Before that, you had made the absolute claims that "a rule must be expressed in language" on page 10, and that "rules cannot exist without language" on page 8. — Luke

We were talking about "rules" in the sense of "rule-following". Obviously when you define "rule" in some other way, which is not consistent with this use, then i would not adhere to that claim about what "rule" means. That's why equivocation is a fallacy.

I should have looked more closely at your #1 and #2 definitions, which I had assumed drew the same distinctions between explicit and non-explicit rules that I was trying to point out to you with the Google definition that I posted earlier. However, this is not the distinction between them. Your #1 definition of rule is: "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform". This is very similar to the Google definition, and likewise allows for the principle or rule to be either explicit or non-explicit. I was probably quick to overlook this because your definition #2: "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things" is close to what I had in mind when it comes to non-explicit rules. — Luke

To "follow a rule" is a judgement. I'm still waiting for you to show how such a judgement can be made when the rule is not expressed in language. Until then, all your assertions, and google references, which assert that someone could be following a "non-explicit rule", have no import.

Since you seem to have such difficulty understanding, let me explain very clearly what I am asking for. To copy another person's actions, to mimic, is not to follow a rule, because a "rule" is a generalization concerning numerous actions. Therefore the "rule" must exist independently of the actions it may describe. Now, if someone is said to "follow a rule", this implies that a judgement of accordance has been made between the person's actions and the rule. Can you explain to me how that rule could exist in some form other than in language, which could allow it to be referred to, in order for that judgement to be made?

What do you mean by a "context"? If a context isn't a rule, then you can't mean any of the OED definitions of "rule". Do you think language ever gets used in the context of "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things"? It seems fairly obvious to me that this OED definition #2 of "rule" has at least some part to play in the teaching of language, the meanings of our words, and the contexts in which those words are used. — Luke

"Context" is a rule? Use your dictionary Luke. Sometimes you seem to have extreme difficulty with the English language. "1 the parts of something written or spoken that immediately precede and follow a word or passage and clarify its meaning". "2 the circumstances relative to something under consideration".

Notice that each of these refers to something particular, the particular position of a word amongst others, or the particular circumstances which are relevant to a subject of consideration. A "rule" is a generalization, it does not refer to a particular situation. To describe a context as a rule is to make a category mistake. Therefore, language never "gets used in the context of 'a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things'" because to say this would be to make a category mistake. You would be claiming that the particular circumstances (context) are something general, a prevailing custom. Quite simply, "a prevailing custom", or "a normal state of things" is not a context, it is a generalization.

We were talking about "rules" in the sense of "rule-following". Obviously when you define "rule" in some other way, which is not consistent with this use, then i would not adhere to that claim about what "rule" means. That's why equivocation is a fallacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not defining "rule" in some other way. The Google definition is of a rule in the sense of "rule-following"; a rule which can be either explicit or understood (i.e. non-explicit).

To "follow a rule" is a judgement. I'm still waiting for you to show how such a judgement can be made when the rule is not expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have shown this, several times. I linked to Wikipedia pages on Convention, Unspoken Rule, and the Unwritten Rules of Baseball, for example. You have provided no reasons for why these are not examples of non-explicit rules (that are followed).

To copy another person's actions, to mimic, is not to follow a rule, because a "rule" is a generalization concerning numerous actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to what definition? I'm not going to accept your own made-up definitions of words.

Now, if someone is said to "follow a rule", this implies that a judgement of accordance has been made between the person's actions and the rule. Can you explain to me how that rule could exist in some form other than in language, which could allow it to be referred to, in order for that judgement to be made? — Metaphysician Undercover

Regarding judgment:

338. One judges the length of a rod, and may look for and find some method of judging it more exactly or more reliably. So — you say — what is judged here is independent of the method of judging it. What length is cannot be explained by the method of determining length. — Anyone who thinks like this is making a mistake. What mistake? — To say “The height of Mont Blanc depends on how one climbs it” would be odd. And one wants to compare ‘ever more accurate measurement of length’ with getting closer and closer to an object. But in certain cases it is, and in certain cases it is not, clear what “getting closer and closer to the length of an object” means. What “determining the length” means is not learned by learning what length and determining are; rather, the meaning of the word “length” is learnt by learning, among other things, what it is to determine length. — Philosophical Investigations

128. From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.

129. This is how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment.

130. But isn't it experience that teaches us to judge like this, that is to say, that it is correct to judge like this? But how does experience teach us, then? We may derive it from experience, but experience does not direct us to derive anything from experience. If it is the ground of our judging like this, and not just the cause, still we do not have a ground for seeing this in turn as a ground.

131. No, experience is not the ground for our game of judging. Nor is its outstanding success.


139. Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.

140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us.

141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)


144. The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.


204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. — On Certainty

Maybe that helped, maybe not. Anyway, even if a rule needs to be made explicit in order to judge whether or not someone has followed a rule, this does not imply that a rule needs to be made explicit in order to be a rule.

