following your categorization someone who disagrees with you can only incorrect, because they are either confused/not informed enough/to be converted (middle group) stupid/misguided (4th group), or morally corrupt (5th group). Doesn't seem all that respectful to me.
— ChatteringMonkey

I think you've misunderstood what Pfhorrest is talking about. He's suggesting a way of approaching people who disagree with you using categories relative to the person using them. So there are no other ways to categorise those who disagree with you ethically. They're either wrong, misinformed (where an ethical choice might be based on empirical data), or misguided (where an ethical choice might require some complex consideration). I'm not sure what other category you might imagine putting people in...

'Also right' doesn't work because that would take them outside the scope of the people being considered (those who disagree with you).

'Differently right'...? 'Using alternative facts'...? 'Not yet right'...?

What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong? — Isaac

Well there's always the possibility that you are or I am wrong, no? If two people disagree about something, isn't it strange to assume that one is always automatically right and the other must be wrong? Seems like a constructive conversation would have to start from the idea that you might also be wrong about some things. Otherwise aren't you effectively always taking on the role of teacher/moral authority? I don't think anyone really likes being on the receiving end of such a conversation.

But aside from that I also do believe that you can come to different conclusions on ethical questions. And I don't mean this in a totally relativistic sense, better and worse arguments can be made, something can be more or less coherent, you can be misinformed etc... but usually - if it's not about extreme clear-cut cases - ethics is not like mathematics or science where you can demonstrate with absolute certainty that this one answer is the right one. And with politics I think this becomes even more questionable because of the enormous complexity involved. There are ideas that seem better or worse, but I don't think anybody really "knows" with any kind of certainty, and I would have that epistemic uncertainty reflected in the terms I use and in the way I approach those conversations.

A person whom you think might be right is not a person with whom you disagree and so is outside of the scope of situations this advice applies to. — Isaac

Yes, as others have commented, the OP as formulated has problems. Following Habermas (and discourse theory in general) if you are entering into a genuine dialog, then you must not only be prepared to offer reasons but also be persuaded by them. Which precludes ever making such assumptions as that one is "correct" and the other "incorrect". The OP, as presented, is the end of dialog, not the beginning.

From the introduction to "Facts and Norms"

Yet modernity, now aware of its contingencies, depends all the more on a procedural reason, that is, on a reason that puts itself on trial.

Well there's always the possibility that you are or I am wrong, no? — ChatteringMonkey

Yeah, but the advice is obviously regarding the categories as they are perceived at the time, not as they might be perceived at some time in the future. People who I think are wrong at this moment would fall into one of the three categories of wrong. The fact that I might, at some future date, come to think they're right doesn't have any bearing on the matter.

Following Habermas (and discourse theory in general) if you are entering into a genuine dialog, then you must not only be prepared to offer reasons but also be persuaded by them. — Pantagruel

Wouldn't that fall into the category of

People who don't have strong opinions one way or the other and just try to give all ideas a fair shake — Pfhorrest

? Seems to be right there in the OP.

? Seems to be right there in the OP. — Isaac

I'd say it is more a fundamental premise which contradicts the reasonableness of some of the other categories.

I think I'm just going to watch and see where this goes with some other comments for now.....

I think you've misunderstood what Pfhorrest is talking about. He's suggesting a way of approaching people who disagree with you using categories relative to the person using them. — Isaac

I did misread him, I thought he had a more objective distinction in mind. My reaction was maybe a bit to strong because of that.

What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong? — Isaac

I would have a category for 'totally different or incompatible' for the genuinely religious and traditional. It's not that I think they have bad intentions (5) or that they are duped or misinformed (if they consciously affirm their faith) (4), but that they have a totally different and incompatible way of thinking about ethics and society.

I would have a category for 'totally different or incompatible' for the genuinely religious and traditional. It's not that I think they have bad intentions (5) or that they are duped or misinformed (if they consciously affirm their faith) (4), but that they have a totally different and incompatible way of thinking about ethics and society. — ChatteringMonkey

If they’re well-intentioned just for bad reasons, that would put them in group 2. E.g. if you’re a socialist atheist and a socialist Christian agrees with you politically but for religious rather than rational reasons, they’re group 2 to you. OTOH a prosperity theologian would be group 5 to you: they really wholeheartedly and devoutly believe something that is completely contrary to any good reasons you can think of.

