Before that, you had made the absolute claims that "a rule must be expressed in language" on page 10, and that "rules cannot exist without language" on page 8. — Luke
I should have looked more closely at your #1 and #2 definitions, which I had assumed drew the same distinctions between explicit and non-explicit rules that I was trying to point out to you with the Google definition that I posted earlier. However, this is not the distinction between them. Your #1 definition of rule is: "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform". This is very similar to the Google definition, and likewise allows for the principle or rule to be either explicit or non-explicit. I was probably quick to overlook this because your definition #2: "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things" is close to what I had in mind when it comes to non-explicit rules. — Luke
What do you mean by a "context"? If a context isn't a rule, then you can't mean any of the OED definitions of "rule". Do you think language ever gets used in the context of "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things"? It seems fairly obvious to me that this OED definition #2 of "rule" has at least some part to play in the teaching of language, the meanings of our words, and the contexts in which those words are used. — Luke
We were talking about "rules" in the sense of "rule-following". Obviously when you define "rule" in some other way, which is not consistent with this use, then i would not adhere to that claim about what "rule" means. That's why equivocation is a fallacy. — Metaphysician Undercover
To "follow a rule" is a judgement. I'm still waiting for you to show how such a judgement can be made when the rule is not expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover
To copy another person's actions, to mimic, is not to follow a rule, because a "rule" is a generalization concerning numerous actions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, if someone is said to "follow a rule", this implies that a judgement of accordance has been made between the person's actions and the rule. Can you explain to me how that rule could exist in some form other than in language, which could allow it to be referred to, in order for that judgement to be made? — Metaphysician Undercover
338. One judges the length of a rod, and may look for and find some method of judging it more exactly or more reliably. So — you say — what is judged here is independent of the method of judging it. What length is cannot be explained by the method of determining length. — Anyone who thinks like this is making a mistake. What mistake? — To say “The height of Mont Blanc depends on how one climbs it” would be odd. And one wants to compare ‘ever more accurate measurement of length’ with getting closer and closer to an object. But in certain cases it is, and in certain cases it is not, clear what “getting closer and closer to the length of an object” means. What “determining the length” means is not learned by learning what length and determining are; rather, the meaning of the word “length” is learnt by learning, among other things, what it is to determine length. — Philosophical Investigations
128. From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.
129. This is how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment.
130. But isn't it experience that teaches us to judge like this, that is to say, that it is correct to judge like this? But how does experience teach us, then? We may derive it from experience, but experience does not direct us to derive anything from experience. If it is the ground of our judging like this, and not just the cause, still we do not have a ground for seeing this in turn as a ground.
131. No, experience is not the ground for our game of judging. Nor is its outstanding success.
139. Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.
140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us.
141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)
144. The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.
204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. — On Certainty
I have shown this, several times. I linked to Wikipedia pages on Convention, Unspoken Rule, and the Unwritten Rules of Baseball, for example. You have provided no reasons for why these are not examples of non-explicit rules (that are followed). — Luke
Maybe that helped, maybe not. Anyway, even if a rule needs to be made explicit in order to judge whether or not someone has followed a rule, this does not imply that a rule needs to be made explicit in order to be a rule. — Luke
I have shown this, several times. I linked to Wikipedia pages on Convention, Unspoken Rule, and the Unwritten Rules of Baseball, for example. You have provided no reasons for why these are not examples of non-explicit rules (that are followed).
— Luke
I believe I explained the deficiencies of your examples. — Metaphysician Undercover
So if there are some different types of "rules" which are non-explicit, and therefore impossible to be followed, these types of rules are irrelevant to our discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover
Anyway, even if a rule needs to be made explicit in order to judge whether or not someone has followed a rule, this does not imply that a rule needs to be made explicit in order to be a rule.
— Luke
What Wittgenstein describes in some of those quoted passages, is that we can make judgements which do not require a rule. But this does not imply that we can judge whether a rule has been followed without a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
Question: are images part and parcel of human mentality?
