What you're describing is a person who is suffering somehow (every unfulfilled appetite is a kind of suffering) and thinks that seeing other people suffer will alleviate his own suffering (satisfy his appetite): someone who has some appetite (his own suffering), and interprets that into a desire to see someone else suffer. — Pfhorrest
It does care to alleviate his suffering (satisfy his appetite), in some way. — Pfhorrest
But it also cares to prevent the suffering of others (to satisfy their appetites), so the alleviation of his suffering can't be done in the way he wants to do it. — Pfhorrest
Think about the parable of the blind men and the elephant, which illustrates the distinction between sensation and perception/belief, which is analogous to the distinction between appetite and desire/intention. Each blind man touches a different part of the same thing, and on account of what he feels, thinks he knows what he has touched. One man thinks he has touched a tree. Another thinks he has touched a rope. The third things he has touched a snake.
All three of of them are wrong about what they think they have touched. But the truth -- that they have touched different parts of an elephant, its leg, its tail, and its trunk, respectively -- is consistent with the sensations that they all felt when they touched it. They were all wrong in their perceptions or beliefs, but the truth has to accord with all of their sensations. One of them being really really certain that the thing they all touched absolutely has to have been a snake and cannot possibly have been anything else doesn't change anything. — Pfhorrest
What is common among PC culture is what Gergen is accusing it of , a blameful moralism based on a belief in a normative standard that is claimed to be superior or preferred to standards of other normative cultures.
— Joshs
This is confused. A belief, whatever its nature, origin and grounding, is always held to be superior to alternatives, however tentatively or transiently. If it wasn't, it wouldn't be a belief. (One can take a pluralistic stance on some issue, but then any isolated strand within that pluralistic web would not be an accurate representation of the whole.) — SophistiCat
I am curious, if you are actually reading my responses, what in what I wrote made you think that I am a moral realist? — SophistiCat
Right, the only way to remove fuel - not just for violent retribution, but for any moral action, good or bad - is to renounce moral beliefs altogether. But, except for a few psychopaths, no one is actually willing to do that, whatever theories they espouse in public. — SophistiCat
Ah, I see. For me, philosophy is a means to an end - and that end is the continued existence of the human species. — counterpunch
But phenomenalism? Phenomenalism is essentially subjectivism.
"Phenomenalism is the view that physical objects cannot justifiably be said to exist in themselves, but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli."
Do you run back into rooms to see if everything is still there?
Science is objectivism. Science assumes an objective reality exists independently of our experience of it. — counterpunch
But what if that is the only way? Here, compromise would involve harming others for this person. — khaled
Because after all, we’re looking for the best compromise and dubbing that “the objectively correct morality” — khaled
Just sounds bizarre to me. In this example the elephant is a physical existing thing. But I don’t see how this can be analogous to moral situations. There is no “moral elephant” as in “the objectivity correct morality”. — khaled
The question of what is moral is the question of what ought we do. We all have those feelings that call for something or another to be done (our appetites), and our immediate, unreflective opinions about what that something or other should be (our desires), on the basis of just our own such feelings. But an objective answer is an unbiased answer. So an objective morality is one that takes into account all such feelings (all appetites). But -- and this is the really important part that saves the whole thing from your usual criticism -- we don't have to take into account everyone's opinions about their feelings (all desires). — Pfhorrest
There is never only one way. Appetites are data points: the states of affairs desired are curves fit to that data. And there are always infinitely many possibly curves that can fit any possible data. — Pfhorrest
I already said earlier that my notion of "the objectively correct morality" does not involve any compromise. — Pfhorrest
We're all stuck inside of our own subjective experiences, both descriptively and prescriptively. We can never know for sure that there is or isn't a physically existing elephant apart from our experiences of it, or that there is or isn't anything morally analogous to that. All we can do is choose whether or not to act as though there is some objectivity attainable, in either case. — Pfhorrest
