What you're describing is a person who is suffering somehow (every unfulfilled appetite is a kind of suffering) and thinks that seeing other people suffer will alleviate his own suffering (satisfy his appetite): someone who has some appetite (his own suffering), and interprets that into a desire to see someone else suffer. — Pfhorrest

Yes. And who also knows that others suffering fulfills this appetite.

It does care to alleviate his suffering (satisfy his appetite), in some way. — Pfhorrest

But what if that is the only way? Here, compromise would involve harming others for this person.

But it also cares to prevent the suffering of others (to satisfy their appetites), so the alleviation of his suffering can't be done in the way he wants to do it. — Pfhorrest

Not necessarily. The way you made your system, his appetite is just as valid as anyone else’s. It has the same moral weight. So if he is suffering hard enough due to this appetite, and we know of only one way to fix it which is causing suffering to others, if the latter suffering is smaller than the former we must allow him to do as he likes. Because after all, we’re looking for the best compromise and dubbing that “the objectively correct morality”

Think about the parable of the blind men and the elephant, which illustrates the distinction between sensation and perception/belief, which is analogous to the distinction between appetite and desire/intention. Each blind man touches a different part of the same thing, and on account of what he feels, thinks he knows what he has touched. One man thinks he has touched a tree. Another thinks he has touched a rope. The third things he has touched a snake.

All three of of them are wrong about what they think they have touched. But the truth -- that they have touched different parts of an elephant, its leg, its tail, and its trunk, respectively -- is consistent with the sensations that they all felt when they touched it. They were all wrong in their perceptions or beliefs, but the truth has to accord with all of their sensations. One of them being really really certain that the thing they all touched absolutely has to have been a snake and cannot possibly have been anything else doesn't change anything. — Pfhorrest

Just sounds bizarre to me. In this example the elephant is a physical existing thing. But I don’t see how this can be analogous to moral situations. There is no “moral elephant” as in “the objectivity correct morality”. I agree that there definitely is the “best compromise morality” which satisfies the most appetites, but I don’t think that is really what anyone’s looking for. You say the two are the same. I don’t think all hedonic experiences should be taken as data points to indicate how we should compromise. Some appetites should be ignored.

What is common among PC culture is what Gergen is accusing it of , a blameful moralism based on a belief in a normative standard that is claimed to be superior or preferred to standards of other normative cultures.
— Joshs

This is confused. A belief, whatever its nature, origin and grounding, is always held to be superior to alternatives, however tentatively or transiently. If it wasn't, it wouldn't be a belief. (One can take a pluralistic stance on some issue, but then any isolated strand within that pluralistic web would not be an accurate representation of the whole.) — SophistiCat

Gergen has a belief, or more precisely a theory, called social constructionism, the view that all truths are contingent constructions of local cultures, including his own theory. Does he think it is superior to alternatives in terms of its implications for how people treat each other? Yes. Does he think that people who don’t hold that belief are morally wrong? No. Then how is his belief superior if it isn’t ‘t making a moral claim?He realizes it is only superior from his perspective and he has no reason to assume that it will or should be perceived as such by another community. Thus, he isnt claiming that others who don’t hold his belief are presenting a moral failing , because he realizes that it is his responsibility to attempt to offer his theory to towers and allow them to determine if it appears superior to them. It is not his judgement to make but theirs, or more precisely, its value is to be decided via intersubjective negotiation.

I am curious, if you are actually reading my responses, what in what I wrote made you think that I am a moral realist? — SophistiCat

How don’t we save a little time here and you just tell me as succinctly as possibly what philosophical position on morality you hold. If you could also mention just 4 or 5 philosophers ( within the past 2 centuries, including living writers ) whose general framework you most closely identify with that would be helpful too.

Right, the only way to remove fuel - not just for violent retribution, but for any moral action, good or bad - is to renounce moral beliefs altogether. But, except for a few psychopaths, no one is actually willing to do that, whatever theories they espouse in public. — SophistiCat

Probably a better way to put this is that you reject philosophies which claim to go beyond moral thinking. Would you put Nietzsche’s Geneology of Morality and Beyond Good and Evil in this category? How about Foucault? Or Richard Garner? ( https://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Morality_The_Final_Delusion )

To simplify , let’s just say that you reject postmodern philosophies in general , to the extent that they all claim to go beyond morality( Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty).

Ah, I see. For me, philosophy is a means to an end - and that end is the continued existence of the human species. — counterpunch

But "why is that the end?" is a philosophical question itself.

But phenomenalism? Phenomenalism is essentially subjectivism.

"Phenomenalism is the view that physical objects cannot justifiably be said to exist in themselves, but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli."

Do you run back into rooms to see if everything is still there?

Science is objectivism. Science assumes an objective reality exists independently of our experience of it. — counterpunch

Did you miss the part earlier in this thread about distinguishing different kinds of "objectivism" and "subjectivism"? Science is objectivist as in universalist, as in not relativist. But it's also subjectivist as in phenomenalist, not transcendent. Science deals entirely with the world as it appears in our observations (which is to say, our subjective experiences), without discussing anything that is wholly unobservable. But it also presupposes that there is a single unified (objective) explanation for all observations, that it's possible for everyone to be wrong about simultaneously.

But what if that is the only way? Here, compromise would involve harming others for this person. — khaled

There is never only one way. Appetites are data points: the states of affairs desired are curves fit to that data. And there are always infinitely many possibly curves that can fit any possible data.

Because after all, we’re looking for the best compromise and dubbing that “the objectively correct morality” — khaled

I already said earlier that my notion of "the objectively correct morality" does not involve any compromise. We may have to compromise in some ways in lieu of our ability to attain that objectively best state of affairs, but that kind of compromise doesn't have to be an "ends justify the means" kind of consequentialism that you seem to assume I support (which I definitely don't).

