Where did you ever get that idea from? — Metaphysician Undercover

From the preceding discussion, obviously.

Or perhaps you'd like to try and answer this again:

I asked you how do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule.

I understand why going outside the boundaries of a rule would not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule, but I don't understand why going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundaries of a rule.

Surely, it must be possible that either following or not following a convention, or acting in some way with regards to a convention, could fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundary of a rule? Or have you simply presupposed that either following or not following a convention does not fulfil the requirement? — Luke

@Snakes Alive

Yeah, I didn't want to suggest it was just a matter of emotion. I think the pull toward 'discovery' is also part of the same nebula of things I'm talking about with values, modes of awareness and so forth. But I take your point - you're focusing more on the 'how' than the 'why.' — csalisbury

At the same time, I think the how and the why are pretty criss-crossed - isn't that Lazerowtiz's thing? A kind of wish-fulillment in words? I think there may be something about abstract language-use in particular (especially when you're proficient in it) that makes it harder to 'pop out' to a meta-level, and reflect on what you're doing.

Any understanding of the destructive portion of OLP has to start with the recognition that philosophy, objectively, doesn't work. That is, it is not what it claims to be – a form of effective inquiry. — Snakes Alive

Do you agree with (at least some interpretations of) Wittgenstein that the role of philosophy then becomes a form of therapy for resolving conceptual confusion?

I asked you how do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule. — Luke

We don't need to make that determination, because if this were the case, the conclusion would be the very same, that a convention is necessarily not a rule.

Then:

Surely, it must be possible that either following or not following a convention, or acting in some way with regards to a convention, could fulfil the requirement of staying within the boundary of a rule? Or have you simply presupposed that either following or not following a convention does not fulfil the requirement? — Luke

Same answer, that convention would not be a rule.

Because you've begged the question and presupposed it?

Premise #1.

FFS what does premise #1 have to do with conventions?

How many times can you go around the same circle Luke?

I asked you how do we determine that going outside the boundaries of a convention does not fulfil the criteria of staying within the boundaries of a rule.
— Luke

If going outside the boundaries of a convention is the same thing as staying within the boundaries of a rule, then obviously a convention is not the same thing as a rule.
— Metaphysician Undercover

If staying within the boundaries of a convention is the same thing as staying within the boundaries of a rule, then obviously a convention is the same thing as a rule.
— Luke

Yes, we could make that judgement — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, that's right. But I think his mono-causal model is a bit oversimple. It's more just that we lack certain metacognitive abilities having to do with how language and inquiry work, and by dint of having extremely specific intellectual concerns and a certain personality and cognitive disposition, you can sort of start to notice this by accident. Trying to express your fantasies and desires, and maintain the omnipotence of the intelligence, can be part of that, but sometimes it's something more banal – simple confusion, and so on.

Do you agree with (at least some interpretations of) Wittgenstein that the role of philosophy then becomes a form of therapy for resolving conceptual confusion? — Luke

No, because I don't think philosophy has a good track record as therapy either. My position, and I've expressed it here before, is that philosophy ought to be exited, and viewed from the outside anthropologically. We should look at philosophy as a practice that we are no longer 'natives' of, and that we do not engage in, but that we do seek to try to understand, much like an anthropologist might for a foreign culture.

Philosophy, in other words, is something certain human beings in certain cultural situations do – and it isn't what it claims to be, and doesn't work, and so there isn't that much good reason to actually practice it, not even for therapeutic reasons. But looking at it and understanding why people do it, and what cognitive factors drive it, is interesting in understanding how human inquiry works.

No, because I don't think philosophy has a good track record as therapy either. — Snakes Alive

To be fair, maybe philosophy as therapy hasn't been given much of a chance. I'm not sure that pronouncements can be made about what philosophy or philosophers ought to do, or who should make them, but you might be right that philosophy could go the way of alchemy.

