You need to get out of your armchair more and engage with actual people.If you do that you will realize that most people have a reasonable moral sense. — Janus

You do realise I literally study people for a living?

You do realise I literally study people for a living? — Isaac

So what? Everybody who engages with people and has a critical mind studies people constantly. Doing it for a living only makes it more likely you will be predisposed to bias in my experience.

Do you think they realize they’re not thinking critically? — Pfhorrest

No, not if they are not thinking critically. — Janus

So people who are not thinking critically may nevertheless think that they are thinking critically.

So merely thinking that you're thinking critically doesn't guarantee that you are in fact thinking critically.

If we asked both you and the aforementioned imaginary neonazis whether each of you hold beliefs grounded in good evidence, and whether each of you are thinking critically about those beliefs and that evidence, both of you would say yes about yourselves, and no about the other. If words meant what you say they meant, both of you would consequently say that your own beliefs were common sense, and the other's were an ideology.

...

I don't know why I'm letting myself get bogged down with arguing this angle with you. It doesn't matter whether "ideology" really means what you say it means or what I meant by it. All that matters is that you understand what I meant when I used it earlier. I think you do, and this conversation about my choice of words is entirely beside the point. Substitute whatever word you want in place of "ideology" in my OP, whatever the superset of "ideology" and "common sense beliefs" is, whatever your general word for "worldview" or "set of beliefs" or whatever you want to call it is. You must understand by now what it was I meant, and quibbling over the phrasing is just a derailment.

Doing it for a living only makes it more likely you will be predisposed to bias in my experience. — Janus

So you're suggesting that studying something disposes one to biases but a lay approach, what, magically removes bias? So should we no longer listen to the climate scientists, but rather engage with the 'unbiased' assessments of those who just experience the weather themselves as laymen?

Yeah, pig-headedly refusing to address an issue doesn't make the issue go away. We're talking about moral dilemmas. Moral dilemmas are almost exclusively social which means that any answer cannot be individually tailored. There can only be a single right answer and it must apply to everyone sharing the common interest that isvthe subject of the dilemma. — Isaac

And that is what pfhorrest is arguing and what you are defending - that Pfhorrest assumes what is right before engaging with anyone. Every time you post a reply you contradict yourself, just like Pfhorrest. Its impossible to have a meaningful conversation with you.

What I've been saying is what you assume to be right or wrong can only be the case for yourself and that you have to talk to others to discover what is right or wrong for them.

Moral dilemmas are the result of conflicting goals. They are a dilemma because every individual is considered equal and should have the equal right of achieving their goals. So moral dilemmas are the result of the idea of equality.

Ironic how the idea of an objective morality stems from the idea that not everyone is created equal - that there are some that have the power to determine what is right or wrong for others, that there are some that can realize their goals sooner than others.

what pfhorrest is arguing and what you are defending - that Pfhorrest assumes what is right before engaging with anyone. — Harry Hindu

Where does he say anything like that?

What I've been saying is what you assume to be right or wrong can only be the case for yourself and that you have to talk to others to discover what is right or wrong for them. — Harry Hindu

Right.

Moral dilemmas are the result of conflicting goals. They are a dilemma because every individual is considered equal and should have the equal right of achieving their goals. So moral dilemmas are the result of the idea of equality. — Harry Hindu

Yep.

...so what do you call the solution arrived at via working through this conflict, after we've talked to everyone, asked them all what's right for them, devised some compromise which best meets everybody's views...? That solution is the _____ solution. Fill in the blank for me because I'm having trouble filling it with any word that isn't just a synonym for 'right'.

And what would you say to someone determined to have their solution implemented despite it not being the (right) one we'd just painstakingly worked out.

I'm happy to use whatever terminology you want to pick.

Edit: I deleted previous remark because I read your last paragraph which at least has some content before the posturing...

So that out of the way, the question is - where is that point? At what level of real-world consequence is it justified to show your disrespect for someone's position in order to let them know that your group do not accept such attitudes? — Isaac

Hate speech and bigotry is probably a good place to start questioning the user. Is this incorrigible hate speech.. simply meant to inflame, or is there some broad point? If it is a broad point of philosophy, can this be easily defeated being that it is misguided?