How would one arrive at an unbiased position on a particular moral dilemma, when all the data points available are subjective? — Pinprick
Also, note that there is more than one option that refrains from causing harm, either to myself or others, so simply saying “whichever option causes less harm” doesn’t fully answer the question. If there is an objectively correct answer, then that answer, whatever it may be, can be the only correct answer. So, someway or another, I need to figure out if it is better to exercise to relieve my anger, or to listen to music, for example. What exactly is the criteria I should use to determine which answer is objectively correct? — Pinprick
Well you don't know that. What you said does not prove that there will never be a case where there is only one way. But regardless, it was a hypothetical "what if". — khaled
We try to maximize appetite-satisfaction no? — khaled
I don't understand what it means to "see objective morality" from within these subjective experiences in the first place. What does it smell like? What does it look like? Is it edible? Nonsense questions. — khaled
It's analytically always the case that there will never be only one way. — Pfhorrest
Not maximize, and not try to. A wholly good state of affairs is one where all appetites are satisfied. — Pfhorrest
Likewise, on my account something being moral is about it being a part of our hedonic experience, everyone's hedonic experience. Morality doesn't look like anything per se, or smell like anything per se, but it feels good, it feels comfortable, it feels like a full belly, it feels like all of your appetites are sated, and it feels like that to everyone, not just you. And if there was some state of affairs where everyone felt good like that, and yet someone wanted it to be different in a way that made someone not feel good, or said that there was something still morally wrong even though everyone's every need was met like that, then that person would just be incorrect. — Pfhorrest
I’m talking pragmatically not analytically. — khaled
Not maximize? So there are times when you would purposely choose to stray away from the ideal of all appetites being satisfied? Based on what? — khaled
I can get behind that. Isn’t it consequentialist though? Here you’re saying that the only arbiter of whether or not someone is wrong is whether or not people’s needs were met. If the act meets people’s needs, it cannot be wrong. How do you avoid consequentialism then? — khaled
In other words, descriptive statements do not imply normative statements, as in "is" does not imply an "ought". — Anthony Minickiello
It is necessary that the ends be one where everyone's appetites are satisfied, but that is not sufficient. — Pfhorrest
or said that there was something still morally wrong even though everyone's every need was met like that, then that person would just be incorrect. — Pfhorrest
But I am unable to make the logical leap between the fact that morality is a "sense" and the notion that "is" statements can imply "ought" ones. How are those related? — Anthony Minickiello
But are humans correct in such inferences? How can we be sure? — Anthony Minickiello
So, the question remains... — Anthony Minickiello
By descriptive statements, I assume you mean "the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not." Or facts. — counterpunch
By normative statements I assume you mean "no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not." Morals or values. — counterpunch
Hume says it himself. It's what people do. He's right insofar as 'is' does not necessitate 'ought' because people have different values. We can look at the same list of facts, and think they imply different moral responses. But the implication of ought from is, is what people do. — counterpunch
We cannot be sure. Is does not necessitate ought, but is does imply ought - a different ought for me than for you perhaps, and so we have philosophy forums and democracy to argue it out. The problem with the suggestion that is does not imply ought is that it devalues the significance of the 'is' - and this is an entirely deliberate feature of western philosophy; currently playing out through left wing post modernist identity politics. — counterpunch
Really, it's a logical discintion that a fact of existing is not the same as a fact of an ought-- that's to say, we do not get or derive the ought from the mere fact something exists. — TheWillowOfDarkness
How don’t we save a little time here and you just tell me as succinctly as possible what philosophical position on morality you hold. — Joshs
To simplify , let’s just say that you reject postmodern philosophies in general , to the extent that they all claim to go beyond morality — Joshs
If we cannot be sure whether or not "ought" statements could ever be correctly derived from "is" statements in the first place (as you seem to suggest...correct me if I got the wrong impression), then don't we run into the possibility that all normative statements could be baseless? — Anthony Minickiello