Yeah, that's right. But I think his mono-causal model is a bit oversimple. It's more just that we lack certain metacognitive abilities having to do with how language and inquiry work, and by dint of having extremely specific intellectual concerns and a certain personality and cognitive disposition, you can sort of start to notice this by accident. Trying to express your fantasies and desires, and maintain the omnipotence of the intelligence, can be part of that, but sometimes it's something more banal – simple confusion, and so on. — Snakes Alive

That makes sense. As someone who, in my teens and 20s, had (unconscious) power/control fantasies about philosophy, and only painfully shed them, that's the narrative I gravitate toward - but it makes sense that that's only one path to it. (Incidentally, I think it's interesting how, initially, the shedding of those fantasies constitute a last gasp of those fantasies. There's a weird moment where you're ready to shed them, but still want the shedding to take place according to those old rhythms. That's kind of where the conversation went last time we talked on here. I think we're both past that now, you may have already been then, but it's something I'm curious to understand better at some point. There's probably some old myth that captures it well, but none come to mind immediately.)

No, because I don't think philosophy has a good track record as therapy either. My position, and I've expressed it here before, is that philosophy ought to be exited, and viewed from the outside anthropologically. We should look at philosophy as a practice that we are no longer 'natives' of, and that we do not engage in, but that we do seek to try to understand, much like an anthropologist might for a foreign culture.

Philosophy, in other words, is something certain human beings in certain cultural situations do – and it isn't what it claims to be, and doesn't work, and so there isn't that much good reason to actually practice it, not even for therapeutic reasons. But looking at it and understanding why people do it, and what cognitive factors drive it, is interesting in understanding how human inquiry works. — Snakes Alive

I don't think philosophy is good therapy, but I do think it can do some work at helping inoculate you to bad arguments. I guess it depends on where you're at. I read someone who made the argument that a lot of cringe-worthy internet atheists are posting in Baptist basements. If you read them in a Unitarian living room, they sound ridiculous - but maybe for them that kind of sheer, almost drag, intensity is a necessary step in their decoupling from a rough abusive-religious situation..

If you grow up in a milieu of reasonable, stolid, middle-class people you can take a lot for granted. For someone else, in an emotionally volatile atmosphere where people use choppy arguments only to the extent it gives them emotional leverage, it may be helpful to sort of gravitate toward the goofy pure philosophy vision as a way to get some breathing room. Then, hopefully, a second exit, later.

I don't think philosophy is good therapy, but I do think it can do some work at helping inoculate you to bad arguments. — csalisbury

I definitely think being taught critical thinking, rhetoric, and some sort of informal (not unrigorous, but informal) logic is good. But to the extent philosophy does teach this (and honestly I don't really think it does very well), it always does so as a cover for what it's really interested in, which is less benign and useful. A lot of philosophy, I think, actually positively harms your ability to think well.

And yeah, I think philosophy more than other fields is used as a means for people to work through themselves and express their deeper desires. That's partly symptomatic of why it's not very good – you can project anything onto it, say whatever you want to. I would advocate looking at it a bit more dispassionately – people trying confusedly to express themselves is fine, but we also want things that are actually real, work, and so on.

If staying within the boundaries of a convention is the same thing as staying within the boundaries of a rule, then obviously a convention is the same thing as a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

"If" it were the same... but it's not. A rule consists of a stated principle of conformity, therefore defined boundaries. A convention, by your own admission does not. Therefore staying within the boundaries of a convention is an oxymoron. A convention has no boundaries. You just think it does. And thinking that you're following a rule is not a case of following a rule.

A rule consists of a stated principle of conformity, therefore defined boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only according to your own self-imposed stipulation for how the word "rule" should be used.

A convention has no boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

If this is true, as you say, then the second premise of your deductive argument is false. People can't act outside the boundaries of conventions if there are none.

i have no further interest in being mired in your bad arguments with you.

