'concludes' — Bartricks

conclusion — Bartricks

Your mistake is to stick to the substantial concept of "conclusion".

Something "absolute" cannot be the conclusion of something, only the premise, because if it turns out to be the conclusion, it is no longer absolute.

Your argument is stuck in the cycle of irefutability:

A, therefore B;
B;
Therefore, A.

But as I say:

"Someone who does not want to understand other visions will never understand."

If you 'ought' to draw the conclusion, then you are bid draw it - that's what the oughtness 'is'.

If you do what you ought not to do, then you are doing what is forbidden - that is, what you are 'bid' not do.

Look, this is silly, the existence of norms of Reason is not in dispute. If you want to talk about something different - descriptions of norms of Reason - then that's fine. But that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about the imperatives of Reason themselves.

The imperatives of Reason are imperatives (hence the name). And they - not something else - require an imperator. And, well, the rest follows.

And yes, obviously the instructions of Reason are not conveyed to you in English (not by Reason, anyway) - where, oh where, did my argument claim otherwise??

'concludes' — Bartricks

conclusion — Bartricks

Your mistake is to stick to the substantial concept of "conclusion".

Something "absolute" cannot be the conclusion of something, only the premise, because if it turns out to be the conclusion, it is no longer absolute.

Your argument is stuck in the cycle of irefutability:

A, therefore B;
B;
Therefore, A.

But as I say:

"Someone who does not want to understand other visions will never understand."

The problem you have with my argument is twofold: a) you don't understand it, b) it's a proof of God.

The problem you have with my argument is twofold: a) you don't understand it, b) it's a proof of God. — Bartricks

Your pride only strengthens my philosophy, so continue with your false arguments with your false proof of God...

I explained. The laws of Reason are prescriptive laws, not descriptive. That's why you can flout them. — Bartricks

It's neither, because it's not a directive. "You should follow the laws of reason" is prescriptive. "People follow the laws of reason" is descriptive (and false). The laws of reason are neither of these statements.

A directive requires a mind to issue it. Take this "give me all your money!" If I'm a bot, is that a directive? No. If I'm a mind, then it is. If I'm not, then it isn't. — Bartricks

The laws of reason are not directives. "You should stick to the laws of reason" is a directive.

Yes, if you say it is 'false' (unsound?) then it will be. That's definitely how reality works. Enjoy listening to yourself.

Okaaay, if you say so.

Look, there can be directives about directives: 'do what he told you to do' for instance.

But anyway, if you're just going to ignore the arguments I give in support of my claims, there's not much I can do for you.

You're not going to defend what you said?

I have done. You can lead a horse to water, but you can't shove its muzzle into the water and say "drink it you stupid horse!!" You can fail to follow an argument - and that's because arguments give you normative reason to believe what they show, but they do not describe what you will, in fact, believe.

but you can't shove its muzzle into the water and say "drink it you stupid horse!!" — Bartricks

You could.

I assumed by the laws of reason you mean things like excluded middle, or non-contradiction. Those aren't directives. And couched ad-homs don't make them so. Your first premise makes no sense.

They are directives and simply saying they're not won't alter that. But it doesn't matter, because I take it that you agree that you ought to believe them and that if you do not you are irrational?

So, you are bid believe them and you are bid believe it by Reason which is why, if you do not believe, you are irrational. That is, you are going against Reason or ignoring her instructions.

And yes, you could force the horse's muzzle into the water - it's just a saying - but you 'ought' not, yes? Becuase there are things we ought to do, and things we ought to believe.

But it doesn't matter, because I take it that you agree that you ought to believe them and that if you do not you are irrational? — Bartricks

It does matter. Because you need them to be directives for them to require a mind. They are not directives. Therefore they do not require a mind.

In the same way that the law of gravity was still working before Newton discovered it. Even before Plato stated the laws of contradiction and excluded middle, they were still working. Even if Plato had not pointed it out, two contradictory statements still could not be true in the same sense at the same time.

And even if they were directives, it doesn't follow that the mind issuing them is God.

They are directives. And you ought to believe them. And that's a description of a directive.

So, they are directives. There are directives of Reason, and no one who knows what they're talking about can deny it. Obviously you can deny it - but in denying it you go against a directive of Reason not to deny it.

And it does follow that they are directives of God, for that's precisely what the argument I presented establishes.

