since the assumption that things are only ideata — StreetlightX

This isn't an assumption, though, it's the conclusion?

...that's built into the very form of any argument that does not distinguish between concepts and objects (i.e. that begs the question).

since there is no logical transitivity from the mind-dependence of concepts to that of conceivable objects. — StreetlightX

But this is not what is being claimed. The claim is that it is not possible to conceive of something that no one is conceiving of. But this is precisely what the realist calls for, and so precisely why Brassier feels he must 'refute' Berkeley.

But this is precisely what the realist calls for, and so precisely why Brassier feels he must 'refute' Berkeley. — The Great Whatever

No it isn't. "It is undoubtedly true that we cannot conceive of concept-independent things without conceiving of them; but it by no means follows from this that we cannot conceive of things existing independently of concepts, since there is no logical transitivity from the mind-dependence of concepts to that of conceivable objects." Again, concepts and objects mate.

...that's built into the very form of any argument that does not distinguish between concepts and objects (i.e. that begs the question). — StreetlightX

How does it beg the question? Where does Berkeley assume that concepts and objects are identical? Rather, he establishes this conclusion as the result of argumentation, part of which involve sa reductio.

Begging the question is a formal fallacy. If he commits it, you should be able to outline explicitly what premise he maintains, and how it the conclusion is logically contained in it.

"It is undoubtedly true that we cannot conceive of concept-independent things without conceiving of them — StreetlightX

But this is not what Berkeley says. He does not say 'we cannot conceive of concept-independent things without conceiving them.' The point is we cannot conceive of concept-independent things full stop. And to see that this is so, he moves by reductio: suppose you conceived of something concept independent. By by hypothesis, you are conceiving of it. Ergo, it is not concept independent.

How does it beg the question? Where does Berkeley assume that concepts and objects are identical? — The Great Whatever

The assumption is implicit in the equivocation between 'things' qua ideata and things simpliciter. And of course Berkeley doesn't make the distinction - but that's precisely the problem. What you think is the feature is exactly the bug.

The assumption is implicit in the equivocation between 'things' qua ideata and things simpliciter. And of course Berkeley doesn't make the distinction - but that's precisely the problem. The feature is bug. — StreetlightX

What equivocation? Where is it? Berkeley concludes that things are ideas; he does not assume this.

To the degree that he does not distinguish between a concept and an object, the conclusion is built into the argument from the beginning. It's not that hard dude. I can't quote what Berkeley does not say: it's not there, that's the problem.

Dude, seriously.

What do you mean by, he does not distinguish? He comes to the conclusion that they are the same; he does not assume this from the outset.

Do you understand the difference between a premise and a conclusion? Are you saying that any conclusion to the effect that X is Y is question begging? It seems to me you don't understand the structural difference between concluding that two things are the same, and assuming they are all along.

SX, show me how the conclusion is built into the argument. Show me the premise, and show me the conclusion, and how one is contained in the other. Without that, your words are just hot air.

No, he does not begin by distinguishing a concept from an object, and go on to argue that they are the same. As far as the argument goes, there are simply objects, or 'things': things that are either mind-independent, or not. And then, from this starting point - which is already skewed - he says that the realist is committed to arguing that he can think of things without thinking of them ('a manifest repugnance'). But this is just the conclusion one would reach if one did not make the prior distinction between a concept and an object, which is something Berkeley manifestly does not do.

Here is what I take to be the essential form of Berkeley's argument, using quotes form the text itself. It does not have the structure that Brassier attributes to it.

1) But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them.

2) But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?

3) To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy.

This argument has the form of a reductio. In 1), the 'say you' is an indication that Berkeley is taking a premise provided by his opponent; in 3), he is showing that this results in a 'repugnancy,' i.e. a contradiction that requires discharging the premise.