I would have a category for 'totally different or incompatible' for the genuinely religious and traditional. It's not that I think they have bad intentions (5) or that they are duped or misinformed (if they consciously affirm their faith) (4), but that they have a totally different and incompatible way of thinking about ethics and society.
— ChatteringMonkey

If they’re well-intentioned just for bad reasons, that would put them in group 2. E.g. if you’re a socialist atheist and a socialist Christian agrees with you politically but for religious rather than rational reasons, they’re group 2 to you. OTOH a prosperity theologian would be group 5 to you: they really wholeheartedly and devoutly believe something that is completely contrary to any good reasons you can think of. — Pfhorrest

Ok I see now what my difficulty with the categorization may be. You're looking at it from an American perspective for the most part I guess. In my country, and most of European Countries, we don't have a two-party system. We have 5 "main-stream" parties and a couple of extreme parties at either end, who have to form coalitions to form a government. So "agrees with you politically" is not a simple black or white matter usually. A socialist Christian and a socialist atheist would typically not be voting for the same party, and those parties may or may not be in the same ruling coalition.

I do. The "fence sitter" in the conversation elsewhere that inspired this thread reminds me of a younger me. It's for the sake of people like that that I'm even thinking about this topic. I don't want to see them treated as enemies, but as potential friends. — Pfhorrest

The problem is that you don't see fence-sitting as a legitimate position, like the left or right. The only possible positions for you is left or right and any other position is "fence-sitting". What a limited way to see the world.

Because politics is a normative field. The questions at hand are what are the right or wrong things to do with our society. Anyone who thinks that nothing is actually right or wrong are just bowing out of that discussion. Anyone who is participating in that discussion is asserting something as right or wrong and acting as though some people (like themselves) are correct in their assessment of which is which and others are incorrect. — Pfhorrest

In other words, people that don't limit their thinking like you do and think like you do can't be part of the discussion, but you can decide what is right for me? Damn, bruh. You're nothing more than an authoritarian despot. You're getting worse everyday.

I do think something is wrong with society. I just don't see the right answers coming from the authoritarian left or the authoritarian right. I see the correct answers in letting each individual speak for themselves and not be dictated by group-think. My right answer would be to abolish the left and right so that everyone is a "fence-sitter" - capable of being reasoned with. Emotionally invested group-thinkers like yourself are incapable of being reasoned with.

Is it right or wrong to speak for others and to determine what is right or wrong for others? Who determines what is right or wrong for yourself, Pfhorrest?

What is this other category in which we could place those who disagree with us ethically aside from misinformed, misguided, or wrong? — Isaac

Its not possible for us both to be objectively correct, but it is possible for both of to be objectively wrong. Pfhorrest seems incapable of acknowledging the latter, or at least acknowledge the possibility that there is no objective morality.

A group-thinker doesn't know what is wrong or right. Group-thinkers look to the group to tell them what is wrong or right. This is pleading to popularity and authority, which are logical fallacies, therefore cannot be the objectively right thing to do.

Its not possible for us both to be objectively correct, but it is possible for both of to be objectively wrong. — Harry Hindu

The question is not what might, later, turn out to be the case, but what I now consider the case to be. That I might later be wrong is trivially true of every position I hold, so it's useless as a distinguishing property.

The point (I think) @Pfhorrest is making here is strictly about how to treat people whose position you disagree with (now), nothing more.

It's got nothing whatsoever to do with the epistemic status of that position, nothing whatsoever to do with politics, extremism or any of these associated issues people seem to have wanted to latch on to. I disagree vehemently with @Pfhorrest's epistemological position, for example, but I broadly agree with his position here.

A group-thinker doesn't know what is wrong or right. Group-thinkers look to the group to tell them what is wrong or right. This is pleading to popularity and authority, which are logical fallacies, therefore cannot be the objectively right thing to do. — Harry Hindu

I don't really understand how this comment relates to either my post, or the OP. Regardless of that, it's obviously wrong. Some people believe quite strongly in principles like democracy, for example, where, in its most radical form, what the majority believe is the right course of action is exactly the right course of action. It can also be a very useful heuristic in situations where one is inexperienced (especially where the group in question is vastly more experienced). There are numerous scenarios where trusting the collective judgement of a group is a good logical choice.