Just sounds bizarre to me. In this example the elephant is a physical existing thing. But I don’t see how this can be analogous to moral situations. There is no “moral elephant” as in “the objectivity correct morality”. — khaled

This is question-begging. We're all stuck inside of our own subjective experiences, both descriptively and prescriptively. We can never know for sure that there is or isn't a physically existing elephant apart from our experiences of it, or that there is or isn't anything morally analogous to that. All we can do is choose whether or not to act as though there is some objectivity attainable, in either case.

The question of what is moral is the question of what ought we do. We all have those feelings that call for something or another to be done (our appetites), and our immediate, unreflective opinions about what that something or other should be (our desires), on the basis of just our own such feelings. But an objective answer is an unbiased answer. So an objective morality is one that takes into account all such feelings (all appetites). But -- and this is the really important part that saves the whole thing from your usual criticism -- we don't have to take into account everyone's opinions about their feelings (all desires). — Pfhorrest

Don’t mean to interrupt or be another distraction, but I’m curious about this.

How would one arrive at an unbiased position on a particular moral dilemma, when all the data points available are subjective? I can get that “everyone feels anger” is objective (unless you want to argue that we can never really know if what I call anger, and what you call anger, feel the same/similar), but this doesn’t lead to any sort of resolution on what I should do when I’m angry. The issue seems to be trying to determine what is an appropriate desire for a particular appetite. Anger can be relieved/released in many different ways, I just so happen to prefer a handful of options over others, so how do I figure out which one is best?

Also, note that there is more than one option that refrains from causing harm, either to myself or others, so simply saying “whichever option causes less harm” doesn’t fully answer the question. If there is an objectively correct answer, then that answer, whatever it may be, can be the only correct answer. So, someway or another, I need to figure out if it is better to exercise to relieve my anger, or to listen to music, for example. What exactly is the criteria I should use to determine which answer is objectively correct?

There is never only one way. Appetites are data points: the states of affairs desired are curves fit to that data. And there are always infinitely many possibly curves that can fit any possible data. — Pfhorrest

Well you don't know that. What you said does not prove that there will never be a case where there is only one way. But regardless, it was a hypothetical "what if".

I already said earlier that my notion of "the objectively correct morality" does not involve any compromise. — Pfhorrest

How do we figure out what the "objectively correct morality" looks like? We try to maximize appetite-satisfaction no? But what happens when these appetites clash is the question. If the goal is to maximize appetite-satisfaction, then the one with the stronger hunger just wins out no matter what they are hungry for. That's consequential-ism but how do you avoid it if your goal is purely to maximize appetite-satisfaction?

We're all stuck inside of our own subjective experiences, both descriptively and prescriptively. We can never know for sure that there is or isn't a physically existing elephant apart from our experiences of it, or that there is or isn't anything morally analogous to that. All we can do is choose whether or not to act as though there is some objectivity attainable, in either case. — Pfhorrest

It goes a level beyond that. I cannot even conceive of putting morality "out there" in the world in the same way you would put an elephant. An elephant is a separate entity from us that has its own agency. "Objective morality" doesn't have its own agency. We cannot see or touch "Objective morality". "Objective morality" would cease to exist the second we do. Etc...

Sure we are stuck inside our subjective experience when seeing the elephant but I don't understand what it means to "see objective morality" from within these subjective experiences in the first place. What does it smell like? What does it look like? Is it edible? Nonsense questions. But not so with the elephant see?

I can conceive of "inter-subjective" morality in the sense that we all agree on what we should do but that's as far as it goes.

How would one arrive at an unbiased position on a particular moral dilemma, when all the data points available are subjective? — Pinprick

You could ask the exact same question about how we arrive at an unbiased position about what is real, since all data points about reality (observations) are also subjective. In both cases, we approach objectivity by replicating each others' experiences, and if we can't, by seeing what is different about us that results in different experiences in the same circumstances.

Also, note that there is more than one option that refrains from causing harm, either to myself or others, so simply saying “whichever option causes less harm” doesn’t fully answer the question. If there is an objectively correct answer, then that answer, whatever it may be, can be the only correct answer. So, someway or another, I need to figure out if it is better to exercise to relieve my anger, or to listen to music, for example. What exactly is the criteria I should use to determine which answer is objectively correct? — Pinprick

There is likewise always another theory that explains a given set of observations (this is the underdetermination of theory by evidence). What to do about that is an epistemic, not ontological, question; and likewise the moral equivalent of that question is not one of what states of affairs are good, but about what the right course of action is.

Analogously to falsificationism in epistemology, which says that all different theories that have not yet been ruled out be the evidence are acceptable, liber(al|tarian)ism in deontology says that all actions that have not yet been ruled out (e.g. that don't harm anyone else) are acceptable. There is still one unique universal reality under falsificationism, we just never pin down exactly what it is, only narrow in on it. Likewise there is still one unique universal morality under my scheme -- one optimal solution -- but we can never pin down exactly what it is, only narrow down the possibilities.

Well you don't know that. What you said does not prove that there will never be a case where there is only one way. But regardless, it was a hypothetical "what if". — khaled

It's analytically always the case that there will never be only one way. Like I said above, this is basically underdetermination of theory by evidence, but about moral "theories" and moral "evidence".

For a simple illustration, the easy to come up with (but hard to implement) solution to all moral dilemmas is just to give everyone their own virtual world where everything goes however makes them the most satisfied. No matter what moral dilemma you come up with, that's an obvious solution to it.