Yep, can't see a prior distinction between concept and object in any of that - just a flat equivocation between 'things' - so I'd say the argument has exactly the form Brassier attributes to it

he says that the realist is committed to arguing that he can think of things without thinking of them ('a manifest repugnance'). — StreetlightX

No. This is not what he says the realist is committed to. He does not say they are committed to saying they can think about things without thinking about them. He is committed to saying that he can think of things that no one is thinking of. Please, Lord.

No, he does not begin by distinguishing a concept from an object, and go on to argue that they are the same.

But this is precisely what he does, in Principles of Human Knowledge. I mean, exactly, literally, precisely, unequivocally. The only way you could think it wasn't is if you haven't read it. He literally starts out by outlining the various sorts of ideas people have, then the various sorts of objects that are in the world, and then drawing the conclusion from various arguments that they are identical.

So, first, I'm not saying there is no such distinction. I am denying that it is the distinction in which the realist is interested. The realist is interested in objects independent of experience simpliciter, not independent of experience within certain hypothetical scenarios, while dependent on experience in order to be conceived of in those hypothetical scenarios. — The Great Whatever

This realist is interested in the idea that this stuff would all be here even if we weren't. The argument against this seems to be that we cannot conceive of anything without that thing being conceived of by us; therefore, we can't make sense of the idea of an unconceived object. But this is a non-sequitur: in order to conceive of an unconceived object, the object need only be unconceived within the conception.

Second, even if that were what the realist is talking about, your conclusion does not follow from your premise, since you are not the only one who can conceive things. And so there is no inference from what you can conceive to what can be conceived. — The Great Whatever

I didn't say anything about what can be conceived, only about what is conceived. As a realist, I am happy to entertain the idea that everything can be conceived or perceived or whatever word you want to use for the idea that a mind can make sense of something. That's just saying that everything is intelligible. Mind-independence just means that the universe would happily chug along even if we weren't here, and that is perfectly compatible with the idea that such a universe would still be intelligible to the next race of sentient creatures that evolved to perceive it. By analogy: the fact that a sphere is visible does not mean that someone is currently looking at it, and its visibility does not make it "vision dependent."

I am also interested in this:

you are not the only one who can conceive things. And so there is no inference from what you can conceive to what can be conceived. — The Great Whatever

First, why should I accept the premise? I can't conceive of a person of whom I am not currently conceiving, so why should I assume that other people are conceiving things without me? After all, I can't conceive of it. Unless you're asking me to accept things I can't conceive of, in which case the master argument fails anyway.

OK, first of all, Brassier does not even understand that the argument is a reductio, which it is. So clearly he cannot have the form of the argument right if even this basic point eludes him. Second, Brassier attributes to Berkeley a tautological premise that he never espouses.

"To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived" - exactly, literally, precisely, unequivocally.

The argument against this seems to be that we cannot conceive of anything without that thing being conceived of by us — Pneumenon

The 'argument,' which is not an argument but a result of the realist's own claim, from which a contradiction is drawn, is that we cannot conceive of things that no one is conceiving of (i.e., we cannot conceive of precisely what the realist is interested in dealing with).

But this is a non-sequitur: in order to conceive of an unconceived object, the object need only be unconceived within the conception.

Realists are not interested in what is conceived of to be unconceived; they are interested in what is unconceived.

First, why should I accept the premise? I can't conceive of a person of whom I am not currently conceiving, so why should I assume that other people are conceiving things without me? After all, I can't conceive of it. Unless you're asking me to accept things I can't conceive of, in which case the master argument fails anyway. — Pneumenon

I think the Master Argument does not establish idealism; what it does establish is that the realist is committed to talking about things he can't conceive of. I think it's consistent to just bite the bullet and accept that, but the realist usually doesn't want to. Berkeley can only establish idealism by further assuming that what is inconceivable is impossible, which I do not think is an acceptable premise.

What are you trying to say here?

3) To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. — TheGreatWhatever

The assumption objects and concepts are identical is embedded here. If they are different, there is no problem with conceiving an instance of existence which is unthought. My thought of: "X no-one is thinking" not the existence of X no-one is thinking. Thinking about an unperceived object does not commit to its presence. The concept of "unexperienced X" is present even as the "unexperienced thing" is not (as I am thinking about it at the moment).