I have shown this, several times. I linked to Wikipedia pages on Convention, Unspoken Rule, and the Unwritten Rules of Baseball, for example. You have provided no reasons for why these are not examples of non-explicit rules (that are followed). — Luke

I believe I explained the deficiencies of your examples. We're going around in circles, and I'm having difficulty getting through to you, but I'll try again. How does one judge whether these "unspoken" and "unwritten" rules are being followed unless the rules are spoken or written? Assertion, and appeal to authority (Wikipedia) does not suffice. The assertion that unspoken or unwritten rules are being followed is completely useless, or meaningless, unless we have the means for judging the truth or falsity of whether any rules are actually being followed.

And, when we do formulate these rules in a way, (expressed in language), so as we can make such a judgement, we find that there are many exceptions to the rules. Therefore we can conclude that it's false that rules are being followed in such situations. It's merely a convenient assumption, "unwritten rules are being followed", which when analyzed, we find to be false.

Maybe that helped, maybe not. Anyway, even if a rule needs to be made explicit in order to judge whether or not someone has followed a rule, this does not imply that a rule needs to be made explicit in order to be a rule. — Luke

I agree with you here, because we can define "rule" in whatever way we please. However, we are explicitly talking about rule-following here, and rule-following requires a judgement. So if there are some different types of "rules" which are non-explicit, and therefore impossible to be followed, these types of rules are irrelevant to our discussion.

What Wittgenstein describes in some of those quoted passages, is that we can make judgements which do not require a rule. But this does not imply that we can judge whether a rule has been followed without a rule. That would be contradiction.

Me, nine days ago:
Question: are images part and parcel of human mentality?

Witt, awhile ago:
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? — Isn’t it something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture?

Philosophical jigsaw puzzle.

“...For understanding is, according to what has been said above, a faculty of thought....”
(A69/B94)

“....Isn’t it (what comes before our mind when we understand a word) something like a picture?....”
(P.I., 139)

Mind, understanding, thought, pictures.....all belong to human mentality. So it looks like images are indeed part and parcel of it. So obvious....dunno why it couldn’t just be admitted as given.
—————

So I hear the word “cube”, and what comes before my mind, say, something like a picture of a cube....
The perception is hearing, so that “picture” which has come before the mind cannot be some external, objective illustration; it is, therefore, because it is before the mind, it must have been drawn by the mind, and is a representation of this kind of perceptual sensation.
((“....extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind,...” (A20/B54))

And “before the mind” merely indicates presented to the mind, in this case by means of sensibility, rather than antecedent to the mind, for the consistency of the thesis requires the mind as the ontologically unconditioned, to which nothing having to do with its operation, can be antecedent.

.....but Witt allows the something that comes before the mind to immediately relate to the perception....I hear “cube”, I immediately image “something like a picture of”, a “cube”....
(“...say, the drawing of a cube...”)
(ibid 139)

Witt then asks, “In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word “cube”?...”
(ibid 139)

Witt says nothing about the speaker of the word, but only the receiver of it: “...your mind when you hear...”. It follows necessarily, that it is utterly irrelevant what the speaker meant by the word, it is irrelevant what his understandings are relative to the word, and it is irrelevant how his knowledge of the word relates to his use of it.

In addition, there is no indication of what it is to “use” the word “cube”. So far, all that’s been accomplished is to bring it “before the mind”, “your mind when you hear”.....which doesn’t carry the implication of being used for anything. Still, he says, “a use....”, which implies use in general. But we’re not talking about in general; we’re talking about “you mind when you hear”, which seems to indicate no use at all.

From the sensibility of the receiver, then, “the way this picture fits” cannot be otherwise than to immediately relate to the perception, for if it didn’t, there is no explanation for the drawing of THAT picture by my mind. This makes explicit I already knew what a cube is. According to Witt, I hear “cube”, I image “cube”. No in-between, no alternative possibilities. This is the fundamental flaw in this particular example, which is meant to characterize the entire philosophy, hence, by association, the fundamental flaw in the entire philosophy.

On the other hand, to then ask in what way the drawn image does not fit the perception, is an exercise in pure irrationality, insofar as it is necessarily a case of forcing my understanding into a contradiction with extant knowledge. It would seem quite inexplicable how to immediately relate the sound of the word “cube” to its only legitimate representation in “something like a picture, say, the drawing a “cube”, if I didn’t already have that image in my mind.

Which glaringly begs the question.....”if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn’t fit the picture.”....why in the hell would I ever point to a prism and say it’s a cube? Merely to indicate some disconnected, non-intuitive, use of a word? What legitimate reason is there to do that? It is patently absurd, for I could point to every singe thing available to my perception, and say it doesn’t fit the picture of “cube” that occurred to me upon hearing that particular word, on the one hand, and on the other, I must already know what a prism is in order name it as such and comprehend the use of that word “prism” I merely thought, doesn’t fit the picture of the word “cube” I perceived. From which follows the irrationality, expressed as....
((“....I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself...” (Bxxvii, a))
....and from that, it is clear Witt should never have qualified the example with, “say, the drawing of a cube”, and he should never have volunteered me into something I had no reason to do.