That's a very very hard solution to implement though, so we have to make do with less than that, but for the purpose of theory it demonstrates that there's always a solution. There just might not be an easy solution.

What to do when we can't just effortlessly make everything perfect like that is the second question of ethics, what I call the deontological one, analogous to epistemology (which we need in turn because we don't just have a Big Book Of Reality that we can look up all the facts in; we have to make do with our imperfect knowledge, like in ethics we have to make do with our imperfect power).

What we've been discussing thus far, and what needs to be settled before you can apply any method like that, is what I call the teleological question, the question of what are good ends, what criteria define a wholly good state of affairs, which we are then going to try to approximate with such a method. That is analogous to how ontology is about the question of what criteria constitute some state of affairs being real, which we then try to approximate with epistemological methods.

We try to maximize appetite-satisfaction no? — khaled

Not maximize, and not try to. A wholly good state of affairs is one where all appetites are satisfied.

As above, we can't just make that happen with a snap of our fingers, so we've got to have a methodology of making do in lieu of that, but that has nothing to do with the definition of what a good state of affairs even is, which we need to have first before we can apply that methodology.

I don't understand what it means to "see objective morality" from within these subjective experiences in the first place. What does it smell like? What does it look like? Is it edible? Nonsense questions. — khaled

Yes, nonsense questions, because you're asking about senses, which define what is real, whereas it is appetites that defined what is moral. I'm not suggesting that there is a real object that exists that is the cause of things being moral or not. Think about what it means for something to be real. Unless you believe in supernatural things, or you're a solipsist, things being real are about them being a part of our empirical experience, everyone's empirical experience.

Likewise, on my account something being moral is about it being a part of our hedonic experience, everyone's hedonic experience. Morality doesn't look like anything per se, or smell like anything per se, but it feels good, it feels comfortable, it feels like a full belly, it feels like all of your appetites are sated, and it feels like that to everyone, not just you. And if there was some state of affairs where everyone felt good like that, and yet someone wanted it to be different in a way that made someone not feel good, or said that there was something still morally wrong even though everyone's every need was met like that, then that person would just be incorrect.

"In a textbook example, if all I know is that you spent $10 on apples and oranges and that apples cost $1 while oranges cost $2, then I know that you did not buy six oranges, but I do not know whether you bought one orange and eight apples, two oranges and six apples, and so on."

And the scientist would know this, be the first to admit it, and seek alternate methods of investigation. Looking in the bag springs to mind!

Underdetermination only becomes a problem if it is the basis of illegitimate claims to knowledge, but every scientific paper I've read goes to enormous lengths to equivocate, by setting conclusions in the context of the limitations of the methods of investigation employed.

It's analytically always the case that there will never be only one way. — Pfhorrest

I’m talking pragmatically not analytically.

Not maximize, and not try to. A wholly good state of affairs is one where all appetites are satisfied. — Pfhorrest

Not maximize? So there are times when you would purposely choose to stray away from the ideal of all appetites being satisfied? Based on what?

I would assume if your goal is all appetites being satisfied then you would choose the option that gets you closest to that. But that’s consequentialist. But idk how you would avoid it.

Likewise, on my account something being moral is about it being a part of our hedonic experience, everyone's hedonic experience. Morality doesn't look like anything per se, or smell like anything per se, but it feels good, it feels comfortable, it feels like a full belly, it feels like all of your appetites are sated, and it feels like that to everyone, not just you. And if there was some state of affairs where everyone felt good like that, and yet someone wanted it to be different in a way that made someone not feel good, or said that there was something still morally wrong even though everyone's every need was met like that, then that person would just be incorrect. — Pfhorrest

I can get behind that. Isn’t it consequentialist though? Here you’re saying that the only arbiter of whether or not someone is wrong is whether or not people’s needs were met. If the act meets people’s needs, it cannot be wrong. How do you avoid consequentialism then?

I’m talking pragmatically not analytically. — khaled

Then we're talking about different things. There's a whole stack of different questions in ethics, just like there are a stack of questions involved in the investigation of reality, including:

- What do our questions (and proposed answers mean), linguistically? What are we trying to do with our words here? (We've not really touched on this one and hopefully won't need to here).

- What are the criteria by which we assess those answers?
- - In investigations of reality this question is answered by the field of ontology: what is it that makes some possible state of affairs a real state of affairs?
- - In investigations of morality I call this question the "teleological" one, because it's about ends rather than means, what it is that makes some possible state of affairs a moral state of affairs?
(This is where questions of objectivity and subjectivity come in, and so what I've mostly been talking about.

- What is the nature of our faculties for assessing such things? I.e. what's the nature of the mind and the will? (We've not really touched on this one and probably don't need to here).

- What are the methods to use to find / get to such a state of affairs, given our limited knowledge / power means we can't just look it up / wish it into being?
- - In investigations of reality this is answered by the field of epistemology, about what is a justified belief.
- - In investigations of morality I call this the "deontological" question", because it's about means rather than ends, what is a justified intention (and consequently action, as justified actions require both a justified belief and a justified intention motivating them).

- Who gets to actually apply those methods or judge if they've been applied correctly?
- - In investigations of reality this is where scientific peer review and other facets of academics and education come into play.
- - In investigations of morality this is where politics and governance come into play.

- How do we get people, as a whole, society, to actually do things that way?

Those last three are the more pragmatic questions. But none of them can begin to be answered without first having a notion of what it even is that we're aiming for.