Anyways, an example would be surely vegans feel strongly of their anti-animal product policy. A vigorous debate may ensue on the matter. Just because vegans feel non-vegans are wrong in their actions/views, and that non- vegans continue with their views/actions does NOT mean non-vegans are absolute enemies that deserve contempt, disrespect, etc. At the same token, non-vegans shouldn't be so "hurt" from vegans thinking their activity is wrong to look at them with contempt and disdain either. Any moral claim is a claim. Any moral claim argued in good faith on a philosophy forum is meant to be an exchange and healthy debate in the realm of ideas. Both parties should know this. NOW, if this was a vegan forum meant for a community of vegans, and I kept posting stuff about how veganism is wrong-headed and misguided, then I think that WOULD be appropriate to bristle with ire at someone trying to troll the community. So it depends on context, the way the person approaches the subject, the interlocutor. It is not just one factor.

Hate speech and bigotry is probably a good place to start questioning the user. — schopenhauer1

Just because vegans feel non-vegans are wrong in their actions/views, and that non- vegans continue with their views/actions does NOT mean non-vegans are absolute enemies that deserve contempt, disrespect, etc. — schopenhauer1

So these are two examples of where you think the line should be drawn, but you don't provide any justification or reason for your choice. Why would (in the view of the person concerned) talking hatefully be deserving of disrespect, but complicity in the torture of sentient beings not so deserving? What is it about these two behaviours which makes the condoning of one worthy of contempt but the condoning of the other merely a good natured disagreement?

Any moral claim argued in good faith on a philosophy forum is meant to be an exchange and healthy debate in the realm of ideas. Both parties should know this. — schopenhauer1

What do you mean by 'good faith' here? It seems as though you're creating a meta-morality around debate. If people can respectfully disagree about something like the suffering of animals or whether abortion is murder, why can we not equally respectfully disagree about methods of discussion?

You both seem to think I am arguing that you should change your views to be in accordance with mine. No, I am merely telling you how I see things, based on my own experience. If your experience tells you something different which it seems it does, then anything I tell you about my views will be unlikely to change your minds.

That's the problem when it comes to issues that are not clearly determinable by direct observation, that are not everyday empirical observations or hard science backed up by hard data; interpretation is always involved.

All I am really saying is that there is a vast difference between people who are committed to an ideology, a system of ideas which purports to be generally salvational either in this life or the next, and the everyday moral principles which pretty much everybody agrees about. I think there are never good reasons for the former, and every good reason to hold to the common moral principles; the latter are not arguable, and in fact people do not generally argue about them, unless they are idiot philosophers.

All I am really saying is that there is a vast difference between people who are committed to an ideology, a system of ideas which purports to be generally salvational either in this life or the next, and the everyday moral principles which pretty much everybody agrees about. I think there are never good reasons for the former, and every good reason to hold to the common moral principles; the latter are not arguable, and in fact people do not generally argue about them, unless they are idiot philosophers. — Janus

I disagree strongly with this, but I think perhaps the source of our disagreement is about what constitutes a moral principle. I think that when I talk about some moral dilemma, about which non-philosophers definitely do argue - abortion, charity, ethical trade, veganism, social responsibility, children's rights, animal testing, wars (just/unjust), wealth taxes, public health...etc you see those not as differences in moral principles, but differences in how to apply the same principles (something more like fostering some balance between autonomy and social harmony which we all have a general idea of).

I can understand that (though to me it's too far to put it down to one principle - the neurological evidence is strongly against you on that one, there's at least a dozen different types of calculation which need to be accounted for), but notwithstanding...

It's the second part I struggle to get behind. The bit where ideologues are any different. to my mind, they're doing the exact same thing - apply these general principles of morality to the knowledge the (think they) have. Whether that knowledge is of an afterlife, of some God-given rules, of some deep political conspiracy no-one else is aware of... It's this special knowledge which means that the application of these same general principles lead to bizarre behaviours and reprimands.

More importantly than either, though. Is that @Pfhorrest's second and fourth groups represent almost everybody on the planet. People simply do not give much thought to the moral aspects of their behaviour by relating them to deep foundational social (or biological) principles. The overwhelming majority of people behave as they do because other people in their social group are behaving that way. They say what they do because other people in their social group say those things. So the commonality you're seeing is not the result of some deep human trait, it's the result of reversion to the mean. Large societies mix a lot and that mixing creates such a wealth of potential influences that the result tends to be fairly watered down in most cases. You only need to look at some of the bizarre cultural practices and taboos in tribes to see the effects of smaller group sizes. Of course there are biological restrictions - taboos and practices which are actually detrimental to the group cannot thrive and so will die out, plus our biological mechanisms can only come up with a limited range of types.