Putting people.that you don't know into groups. — Harry Hindu

At best, it's just a useful heuristic for navigating social life more easily.

Ok I see now what my difficulty with the categorization may be. You're looking at it from an American perspective for the most part I guess. In my country, and most of European Countries, we don't have a two-party system. We have 5 "main-stream" parties and a couple of extreme parties at either end, who have to form coalitions to form a government. So "agrees with you politically" is not a simple black or white matter usually. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, absolutely. In European countries, things are not so either-or or black-and-white as in the US. Although there is a less or more visible trend toward such a simplification and polarization of political life in Europe as well.

Ok I see now what my difficulty with the categorization may be. You're looking at it from an American perspective for the most part I guess. In my country, and most of European Countries, we don't have a two-party system. We have 5 "main-stream" parties and a couple of extreme parties at either end, who have to form coalitions to form a government. So "agrees with you politically" is not a simple black or white matter usually.
— ChatteringMonkey
Yes, absolutely. In European countries, things are not so either-or or black-and-white as in the US. Although there is a less or more visible trend toward such a simplification and polarization of political life in Europe as well. — baker

Yes definitely. There's a trend of 'extremist' or 'populist' parties gaining more traction in Europe now for 20 or more years, depending on the country. The difference with the US is I guess that they are for the most part not subsumed in the traditional parties and so don't get all that much chances to effectively take part in power. But the trend is unmistakably there and probably caused by more or less the same socio-economic dynamics, i.e. globalization, neo-liberal policies and rise in inequality from the 1970 on wards.

The topic of this thread isn't determining which is which, but just what's a good way to address people relative to their place on a spectrum of (dis)agreement about which is which. "A good way" both in the sense of a kind and respectful way, and also in the sense of a productive and effective way. — Pfhorrest

How can political discussion on an internet forum be productive and effective?

Political discussion can be productive and effective in, for example, a parliament or a board meeting, where the people involved actually have tasks to accomplish, their political discussion is supposed to lead to some goal (such as passing a bill, voting an official into or out of office, etc.).

But on a forum like this, political discussion is bound to lack this practical element, which, arguably, renders a political discussion into a philosophical one, so different rules apply.

? Seems to be right there in the OP.
— Isaac

I'd say it is more a fundamental premise which contradicts the reasonableness of some of the other categories. — Pantagruel

Indeed, this is why a philosopher cannot be a politician, nor a politician a philosopher.
A philosopher is supposed to "give all ideas a fair shake", whereas a politician is supposed to take sides and work toward a particular practical outcome.

A philosopher is supposed to "give all ideas a fair shake" — baker

Permanently? Are they never allowed to reach conclusions about said ideas?

Permanently? Are they never allowed to reach conclusions about said ideas? — Isaac

Presumably a philosopher will stay open to new ideas indefinitely, so that any conclusion will, at most, be just temporary.

At best, it's just a useful heuristic for navigating social life more easily. — baker

That is questionable. Assuming that people think a certain way because of how they look often gets you into trouble.

The point (I think) Pfhorrest is making here is strictly about how to treat people whose position you disagree with (now), nothing more. — Isaac

My point was that one of the ways of how you treat people whose position you disagree with (now) is by acknolwedging that there is the possibility that the reason they disagree with you is because you are wrong. That never seems to be even a contemplated possibility for Pfhorrest.

I don't really understand how this comment relates to either my post, or the OP. Regardless of that, it's obviously wrong. Some people believe quite strongly in principles like democracy, for example, where, in its most radical form, what the majority believe is the right course of action is exactly the right course of action. It can also be a very useful heuristic in situations where one is inexperienced (especially where the group in question is vastly more experienced). There are numerous scenarios where trusting the collective judgement of a group is a good logical choice. — Isaac

Sure, for your own social well-being, not because of what they said is true.

My point was that there is no such thing as an objective morality. We all do what we think is right for ourselves, but whether that is right for others in every possible circumstance is highly questionable and illogical to assume.

Assuming that people think a certain way because of how they look — Harry Hindu

What do you mean by that?

there is no such thing as an objective morality — Harry Hindu

How can one do politics if one belives that?