Not maximize? So there are times when you would purposely choose to stray away from the ideal of all appetites being satisfied? Based on what? — khaled

Sorry, I was unclear. "Maximize" to my ear sounds like "get as much as you can manage", but at this point in the analysis we're not talking about what is manageable or not, so maximization is irrelevant. A good state of affairs is one where all appetites are satisfied. A less bad state of affairs is one where fewer appetites are unsatisfied (or they're less unsatisfied), but that doesn't mean that the correct methodology is just "do whatever creates more satisfaction than dissatisfaction", and that all intentions to do so (and actions on such intentions) are justified. Just like in science we can't just throw out the inconvenient observations and go say that whatever satisfied more observations than it dissatisfies is the right theory; if there's unsatisfied observations there's still a problem with your theory.

I can get behind that. Isn’t it consequentialist though? Here you’re saying that the only arbiter of whether or not someone is wrong is whether or not people’s needs were met. If the act meets people’s needs, it cannot be wrong. How do you avoid consequentialism then? — khaled

It is necessary that the ends be one where everyone's appetites are satisfied, but that is not sufficient. The means used to get there must themselves also be justified. It's exactly like how an argument with a true conclusion is not therefore a sound conclusion; it needs to get there by valid inferences as well.

For example, if you could magically create a state where all appetites were satisfied, but at the cost of an agonizing death for half the people presently in the universe, then you would end up with a state of affairs where there is no room for improvement (everyone's appetites are satisfied, nothing can be made better there... somehow, we posit in this thought experiment), but you would have gotten there by horribly unjust means, and that end would not justify those means, so we in the universe prior to making the decision to that should decide not to do so.

I haven't read the whole conversation because I don't have time, but the prompt looked cool. I am not sure if there is an objectively true moral code, but I think that if there is, I am not sure how I could know about it. There is no universal consensus regarding what is right and wrong, so an objectively true morality is most difficult to recognize. Emotions or perspectives often can mislead or cloud our thoughts, and while they might compel me to take the objectively moral course of action (if one exists), they cannot prove that I did so. An objectively true moral code, if it exists, would be correct regardless of whether or not you agree or desire it, in the same way that 1+2 must equal 3 in reality. If that is the case, then we could only recognize a moral code as objectively true through an airtight, consistent logical system of reasoning. Alas, the rational nature of logic and math tells me about the way things are, but does not tell me about the way I ought to live my life. In other words, descriptive statements do not imply normative statements, as in "is" does not imply an "ought". However, just because we cannot recognize an objectively true moral code does not mean one does not exist. So, the question remains, how can we possibly know if an objectively correct moral code exists?

In other words, descriptive statements do not imply normative statements, as in "is" does not imply an "ought". — Anthony Minickiello

Yes, they do. Descriptive statements do not necessitate normative statements. But they do imply them, and they do so because morality is fundamentally a sense - fostered in the human animal by evolution in the context of the hunter gatherer tribe - and only made explicit when hunter gatherer tribes joined together to form societies and civilisations. Human beings cannot look at a list of facts without inferring the moral implications of those facts.

I guess I'm having a hard time understanding why you think that descriptive statements can imply normative ones. I think you are quite right that morality is a sense fostered in the human animal by evolution, and I think that is an astute observation. But I am unable to make the logical leap between the fact that morality is a "sense" and the notion that "is" statements can imply "ought" ones. How are those related? I hope you will expand upon this. I also agree with what you said about how humans infer moral implications from a list of facts, I think that is very true. But are humans correct in such inferences? How can we be sure? I like what you said a lot but I need some comprehension help

It is necessary that the ends be one where everyone's appetites are satisfied, but that is not sufficient. — Pfhorrest

or said that there was something still morally wrong even though everyone's every need was met like that, then that person would just be incorrect. — Pfhorrest

Those two seem contradictory. In one you’re saying that means matter. In the other you’re saying that as long as everyone’s need is met, that’s all that matters (which implies the means don’t matter)

Here's what Hume said:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not."

By descriptive statements, I assume you mean "the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not." Or facts.

By normative statements I assume you mean "no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not." Morals or values.

I would argue that Hume misunderstood his own observation because he believes there is a God given objective moral order; whereas, for me - I think morality is a sense, and religion, law, politics, economics are expressions of that sense.

But I am unable to make the logical leap between the fact that morality is a "sense" and the notion that "is" statements can imply "ought" ones. How are those related? — Anthony Minickiello

Hume says it himself. It's what people do. He's right insofar as 'is' does not necessitate 'ought' because people have different values. We can look at the same list of facts, and think they imply different moral responses. But the implication of ought from is, is what people do. We know things, and then act morally on the basis of what we know. (ideally)

But are humans correct in such inferences? How can we be sure? — Anthony Minickiello

We cannot be sure. Is does not necessitate ought, but is does imply ought - a different ought for me than for you perhaps, and so we have philosophy forums and democracy to argue it out. The problem with the suggestion that is does not imply ought is that it devalues the significance of the 'is' - and this is an entirely deliberate feature of western philosophy since Descartes; currently playing out through left wing post modernist identity politics.

So, the question remains... — Anthony Minickiello

Hit the "post comment" button by mistake. I'm done editing now.

The is/ought distinction gets confused because people mistake it for a suggestion morality is not..

Really, it's a logical discintion that a fact of existing is not the same as a fact of an ought-- that's to say, we do not get or derive the ought from the mere fact something exists. The ought is own fact, an ought about something, which is known on its own terms.

In the respect, the human sensing of morality is about an is: a fact of the ought, about a state or action of concern. We never derived from the fact something existed. We know all along that some existences we ought to have (or not have).

By descriptive statements, I assume you mean "the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not." Or facts. — counterpunch

Yes. Descriptive statements aim to describe the world as it is.

By normative statements I assume you mean "no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not." Morals or values. — counterpunch

I am not familiar with Hume, but that phrase sums my thoughts up well. Normative statements aim to describe how things ought to be.