Now the kicker: up to this moment, it is me hearing and me picturing in my mind. At this point, after I have already understood the picture of “cube” that occurs to me before my mind, fitting with the prism to which I point, is a case of which “the use of the word does not fit the picture”, Witt chimes in and has the audacity to ask, “But doesn’t it fit?”, which implies there is a way it does fit and perhaps I should find it.

Witt finishes by saying, “I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture does fit after all.”

Errrrrr.....wha??? Where did he do that? I’ve already established in my mind the parameters by which a perception relates to its image, and given an example of how something else I point to wouldn’t “fit the picture”. Neither he nor I ever suggested how the picture of “cube” before my mind would fit with some different object to which I subsequently point.

All in all, this is a poor example of so-called OLP. Witt defeats himself by mandating that a word brings up an image immediately relating to it (which does happen under certain conditions), but doesn’t stipulate the mechanism for that relation (which is given in the historical literature), and what’s philosophically more disastrous, does not allow for the possibility that the perception and the image do not relate (which does happen under other than those certain conditions), except by means of some post hoc epistemologically invalid imaginings.

Rhetorical opinion.

I have shown this, several times. I linked to Wikipedia pages on Convention, Unspoken Rule, and the Unwritten Rules of Baseball, for example. You have provided no reasons for why these are not examples of non-explicit rules (that are followed).
— Luke

I believe I explained the deficiencies of your examples. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you haven't.

So if there are some different types of "rules" which are non-explicit, and therefore impossible to be followed, these types of rules are irrelevant to our discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Conventions, unspoken rules, and the unwritten rules of baseball are not impossible to be followed. These are all relevant rules.

Anyway, even if a rule needs to be made explicit in order to judge whether or not someone has followed a rule, this does not imply that a rule needs to be made explicit in order to be a rule.
— Luke

What Wittgenstein describes in some of those quoted passages, is that we can make judgements which do not require a rule. But this does not imply that we can judge whether a rule has been followed without a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

Our disagreement started with your claim that rules are not necessary for language because a child does not have grammar/rules to begin with. This was all based on your starting assumption that rules must be explicitly stated. I have now shown this assumption to be false: rules do not need to be explicitly stated in order to be rules.

Our disagreement/discussion was never about the ability to judge whether or not a rule is being followed. You are trying to move the goalposts. I'm not interested.

Question: are images part and parcel of human mentality?

"What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? — Isn’t it something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture". (Emphasis in original)
--Wittgenstein, PI #139 — Mww

This is not Witt speaking, but his questioner; his Interlocutor (or, as it where, Witt's former (positivist) self asking the question). And the next paragraphs are Witt imagining cases of what an answer would look like, and to account for other applications.

We are missing what comes right after this, which is essential:

"Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word "cube"? — Wittgenstein PI

(my emphasis)

Here Witt is asking for a grammatical answer, the ways in which the uses of the word cube with this picture might fit (or fail to). And the interlocutor is proposing a version of language that connects picturing a thing when we understand a word. Before accepting it, Witt pauses ("Weeeeellllll"--see above) and asks us to imagine ("suppose", above) a use of the word cube like this and if there are other uses of the word that include this picture.

From the sensibility of the receiver, then, “the way this picture fits” cannot be otherwise than to immediately relate to the perception, for if it didn’t, there is no explanation for the drawing of THAT picture by my mind. This makes explicit I already knew what a cube is. — Mww

This is the first framework that comes to mind; Witt will say we are "inclined" to it, or it "forces" itself on us. We know what cubes are, we can picture one, even without it in front of me. But this does not dictate the use of the word cube; say, that it can only be used as the relation of what is pictured to what is perceived.

141. Now clearly we accept two different kinds of criteria for this: on the one hand the picture (of whatever kind) that at some time or other comes before his mind; on the other, the application which—in the course of time—he makes of what he imagines. (And can't it be clearly seen here that it is absolutely inessential for the picture to exist in his imagination rather than as a drawing or model in front of him; or again as something that he himself constructs as a model?) — Wittgenstein PI

Here the picture of the word; there the use or application of the word (even without the picture).

.....but Witt allows the something that comes before the mind to immediately relate to the perception....I hear “cube”, I immediately image “something can imagine like a picture of”, a “cube”....
(“...say, the drawing of a cube...”)
(ibid 139) — Mww

It is asked by the Interlocutor if we understand a word instantly, and by Witt, if we see the fit of a use immediately as well. #138-139. As we have seen one is separate from the other, so we can ask: what do we understand when we picture a cube? does the picturing/perceiving have meaning? or does the use?

Witt then asks, “In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word “cube”?...”
(ibid 139)[/quote]

And here is the OLP methodology of imagining examples that would show us the place of picturing a cube to the use of the word "cube" to try to understand if the word cube allows for only one use--the representation or understanding ("meaning") of the picture. He does give an example, but it is like a riddle: he says (rephrased) it is easy to imagine a method of projection that allows for pointing to a triangle prism and saying the word "cube" that actually fits the picture of a cube. We have a picture of a cube (which is technically a type of prism) and we are projecting the use of the cube's "prismness" onto a different (triangular) prism. And this is a different use of the word cube (comparing aspects) than the framework that comes to mind when we imagine understanding an object when picturing/perceiving it, or imagine meaning a word as expressing the picture. The picture without the use has no meaning.