"What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? — Isn’t it something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture". (Emphasis in original)
--Wittgenstein, PI #139 — Mww
(my emphasis)"Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word "cube", say the drawing of a cube. In what sense can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word "cube"? — Wittgenstein PI
From the sensibility of the receiver, then, “the way this picture fits” cannot be otherwise than to immediately relate to the perception, for if it didn’t, there is no explanation for the drawing of THAT picture by my mind. This makes explicit I already knew what a cube is. — Mww
141. Now clearly we accept two different kinds of criteria for this: on the one hand the picture (of whatever kind) that at some time or other comes before his mind; on the other, the application which—in the course of time—he makes of what he imagines. (And can't it be clearly seen here that it is absolutely inessential for the picture to exist in his imagination rather than as a drawing or model in front of him; or again as something that he himself constructs as a model?) — Wittgenstein PI
.....but Witt allows the something that comes before the mind to immediately relate to the perception....I hear “cube”, I immediately image “something can imagine like a picture of”, a “cube”....
(“...say, the drawing of a cube...”)
(ibid 139) — Mww
some post hoc epistemologically invalid imaginings. — Mww
The perception is hearing, so that “picture” which has come before the mind cannot be some external, objective illustration; it is, therefore, because it is before the mind, it must have been drawn by the mind, and is a representation of this kind of perceptual sensation. — Mww
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. — Wittgenstein PI
(The interlocutor is in italics)I believe the right word in this case is ... .". Doesn't this shew that the meaning of a word is a something that comes before our mind, and which is, as it were, the exact picture we want to use here? Suppose I were choosing between the words "imposing", "dignified", "proud", "venerable"; isn't it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio?—No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate; because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on. — Wittgenstein, PI
Conventions, unspoken rules, and the unwritten rules of baseball are not impossible to be followed. These are all relevant rules. — Luke
Our disagreement/discussion was never about the ability to judge whether or not a rule is being followed. — Luke
First premise: to follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions. Second premise: people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules. Conclusion: conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. — Metaphysician Undercover
Don't you see that in order that a rule is being followed, such a judgement is necessary? — Metaphysician Undercover
Even if your bare assertion that people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules were true, people more often act in ways inside of conventions and unspoken rules. — Luke
Do you honestly believe that conventions are not followed? — Luke
I've already said that it may be necessary to make a rule explicit in order to judge whether a rule is being followed. — Luke
Following a rule does not mean to act in accordance with the rule more often than not. Try telling the judge, I only murdered twice in my entire life, that should qualify as following the rule, so I think you should let me go free. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you honestly believe that conventions are not followed? — Luke
Yes, of course I believe that, — Metaphysician Undercover
What I think, is that this whole way of describing human behaviour as fundamentally consisting of rule-following activity, is completely wrong at the most basic level. I believe we are fundamentally free willing human beings, making free choices, and this is completely inconsistent with your representation of human beings as creatures who are following rules in their behaviour. And I believe it quite obvious that the evidence supports my perspective, because we really are not very good at following rules, even when we try really hard. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point, which I've been repeating, is that "following a rule" is that judgement itself. The judgement that "a rule is being followed" is what constitutes "following a rule". It seems very clear to me that "X is following the rule" is nothing other than a judgement that X is following the rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you believe that conventions are never followed - as the conclusion of your deductive argument implied — Luke
The underlying false assumption here is that rules compel us to follow them, as if they were laws of nature. Neither rules nor laws nor conventions force you to follow them; they will not rob you of your free will. — Luke
I think, "protocol" would be a more apt term to use when explaining how communication works.The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed". Furthermore, following that conclusion, I explicitly stated "there are some conventions which serve as rules that we follow". — Metaphysician Undercover
Oh boy Luke, this is becoming extremely dreadful. I think you need to read that post over. Not only have you demonstrated an inability to interpret a deductive argument, but also you didn't even remember what I wrote following that conclusion. When a person says "not all conventions serve as rules which we follow", and you represent this as saying "conventions are never followed", that's an inexcusably horrible straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover
The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed" — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the crux of the problem. And I went over this with Josh earlier in the thread. Let's assume that these things which you call "rules" (and I'm trying to get away from this word so that we can distinguish these from true rules), act as some sort of guidelines for behaviour which we freely choose to either follow or not follow in our common activities. Then we cannot describe this behaviour as "rule-following behaviour", because the real nature of the behaviour consists of deciding whether or not to follow the "rules", and the actions resulting from both decisions. If you only allow into your description the part of that activity which is observed to be rule-following, then your description of the activity is deficient because it doesn't account for the other part which is not rule-following. — Metaphysician Undercover
Of course, conventions aren't always followed, but then rules and laws aren't always followed, either. — Luke
This is not Witt speaking, but his questioner — Antony Nickles
We are missing what comes right after this, which is essential: — Antony Nickles
We know what cubes are, we can picture one, even without it in front of me. But this does not dictate the use of the word cube; say, that it can only be used as the perception of what is pictured. — Antony Nickles
Witt pauses ("Weeeeellllll"--see above) and asks us to imagine ("suppose", above) a use of the word cube like this and what would be implied. — Antony Nickles
And here is the OLP methodology of imagining examples that would show us the place of picturing to the use of the word "cube" to try to understand if the word cube allows for only one use--the representation or meaning of the picture. — Antony Nickles
And here the picture could be of anything. Basically, the picture doesn't matter in the process of using a word like "cube" (a label) to name a thing. — Antony Nickles
And this is a different use of the word cube than the framework that comes to mind when we imagine understanding an object as picturing it, or see meaning a word as expressing the picture. — Antony Nickles
He will say this "called our attention to (reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should be prepared to call 'applying the picture of a cube'." #140 — Antony Nickles
this is an investigation (it is an epistimology) to see how our concepts work differently, or similarly, and that there are different ways each can be used. — Antony Nickles
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. — Wittgenstein PI
as one thing of many we can do--bring up a memory, even of a smell)? — Antony Nickles
and because we can create representations of words. — Antony Nickles
I think, "protocol" would be a more apt term to use when explaining how communication works.
It seems nit-picking to me. We all use reasons for our actions and thoughts. Arguing over whether or not we use the terms, "rule" or "convention" or "protocol" when these terms represent the reason we use some word rather than another, is trivial. — Harry Hindu
Try substituting "rules" for "conventions and unspoken rules" in — Luke
The whole point of that deductive argument was to show that "rule" in the sense of rule-following, has a very distinct meaning from "rule" in the sense of unwritten rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I can agree to your substitution if you insist, just to humour you. I don't see the point though, because it doesn't show that rules are not rules, as you claimed. — Metaphysician Undercover
The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed" — Metaphysician Undercover
The substituted conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that rules are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules". Therefore we ought not describe rules as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "rules are never followed". — Luke
C. Rules are not rules which are followed. — Luke
Perhaps you might think I'm begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover
It only shows that rules are not followed. And I already addressed this issue. Human beings are not rule-following creatures, as I described, we choose freely, with free will, whether or not to follow any given rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore we cannot make the general statement that rules are followed, and we are left with the converse, rules are not followed, if we desire the general statement. See, it is false to describe human activities as rule-following activities. — Metaphysician Undercover
You can deny this all you want, because it doesn't make sense to you that people could communicate with each other without following rules, but I think the evidence is very clear. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is a rule if not an action that should be performed given a particular set of circumstances? The rule, "Dont run around the pool" only applies in a particular circumstance of moving around a pool.The point is that in the majority of instances when we use language, when we speak, the circumstances are very particular and unique. The combinations of words chosen are therefore specific to the particular circumstances, chosen specifically for that particular, unique situation. And in the majority of cases there is no evidence of any general rules or protocols being referred to for guidance. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is a rule if not an action that should be performed given a particular set of circumstances? — Harry Hindu
To say that there is no guidance, — Harry Hindu
I really dont get your aversion to using the term, "rule" when using language. — Harry Hindu
Thinking that rules are always rigidly applied is a misconception if rules. Rules can also be like a guide and not necessarily a dictator. — Harry Hindu
The absurd conclusion of your summary of the argument is: "we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules"." — Luke
And if the general conclusion is, no rules are followed — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore the general conclusion is not absurd at all, it's a simple brute fact of human existence, that all rules are broken by free willing human beings.
"Rules are not rules which are followed", and that statement simply reflects the nature of freedom of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover
demonstrate that "one" needn't have only the meaning of "a single unit", as you asserted. — Luke
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