Hume says it himself. It's what people do. He's right insofar as 'is' does not necessitate 'ought' because people have different values. We can look at the same list of facts, and think they imply different moral responses. But the implication of ought from is, is what people do. — counterpunch

That's right. I agree that people often tend to infer conflicting conclusions about what courses of action are morally right and wrong based from their observations of the real world.

We cannot be sure. Is does not necessitate ought, but is does imply ought - a different ought for me than for you perhaps, and so we have philosophy forums and democracy to argue it out. The problem with the suggestion that is does not imply ought is that it devalues the significance of the 'is' - and this is an entirely deliberate feature of western philosophy; currently playing out through left wing post modernist identity politics. — counterpunch

Well said. I concede that human beings do imply "ought" from "is". I guess my worry is that this feature of philosophical thinking is unwarranted. If we cannot be sure whether or not "ought" statements could ever be correctly derived from "is" statements in the first place (as you seem to suggest...correct me if I got the wrong impression), then don't we run into the possibility that all normative statements could be baseless?

Really, it's a logical discintion that a fact of existing is not the same as a fact of an ought-- that's to say, we do not get or derive the ought from the mere fact something exists. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This resonates with me a bunch. This is kind of why I believe an "ought" can't come from an "is".

How don’t we save a little time here and you just tell me as succinctly as possible what philosophical position on morality you hold. — Joshs

You are kidding, right?

To simplify , let’s just say that you reject postmodern philosophies in general , to the extent that they all claim to go beyond morality — Joshs

No, let's not. I see you aren't really interested in the conversation. That's fine, the thread has been derailed anyway.

The discintion is embedded in morality itself. If all it took was the existence of something to make an ought, then anything that existed would be moral. There would be no space for wrong to be committed. Any time a suggested ought didn't happen, it wouldn't even be the case it ought to be (as it didn't exist).

I think I get what you're saying. My worry is that if existence does not accurately tell me anything about how things ought to be, then does that mean all of my ethical beliefs are wrong? Or are they unjustified as a result? I am concerned that talking about a right way to live morally is vacuous because of the "is/ought" gap.

If we cannot be sure whether or not "ought" statements could ever be correctly derived from "is" statements in the first place (as you seem to suggest...correct me if I got the wrong impression), then don't we run into the possibility that all normative statements could be baseless? — Anthony Minickiello

"Baseless" is a strong term. The moral sense is a very real basis for human action; but often, people are quite ill-informed, or worse yet, deliberately misinformed. BLM spring to mind.

When the rioting began, I went looking for statistics - and it's quite clear from the Bureau of Justice statistics website that the BLM social media narrative is false. Nonetheless, people seemed to believe US police were engaged in some sort of racist killing spree, and were outraged. They took to the streets, burning and looting, attacking police.

The statistical evidence shows that police arrest 10 million people per year, and less than 1000 die in the process - so it's clearly not the case that there's some sort of systematic, racist killing spree.

The footage shared on social media of George Floyd was carefully edited. Only later was police bodycam footage leaked showing George Floyd fighting like a wild animal to resist arrest. He needed to be restrained. He was restrained. Unfortunately he died. But because people were misled, an unbiased observer must agree - the moral outrage generated was massively disproportionate to the facts.

What I'm trying to get to, I suppose - is that just because morality is a sense, does not mean it is not a finely tuned instrument responsive to "fact" - whether merely believed, or actually true. So when you say 'baseless' - while that's true in the sense that no moral response is logically necessitated by the facts, it remains - many people had exactly the same response to the false narrative created by BLM, and so baseless isn't quite the right term. Instead, one might argue that the normative value of morality is in the normative value of morality.

I think I get what you're saying. My worry is that if existence does not accurately tell me anything about how things ought to be, then does that mean all of my ethical beliefs are wrong? Or are they unjustified as a result? I am concerned that talking about a right way to live morally is vacuous because of the "is/ought" gap. — Anthony Minickiello

This is very helpful to me because I can't make head nor tails of Willow's post and don't know how to handle it politely. "I think I get what you're saying" How simple and diplomatic. I don't get what she's saying, and was preparing to tell her so in no uncertain terms.

The is/ought distinction gets confused because people mistake it for a suggestion morality is not.. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I was about to suggest that sentence looks like it was scrawled on the wall of a toilet by an idiot child dipping its fingers in a mad woman's shit! Sorry Willow. No offense sweetie. It's my problem, and I'm learning how to deal with it!

I think it's only saying that that is pretty much definitionally a good state of affairs that's at all controversial here -- that a wholly good state of affairs is necessarily and sufficiently one where everyone is pleased and not pained, enjoying rather than suffering, etc. — Pfhorrest

I think this is where you're going wrong. pleasure and pain, enjoyment and suffering are not appetites in the sense you're trying to suggest. They're already interpreted. This is why the incorrectness of the causal chain you're implying matters. A feeling like 'pleasure' is not an interocepted state, it is an interpreted state, the interocepted states of various neural circuits massively under-determine the phenomenological feeling of pleasure. What happens is that these states are compared to expected states which are themselves influenced by our culture/upbringing/experiences and are not only interpreted in that light, but actually filtered and suppressed in that light. thus what makes a person feel 'pleasure, or 'pain' is to a very great extent, a product of their upbringing and the culture in which they live.

Drug addiction is a good example. For a drug addict, the taking of a drug dose is not merely an intention (as you put it, a plan to achieve a desire which is formed from an appetite being unfulfilled). The drug actually initiates changes in the amygdala and hippocampus which trigger negative valences in internal states which simply did not exist prior to the exposure to that drug. Hunger is another example, mediated, in part, by pro-opiomelanocortin neurons. Individuals with genetic disfunctions limiting the production of pro-opiomelanocortin neurons become very obese and they do so because they are less satiated, their raw sensation, not their desire or their intention.