Though "the picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use [practice] to us [representation], but it was possible for me to use it differently [as an example of a prism]." #139. He will say this "called our attention to (reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should be prepared to call 'applying the picture of a cube'." #140

some post hoc epistemologically invalid imaginings. — Mww

Yes, I don't think this is his easiest example (I would see my discussion of "I believe" above). But it is not epistemology as finding (facts or other) justifications for explanations of a general theory of meaning or language; this is an investigation (it is an epistimology) to see how our concepts (practices) work differently, or similarly, and that there are different ways each can be used. And part of OLP is imagining cases, (even fantastical ones--to make sense of a context for philosophy's fantasies) to compare, or draw connections, or show distinctions, etc.

The perception is hearing, so that “picture” which has come before the mind cannot be some external, objective illustration; it is, therefore, because it is before the mind, it must have been drawn by the mind, and is a representation of this kind of perceptual sensation. — Mww

Isn't that just to describe how we bring an image to our mind (as one thing of many we can do--bring up a memory, even of a smell)? And that there are criteria even for doing this. "I can see the schematic cube as a box;—but can I also see it now as a paper, now as a tin, box?"PI p. 208 3rd ed. And here there will be certain things we can imagine and those we can't within the criteria of a cube because we grew up with cubes as we practiced naming and picturing and focusing on aspects of objects and the language that goes with these activities. I investigate above what we imply when we say "I imagine" or "I see an image".

What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. — Wittgenstein PI

He does also offer examples that choosing the appropriate word is not flipping through a book of mental images, but that there are different (ordinary) criteria for what is appropriate in each case and context:

I believe the right word in this case is ... .". Doesn't this shew that the meaning of a word is a something that comes before our mind, and which is, as it were, the exact picture we want to use here? Suppose I were choosing between the words "imposing", "dignified", "proud", "venerable"; isn't it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio?—No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate; because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on. — Wittgenstein, PI

(The interlocutor is in italics)

Here, the "appropriateness" of the word is its "aptness", as Austin says, for this context and the uses of this word, and criteria for applying one to the other. That a word is appropriate is not a connection between "something that comes before our mind" which is "the exact picture we want to use here", ( emphasis added) say the/my "meaning"?

And I underlined "inclined" because Witt likes to show why it is possible to imagine picturing (or other "mentality") as a singular explanation for language: because words can have meaning independent of context, because different words can have the same criteria for use (say, as objects), and because we can create representations of words.

Conventions, unspoken rules, and the unwritten rules of baseball are not impossible to be followed. These are all relevant rules. — Luke

Since you're having so much difficulty understanding this simple matter, I'll spell it out for you in the form of a simple deductive argument. First premise: to follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions. Second premise: people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules. Conclusion: conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed.

Having said that, there are some conventions which serve as rules that we follow, like the rules of mathematics. But by the preceding deductive argument, not all conventions serve as rules which we follow. Therefore some conventions serve as rules which we follow, and some do not.

What I propose is that the only conventions which we can truthfully say that people follow as rules, are some of the ones which are expressed in language.

Our disagreement/discussion was never about the ability to judge whether or not a rule is being followed. — Luke

Don't you see that in order that a rule is being followed, such a judgement is necessary? How could anyone be following a rule if there was no judgement that the act is in accordance with the rule? You do understand the necessity for an interpretation of a rule, do you not?

First premise: to follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions. Second premise: people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules. Conclusion: conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even if your bare assertion that people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules were true, people more often act in ways inside of conventions and unspoken rules. Therefore, your conclusion does not follow from the second premise. Do you honestly believe that conventions are not followed? Conventions could not exist if that were true.

Don't you see that in order that a rule is being followed, such a judgement is necessary? — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already said that it may be necessary to make a rule explicit in order to judge whether a rule is being followed. That wasn't our discussion/disagreement. You made the absolute claim that all rules must be explicit and that children couldn't learn rules prior to learning language because of this. I'm not going to keep repeating myself.

Even if your bare assertion that people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules were true, people more often act in ways inside of conventions and unspoken rules. — Luke

To follow a rule means to stay inside that rule. If you do not stay inside the rule, then you are not following the rule. I think that's straight forward enough. Following a rule does not mean to act in accordance with the rule more often than not. Try telling the judge, I only murdered twice in my entire life, that should qualify as following the rule, so I think you should let me go free.

Do you honestly believe that conventions are not followed? — Luke

Yes, of course I believe that, I find it very obvious, and I'm dumbfounded that you refuse to face the reality of this situation. What I think, is that this whole way of describing human behaviour as fundamentally consisting of rule-following activity, is completely wrong at the most basic level. I believe we are fundamentally free willing human beings, making free choices, and this is completely inconsistent with your representation of human beings as creatures who are following rules in their behaviour. And I believe it quite obvious that the evidence supports my perspective, because we really are not very good at following rules, even when we try really hard.