I'll give you what I hope might be an example. I'm quite a strong advocate of children's rights. Something which you'd say (on the face of it) came under the 'common moral principles' right? But I have a fundamental disagreement with what seems to me a purely ideological belief. I've never reprimanded my children, nor have I ever told them what to do, they did entirely as they pleased (still do, but that's because they're adults now). That, to me, is children's rights. According to the Human Rights Act, however, children can be forced, by their parents or government, to attend school, to dress a certain way, even imprisoned and physically abused.. etc. That children can be treated this way – ways which would often constitute criminal offences if done to adults, seems to me to be an ideological difference, not a ‘common sense morality’ one. Children are given full autonomy in hunter-gatherer societies, then at some point in time it became culturally acceptable to treat them as the ‘property’ of adults, much like women were in marriage. Now, treating them that way is the cultural norm and it is rarely questioned. Whole mythologies build up around it. The point is, I don’t see any more of a ‘common principle’ here that I share with most normal people, than there would be with an ideologue of any other persuasion. I could couch it in terms of people trying to do their best for their children, but that would include religious fundamentalists too (who, arguably are still just trying to do the same, within the world-view they have)
My point is basically that I think the split you’re seeing is not revealing a difference in moral epistemology. It’s just cultural. Things which our culture thinks of as extreme seem ideological, things our culture thinks of as normal seem ‘common sense’.

what pfhorrest is arguing and what you are defending - that Pfhorrest assumes what is right before engaging with anyone.
— Harry Hindu

Where does he say anything like that? — Isaac

It was you who interpretted his words in that way:

I don't understand how this could possibly work as an assessment of a disagreement about an idea you currently think is right. How could it possibly be the case the reason they disagree with you (according to you) is because you're wrong? If you thought you were wrong, you wouldn't hold the idea in question. So we have to only include categories which assume you're right. The question I understood the OP to be addressing is "assuming I'm right, why might my interlocutor think the way they do?" — Isaac

The question is not what might, later, turn out to be the case, but what I now consider the case to be. That I might later be wrong is trivially true of every position I hold, so it's useless as a distinguishing property.

The point (I think) Pfhorrest is making here is strictly about how to treat people whose position you disagree with (now), nothing more. — Isaac

And Pfhorrest agreed with your interpretation:

I'm pleasantly surprised to see Isaac of all people being my staunchest defender here, but yeah, he's basically said everything I'd want to say in response already. Thanks Isaac. — Pfhorrest

The fact that I have to do you homework for you and remember what you said for you, just shows how lazy of a thinker you are.

..so what do you call the solution arrived at via working through this conflict, after we've talked to everyone, asked them all what's right for them, devised some compromise which best meets everybody's views...? That solution is the _____ solution. Fill in the blank for me because I'm having trouble filling it with any word that isn't just a synonym for 'right'.

And what would you say to someone determined to have their solution implemented despite it not being the (right) one we'd just painstakingly worked out.

I'm happy to use whatever terminology you want to pick. — Isaac

So NOW you finally have come around to seeing things as I have been explaining them. The problem is that you believe that compromises can always be reached. If they could, there would be no such things as moral dilemmas. You need to give me an explanation as to what moral "truth" can be true for all in the same way that gravity is true for all. We all fall at the same rate, but how hard we hit the ground depends on our mass, and there is no compromise in that.

Things being in two different categories is insufficient to justify any two responses to them. You must show how each category justifies each response. — Isaac

Indeed. I have so far been unable to get this answer from free speech absolutists (FSAs).

But if that were the case, then all disagreement would be trivial. There'd be no reason at all to resolve it.

Not just attempts to resolve disagreement, but any situation where people use language to accomplish anything would become trivial.

It appears that the FSA position is internally inconsistent.

It wasn't an historical question. I was asking why you believe they should be treated differently, not why other people might have come to.

I don't believe they are in different categories, I'm not a FSA.

I see, so we're back to the delusion that what seems to you to be the case is actually the case. You personally have a sense of what constitutes encroaching upon other's freedoms, other people have a different sense.

Really...most people grasp theory of mind by the age of three and you're still having trouble with it. — Isaac

Understanding that other people think differently than oneself doesn't automatically lead to caring about that.

So you're suggesting that studying something disposes one to biases but a lay approach, what, magically removes bias? — Isaac

Heh.
Some things do escape those who study people professionally.

For example, there are areas of studying people that are ethically prohibited for direct study (such as the behavior of people in their privacy, when they don't know they are being observed and have never agreed to being observed), then there are areas that would be prohibitively time-consuming or expensive (such as detailed long-term all-round studies).