Presumably a philosopher will stay open to new ideas indefinitely, so that any conclusion will, at most, be just temporary. — baker

:up:

Presumably a philosopher will stay open to new ideas indefinitely, so that any conclusion will, at most, be just temporary. — baker

I wasn't really referring to 'new' ideas. Very few ideas are new. The vast majority have been expressed before. So what about those? OK to categorise them, or do we have to remain open to them indefinitely?

there is the possibility that the reason they disagree with you is because you are wrong. — Harry Hindu

I don't understand how this could possibly work as an assessment of a disagreement about an idea you currently think is right. How could it possibly be the case the reason they disagree with you (according to you) is because you're wrong? If you thought you were wrong, you wouldn't hold the idea in question. So we have to only include categories which assume you're right. The question I understood the OP to be addressing is "assuming I'm right, why might my interlocutor think the way they do?"

The important point is that the OP is about ethics, not knowledge in general. In most ethical cases one must act in accordance with some assumption (many more empirical cases of knowledge fall into this category too). Personally I don't see much merit in making an entirely academic distinction between 'acting as if x were right / the case' and 'believing x is right / the case', especially in ethics and politics, the two are for all intents and purposes, the same. Which means that, for all binomial dilemmas (and obviously all dilemmas can be framed binomially as x,~x), we can treat each person as believing either x or ~x.

I'm pleasantly surprised to see Isaac of all people being my staunchest defender here, but yeah, he's basically said everything I'd want to say in response already. Thanks Isaac.

there is no such thing as an objective morality
— Harry Hindu
How can one do politics if one belives that? — baker

That's the point. If you need a Big Brother, that's your problem, not mine.

,

I don't understand how this could possibly work as an assessment of a disagreement about an idea you currently think is right. How could it possibly be the case the reason they disagree with you (according to you) is because you're wrong? If you thought you were wrong, you wouldn't hold the idea in question. So we have to only include categories which assume you're right. The question I understood the OP to be addressing is "assuming I'm right, why might my interlocutor think the way they do?" — Isaac

You seem to be just as thick-headed as Pfhorrest. Assuming that you are right is one thing. Proving it to others is another. Once you try to prove it to others and they don't agree, at that point you may want to revisit your assumption. I'm not saying that you being wrong is the only possibility if someone disagrees, just that it is a possibility to be considered. If you don't consider that, then you would be no better than the person you are arguing with that you assume is wrong and just won't admit it, or even consider it.

To think that you can assume that you are right without having to prove it to others - without having exposed your ideas to open criticism - is the problem.

The important point is that the OP is about ethics, not knowledge in general. In most ethical cases one must act in accordance with some assumption (many more empirical cases of knowledge fall into this category too). Personally I don't see much merit in making an entirely academic distinction between 'acting as if x were right / the case' and 'believing x is right / the case', especially in ethics and politics, the two are for all intents and purposes, the same. Which means that, for all binomial dilemmas (and obviously all dilemmas can be framed binomially as x,~x), we can treat each person as believing either x or ~x. — Isaac

Ethics is about knowing the difference between right and wrong. So ethics is based upon a sound epistemology. The problem of induction is akin to the problem of ethics. Is what is right for me in this particular circumstance good for another in a similar circumstance? How do you know that what is right for you in a particular circumstance is always right for not just you, but everyone else?

I wasn't really referring to 'new' ideas. Very few ideas are new. The vast majority have been expressed before. So what about those? OK to categorise them, or do we have to remain open to them indefinitely? — Isaac

Presumably a philosopher is still a human and still in the process of learning, so to him, there are ideas that are new, even if someone else might have known those ideas for a long time.

There is no such thing as an objective morality
— Harry Hindu
How can one do politics if one belives that?
— baker
That's the point. If you need a Big Brother, that's your problem, not mine. — Harry Hindu

My point is that if one doesn't believe in objective morality, then how can one hope to get along with others in the pursuit of some common goal (which is, presumably, what politics is about, ie. the pursuit of some common goal)?

I also don't believe there is objective morality, but I think it is of vital importance to assume and act as if there was objective morality. Otherwise, we're talking about a bunch of moral egoists/moral narcissists who will never be able to get anything done together.