I've already said that it may be necessary to make a rule explicit in order to judge whether a rule is being followed. — Luke

The point, which I've been repeating, is that "following a rule" is that judgement itself. The judgement that "a rule is being followed" is what constitutes "following a rule". It seems very clear to me that "X is following the rule" is nothing other than a judgement that X is following the rule.

Since "following a rule' requires a correlation between "the rule" and "the action", what else could make this correlation but a judgement?

Following a rule does not mean to act in accordance with the rule more often than not. Try telling the judge, I only murdered twice in my entire life, that should qualify as following the rule, so I think you should let me go free. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not all rules are laws.

Do you honestly believe that conventions are not followed? — Luke

Yes, of course I believe that, — Metaphysician Undercover

If you believe that conventions are never followed - as the conclusion of your deductive argument implied - then you're a fool living in a fantasy world. Of course, conventions aren't always followed, but then rules and laws aren't always followed, either. So, what's your point? Should we now class rules and laws, together with conventions, as being inappropriate to rule-following and impossible to follow?

What I think, is that this whole way of describing human behaviour as fundamentally consisting of rule-following activity, is completely wrong at the most basic level. I believe we are fundamentally free willing human beings, making free choices, and this is completely inconsistent with your representation of human beings as creatures who are following rules in their behaviour. And I believe it quite obvious that the evidence supports my perspective, because we really are not very good at following rules, even when we try really hard. — Metaphysician Undercover

The underlying false assumption here is that rules compel us to follow them, as if they were laws of nature. Neither rules nor laws nor conventions force you to follow them; they will not rob you of your free will.

The point, which I've been repeating, is that "following a rule" is that judgement itself. The judgement that "a rule is being followed" is what constitutes "following a rule". It seems very clear to me that "X is following the rule" is nothing other than a judgement that X is following the rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not interested in moving on to this new argument of yours. Our disagreement was over what counts as a rule and whether a rule must be explicitly stated or not. You can refer to the dictionary again for that answer. The goalposts aren't moving.

If you believe that conventions are never followed - as the conclusion of your deductive argument implied — Luke

Oh boy Luke, this is becoming extremely dreadful. I think you need to read that post over. Not only have you demonstrated an inability to interpret a deductive argument, but also you didn't even remember what I wrote following that conclusion. When a person says "not all conventions serve as rules which we follow", and you represent this as saying "conventions are never followed", that's an inexcusably horrible straw man.

The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed". Furthermore, following that conclusion, I explicitly stated "there are some conventions which serve as rules that we follow".

The underlying false assumption here is that rules compel us to follow them, as if they were laws of nature. Neither rules nor laws nor conventions force you to follow them; they will not rob you of your free will. — Luke

This is the crux of the problem. And I went over this with Josh earlier in the thread. Let's assume that these things which you call "rules" (and I'm trying to get away from this word so that we can distinguish these from true rules), act as some sort of guidelines for behaviour which we freely choose to either follow or not follow in our common activities. Then we cannot describe this behaviour as "rule-following behaviour", because the real nature of the behaviour consists of deciding whether or not to follow the "rules", and the actions resulting from both decisions. If you only allow into your description the part of that activity which is observed to be rule-following, then your description of the activity is deficient because it doesn't account for the other part which is not rule-following.

Language use is this type of activity, in which we have free choice to either follow or not follow the guidelines. So if you describe language use as an activity which follows those rules, your description is incorrect, because it excludes all that part of language use where people choose freely not to follow those rules.

The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed". Furthermore, following that conclusion, I explicitly stated "there are some conventions which serve as rules that we follow". — Metaphysician Undercover

I think, "protocol" would be a more apt term to use when explaining how communication works.

It seems nit-picking to me. We all use reasons for our actions and thoughts. Arguing over whether or not we use the terms, "rule" or "convention" or "protocol" when these terms represent the reason we use some word rather than another, is trivial.

How do you learn a rule as opposed to how you learn a convention or protocol, and is any of that really different than, say, how you learn to play soccer?

Oh boy Luke, this is becoming extremely dreadful. I think you need to read that post over. Not only have you demonstrated an inability to interpret a deductive argument, but also you didn't even remember what I wrote following that conclusion. When a person says "not all conventions serve as rules which we follow", and you represent this as saying "conventions are never followed", that's an inexcusably horrible straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh boy Meta, you are painfully dense. Try substituting "rules" for "conventions and unspoken rules" in your argument:

P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People often act in ways outside of rules.
C. Rules are not rules which are followed.

The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed" — Metaphysician Undercover

The substituted conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that rules are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules". Therefore we ought not describe rules as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "rules are never followed".

Sound reasonable?

This is the crux of the problem. And I went over this with Josh earlier in the thread. Let's assume that these things which you call "rules" (and I'm trying to get away from this word so that we can distinguish these from true rules), act as some sort of guidelines for behaviour which we freely choose to either follow or not follow in our common activities. Then we cannot describe this behaviour as "rule-following behaviour", because the real nature of the behaviour consists of deciding whether or not to follow the "rules", and the actions resulting from both decisions. If you only allow into your description the part of that activity which is observed to be rule-following, then your description of the activity is deficient because it doesn't account for the other part which is not rule-following. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand what you're blabbering about here. Just give up, please.

