Materialists would try to say that the experience of love doesn't exist. All that exists are the chemicals.

That's what I'm saying. You just expressed it better than me. I'm pretty sure you said something like "love isn't floating anywhere, it's not a physical thing." I was agreeing with you. There is no such thing as love, in terms of something that exists outside of the brain. I guess we could discuss what a "thing" is - is a unicorn a "thing?" Then yes love is a thing - a non-existent thing.

I respect your argument 100%. But I still sense the pull of wanting to say that love is "more than just a chemical." I hear it a lot from non-academics. But if it is "more" then it has to be dualism, pure and simple? You can't argue "the brain and consciousness are two different things" and then claim you';re not talking about two different things. Can you? Am I getting annoying? haha.

But there can be no evidence of this isomorphism, and so the only direction the argument can go in is from the fact of communication to the supposition of isomorphism. That we talk of love leads us to think that we are talking of the very same thing; but that conclusion is misguided. Indeed, I'd go a step further and say that there is no "thing" to be isomorphic, that all we have is the communication... — Banno

I am probably being technical, but is this dualism or idealism? I thought so far that the whole point of dualism is that the physical world is temporarily bonded with the person's consciousness or any transcendent reality. Either the mind is merely a witness, or acts as compelling force that produces miracles (or in the context of QM, could be producing determinacy, which is a kind of miracle). If the mind starts minding its own business (pun intended), what is the point of being submerged in material substance? What would be then the difference from subjective idealism?

It is probably tangent to the discussion, but I'd like to point out that some people are incapable of being in love. Or at least they don't show any signs of it. Neurological differences. The psychopathic form of APSD is linked strongly with variations of the amygdala volume under brain scans, and the people diagnosed also have differences in the action of their neurotransmitters. The problem I see with dualism is that we know we can alter the act of a human being by manipulating their brain function. So, if the mind doesn't act independently from the person's elicited response, which to me starts to approach subjective idealism (unless dualism is contented with a passively witnessing mind), I can't understand what room we leave for transcendent agency. Again, one can argue for determinisation in the context of QM.

Btw. Sorry for the interject.

I don't mind (pun intended unfortunately)

I generally steer away from metaphysical discussions. I made entry in the forum with a question of some such nature, but there are certain things that I find can never be settled, unless the criteria is agreed upon. I don't think that I can argue against subjective idealism, or solipsism, or some kind of Leibniz monadism. I am myself partial towards panpsychism and pantheism. But in metaphysics, approaching the discussion from the point of view of modern positivism, where the only factor is the observable physical reality, little can be argued for the private subjective experience. Except for dualism. It tries to connect the physical and transcendent worlds and exposes itself to empirical criticism. Or so I think.

There is no such thing as love — GLEN willows

Would be be what a materialist would say.

My response would be: “That’s just not true”.

Have you never had experiences before? I find that hard to believe.

in terms of something that exists outside of the brain. — GLEN willows

So love is in the brain? How much does it weigh? What does it smell like? Where is it? Can you send me a picture of that part of the brain that is love?

love is "more than just a chemical." I hear it a lot from non-academics. But if it is "more" then it has to be dualism, pure and simple? You can't argue "the brain and consciousness are two different things" and then claim you';re not talking about two different things. Can you — GLEN willows

I don’t think so. Yes this is dualism.

Am I getting annoying? — GLEN willows

Nah you’re good.

Haha good.

How much does love weigh? How much do the chemicals that create the feeling of love weigh. That's your answer.

Option 2: The concept of love - and all it IS is a concept created by neurons firing etc. - weighs zero.

Interesting. I actually agree that solipsism can NOT be argued with, and that a lot of thinkers that have now disproven theories seem to end up in a solipsistic quagmire. I know that's not an original thought, but why is it never mentioned in philosophy classes? It's a bullet-proof theory, as is subjective idealism. After Hume and Locke it seems impossible to prove there is an independent world out there. Yet I feel like a traitor bringing it up with a prof.

Or am I mistaking your meaning?

I don't understand this statement - "from the point of view of modern positivism, where the only factor is the observable physical reality, little can be argued for the private subjective experience. Except for dualism."