It wouldn't be a rational target to satisfy the hedonic levels of the drug addict of the the POMC deficient patient would it? Yet these are not 'desires', or 'intentions' as you describe them, they are raw appetites, no less than the pain I experience when I stub my toe (which itself is already interpreted by sub-conscious cortices before I'm even aware of the pain).

So why do we treat the drug addict or the POMC deficient patient? Only because we recognise that their target valences are not normal. That taking action (even temporarily harmful action) to bring those target valences down to normal levels is overall a better course of action than trying to re-arrange the world in such a way as to meet them (together with everyone else's, of course). But we'd have absolutely no reason at all not to take these target valences seriously unless we used 'normality' as a baseline.

It would be perfectly possible to satisfy everyone's target satiety by exposing them to less food in childhood, thus reducing the sensitivity to Agouti-related protein neurons and so promoting the interpretation of their action as more pleasurable than otherwise. Similarly, we could change our culture to be more rewarding of pain experiences, which would give a dopamine counterpart to pain nociception promoting the interpretation of pain experiences as more positive.

As I know you're fond of linking your ethical approach with your epistemological one, it will perhaps please you that the problems here are similar to the ones I (and others) had with that. You've underestimated the reach of the underdermination, you limit it to the matching of data points (which you admit is underdetermined), but it actually extends to the ability to manipulate, in predictable ways, the valence of those data point in future. We can match a curve to data points as they are, or we can deliberately manipulate data point to match a chosen curve. The second is the option we take with drug addicts and POMC deficient patients.

We end up with such enormously wide parameters as to be virtually useless as a moral aim. Basically we're limited to saying that we should not bring about a world which is so utterly unbearable that it is outside of the neurological limits of our brain to cope with it. I just don't think that helps at all with any actual real-world moral dilemmas.

Those two seem contradictory. In one you’re saying that means matter. In the other you’re saying that as long as everyone’s need is met, that’s all that matters (which implies the means don’t matter) — khaled

In the latter, I'm saying that there is nothing wrong with the state of affairs. There can still be something wrong with how we got to that state of affairs.

For an example of the analogy with soundness of arguments (already explained before): I have on my desk here a yellow pencil. One could give the argument "All yellow things are asteroids. This pencil is an asteroid. Therefore this pencil is yellow." The conclusion is absolutely true, there is nothing the slightest bit false about the sentence "this pencil is yellow" (assuming "this" refers to my yellow pencil here). But the argument to that effect is horribly broken: both of its premises are false, and even if they were true, they wouldn't entail the conclusion. Nevertheless, the conclusion is still completely true.

Likewise, a state of affairs can be fine and optimal, such that nothing is morally wrong with it, and there is no room for improving it from there; but the way that we got to that state of affairs can still have been horribly wrong.

It wouldn't be a rational target to satisfy the hedonic levels of the drug addict of the the POMC deficient patient would it? — Isaac

It would be rational to aim for their appetites to be sated, whether that would be by changing the world to sate their appetites or by changing their appetites to be satiable by the world. I'm not saying that people should never change and the world must bend to them exactly as they are now, just that somehow or another (within deontological limits beyond the scope of this teleological part of the conversation) the two should be brought together into alignment.

But that part aside, the only reason why the drug addictions and overeating disorders are bad are because they lead to other suffering, i.e. the dissatisfaction of other appetites, like from health problems, withdrawals, etc. "Normalcy" should have nothing to do with it. Since we presently lack the power to sate those appetites and avoid the consequent dissatisfaction of other appetites, we're forced to compromise and target (within those deontological limits again) the maximal balance of satisfaction minus dissatisfaction. But a more optimal solution would be to eliminate those negative consequences: it would be great if e.g. we could all eat as much as we want and enjoy that, without our health suffering because of it (or running out of resources due to overconsumption, etc).

One other extreme conceivable solution to satisfying all appetites (besides the "everyone gets their own world" one previously mentioned) would be merely to extinguish all appetites, changing all the people such that they want for nothing, and so don't suffer from lack of anything. That is the solution aimed for by Buddhists, Stoics and the like, and it is a solution that's fine on my account, and some aspects of it can be very useful in pragmatic compromises we're forced to make. But it's not the optimal conceivable solution. Because while wanting nothing and getting nothing is better (less suffering) than wanting something and not getting it, wanting something and getting it is better (more enjoyment) still.

We end up with such enormously wide parameters as to be virtually useless as a moral aim. Basically we're limited to saying that we should not bring about a world which is so utterly unbearable that it is outside of the neurological limits of our brain to cope with it. I just don't think that helps at all with any actual real-world moral dilemmas. — Isaac

Even if that were an accurate gloss of my moral stance (and I'm not sure whether it is or isn't), I still think that that is a useful limit to the range of ethical considerations, compared to the kinds of things people actually try to bring into play in real-world ethical debates. This teleological aspect of my ethics we've been discussing, about what makes for a good state of affairs, is deliberately very broad, just like my ontology is, but there are still limits that rule out completely untenable extremes.

My ontology pretty much only rules out the utterly supernatural, and there being different actual realities for people who believe different things. Within that, anything goes, and it's beyond philosophy's scope to figure it out; that's for physics to do. Likewise, this teleological aspect of my ethics is only meant to be whatever is left after you rule out two things:

- that considerations besides what affects people's pain/pleasure/enjoyment/suffering/etc, like "ritual purity" or something, are morally relevant (i.e. that something can be wrong despite it hurting nobody)

- that who or how many people are of what ethical opinion or another has any bearing on what the correct ethical opinion is (e.g. that slavery was actually morally okay in societies where 'enough' of 'the right' people approved of it, and only became not-okay after they changed their minds).