Secondly, there are social phenomena that can only be studied emically, by the observer becoming a member of the group he's studying (like the motivation for taboos, or the content of public secrets), and are as such problematic.

However, it is precisely these areas that ordinary people routinely have access to and in which they have to function. They can study these areas qualitatively, but not quantitatively (which would be relevant for generalizing scientific purposes).

I was thinking more of political conversations with non-philosophers out there in the wild. — Pfhorrest

I don't see why a categorization like the one in the OP would be necessary or helpful. Other than in the case where one assumes one's superiority over others, and thus feels justified to unilaterally define the terms of engagement.

Because this is what the categories in the OP are: unilaterally defined terms of engagement.

I have to do you homework for you and remember what you said for you, just shows how lazy of a thinker you are. — Harry Hindu

Where in any of that does is say anything about whether this assumption is "before engaging with anyone"? If you actually read what I write rather than jumping to conclusions about what you think I'm saying we might have had a profitable conversation. As it it you're just arguing against a caricature from your imagination.

The problem is that you believe that compromises can always be reached. — Harry Hindu

Once more then. Where have I made an assumption that this is always possible? I've highlighted the key word for you to make the job easier.

You need to give me an explanation as to what moral "truth" can be true for all in the same way that gravity is true for all. — Harry Hindu

And the last one...where have I spoken about what is true?


I choose my words carefully. If you can't be bothered to read them with equal care don't bother replying at all.

Some things do escape those who study people professionally. — baker

You've given a really good list there of the limits of psychological investigation. I'm largely in agreement. You've prefaced the list rather unfortunately though. These things do not escape those of us who study people professionally. We have no lesser access to them than others.

You've given a really good list there of the limits of psychological investigation. I'm largely in agreement. You've prefaced the list rather unfortunately though. These things do not escape those of us who study people professionally. We have no lesser access to them than others. — Isaac

Sure, you can do so as private persons (ie. when not in your professional capacity), or else, only produce qualitative case studies, which are of limited scientific value.

I doubt that we've been talking past each other this whole time, but if that is how you want to finally admit that you're agreeing with everything that I said, that's fine with me.

I don't see why a categorization like the one in the OP would be necessary or helpful. — baker

It might help you see better if you realize that it is proposed in juxtaposition to the common practice of treating people as only being in groups 1 or 5. I’m advocating more nuance than that.

It might help you see better if you realize that it is proposed in juxtaposition to the common practice of treating people as only being in groups 1 or 5. I’m advocating more nuance than that. — Pfhorrest

Since I don't practice that common practice, the whole classification is moot for me.

Like I said: The categories in the OP are unilaterally defined terms of engagement.

The categories in the OP are unilaterally defined terms of engagement. — baker

How would you multilaterally define the terms of engagement, since to do so one would have to first engage?

How would you multilaterally define the terms of engagement, since to do so one would have to first engage? — Isaac

I eschew the defining of terms of engagement in advance, and instead just follow the arguments/ideas.

It's an interpersonal communication dynamic, with emphasis on it being dynamic.

I see no need to categorize people in advance in such a forum setting.

I don’t even see HOW you could categorize people in advance of engaging with them, so I’m certainly not advocating that anyone somehow do that.

But after engaging with people, it will become clear whether their opinions are the ones you think are correct or not, and how strongly held those opinions are and for what reasons they’re held.

It’s then appropriate to engage with them differently based on those various factors. My proposal in the OP is to use more nuance in that differentiation than just “agree with me good, otherwise bad”, which is a sadly common method.

I’m first and foremost advocating the recognition of a difference between “doesn’t agree with me” and “disagrees with me”, as there are people who are undecided and might eventually end up agreeing or disagreeing, and treating them like they’ve already sided against you is counterproductive.

Then within the groups who do agree or disagree, I’m advocating a differentiation between those who just go with the social flow of agreement with their in-group, and those who hold their views for thoroughly introspective personal reasons. Because people who are “on your side” but not for good reasons might make problematic allies, and people who are “against you” but not really personally committed to the opposite of your principles might still be swayed away from being your enemies.

I think that when I talk about some moral dilemma, about which non-philosophers definitely do argue - abortion, charity, ethical trade, veganism, social responsibility, children's rights, animal testing, wars (just/unjust), wealth taxes, public health...etc you see those not as differences in moral principles, but differences in how to apply the same principles (something more like fostering some balance between autonomy and social harmony which we all have a general idea of).