If you 'ought' to draw the conclusion, then you are bid draw it - that's what the oughtness 'is'. — Bartricks

Let's say I'm playing chess. I "ought" to avoid moving my knight, because that can lead to a checkmate. I "ought" to consider other moves that improve my position. Those oughts are prescriptive; they are a consequence of a teleos in my own human mind... the desire to win... and the ways in which the artificial laws of chess unfold on the board. That I ought not move my knight does not require an omniscient mind commanding that this be the case. All it requires is that there is a move by my opponent that can checkmate me if I do so.

The imperatives of Reason are imperatives (hence the name). — Bartricks

Give an example of an imperative of reason that requires an omnipotent mind.

Give an example of an imperative of reason that requires an omnipotent mind. — InPitzotl

Are you slow? The. Imperatives. Of. Reason. See argument above.

Let's say I'm playing chess. I "ought" to avoid moving my knight, because that can lead to a checkmate. I "ought" to consider other moves that improve my position. Those oughts are prescriptive — InPitzotl

Yes, I know they're prescriptive. If you want to win the game, you have reason to move your knight. That reason is called a 'normative reason'. It's what 'oughtness' is made of.

Now see the rest of my argument to see why a) the existence of normative reasons can't rationally be denied and b) why they entail God's existence.

They are directives. — Bartricks

You saying it doesn't make it so, but even assuming this:

Anyone giving directives on how you should reason becomes omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent by your premises. They don't have to be God. They could just be Plato.

"The laws of reason are directives. So the mind issuing them is omnipotent (since they control how reason works), omniscient (since they determine what classifies as knowledge, this is total BS. Determining what classifies as knowledge doesn't mean you actually know everything) and omnibenevolent (because morality is a matter of logic, apparently, and they control the laws of logic)"

However this doesn't distinguish between God and Plato. Since all the requirements for being omnipotent/omniscient/omnibenevolent stem from the fact that this mind issued the laws of reason. However anyone can issue instructions and call them "laws of reason" and your argument would apply to them too. And the issuer would have the power to change his mind which, by some manner of BS, makes them omnipotent :rofl:

Are you slow? The. Imperatives. Of. Reason. See argument above. — Bartricks

I'm having problems understanding whichever of these things are true:

(a) That "Are you slow? The. Imperatives. Of. Reason. See argument above." is an example of an imperative of reason requiring an omnipotent mind.
(b) Why you bothered to waste my time reading your reply if you're uninterested in a conversation with me.

You saying it doesn't make it so, but even assuming this: — khaled

No, but I have provided you with arguments for thinking them so. So it's you who, rather than addressing or acknowledging the arguments, just persists in insisting that they're not directives.

Anyone giving directives on how you should reason becomes omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent by your premises. — khaled

No, that doesn't follow. If I order you to do X, you do not thereby have a reason to do X, right?

So, my instructions are not the instructions of Reason.

Whose instructions are the instructions of Reason? Why, the mind whose instructions they are.

And that mind will, by dint of that fact, be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see argument above for the explanation).

Another way to make the same point: the mind whose instructions are the instructions of Reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see proof above of that). I am not omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Therefore I am not the mind whose instructions are the instructions of Reason.

I'm having problems understanding whichever of these things are true:

(a) That "Are you slow? The. Imperatives. Of. Reason. See argument above." is an example of an imperative of reason requiring an omnipotent mind.
(b) Why you bothered to waste my time replying to me if you're uninterested in a conversation with me. — InPitzotl

Of course you are (see a).

As for b, I have my reasons.

Can God commit a fallacy? Yes. Can I? Yes. How absurd would it be for me to be able to do what God cannot? How could you, with a straight face, describe as 'all powerful' a being who couldn't do something I can do? — Bartricks

It seems to me that you've given this some thought. Here's hoping you will approach the matter with sincerity to truth and reason. Whether you will or not, is entirely unknown to me. In any case, in response to your objection:

God can make you commit fallacies. You can't make God commit fallacies. God can't make God commit fallacies. None (including you) can do what God can't do because God is Omnipotent.

Of course you are (see a). — Bartricks

You still didn't give an example.

And what are you following when you reason, if not some kind of directive? — Bartricks

In the example I gave, a desire not to be checkmated, my understanding of the rules, and my ability to model the consequences of my actions.

As for b, I have my reasons. — Bartricks

Why did you bother with the thread then?

I wondered how long it would be before the bibleos came along and started discussing the God of the bible rather than thinking for themselves.