Of course, conventions aren't always followed, but then rules and laws aren't always followed, either. — Luke

Hadn’t intended to get involved with this again, but you gave such a good presentation I figured I’d better contribute to the other side.

This is not Witt speaking, but his questioner — Antony Nickles

Doesn’t matter; it’s all part of a whole.

We are missing what comes right after this, which is essential: — Antony Nickles

You have a point....

“....A philosophical system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to particular passages, while the organic structure of the system, considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their connection (...), it is easy to pick out apparent contradictions...” (Bxlvii)

........but is was #139 taken from another comment, thus subjected to rhetorical opinion in mine. Still, any arbitrary section subjected to dismemberment by a continental X-Acto knife, would miss the “comprehensive view”, provided only that there is one.
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We know what cubes are, we can picture one, even without it in front of me. But this does not dictate the use of the word cube; say, that it can only be used as the perception of what is pictured. — Antony Nickles

Without it in front of me and given extant experience of them, the picture in the mind is the a priori intuition of empirical cubes in general, yes;
No, the image.....the picture/that which is drawn before the mind......does not dictate the use of the word; such is the purview of judgement alone, from the philosopher’s point of view as a matter of interest, yet only intention from Everydayman’s point of view, as a matter of mere desire.
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Witt pauses ("Weeeeellllll"--see above) and asks us to imagine ("suppose", above) a use of the word cube like this and what would be implied. — Antony Nickles

I covered that implication, and it reduces to irrationality when done with serious intent, or merely idle fabrications if otherwise, both of which are anathema to knowledge.
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And here is the OLP methodology of imagining examples that would show us the place of picturing to the use of the word "cube" to try to understand if the word cube allows for only one use--the representation or meaning of the picture. — Antony Nickles

I covered that. Again, there is no logical reason to do any of that imagining, for it is known what a cube is, and because it is known as nothing other than a geometric figure, the objective cube can only be represented by one general intuition empirically and only one general conception a priori.
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And here the picture could be of anything. Basically, the picture doesn't matter in the process of using a word like "cube" (a label) to name a thing. — Antony Nickles

I covered that. I can think anything I want, provided only that I do not contradict myself. The word “cube” does name a single thing, and the word represents the conception of a single thing, and the conception immediately relates the perception of that single thing, as phenomenon, to the image of it, “drawn before the mind”. It follows necessarily that the picture does very much matter in the use of the word. Under the condition that the word is used correctly, of course. And if not, we’re right back to irrationality or idle fabrications. It matters very much; it is the apodeictic justification for NOT calling out the object prism with the word “cube”.
(Caveat: and I covered this as well, insofar as this only works for perception of already known objects. For unknown objects, we are not rationally prohibited from using examples of extant pictures in order to determine “a fit”, from which a name for the unknown object may follow.)
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And this is a different use of the word cube than the framework that comes to mind when we imagine understanding an object as picturing it, or see meaning a word as expressing the picture. — Antony Nickles

Perhaps, but the framework that comes to mind when we imagine understanding an object as picturing it, is an absolutely necessary ground for knowledge of the object, and meaning the word as expressing the picture, is how we communicate the validity of the knowledge. Neither of those epistemological necessities reside in OLP.
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He will say this "called our attention to (reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should be prepared to call 'applying the picture of a cube'." #140 — Antony Nickles

There are other processes, or, there is only one process used in other ways. Much the more parsimonious to subscribe to the latter than the former. It just makes sense that it is easier, e.g., to correct a mistake in one process, than to investigate more than one process in order to even determine which is responsible for the mistake.
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this is an investigation (it is an epistimology) to see how our concepts work differently, or similarly, and that there are different ways each can be used. — Antony Nickles

Why not just talk to somebody, see if he understands what you said? If he does, yours and his conceptions are congruent, if not, they’re not. No need for an investigation full of examples already present whenever folks communicate.
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What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. — Wittgenstein PI

In ordinary language, application can be different, yes. Hearing the word “orange” can bring up the object “orange” without regard to its color, or, the word can bring up the a priori color “orange” without regard to its object, which are obviously non-congruent meanings of a common word. However, while the common word “orange” represents different conceptions, one of them was cognitively antecedent to the other, and serves as ground for it. I’m guessing the object named “orange” came first, and the color obtained its name merely from similarity.

Some applications cannot be different. Hearing the number one, for example, can never be applied in any other way than to an image of a single unit, hence must have the same meaning to everyone hearing the word.
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as one thing of many we can do--bring up a memory, even of a smell)? — Antony Nickles

Surely you realize it is impossible to intuit smells, which is the same as being impossible to bring up a memory of a smell. We only intuit objects that have a property from which smells arise, but we cannot bring the smell itself to our conscious attention. Same for all sensations except vision. Which is why the notion “image” in cognitive philosophy has so much theoretical power.

