literally applicable to the necessary being, due to the limitations of human thought and reason. This is why Duns Scotus' insistence on the 'univocity of being' had such momentous (and, some say, deleterious) consequences on later theology.

Well he said "God is all possibility, even the possibility to not exist". I think Eckhart got this idea perhaps from John the Scott who said in his four fold division that God is that which is uncreated and creates as well as being created (in his creation) and being the absense of form. Two original thinkers of those days, which I want to read more about. "Love Him as not-God, not-spirit, no-person, not-image, just love God as He is, a sheet pure absolute One, sundered from all twoness, and in Whom we must eternally sink from nothingness to nothingness."

That last quote was Eckhart. I found in a Huston Smith book

Well "God is all possibility, even the possibility to not exist" sounds incoherent. What does it mean to say God 'is' all possibility? It's a category error. Anything is possible with an omnipotent being - that's true. But that's not the same as saying that an omnipotent being 'is' all possibility. So I don't think he's being helpful - either he's saying very gnomically what I'm saying, which is that an omnipotent being can do anything, including destroying himself and including divesting itself of omnipotence (from which it follows that there are no necessary existences), or he's saying something I know-not-what.

I hope you can see that you have to prove first that God has to be omnipotent (your version of omnipotence)..and since you believe that omnipotence requires being able to break laws of logic (according to your previous claims not mine)
Therefore what you actually have to prove is that breaking laws of logic may happen or in other words you gotta use logic to prove the diposability of logic....this is very bad maaan....
Unless you find a way to prove your premise(that God has to be above logic), then you can't use it in a discussion.

I think the fate of the distinction between "is all possibility" and "has all possibility" rests on questions better answered by Sartre then classical Greek thoughts. Can existence precede ALL essence? And is that then just a state of Pure potentiality. Then suddenly we are are at Plotinus's door, he, as a modernized Greek, put potentiality before actuality

No, it's a conceptual truth that God is omnipotent.

Omnipotence means all powerful, yes?

How is a god who is bound by laws more powerful than one who is not?

I hope you can see that logic itself tells you loud and clear that a god who is not bound by logic is more powerful than one who is bound by logic, yes?

And I hope you can see that it is a truth of logic that no god can be more powerful than an omnipotent being.

Thus, if you listen to reason - reason, that is, not scholars and traditions - then you will see that God is not bound by reason. Reason herself tells you this if you will but listen.

If you think I am wrong, where is the error in my reasoning?

You ask 'how is he great?' He fully approves of himself, that's how. — Bartricks

:rofl:

He tell you that?

Yes, via my faculty of reason. As I explained above.

Actually no...the necessary existent is a necessary existent even if it exists alone and I can't see why you're thinking otherwise. — BARAA

Why is the necessary existent necessary? Why is it not just an existent? What attribute is it that gives the necessary existent the quality of necessary?

To me, it seems that Avicenna's argument is based on the fact that a chain of contingents existents exists. If things that need a cause to exist did not exist, which - from what I understand - is a possibility for contingent existents, would their "cause" have the quality of necessary? How could their cause be necessary prior to their existence? To me, it seems that a necessary cause is necessary if and only if what it causes exists or will exist.

Have a good time!

Let me reform my previous reply to you......
A necessary existent is the existent which its very self is sufficient for explaining his existence or in other words it's the existent which exists by the essence of entity.
After that we can see that this truth is not negated if this existent is alone.

"(1) that which creates and is not created; (2) that which is created and creates; (3) that which is created and does not create; (4) that which is neither created nor creates. The first is God as the ground or origin of all things; the second, Platonic ideas or forms; the third, phenomena, the material world; and the last is God as the final end or goal of all things.." WIkipedia on John the Scott

I hope you can see that you have to prove first that God has to be omnipotent (your version of omnipotence)..and since you believe that omnipotence requires being able to break laws of logic (according to your previous claims not mine) — BARAA

This is an important point - according to M A GIllespie, Theological Origins of Modernity (review here), this conception of God as being completely above logic originated with the Franciscans in late medieval times. I think it's associated with the theological doctrine of 'voluntarism'. But it is quite at odds with the Scholastic tradition, which would never posit that God would willingly alter or ignore logic (though He might of course exceed it.) Of course, in the book itself this argument is developed over hundreds of pages and I couldn't hope to summarize it here, but to say that Bartricks is assuming the 'voluntarist' position, as distinguished from the 'Intellectualist' position, represented by e.g. Aquinas et al.

Because I'm right, yes, and thus deserve a good time? Thank you, I agree entirely and to that end I am off to a bar to drink beer, which I have found pretty much guarantees - though does not necessitate - a good time if drunk in sufficient quantities. Goodbye sir!