I can understand that (though to me it's too far to put it down to one principle - the neurological evidence is strongly against you on that one, there's at least a dozen different types of calculation which need to be accounted for), but notwithstanding... — Isaac

I think those issues are not really moral dilemmas in the sense that an any moral principles is being disagreed about. If it is accepted that most would agree that a person's life should not be taken, except in very extreme circumstances, then whether someone thinks abortion is acceptable or not depends on whether they think the fetus is a person or not. The same goes for animal testing; those who think, like Descartes, that animals are not persons but machines would not have much reason to be against testing. Very few people valorize war, I would say most people see it as an evil, either unnecessary or necessary depending on other non-moral considerations.

When it comes to charity, health care and wealth taxes I think most people feel obliged only to look after their own. This is one area where there is moral disagreement when it comes to whether the government should look after those who cannot care for themselves. And this disagreement is ideological. The 'dog eat dog' view of life is ideological I would say, but the nurturing view is based on compassion.

My point is basically that I think the split you’re seeing is not revealing a difference in moral epistemology. It’s just cultural. Things which our culture thinks of as extreme seem ideological, things our culture thinks of as normal seem ‘common sense’. — Isaac

Sure, there are "minor" moral issues that people disagree over like whether it's right to have sex before marriage, right to be gay, whether children should enjoy full autonomy and so on. I would say the differences in those areas are ideological. A person of good moral sense would be inclined to a live and let live approach, when it comes to such issues, insofar as I think it is arguable that a good moral sense just is a feeling for and respect of others' autonomy and freedom.

I have no right to say whether you should have sex before marriage, whether you should be gay, or whether you should grant your children full autonomy. Those who want to prescribe such things to others are driven by ideology. I also agree that much of what we take for normal in our societies is ideologically driven, so I have not wanted to say that ideology exists only in extremis. Those ideologically driven elements of common social morality should be expunged, because just as there is no good basis for ideological thinking, there is no good basis for the moral principles they inform.

I don’t even see HOW you could categorize people in advance of engaging with them, so I’m certainly not advocating that anyone somehow do that. — Pfhorrest

I mean that you're presenting a model of different ways of engaging with people, based on whether they agree with you or not.
Not that you suggest that Tom be put in category 1, Dick in 3, and Harry in 5, based simply on their names or some such.

But after engaging with people, it will become clear whether their opinions are the ones you think are correct or not, and how strongly held those opinions are and for what reasons they’re held.

It’s then appropriate to engage with them differently based on those various factors.

I don't see it this way at all.
I can't even begin to understand why one would take this approach, at least not in philosophy(ish).

What you're saying makes sense in terms of politics (whether it's ordinary citizens or professional politicians discussing politics, or whether it's employees discussing workplace politics, and such).

But beyond that ...?

Politics is the context this is all about. The kind of people that you could productively engage in philosophy with are all in groups 1-3, and only group 1 are really available for two-way philosophical discourse.

People who hold views based on things that both of you agree are good kinds of reasons are people you can philosophically reason with, and those are all group 1. As I said before, being in group 1 doesn’t mean they agree with you completely. Those differences grounded in what you nevertheless agree is solid reasoning are the places you have learning opportunities.

People who see you as “on their side” socially-speaking might at least be open to reasons to refine their beliefs, but if they aren’t “on your side” for reasons you see as rational then there’s not really opportunity for you to learn from them in turn. Those are group 2. They don’t necessarily agree with you completely either, but they at least trust that you’re an ally rather than an enemy, and may at least listen to you openly and honestly.

People who are undecided, group 3, similarly at least don’t see you as an enemy and so might be willing to listen honestly if you convey to them successfully that you are allied with their interests. Then you might have opportunity to explain why the reasons of your opposition are not good ones, and why they should not trust that kind of argument.

Group 4 sees you socially as an enemy and won’t be willing to engage with your arguments in an open and honest way. There’s no opportunity to learn anything from your uncle who fell for Qanon because of something he saw on Facebook, or to reason him out of beliefs he didn’t reason himself into in the first place. But you could at least maybe stand a chance of convincing him that you really do care for him and that those kinds of sources and arguments are unreliable.

And lastly, you just can’t do honest philosophy with a died-in-the-wool Nazi or such, in group 5. Their entire worldview is founded entirely in things you don’t see as rational at all, so there’s just not a common ground of reason from which to conduct a rational argument.

Oh dear. This thread is in the Political Philosophy section. I only saw this now.