Only according to your own self-imposed stipulation for how the word "rule" should be used. — Luke

As I said, you can use "rule" however you please, there's no rule which dictates how you must use the word. However, if you are trying to remain consistent with Wittgenstein, I already quoted PI 202. This is a pivotal point of PI, where the "rule" is stipulated as being outside of the private mind, to be defined as necessarily public.

So, if the boundary of a convention is implicit instead of explicit, we cannot get beyond "I think I am following a rule", because the boundary is only thought of. That is what "implicit" means, it's only produced by thinking. Therefore conventions with implicit boundaries do not qualify as "rules" by Wittgenstein's demonstration of how "rule" ought to be defined, at PI 202.

It really does not bother me if you simply want to define "rule" in a way which is inconsistent with Wittgenstein. I am often inclined to use it that way myself. What bothers me is that you pretend to adhere strictly to Wittgenstein's philosophy, while not adhering to this very important point, how we must define "rule". That's hypocrisy. But I believe this hypocrisy is not intended by you, it's the product of a simple misunderstanding. So I feel the need to bring it to your attention because I think if you developed an appropriate understanding, you would be inclined to change your ways.

So, if the boundary of a convention is implicit instead of explicit, we cannot get beyond "I think I am following a rule", because the boundary is only thought of. — Metaphysician Undercover

As though a convention is something that exists only as an idea.

Unless stated as rules, the boundaries of conventions only exist as ideas. This is what is meant when people say agreement is "implicit", they mean that the existence of the agreement spoken about is implied only. That means that there is an act of thought required to draw the conclusion that there is such an agreement. The assumed agreement is not something which can be observed as if it were stated on a piece of paper. It is theoretical only, its claimed existence relies on that act of thought. It is not something which can be empirically observed, which it could be if it were written down.

I would advocate looking at it a bit more dispassionately – people trying confusedly to express themselves is fine, but we also want things that are actually real, work, and so on. — Snakes Alive

Yeah, exactly, that's what I was trying to get at in my first post. The need to confusedly express one's deepest feelings and desires is natural, even laudable; but philosophy isn't a good vehicle for that.

If I understand OLP correctly, the move to look at what's actually happening in philosophical discussion is right - people are talking about words and how they're used. — csalisbury

I appreciate taking a stab at understanding OLP and joining the conversation. I would only add that, yes, OLP is looking at what is said in philosophical discussion (expressions) but also the other uses there are for the activities like thinking, believing, knowing, intending, but also regular expressions and uses of apologizing, sitting in a chair, pointing, seeing, etc. And in talking about the uses of words we see the criteria that frame a use--the way it works (its Grammar Witt says), which, ultimately, provides insight into our philosophical issues, and ourselves.

A lot of the animus toward OLP seems to stem from a feeling that it's trivializing those values and emotions and modes of awareness. But values are borne out in action, not discussion; And emotions, or different ways of attuning to the world, are borne out in activities that do that kind of attuning. The 'click' can only happen if you're also willing to give up the (implicit) idea that living-well (in accordance with your values, say) means simply verbally laying claim to the right kind of thing, or discussing the world in a certain way. — csalisbury

I won't quibble here, as I think the gist of what you are trying to point out is relevant. It is hard to avoid the dismissive nature of OLP (Moore, Austin to an extent) when it does not take the effort to account for the legitimate concerns of traditional skeptical philosophy (Cavell does a better job of this). And I agree with looking past philosophical theories to connect them to a motivation. That it is doing more than making a claim; it is a person taking a stance, and it reflects on that person. Cavell will discuss this as "living your skepticism". I would also point out (as I did above regarding a kayak) that when we are making claims about the criteria of our expressions (and actions), we are at the same time making claims about the ways we live in the world--not just discussing language, nor just speculating without any of the value of truth.