I think I get what you're saying. My worry is that if existence does not accurately tell me anything about how things ought to be, then does that mean all of my ethical beliefs are wrong? Or are they unjustified as a result? I am concerned that talking about a right way to live morally is vacuous because of the "is/ought" gap. — Anthony Minickiello
The is/ought distinction gets confused because people mistake it for a suggestion morality is not.. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I think it's only saying that that is pretty much definitionally a good state of affairs that's at all controversial here -- that a wholly good state of affairs is necessarily and sufficiently one where everyone is pleased and not pained, enjoying rather than suffering, etc. — Pfhorrest
Those two seem contradictory. In one you’re saying that means matter. In the other you’re saying that as long as everyone’s need is met, that’s all that matters (which implies the means don’t matter) — khaled
It wouldn't be a rational target to satisfy the hedonic levels of the drug addict of the the POMC deficient patient would it? — Isaac
We end up with such enormously wide parameters as to be virtually useless as a moral aim. Basically we're limited to saying that we should not bring about a world which is so utterly unbearable that it is outside of the neurological limits of our brain to cope with it. I just don't think that helps at all with any actual real-world moral dilemmas. — Isaac
The moral sense is a very real basis for human action; but often, people are quite ill-informed, or worse yet, deliberately misinformed — counterpunch
What I'm trying to get to, I suppose - is that just because morality is a sense, does not mean it is not a finely tuned instrument responsive to "fact" - whether merely believed, or actually true. — counterpunch
I see that the moral sense of a real basis for human action, but I am trying to figure out what you think about when it is reliable. What conditions do you think have to met before I can trust my moral intuition to guide my actions correctly? — Anthony Minickiello
As you alluded to, perhaps I need to have a grasp of all of the morally relevant information within a situation before I can make correct ethical inferences from that data. — Anthony Minickiello
If moral sense is not finely-tuned to correctly respond to fact in the first place, as you seem to suggest here, how can I trust it to lead me to lead a good life? This is where my doubt surfaces. Two people may accept the same morally relevant information about a situation but react in different ethical manners to that data, so how can I know which moral sense is correct? — Anthony Minickiello
In both cases, we approach objectivity by replicating each others' experiences, and if we can't, by seeing what is different about us that results in different experiences in the same circumstances. — Pfhorrest
and likewise the moral equivalent of that question is not one of what states of affairs are good, but about what the right course of action is. — Pfhorrest
liber(al|tarian)ism in deontology says that all actions that have not yet been ruled out (e.g. that don't harm anyone else) are acceptable. — Pfhorrest
So, if I’m angry I should just use trial and error to see what relieves it? In this case, what would an incorrect (immoral) act be? One that doesn’t relieve anger? — Pinprick
How could I know what the right course of action is without first knowing what state of affairs is good? A good state of affairs is precisely what I’m trying to achieve by acting in the first place. — Pinprick
But, if you’re willing to accept that there are many “correct” answers, or at least not wrong answers, then why not just say moral truth is relative? — Pinprick
Someone I know was beaten and robbed in the street. That person suffered a concussion and a broken bone as a result. I hold the perpetrators morally responsible for what they did, because (a) they did it, and (b) what they did was wrong. Whether the act was objectively, universally wrong is simply beside the point; all that matters, as far as me holding people morally responsible, is how I relate to the incident.
Once I have given a moral assessment of an act, it would simply be incoherent for me to then say that no one is morally responsible for it. An act can only be morally charged if it is performed by a moral actor, and a moral actor is morally responsible by definition. No one would be morally responsible if the person in my example was mauled by a bear instead of being assaulted by hoodlums. But that is why we wouldn't qualify that as a moral act - it would be an accident.
is it not possible that those we excoriate are but living also within traditions that are, for them, suffused with a sense of ethical primacy?
— Joshs
I intentionally led with an example that was not of this sort (I think we can all agree that violent street criminals are not "suffused with a sense of ethical primacy.") — SophistiCat
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