The deontological aspect of my ethics (about the methods of applying those criteria to the justification of particular intentions) is more useful for resolving ethical dilemmas between people who're already on board with that kind of thing, like most modern philosophers have been (e.g. Kant vs Mill). And even that is still just a method for figuring out what intentions are justified; I think it's beyond the scope of philosophy to give actual prescriptions on particular choices, just like it's beyond the scope of philosophy to go into what kinds of physical particles exist.

But there's no point even getting into that methodological aspect with people who can't even agree on those two very broad limits on what makes for a good end, or state of affairs. And you've generally sounded like someone who's strongly attached to that second broad class of views that I would categorically exclude.

The moral sense is a very real basis for human action; but often, people are quite ill-informed, or worse yet, deliberately misinformed — counterpunch

I accept readily that moral senses are real bases for human action, but when do you think moral senses are and are not reliable? What conditions do you think must be met before I can trust my moral intuition to guide my actions correctly? As you mention, perhaps I need to grasp the facts of a situation before I can make correct ethical inferences about them. Although, that may not be enough; which facts are deemed morally relevant seem to depend on who you ask, because that matter tends to dip into value judgements, often subjective things.

What I'm trying to get to, I suppose - is that just because morality is a sense, does not mean it is not a finely tuned instrument responsive to "fact" - whether merely believed, or actually true. — counterpunch

If moral sense is not finely-tuned to correctly respond to fact in the first place, as you seem to suggest here, how can I trust it to lead me to lead a good life? When is it right or wrong? This is where my doubt surfaces. Two people may accept the same morally relevant information about a situation but react in different ethical manners to that data, so how can I know which moral sense is correct? Inevitably, humans hold subjective values that influence in different ways what individuals make of morally relevant facts. So there is something more than “fact” that can lead our moral senses astray. An unbiased, neutral, and value-free observer, I think, would not infer any moral conclusions from facts, since that very act seems to introduce extraneous bias to factual information. At the very least, all of this aims to explain why moral senses like emotions and intuitions cannot be relied upon in any consistent way to track down moral truth.

I see that the moral sense of a real basis for human action, but I am trying to figure out what you think about when it is reliable. What conditions do you think have to met before I can trust my moral intuition to guide my actions correctly? — Anthony Minickiello

I'm inclined to suggest, the moral sense is not reliable. It takes work to develop a moral sense for yourself. Either that or painful experience. You could always adopt the moral code of a religion, and just do as you're told. Probably easier, but I'm inclined to suspect someone doesn't really learn if their morality is mere obedience, rather than agonised and recriminated over.

As you alluded to, perhaps I need to have a grasp of all of the morally relevant information within a situation before I can make correct ethical inferences from that data. — Anthony Minickiello

Valid understanding of any situation is a pre-requisite of valid decision making, whether that be moral decision making, or deciding which technologies to apply to combat climate change. If the basis of decision making is factually inaccurate, the outcome cannot be right - either morally right, or sustainable.

If moral sense is not finely-tuned to correctly respond to fact in the first place, as you seem to suggest here, how can I trust it to lead me to lead a good life? This is where my doubt surfaces. Two people may accept the same morally relevant information about a situation but react in different ethical manners to that data, so how can I know which moral sense is correct? — Anthony Minickiello

Therein lies the choice; accept someone else's moral code, or develop one for yourself through hard work - and/or painful experience. Go out and live your life, and rest assured that whatever stupid thing you do, your moral sense will be there in the morning to make you feel terrible about it. Pretty quiet beforehand - but afterwards, it gets real loud! Ha ha ha! Seriously though, trust yourself. You don't seem bad, mad or stupid. If you have a moral problem, learn all you can about it - and go with your gut.

In both cases, we approach objectivity by replicating each others' experiences, and if we can't, by seeing what is different about us that results in different experiences in the same circumstances. — Pfhorrest

So, if I’m angry I should just use trial and error to see what relieves it? In this case, what would an incorrect (immoral) act be? One that doesn’t relieve anger? Also, I would say that we’re never in the same moral circumstance twice, and that no two people are ever in the exact same moral circumstance.

and likewise the moral equivalent of that question is not one of what states of affairs are good, but about what the right course of action is. — Pfhorrest

How could I know what the right course of action is without first knowing what state of affairs is good? A good state of affairs is precisely what I’m trying to achieve by acting in the first place.

TG

liber(al|tarian)ism in deontology says that all actions that have not yet been ruled out (e.g. that don't harm anyone else) are acceptable. — Pfhorrest

Ok, so it’s basically the golden rule, at least the Wiccan version of it. That probably answers some of what I just wrote. But, if you’re willing to accept that there are many “correct” answers, or at least not wrong answers, then why not just say moral truth is relative? Why insist that there is some unknowable absolute correct answer? A belief in that seems faith based, as opposed to evidence based. That’s like insisting Bigfoot exists, and using the existence of other Bigfoot-like creatures as evidence.

So, if I’m angry I should just use trial and error to see what relieves it? In this case, what would an incorrect (immoral) act be? One that doesn’t relieve anger? — Pinprick

It doesn’t have to be entirely trial and error, you can use prior knowledge and expectations based on that to guide you. But yeah a bad outcome would be one where either your anger is not relieved, or where you or someone else are made to suffer (now or later) in some other way.

How could I know what the right course of action is without first knowing what state of affairs is good? A good state of affairs is precisely what I’m trying to achieve by acting in the first place. — Pinprick

You do need to know what a good state of affairs is first, but that’s not all you need.