Anyway I've already agreed that consciousness/love/emotions can't be found in the brain. I can't find them, and you can't. Even fMRI's showing areas that light up when one is in love only show blood and electrical signals in your brain - they aren't love itself.

But as you yourself pointed out, electrons were once thought to be invisible. I'm making an inductive argument (only) that science has proven again and again that questions we thought were unanswerable, are indeed answerable. Maybe we'll use a new technique to find them or more likely we'll realize they are sensations we have that correlate with some sort of activity in the brain. Love is still a wonderful thing though!

My question posed at the beginning was what could consciousness be, if not simply a part of the brain? I would just add...part of the brain that we don't understand yet, but probably will soon enough.

How much does love weigh? How much do the chemicals that create the feeling of love weigh. — GLEN willows

That you had to make a distinction means they're not the same thing no?

Option 2: The concept of love - and all it IS is a concept created by neurons firing — GLEN willows

Ah so there is a concept (I would use the word "feeling") separate from the neurons?

Maybe we'll use a new technique to find them or more likely we'll realize they are sensations we have that correlate with some sort of activity in the brain. — GLEN willows

A sensation-o-meter. A very exciting idea. Imagine being able to point it at politicians speaking for example to make it apparent to all, that even the guy himself knows he's bullshitting out of his mind.

Wonder what would happen when you point it at priests and pastors....

My question posed at the beginning was what could consciousness be, if not simply a part of the brain? — GLEN willows

Then I'll reply with the same style of question. How much does consciousness weigh? What does it smell like? Is it edible?

"That you had to make a distinction means they're not the same thing no?"

No. I am saying they are the same thing, I figured you'd get that.

"Ah so there is a concept (I would use the word "feeling") separate from the neurons?"

No. I'm saying they are the same thing. Next I'll say "H20 is water" and you'll say "aha - you had to make a distinction!"

Oy! I'm a materialist - you know this, I think everything is the brain. That's what a materialist does. Enough with the lame "gotcha" moments...I'm sure you can come up with some better arguments.

Oh I forgot to answer the last question.

No. I think they are the same thing. (didn't I answer this already?)

Sorry it's late and I have the Covid Crazies.

No. I am saying they are the same thing, I figured you'd get that. — GLEN willows

No. I'm saying they are the same thing. Next I'll say "H20 is water" and you'll say "aha - you had to make a distinction!" — GLEN willows

Then you’re wrong. The experience of love is clearly different from the chemicals causing it.

A point to illustrate: People came up with words like “love” and “anger” way before they were able to scan the brain. How come? What were they referring to when using the words back then? It can’t have been any chemical. They didn’t even know what chemicals are!

Oy! I'm a materialist - you know this — GLEN willows

Anyway I've already agreed that consciousness/love/emotions can't be found in the brain. I can't find them, and you can't. Even fMRI's showing areas that light up when one is in love only show blood and electrical signals in your brain - they aren't love itself. — GLEN willows

What’s going on I’m confused... Are you parodying being a materialist?

I don't believe in dualism - b/c of the interaction problem. That's the point of my question - who would still be a dualist in 2021? Unless you believe in other intangible undetectable things like God.

Or...are you saying that the statement "some things are explained by science and some things aren't" is dualism. How so? — GLEN willows

I'm saying that you divided the world into two types of events: those explainable by science and those not. You have clearly placed mental events into a separate category. Since we have two categories here, we have a form of dualism. The question then becomes whether there is something about the underlying structure of mental events that causes this category distinction. From your OP, you reject that idea and state that mental events and non-mental events must all be composed of the same underlying substance. You therefore reject substance dualism, but that doesn't close the door on property dualism. Property dualism seems to say what you're saying: There are two types of events in the world (the mental and non-mental), both being composed of matter, but each being distinct enough to require differing ways to describe and explain them.

...perhaps there are no strict laws explaining mental events - anomalous monism. — Banno

The question then becomes why that's the case. If a scientist uses a different explanatory system to explain mental events than non-mental events, then the scientist at some point needs to explain why that's the case. If the scientist cannot offer a physical explanation for the distinction, you will forever have substance dualists proclaiming there must be a non-physical explanation, invoking a fundamental metaphysical distinction.

Even your explanation demands a form of dualism. There are two types of physical events in the world: normally explainable ones and then those pesky anomalies.