First & foremost, a formal thing: I apologize for coming into your thread headfirst and missing the whole. What sucks about forum discussions is once it veers into 3+ pages (much less 15+ pages) it reaches a point where you simply can't catch up on what's already being said. Snakes Alive is someone I follow, so to speak, and I saw his posts here and dove in, in media res, responding solely to that post. I'll cop to not having read the OP, initially, but I've just gone back and read it. It's refreshingly well-presented. Not that I don't support whoever is coming onto a philosophy forum and opening up a conversation, regardless of their skill-level - but the OP in this thread has a lot more meat and is, brass tacks, on another level.

I won't quibble here, as I think the gist of what you are trying to point out is relevant. It is hard to avoid the dismissive nature of OLP (Moore, Austin to an extent) when it does not take the effort to account for the legitimate concerns of traditional skeptical philosophy (Cavell does a better job of this). And I agree with looking past philosophical theories to connect them to a motivation. That it is doing more than making a claim; it is a person taking a stance, and it reflects on that person. Cavell will discuss this as "living your skepticism". I would also point out (as I did above regarding a kayak) that when we are making claims about the criteria of our expressions (and actions), we are at the same time making claims about the ways we live in the world--not just discussing language, nor just speculating without any of the value of truth. — Antony Nickles

That's a good point. The implicit throughline in my above posts is that there's a place for deep personal values/approaches to the world etc; and that that place is not philosophy; and that OLP did a service by severing philosophy from those impulses.

But I think you (& OLP?) are correct in pointing out that that's not quite it- there's a lot to learn about how & what we value by looking at how we talk. & There's also something fun (even creatively joyful) in sussing out our implicit criteria.

From a very different angle, my feeling is that the first-generation, ingenuous postmodern thinkers also do this in their culture studies, but that most of that aspect of their work has been drowned out by their second-generation interpreters. Going back one generation, Walter Benjamin's Arcade Project is in the same spirit. In pop culture, I think there was a move in this direction with Carlin & his heirs. Or, to be fair, Lenny Bruce -->Carlin-->Next generation. Obviously it's a little looser, but there's something OLP-y about Seinfeld, for example, at least if you squint.

I think the chief achievements of OLP are at a meta-level: it was the site of the invention of not only of metaphilosophy (including the journal of that name, which is still going to this day and quite good), but also of metasemantics, that is, the search for the conditions under which expressions become meaningful, and what it is for something to be meaningful. Granted, this was under the guise of providing a very specific metasemantics, adopting the Wittgensteinian maxim distorted through Moore, but this was the first time in the specific tradition they were working in that it was done.

You can see precursors to it in the early analytic concern with meaning, especially the positivist conditions on intelligibility, but the positivists never asked the question in such an explicit way, not of which sorts of things were meaningful, but what it even meant for something to be meaningful, and how this might be made intelligible in terms of actual linguistic practices. This is a very powerful move, and one that I take to be 'naturalistic' and 'anthropological,' as opposed to the kind of (what I take to be) misguided neo-Kantian attempt to look for the origins of meaning in transcendental conditions that, say, Habermas fell into. The OLPers had a view of the foundations of meaning, where the foundational conditions were not coherently deniable from within, as you made use of those very conditions ('ordinary language is correct language,') but which themselves were multiform and contingent (something like the the shifting riverbed).

there's some lack of meta-cognitive awareness of what goes on when we use [language], in general. But sadly, I think philosophy itself is also not a great medium for giving people these meta-cognitive skills. Any understanding of the destructive portion of OLP has to start with the recognition that philosophy, objectively, doesn't work. That is, it is not what it claims to be – a form of effective inquiry. — Snakes Alive

Witt will talk a lot about philosophy not being able to work, get traction, be anything but a house of cards, a fly in a bottle. Heiddeger and Emerson say that the more we grasp (for certainty) the more slips through our fingers; our acceptance of only a narrow criteria for knowledge blinds us to our more varied lives.

