I am probably being technical, but is this dualism or idealism? I thought so far that the whole point of dualism is that the physical world is temporarily bonded with the person's consciousness or any transcendent reality. Either the mind is merely a witness, or acts as compelling force that produces miracles (or in the context of QM, could be producing determinacy, which is a kind of miracle). If the mind starts minding its own business (pun intended), what is the point of being submerged in material substance? What would be then the difference from subjective idealism?But there can be no evidence of this isomorphism, and so the only direction the argument can go in is from the fact of communication to the supposition of isomorphism. That we talk of love leads us to think that we are talking of the very same thing; but that conclusion is misguided. Indeed, I'd go a step further and say that there is no "thing" to be isomorphic, that all we have is the communication... — Banno
There is no such thing as love — GLEN willows
in terms of something that exists outside of the brain. — GLEN willows
love is "more than just a chemical." I hear it a lot from non-academics. But if it is "more" then it has to be dualism, pure and simple? You can't argue "the brain and consciousness are two different things" and then claim you';re not talking about two different things. Can you — GLEN willows
Am I getting annoying? — GLEN willows
How much does love weigh? How much do the chemicals that create the feeling of love weigh. — GLEN willows
Option 2: The concept of love - and all it IS is a concept created by neurons firing — GLEN willows
Maybe we'll use a new technique to find them or more likely we'll realize they are sensations we have that correlate with some sort of activity in the brain. — GLEN willows
My question posed at the beginning was what could consciousness be, if not simply a part of the brain? — GLEN willows
No. I am saying they are the same thing, I figured you'd get that. — GLEN willows
No. I'm saying they are the same thing. Next I'll say "H20 is water" and you'll say "aha - you had to make a distinction!" — GLEN willows
Oy! I'm a materialist - you know this — GLEN willows
Anyway I've already agreed that consciousness/love/emotions can't be found in the brain. I can't find them, and you can't. Even fMRI's showing areas that light up when one is in love only show blood and electrical signals in your brain - they aren't love itself. — GLEN willows
I don't believe in dualism - b/c of the interaction problem. That's the point of my question - who would still be a dualist in 2021? Unless you believe in other intangible undetectable things like God.
Or...are you saying that the statement "some things are explained by science and some things aren't" is dualism. How so? — GLEN willows
...perhaps there are no strict laws explaining mental events - anomalous monism. — Banno
What does that mean? If you just mean the brain causes or creates the mind then everyone can agree there I think. — khaled
The institution is there in the first place to school you on what is right and wrong. If you start asking questions like "aren't we all high on grass", the discussion is as comfortable as a castaway asking the local cannibals "what's for dinner". (A vegetarian here, so don't mind the joke.)I actually agree that solipsism can NOT be argued with, and that a lot of thinkers that have now disproven theories seem to end up in a solipsistic quagmire. I know that's not an original thought, but why is it never mentioned in philosophy classes? It's a bullet-proof theory, as is subjective idealism. After Hume and Locke it seems impossible to prove there is an independent world out there. Yet I feel like a traitor bringing it up with a prof. — GLEN willows
QUESTION: Unless you believe in God, spirits, ghosts or other such things (pretty clear I'm an atheist) how could anyone argue that consciousness ISN'T simply an integral aspect of the material brain - DESPITE the fact that the can't be explained scientifically? If they aren't - where are they? Isn't this still hopeless dualism, and our primitive tendency to believe in spirits, souls etc.? — GLEN willows
I think this is bullet proof - for one thing the fact that when a brain is damaged or cut up, it affects qualia as well as the physical brain. People have complete changes of the way they view emotions, love, other people when this happens. Changing the brain in other ways (psychedelic and pharmaceutical drugs) also changes emotions, and qualia. — GLEN willows
I think the hypothesis doubts the notions of objective empirical world and our community. It is indeed a hypothesis, but for some it is with a high value attached to its potential and cannot be neglected. These are as I said the ethical implications. In the question of solipsism, even the possibility can be seen as the dismissal of the value of life and human effort. It can reinforce nihilism, depending on the view taken. The same way in which dualism is a form of theism for some, not merely a hypothesis.In the early stages you seem to be arguing that solipsism, for some reason, can't be a tenable approach to life. You say it's a hypothesis, of course it is but so are all philosophical theories. — GLEN willows
I wouldn't use the needs of the human psychology to substantiate the claim. If you mean, the paragraph about your questions in philosophy classes, what I meant was that no productive discussion can arise from them, since there is something implicitly disparaging to the education in itself if solipsism is right. Therefore, the topic is not going to get priority in class. It opposes knowledge, even if merely tentatively.I may be mistaking your argument, but I get the sense that you're saying "we can't be the only person in existence, watching a simulation of our life (not mean a computer virtual reality) because it would make life unbearable or impossible." — GLEN willows
Neuroplasticity doesn't argue against materialism either, IMO. It shows the amazing power of the brain to heal and renew the things lost by the injury. — GLEN willows
It's rather that Davidson supposes we can describe the same event i two different ways; I'm in love, and I have high levels of norepinephrine. THis does nto suppose an ontological bifurcation.If a scientist uses a different explanatory system to explain mental events than non-mental events... — Hanover
No, one event from two differing points of view....but is he talking about two entities? — GLEN willows
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