What does that mean? If you just mean the brain causes or creates the mind then everyone can agree there I think. — khaled

I'd like to rephrase your observation:

"What does that mean? If you just mean the brain causes or creates the mind then everyone can know what I think."

Given the proper technology, of course.

I am an armchair philosopher as you remarked in your original post. A software guy by education and a confused person by vocation. My opinions are not very literate. You are warned to be skeptical about my imaginary views. I hope that when I expose the weaknesses therein someone will point them out to me with appropriate arguments.

I actually agree that solipsism can NOT be argued with, and that a lot of thinkers that have now disproven theories seem to end up in a solipsistic quagmire. I know that's not an original thought, but why is it never mentioned in philosophy classes? It's a bullet-proof theory, as is subjective idealism. After Hume and Locke it seems impossible to prove there is an independent world out there. Yet I feel like a traitor bringing it up with a prof. — GLEN willows

The institution is there in the first place to school you on what is right and wrong. If you start asking questions like "aren't we all high on grass", the discussion is as comfortable as a castaway asking the local cannibals "what's for dinner". (A vegetarian here, so don't mind the joke.)

Solipsism is no more than a hypothesis. It cannot be asserted. The lack of certainty in cognisance does not immediately confer ignorance. That is, in a physical world, the perseverance in entropic conditions might have evolved to the passionate pursuit for knowledge and the instinctive conviction in the inductive method, objective reality, etc. The perception of truth would then be compatible with an actual physical environment. (This I believe is close to the Hume style of explanation, modulo the Darwinism part) The correct conclusion to make is, "we don't know". These are hypotheses, not conjectures, not assertions.

Furthermore, there are multiple styles of inquiry for each scenario. We could ask ontic questions ("what is out there"), epistemic questions ("what are the indications that would reveal it to us"), ethical questions ("what value does it hold to us"), conventionalist/antropological/social questions ("what we agree upon to do about it"). For example, with solipsism, the possibility of being alone in the universe is a distinct case of reality. But it should never manifest as experience, because that it the entire point of the hypothesis. It does matter to us, because we gather motivation by believing to be together with other people. However, we agree not to invest in the idea socially (except in philosophy), because we have no way to refute or validate the hypothesis. It is interesting that solipsism has ethical implications to us even if it is false (merely as a possibility), and no epistemic implications even if it is true.

Dualism can be admitted in some restricted sense, I think. might have referred to it, but I had questions about it. For example, a mix between physicalism and solipsism, with some private and some shared physically experience is epistemically indistinguishable (during the earthly phase of life) from meterialism, because solipsism isn't either. The observable difference can show in the post-mortem phase, but would be uncofirmable for the philosophical inquiry and the social convention, where it will rely on culture of faith, based on unrelated socio-political necessities and the ethical consequences of the mere possibility (like solipsism). (It is one of the few views that, if true, may have epistemic fingerprint and no rational conventional consequences.) In contrast, views on dualism that imply (through physically autonomous agency, freedom of the mind) that a transcendent part confers irregular behavior on its physical embodyment, are effectively suggesting miracles. (Even if we are considering determinisation of the QM model of physics.) This is where they differ from pantheism / panpsychism, where the constituent particles of matter follow the usual physical law, but are inherently agent (my take - functionally emergently collectively conscious). If the miracles are not clarified in technical terms, in my opinion, they are ambiguous propositions and can only be tenuous devices of philosophical discourse, ideas, but not proper hypotheses. If clarified, they can either be empirically refuted or confirmed (inductively validated), or this will be impossible, forcing them to remain hypotheses. (Same for physical sciences. Obscurity to measurement is not the empirical justification of assertions. The criteria here is Occam's razor. That is, minimalism over redundancy. Speculations, i.e. hypotheses get a free pass in my book.) On a slightly tangent note, my first question on the forum investigated eliminative materialism. But the underlying reason was that I couldn't grasp the difference between materialism and pantheism in general. If consciousness exists, I still think that any non-eliminative materialism should be panpsychic or pantheistic, or just methodological (uninvolved with the questions of the mind). But that is discussion for a different time. Continuing with dualism, there is the remaining possibility that the transcendent features are passive witness of the physical form. This position is infalsifiable during the earthly phase of life, but it is also incompatible with certain ethical positions. The mind would either bare no personal responsibility or the personal responsibility would be (rather convoluted) function of the divine omnipotence. Some theistic views as Leibniz monadism are not dualistic and are more akin to inter-subjective pantheistic idealism, which are again, epistemically indistinguishable from materialism. This naturally continues to my stance on theism, which is similar. I accept different ideas as hypotheses for discussion, but not as assertions. For example, I would like to discuss the consequences of dystheism, polytheism, alien origin, etc. (That is, I am a possibianist.)