So to the extent OLP is "destructive" (of the house of cards) it is to set aside the "picture" (the paradigm) of positivism in order to see our ordinary criteria (amongst the rubble Witt will say). My claim in this OP is that OLP is an effective method of inquiry that allows us to get some grist for the mill of our fundamental philosophical issues (morality, meaning, art, knowledge, truth, the betterment of ourselves, etc.). That "Essence is expressed by Grammar" PI #371 Not just a different form of "essence", but providing us a view of what is essential to us--what matters to us about something; what differentiates it from something else; how we judge, see, count in its regard, etc. Our ordinary criteria express our needs and desires and hopes and agreements--our lives. As well, @csalisbury, although there may be a need to say philosophy should not be a home for dogmatism or ideology or envy or fear, it need not erase the human, the fallible, the partial, the uncertain. That without any surety that we will agree, we nevertheless may have a productive discussion.

Witt will talk a lot about philosophy not being able to work, get traction, be anything but a house of cards, a fly in a bottle. Heiddeger and Emerson say that the more we grasp (for certainty) the more slips through our fingers; our acceptance of only a narrow criteria for knowledge blinds us to our more varied lives. — Antony Nickles

My view of philosophy is a bit more prosaic. It's just a bad method of inquiry, based on misconceptions that we have no reason to bind ourselves to anymore. It's like entrail-reading to try to see the future, say. We just don't really have a reason to do it anymore.

the search for the conditions under which expressions become meaningful, and what it is for something to be meaningful. Granted, this was under the guise of providing a very specific metasemantics, adopting the Wittgensteinian maxim distorted through Moore, but this was the first time in the specific tradition they were working in that it was done.

You can see precursors to it in the early analytic concern with meaning, especially the positivist conditions on intelligibility, but the positivists never asked the question in such an explicit way, not of which sorts of things were meaningful, but what it even meant for something to be meaningful, and how this might be made intelligible in terms of actual linguistic practices. This is a very powerful move, and one that I take to be 'naturalistic' and 'anthropological,'... — Snakes Alive

emphasis mine...

:smile: :point: :smile:

@Snakes Alive @Antony Nickles Part of me wants to say that, if we're in the rubble, it's a good vibe to go into it just being like - what do you think of this, or that? Why do you think that? etc I understand that there's a valuable scholarly angle here - & for those who are tuned that way, there's a lot to discuss reading over the existent literature. But in this rubble, I think it's as legit to just be like, ok, what's up for you? This is how I think of this term, what do you think of it? etc There are exceptions, like if you're getting into nuts-and-bolts linguistics stuff. But basically, if philosophy crumbles into ruins, then there's nothing wrong with just shooting the shit to figure stuff out. All traditions organically become sophisticated, and will probably be as sophisticated as an arcane literature - it's just that, in today's rubble, the esoteric/exoteric divide is less clear, no one can be sure who has the right credentials.

Obviously this is a very legible approach (i.e. you can name what it's thrust is, and approach it thusly) that is easy to break down. But it's hard to to consistently, coherently come at it in a way that doesn't mess up the foundations you're coming from. I think it's a trickier puzzle than it seems at first glance.

I have no issue with just discussing things, but philosophy doesn't do it self-consciously, so it always ends up in its old traps. A more clear-eyed discussion might be possible, but I think it would lack the core features of philosophy.

If you're really interested in knowing how these things go, my advice would be: read history, read anthropology. Insofar as you read philosophy, read it historically, the way you read about reading entrails. Don't actually do it! [And knowing more about history and anthropology makes philosophy less appealing cognitively, I think inescapably – it persists in ignorance].

I think those reccs are good &, listen, I don't want to duel you over who's read more on these subjects, but my feeling is we've both read a lot of history and anthropology. I appreciate that perspective and think it's a good one. I'm coming at this from a different angle, but I don't want to push it either. As a student of anthropology and sociology, you're familiar with the dynamic of landed vs aspirational classes ( the way in which the landed color the aspirational.) I'm talking about something like that.