But, if you’re willing to accept that there are many “correct” answers, or at least not wrong answers, then why not just say moral truth is relative? — Pinprick

Because just having a range of acceptable possibilities doesn’t mean that that range is unlimited. We can be sure that some things are definitely wrong no matter who thinks they’re not, without having to know exactly what the optimal course of action is for everyone.

It’s the difference between multiple answers being acceptable because we’re not completely sure on the details of the correct answer, and ANY answers being acceptable because the only thing that makes it a right answer is someone believing it.

I want get back to what you wrote last week as an example of a moral assessment:

Someone I know was beaten and robbed in the street. That person suffered a concussion and a broken bone as a result. I hold the perpetrators morally responsible for what they did, because (a) they did it, and (b) what they did was wrong. Whether the act was objectively, universally wrong is simply beside the point; all that matters, as far as me holding people morally responsible, is how I relate to the incident.

Once I have given a moral assessment of an act, it would simply be incoherent for me to then say that no one is morally responsible for it. An act can only be morally charged if it is performed by a moral actor, and a moral actor is morally responsible by definition. No one would be morally responsible if the person in my example was mauled by a bear instead of being assaulted by hoodlums. But that is why we wouldn't qualify that as a moral act - it would be an accident.

is it not possible that those we excoriate are but living also within traditions that are, for them, suffused with a sense of ethical primacy?
— Joshs

I intentionally led with an example that was not of this sort (I think we can all agree that violent street criminals are not "suffused with a sense of ethical primacy.") — SophistiCat

My favorite psychologist George Kelly argues that individuals always make what he calls the elaborative
choice when faced with any kind of decision. This entails always choosing what enhances ones ability to anticipatively make sense of a situation. You may wonder what this has to do with moral acts. For Kelly, sense making is inherently in the direction of the greater good in that it entails our acting not only in our own best interest in situations but also in the best interest of other as far as we understand their intent , motive, point of view and needs. So from Kelly’s vantage , the other can’t do wrong morally. Every situation is like that of the bear mauling. Our blaming the other is just our failure to understand his actions from his own point of view.

I realize from your vantage this is an extreme model that jettisons the concept of moral wrong, and thus you would be inclined to label it either pathological or hypocritical. I mention it , though, because even though Kelly makes the point of choice as personal, unique to the individual, his construal of choice in terms of his model of the elaborative choice is theoretical. That is, if Kelly is the one making the elaborative choice, the reason he will refuse to think of it as assessing moral blame is due to the theory that informs his understanding of it. More broadly, the theory’s understanding of the nature of human motive and affectivity , and how these relate to the overall organizational dynamics of human cognition, enter directly into how any situation of choice of whatever kind will be construed by Kelly.

In your terms , how he relates to any particular incident , such as being beaten and robbed, is not just a function of the circumstances , but how the circumstances are interpreted in relation to what Kelly understands about the nature of human choice and motive.

Kelly wouldn’t label the act as ‘wrong’, ‘criminal’ because he would believe that from the robbers’ perspective the act WAS sufffused with a sense of ethical primacy.

He would argue that there are many ways we justify our own acts of violence against others as morally defensible , and these are not mere rationalizations. For instance: The victims deserve punishment , they are responsible either directly or indirectly for our bad circumstances. We needed the money and didn’t intend to harm them but things got out of hand and we panicked. We were raised in an inner city environment of survival of the fittest, etc, etc.

You say that in a moral act , “whether the act was objectively, universally wrong is simply beside the point”. But objectivity, and universality do come into play in our very definition of wrongdoing and blamefulness. For instance, in your example of the robbers, your assessment that what they did was wrong pre-supposed not only that the robbers did the act , but that they intentionally meant to cause harm and to steal what wasn’t theirs. So your definition of wrong implies intent. Many older tribal cultures did not include intent in their definition of moral wrong because their psychological understanding did not grasp the concept of intent. It is a more recent empirical discovery . So a certain culturally and scientifically informed notion of wrong as requiring psychological intent is not beside the point in your example, but an important part of your definition of blameworthiness. I assume that you would not recommend that body parts be cut off of the robbers or that they be executed for their crime of robbery and assault But that’s how religious fundamentalist cultures have commonly dealt with such crimes. If both those cultures and you believe that robbery and assault is wrong and worthy of blame , what accounts for the difference in method of punishment? Could it be that a fundamentalist worldview understands the notion of moral blame in a different way than you do, which includes a model of human psychology, motivation and will that also differs from yours? Is such a difference in assimptions about what is objectively or universally operative in human behavior besides the point or is it directly pertinent to the very notion of moral blame?

In our era, there are all sorts of debates between conservative and liberal factions over what sort of response to crime is just or appropriate , whether harsh measures or more leniency is called for, whether rehabilation is useful , etc. And these debates reflect differences in larger frames of understanding concerning what is objectively true concerning human behavior.

So there is a wide range of viewpoints on what constitutes moral wrong , from blame with a capital B to notions of blame as a small b, that consider it always mitigated and complicated by the way each of us is socialized And as I mentioned with Kelly, they are even approaches that don’t find the notion of blame useful at all.


Given the fact that in an important sense, Gergen , Foucault and a host of other postmodern thinkers do believe that all acts of criminality are performed by actors with a sense of ethical primacy, and you clearly disagree with that position, I made the tentative guess that you do not identify with philosophical
postmodernism , or at least not with social constructionism and poststructuralism. Generally , those who are not postmodernists are modernists, and that usually entails a commitment to some form of realism( if not ‘moral realism’ then at least scientific realism. ).

You can correct me if I’m wrong, or just throw sarcastic hostility my way. Whichever makes you feel better.