I understand your point. The experience of a quale is different from the source of the experience. I think this is exactly the argument that's raging today. If everything is physical, what are these qualia we experience, that seem to be separate from the chemicals?

There are many different arguments from top philosophers who don't agree. My view is this (and this discussion has been beneficial for me in expressing it...thanks).

1) All mental experience derives from the brain. I think this is bullet proof - for one thing the fact that when a brain is damaged or cut up, it affects qualia as well as the physical brain. People have complete changes of the way they view emotions, love, other people when this happens. Changing the brain in other ways (psychedelic and pharmaceutical drugs) also changes emotions, and qualia.

2) Nonetheless, any materialist would admit we don't know exactly how qualia work. There is no direct proof of where they are in the brain. But they are in the brain.

Does that sound like a rational argument. BTW I'm not claiming I'm "right." But I base that admission (which I think all philosophers should acknowledge, to be honest) on changes that could happen in SCIENCE, the kind that move the earth beneath our feet. For instance no one could have predicted quantum weirdness, but when it was discovered, it was discovered through experimental science, not inductive or deductive argument.

Thanks so much for the answer. I'm a slow reader so going through it as we speak - maybe I'll engage one idea at a time.

In the early stages you seem to be arguing that solipsism, for some reason, can't be a tenable approach to life. You say it's a hypothesis, of course it is but so are all philosophical theories. I may be mistaking your argument, but I get the sense that you're saying "we can't be the only person in existence, watching a simulation of our life (not mean a computer virtual reality) because it would make life unbearable or impossible." Is that a fair assessment?

I agree. It seems likely that will happen.

QUESTION: Unless you believe in God, spirits, ghosts or other such things (pretty clear I'm an atheist) how could anyone argue that consciousness ISN'T simply an integral aspect of the material brain - DESPITE the fact that the can't be explained scientifically? If they aren't - where are they? Isn't this still hopeless dualism, and our primitive tendency to believe in spirits, souls etc.? — GLEN willows

I think the way you pose the question is problematical. As has been pointed out above, you carve up the territory in a certain way, which conforms to your ontological categories, and then sort the responses in terms of those definitions.

I think this is bullet proof - for one thing the fact that when a brain is damaged or cut up, it affects qualia as well as the physical brain. People have complete changes of the way they view emotions, love, other people when this happens. Changing the brain in other ways (psychedelic and pharmaceutical drugs) also changes emotions, and qualia. — GLEN willows

But there are contrary cases as well - cases where subjects have had such grossly damaged or deformed brains that they ought to be dead or vegetative, but they have survived and adapted. The obvious case is Phineas Gage, the railway man who had a crowbar blown right through his brain by a stick of dynamite, and lived to tell the tale. There's also a case of a man whose cranium was filled mostly by fluid but who lived and worked fairly normally.

There are also 'top-down' effects that can be demostrated with respect to brain physiology. An experiment was done with a group of subjects to determine neurological changes caused by learning motor skills, specifically learning piano. One of the control groups was given no piano, but only told to imagine that they were practicing scales. Yet the same neurological changes were observed in those subjects as in the group that had an actual piano (ref).

That experiment was part of the newly-discovered field of neuro-plasticity, the motto of which is 'change your mind, change your brain'. So in such cases, neurological changes are initiated by volitional direction of thought, which are called 'top-down', as distinct from 'bottom-up' changes.

That's one line of enquiry which I think undermines the materialist account.

In the early stages you seem to be arguing that solipsism, for some reason, can't be a tenable approach to life. You say it's a hypothesis, of course it is but so are all philosophical theories. — GLEN willows

I think the hypothesis doubts the notions of objective empirical world and our community. It is indeed a hypothesis, but for some it is with a high value attached to its potential and cannot be neglected. These are as I said the ethical implications. In the question of solipsism, even the possibility can be seen as the dismissal of the value of life and human effort. It can reinforce nihilism, depending on the view taken. The same way in which dualism is a form of theism for some, not merely a hypothesis.