All this shows is that of the many things we are said to be able to do.....some of them we actually cannot.
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and because we can create representations of words. — Antony Nickles

I submit that words are the representations, words representation conceptions. We cannot speak in images or intuitions or conceptions, just as we cannot think in terms of the natural forces which govern the physiology of that by which thinking occurs. They all need translating into a method of communication, words being the basic units of that method we use as language. From this perspective, it is clear words are at the tail end of the system, and are not even necessary for the operation of the system, but only the objective manifestations of it.

More rhetorical opinion.....

Some applications cannot be different. Hearing the number one, for example, can never be applied in any other way than to an image of a single unit, hence must have the same meaning to everyone hearing the word. — Mww

Pull the other one.

I don’t know what that means.

One could Google it:

Pull the other one

So.....I get a postcard, and the message is in French, I can either drop it in the circular filing cabinet, or run down to the library and research a translation. Hmmm....lemme think on that a minute.

Ability does not imply interest.

Did you hear the one about the zoo that only had a dog in it?

No.

Well, basically @Mww is responding to my first draft.

I edited my response quite a bit after initially putting it up; it looks like if you click on the link provided in a notification or whatever, it does not take you to the most updated version, unless you refresh the page. I don't know how to fix that.

In any event, I'll give Mww a chance to look at the current version and paste in what responses still fit. It is much the same except I got a better handle on the way Witt uses the word cube in his example.

It was a shih tzu.

In case you missed it, the point of my three examples was to suggest meanings of "one" you may not have thought of, in order to try and demonstrate that "one" needn't have only the meaning of "a single unit", as you asserted.

I think, "protocol" would be a more apt term to use when explaining how communication works.

It seems nit-picking to me. We all use reasons for our actions and thoughts. Arguing over whether or not we use the terms, "rule" or "convention" or "protocol" when these terms represent the reason we use some word rather than another, is trivial. — Harry Hindu

I think "protocol", which refers to something even more formal than "rule" is a step in the wrong direction. The point is that in the majority of instances when we use language, when we speak, the circumstances are very particular and unique. The combinations of words chosen are therefore specific to the particular circumstances, chosen specifically for that particular, unique situation. And in the majority of cases there is no evidence of any general rules or protocols being referred to for guidance. So it appears highly unlikely that we follow any sort of general rules or protocols when choosing words in the majority of natural language use.

Try substituting "rules" for "conventions and unspoken rules" in — Luke

The whole point of that deductive argument was to show that "rule" in the sense of rule-following, has a very distinct meaning from "rule" in the sense of unwritten rules. We discussed the difference between OED #1 and #2. So you're just providing further proof of my point, by showing the absurdity of making that substitution. If you're not doing this substitution thing to help demonstrate my point, but instead think that it somehow supports your position, then I believe you still haven't learned that equivocation is a fallacy in logic.

The whole point of that deductive argument was to show that "rule" in the sense of rule-following, has a very distinct meaning from "rule" in the sense of unwritten rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

You'll have to do a lot more work than that. If your deductive argument was intended to demonstrate that your "true" rules are very distinct from conventions and unspoken rules, then why does the substitution produce exactly the same results for both? And why does it produce the absurd conclusion for both that rules (including conventions and unspoken rules) are not rules? There seems to be a problem with your reasoning.

The substitution is invalid because "rule" in the sense of "to follow a rule" has a different meaning from "convention". Perhaps you might think I'm begging the question.

But I can agree to your substitution if you insist, just to humour you. I don't see the point though, because it doesn't show that rules are not rules, as you claimed. It only shows that rules are not followed. And I already addressed this issue. Human beings are not rule-following creatures, as I described, we choose freely, with free will, whether or not to follow any given rule. We often choose not to. Therefore we cannot make the general statement that rules are followed, and we are left with the converse, rules are not followed, if we desire the general statement. See, it is false to describe human activities as rule-following activities.

You can deny this all you want, because it doesn't make sense to you that people could communicate with each other without following rules, but I think the evidence is very clear. So continue with your denial, if your illusion keeps you satisfied.

But I can agree to your substitution if you insist, just to humour you. I don't see the point though, because it doesn't show that rules are not rules, as you claimed. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not my claim, it's yours, as your summary of the conclusion of your own deductive argument:

The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed" — Metaphysician Undercover

Simply substitute the word "rules" for "conventions" in the above. To make things easier, I already did this for you:

The substituted conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that rules are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules". Therefore we ought not describe rules as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "rules are never followed". — Luke

The absurd conclusion of your summary of the argument is: "we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules"."

The conclusion of your argument, if you substitute "rules" for "conventions" becomes:

C. Rules are not rules which are followed. — Luke

Perhaps you might think I'm begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your deductive argument is invalid and begs the question. Here is your original argument again:

Argument 1 (your original argument):
P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules.
C. Conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed.

The conclusion should be that conventions and unspoken rules are rules which are not always (or only often) followed.
In order to arrive at your original conclusion, you require another premise stating that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. Since that (hidden) premise is also your conclusion, you are begging the question.

Let's try some other versions of your argument to clarify the matter:

Argument 2:
P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People NEVER act in ways outside of rules/conventions/laws/unspoken rules.
C. Rules/conventions/laws/unspoken rules are rules which are ALWAYS followed.

