since the assumption that things are only ideata — StreetlightX
since there is no logical transitivity from the mind-dependence of concepts to that of conceivable objects. — StreetlightX
But this is precisely what the realist calls for, and so precisely why Brassier feels he must 'refute' Berkeley. — The Great Whatever
...that's built into the very form of any argument that does not distinguish between concepts and objects (i.e. that begs the question). — StreetlightX
"It is undoubtedly true that we cannot conceive of concept-independent things without conceiving of them — StreetlightX
How does it beg the question? Where does Berkeley assume that concepts and objects are identical? — The Great Whatever
The assumption is implicit in the equivocation between 'things' qua ideata and things simpliciter. And of course Berkeley doesn't make the distinction - but that's precisely the problem. The feature is bug. — StreetlightX
he says that the realist is committed to arguing that he can think of things without thinking of them ('a manifest repugnance'). — StreetlightX
No, he does not begin by distinguishing a concept from an object, and go on to argue that they are the same.
So, first, I'm not saying there is no such distinction. I am denying that it is the distinction in which the realist is interested. The realist is interested in objects independent of experience simpliciter, not independent of experience within certain hypothetical scenarios, while dependent on experience in order to be conceived of in those hypothetical scenarios. — The Great Whatever
Second, even if that were what the realist is talking about, your conclusion does not follow from your premise, since you are not the only one who can conceive things. And so there is no inference from what you can conceive to what can be conceived. — The Great Whatever
you are not the only one who can conceive things. And so there is no inference from what you can conceive to what can be conceived. — The Great Whatever
The argument against this seems to be that we cannot conceive of anything without that thing being conceived of by us — Pneumenon
But this is a non-sequitur: in order to conceive of an unconceived object, the object need only be unconceived within the conception.
First, why should I accept the premise? I can't conceive of a person of whom I am not currently conceiving, so why should I assume that other people are conceiving things without me? After all, I can't conceive of it. Unless you're asking me to accept things I can't conceive of, in which case the master argument fails anyway. — Pneumenon
3) To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. — TheGreatWhatever
I think the Master Argument does not establish idealism; what it does establish is that the realist is committed to talking about things he can't conceive of — The Great Whatever
I am male. Therefore, if we don't make a distinction between conception simpliciter and conception ex hypothesi, then I can't conceive of something that isn't being imagined by a male. Thus, I am entitled to reject the idea of objects that are not conceived of by males.
because he doesn't establish a priori distinction between concepts and objects
I don't understand what this means. What do you mean by, a priori? Is the realist committed to the position that he cannot possibly be wrong about the distinction, and so any argument that purports to show that the distinction is invalid is wrong because he has ruled out that possibility to begin with? If that is not what you are saying, what are you saying? If it is what you are saying, what interest is there in an argument that simply assumes its conclusions a priori? You can assume anything you want a priori. — The Great Whatever
Quite the reverse: it is the assumption that the difference between concept and object is always internal to the concept—that every difference is ultimately conceptual—that needs to be defended — StreetlightX
If you like, SX, another way of thinking about Berkeley's arguments is to say that he does assume that these two are distinct to begin with, shows how this leads to a contradiction, and so discharges the assumption that led to said contradiction. — The Great Whatever
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