This thread is about whether an all powerful being can do anything - which is a philosophical question that can't be settled by appeal to the bible or anything else. — Bartricks

Ok, then engage with sincerity to truth and reason. I'm not here defend or criticise the bible. I'm here to discuss the semantic of Omnipotence, which both you and I are somehow magically aware of.

God can make you commit fallacies. — Philosopher19

Correct, of course.

You can't make God commit fallacies. — Philosopher19

Also correct, of course.

God can't make God commit fallacies. — Philosopher19

Yes he can. I can make me commit fallacies, yes? So God can make God commit fallacies if he so wishes, otherwise I'd have a power that God doesn't have, namely the power to make oneself commit fallacies.

No, but I have provided you with arguments for thinking them so. — Bartricks

False. You kept restating it. That's all you did. Here were your "arguments":

They are directives — Bartricks

So, they are directives. — Bartricks

They are directives and simply saying they're not won't alter that. — Bartricks

On the other hand I've shown why they are not:

Even if Plato had not pointed it out, two contradictory statements still could not be true in the same sense at the same time. — khaled

If I order you to do X, you do not thereby have a reason to do X, right? — Bartricks

Not right. You, personally, yes. But depending on the person I could have a reason to do X just because they told me to. Like a robber holding a gun out for example.

And that mind will, by dint of that fact, be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see argument above for the explanation). — Bartricks

It's a terrible explanation.

Being able to control what constitutes as reason doesn't make you omnipotent. You handwaved it as "This mind is not bound by the laws of reason so it can do anything". Idiots have minds not bound by the laws of reason. They can't lift planes all of a sudden.

Omniscience does not follow from being able to determine what beliefs count as knowledge. You handwaved it as "has power over all knowledge" but all you actually showed is that the mind who dictates the laws of reason can figure out if a belief counts as knowledge or not. That is not omniscience.

Another way to make the same point: the mind whose instructions are the instructions of Reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see proof above of that). I am not omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Therefore I am not the mind whose instructions are the instructions of Reason. — Bartricks

First premise is false.

Yes he can. I can make me commit fallacies, yes? So God can make God commit fallacies if he so wishes, otherwise I'd have a power that God doesn't have, namely the power to make oneself commit fallacies. — Bartricks

Precisely my point. You can make YOU commit fallacies. Your power is "you can make YOU commit fallacies". Your power is not "you can make GOD commit fallacies" is it?

Do we agree on the above?

In the example I gave, a desire not to be checkmated, my understanding of the rules, and my ability to model the consequences of my actions — InPitzotl

Yes, I know - it's an example from Judith Jarvis Thomson, I think - and I addressed it.

I have my own reasons for bothering with the thread, one of which is that there is always the chance someone will come up with a telling objection.

Yes, I didn't say that I have the power to make God commit fallacies, I said that I have the power to make myself commit fallacies.

So, 'one has the power to make oneself commit fallacies'. That's true of me - I have that power. And as I cannot have more powers than those of an omnipotent being, then an omnipotent being also has that power - he can say truly, as truly as I can, that "one has the power to make oneself commit fallacies'. Yes?

An omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent being cannot do anything; which is to say they could not do anything at all - because they would understand the long term implications of their actions. Any intervention would necessarily imply further interventions, to account for the consequences of the first, and so on and on until they had to do everything. — counterpunch

Which is why God is Perfect and Omnipotent. It Handles ALL affairs. You cannot will anything except if it is also Willed by God. God's power absolute. You're only responsible for your intent (good/evil). The consequences of your actions are entirely out of your hands.

You think the handeye coordination you have to drink a glass of water is being sustained by non-existence (nothingness), or do you think that Existence/God sustains it such that very glass of water you drink, was Willed by God priori to you even intending it.

Perfection = a perfect existence. Which semantically/logically requires everyone to get what they truly deserve, which requires an Omnipresent being (aka Existence) to be Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnibenevolent towards good, Omnimalevolent towards evil (as well as Infinite, and Infinite existence is better than a finite one). Hence why God necessarily exists.

How can an imperfect existence/being have any idea of what a perfection existence/being is, independently of a perfect being/existence? It cannot.

Yes, I didn't say that I have the power to make God commit fallacies, I said that I have the power to make myself commit fallacies. — Bartricks

But God also has the power to make you commit fallacies too. So what power do you have that God doesn't?