I may be mistaking your argument, but I get the sense that you're saying "we can't be the only person in existence, watching a simulation of our life (not mean a computer virtual reality) because it would make life unbearable or impossible." — GLEN willows

I wouldn't use the needs of the human psychology to substantiate the claim. If you mean, the paragraph about your questions in philosophy classes, what I meant was that no productive discussion can arise from them, since there is something implicitly disparaging to the education in itself if solipsism is right. Therefore, the topic is not going to get priority in class. It opposes knowledge, even if merely tentatively.

Thanks for the reply.

"But there are contrary cases as well - "

Your examples don't show that there's no change of qualia after brain injuries. Phineas Gage is usually used as argument to my side - he behaved aberrantly, was prone to outbursts and eventually couldn;t handle his job. BUT - it seems there's a reassessment going on. Nonetheless no one argues he behaved perfectly normally after such a horrendous brain injury, just that he eventually recovered enough to interact with people normally. The second example states the patient ended up behaving "fairly normally." Which means the injury did change his behaviour, albeit a small amount.

The vast majority of studies on brain injuries, including the fascinating split brain operations, show major changes to qualia.

Neuroplasticity doesn't argue against materialism either, IMO. It shows the amazing power of the brain to heal and renew the things lost by the injury.

Neuroplasticity doesn't argue against materialism either, IMO. It shows the amazing power of the brain to heal and renew the things lost by the injury. — GLEN willows

The brain or the mind? That remains an outstanding question.

If a scientist uses a different explanatory system to explain mental events than non-mental events... — Hanover

It's rather that Davidson supposes we can describe the same event i two different ways; I'm in love, and I have high levels of norepinephrine. THis does nto suppose an ontological bifurcation.

"I think the hypothesis doubts the notions of objective empirical world and our community. It is indeed a hypothesis, but for some it is with a high value attached to its potential and cannot be neglected. These are as I said the ethical implications. In the question of solipsism, even the possibility can be seen as the dismissal of the value of life and human effort. It can reinforce nihilism, depending on the view taken. The same way in which dualism is a form of theism for some, not merely a hypothesis."

I say yes to all your assertions. They are reasons to see it as repugnant, but not reasons to reject the theory. The first time I encountered Locke or Hume, the idea that there isn't a "table there" was baffling. As was Hume's rejection of induction (I know it's more complex than that). If those thinkers believed that, said I, how they could even be sure the ground under their feet wouldn't disappear with every step they take? Hume acknowledged this, and admitted he doesn't really live his life that way.

I know this is broad strokes but please bear with me. Dismissing free will has very disturbing implications for the criminal system. I'm sure I don't have to explain that. But a lot of minds better than mine doubt it's existence.

My point is that it seems to me, the entry-level dude, that solipsism is no more or less valid a theory than empiricism...let alone Leibniz's bizarre monad-world. And just as counter-intuitive as those theories, or that of full-on determinism.

Same thing, that's what I'm saying. If you damage the brain, your mind will change. When your brain dies, you mind dies. Again I'm being reductive, but maybe there IS a simple truth. I'm a fan of the Churchlands, if you want to read further on reductive materialism. Or is it eliminative? I think the latter.

but is he talking about two entities? Isn't that dualism? How and where do they interact?

...but is he talking about two entities? — GLEN willows

No, one event from two differing points of view.

He turned on the light.

He alerted the burglar.

Two descriptions of the same event.

From the cursory reading I've done on Davidson and anomalous monism, I can already see many things that strike me (and many other critics) as logical contradictions. And he is criticized for being a dualist, which I think he is. Because you're a fan, I think it's probably best if we agree to disagree. I hope this doesn't sound dismissive. I just think it could lead to a very long thread, for this topic alone.

but you can just as easily argue, from top-down effects, that the higher level, namely, intentionality and mind, re-configures the material substrate. In other words, materialism is always bottom-up, that the neural matter dictates mind, but if mind re-configures matter, then it overturns the materialist explanation.