Argument 3:
P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People ALWAYS act in ways outside of rules/conventions/laws/unspoken rules.
C. Rules/conventions/laws/unspoken rules are rules which are NEVER followed.

This removes the ambiguity and does not lead to absurdity.

It only shows that rules are not followed. And I already addressed this issue. Human beings are not rule-following creatures, as I described, we choose freely, with free will, whether or not to follow any given rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, as I have repeatedly stated, this is no different for conventions. We choose freely, with free will, whether or not to follow any given convention. Conventions are just like rules because they are rules.

Therefore we cannot make the general statement that rules are followed, and we are left with the converse, rules are not followed, if we desire the general statement. See, it is false to describe human activities as rule-following activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot make sense of this. Is it "false to describe human activities as rule-following activities" even when at least some of those activities include rule-following (e.g. sports)?

You are going to extreme lengths to try and dispute a dictionary definition.

You can deny this all you want, because it doesn't make sense to you that people could communicate with each other without following rules, but I think the evidence is very clear. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not an argument, though, is it.

The point is that in the majority of instances when we use language, when we speak, the circumstances are very particular and unique. The combinations of words chosen are therefore specific to the particular circumstances, chosen specifically for that particular, unique situation. And in the majority of cases there is no evidence of any general rules or protocols being referred to for guidance. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is a rule if not an action that should be performed given a particular set of circumstances? The rule, "Dont run around the pool" only applies in a particular circumstance of moving around a pool.

To say that there is no guidance, when we have books on proper grammar and spelling, tests for measuring ones skill and professors that teach you the rules, is just absurd. I really dont get your aversion to using the term, "rule" when using language. Rules of logic must also be applied. Rules are not set in stone. Rules can be broken and adapted. Thinking that rules are always rigidly applied is a misconception if rules. Rules can also be like a guide and not necessarily a dictator.

What is a rule if not an action that should be performed given a particular set of circumstances? — Harry Hindu

A rule is not "an action". It is a generalization which may apply to numerous actions. If you say that a particular action should be carried out in a specified set of circumstances, then to justify the "should" you might refer to a rule.

To say that there is no guidance, — Harry Hindu

You'd have to go back and read the thread, but I don't argue that there's no guidance, I argued that in the majority of instances of natural language use, we do not refer to any such rules. So I argued that rules are not fundamental to language use, they exist as part of specialized language use like math, logic, and writing. Therefore it's wrong to characterize language as a rule following activity. I discussed with Josh at one point, what type of guidance is employed at the fundamental level of language use, since it ought not be called a form of rule following. But this was just speculation, there is no real understanding here. What we can say though, is that it's not a matter of rule following.

I really dont get your aversion to using the term, "rule" when using language. — Harry Hindu

I avert it because I see it as an oversimplification which is simply wrong. And using such words which create "a picture", model, or representation, which is actually wrong, is misunderstanding.

Thinking that rules are always rigidly applied is a misconception if rules. Rules can also be like a guide and not necessarily a dictator. — Harry Hindu

Actually, the misconception is in thinking that such a situation can be described as rule following. If rules are not being rigidly applied, say they exist there to be consulted, and the person looks at the rules and decides whether or not to follow them at each individual instance of judgement, then we cannot say that rules are being followed, because the person often decides not to follow. We cannot even say that such a rule would serve as "a guide", because when the person decides not to follow, it provides no guidance.

What is glaringly obvious, is that there are no such rules which we consult during natural language use. When we speak in most ordinary circumstances, we speak the words which rapidly come to our minds, designed for the particularities of the circumstances, without consulting general rules. So this whole conception, that language use is based in some sort of rule following activity is a misconception..

The absurd conclusion of your summary of the argument is: "we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules"." — Luke

Strawman, the conclusion would be "rules are not rules which are followed". There's nothing absurd about having a rule which is not followed. And if the general conclusion is, no rules are followed, this is in accordance with the fact that we are free willing human beings, and it is a false description to describe us as rule-followers. Of any rule, all that is required is one violation, anywhere, anytime, and we can correctly conclude that the rule has not been followed. Therefore the general conclusion is not absurd at all, it's a simple brute fact of human existence, that all rules are broken by free willing human beings.
"Rules are not rules which are followed", and that statement simply reflects the nature of freedom of choice.

And if the general conclusion is, no rules are followed — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you even read my post? Your argument is invalid. The valid conclusion of your argument is that rules are not always followed, not that no rules are followed.

Therefore the general conclusion is not absurd at all, it's a simple brute fact of human existence, that all rules are broken by free willing human beings.
"Rules are not rules which are followed", and that statement simply reflects the nature of freedom of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your general conclusion is that "no rules are followed", this must mean that humans are not free to follow rules. So it's probably a good thing that your argument is invalid. "Rules are not rules" just seems off somehow.

demonstrate that "one" needn't have only the meaning of "a single unit", as you asserted. — Luke

.....except those two, not three for one was repetitive, are precisely examples of a single unit.....one thing to pull, one joke not heard.

There may be demonstrations that successfully counter my assertion; those are not them.