There is only a manifest repugnancy if one equivocates thinking about an unexperienced object with its existence. Berkeley needs to equivocate ideas and things for his reductio to function.

That's what Berkeley attributes to the realist. But it's wrong - because he doesn't establish a priori distinction between concepts and objects. Man, there are only so many ways I can say the same thing.

Put it this way: both you and Brassier agree that the argument doesn't serve to establish idealism, only disqualify realism. It's a negative, not a positive argument. Which is to say, in order to be 'correct', it needs to get the realist position right. And for Brassier, this is exactly what it doesn't do. Why? Because it doesn't distinguish between concepts and objects. Where does Berekley not do so? In exactly the place where there's nothing to quote. I can only point out an absence, not quote one.

(Is this part of your idealist proclivities? If there's nothing to quote, Berkeley did not not-say something?)

I think the Master Argument does not establish idealism; what it does establish is that the realist is committed to talking about things he can't conceive of — The Great Whatever

Person 1: "There is stuff you can't conceive of, but I can."
Person 2: "Well, then, there's stuff I can't conceive of, but you can."
Person 1: "Wrong! You're trying to talk about stuff you can't conceive of. It's only right when I say it."

This seems like a reductio to me... Unless you think it's impossible for one person to be able to conceive of something another one can't. But then we're back to this argument:

I am male. Therefore, if we don't make a distinction between conception simpliciter and conception ex hypothesi, then I can't conceive of something that isn't being imagined by a male. Thus, I am entitled to reject the idea of objects that are not conceived of by males.

What does it get wrong about the realist position?

because he doesn't establish a priori distinction between concepts and objects

I don't understand what this means. What do you mean by, a priori? Is the realist committed to the position that he cannot possibly be wrong about the distinction, and so any argument that purports to show that the distinction is invalid is wrong because he has ruled out that possibility to begin with? If that is not what you are saying, what are you saying? If it is what you are saying, what interest is there in an argument that simply assumes its conclusions a priori? You can assume anything you want a priori.

I don't understand what you are saying in this post.

If you like, SX, another way of thinking about Berkeley's arguments is to say that he does assume that these two are distinct to begin with, shows how this leads to a contradiction, and so discharges the assumption that led to said contradiction.

I don't understand what this means. What do you mean by, a priori? Is the realist committed to the position that he cannot possibly be wrong about the distinction, and so any argument that purports to show that the distinction is invalid is wrong because he has ruled out that possibility to begin with? If that is not what you are saying, what are you saying? If it is what you are saying, what interest is there in an argument that simply assumes its conclusions a priori? You can assume anything you want a priori. — The Great Whatever

Nope. See: §§30: "Contrary to what correlationists proclaim, the presupposition of this difference is not a dogmatic prejudice in need of critical legitimation. Quite the reverse: it is the assumption that the difference between concept and object is always internal to the concept—that every difference is ultimately conceptual—that needs to be defended. For to assume that the difference between concept and object can only be internal to the concept is to assume that concepts furnish self-evident indexes of their own reality and internal structure—that we know what concepts are and can reliably track their internal differentiation—an assumption that then seems to license the claim that every difference in reality is a conceptual difference. The latter of course provides the premise for conceptual idealism, understood as the claim that reality is composed of concepts—precisely the sort of metaphysical claim which correlationism is supposed to abjure. Yet short of resorting to the phenomenological myth of an originary, self-constituting consciousness (one of the many variants of the myth of the given, denounced by Sellars), the same critical considerations that undermine dogmatism about the essence and existence of objects also vitiate dogmatism about the essence and existence of concepts (whether indexed by signifiers, discursive practices, conscious experiences, etc). Thus it is not clear why our access to the structure of concepts should be considered any less in need of critical legitimation than our access to the structure of objects. To assume privileged access to the structure of conception is to assume intellectual intuition. But this is to make a metaphysical claim about the essential nature of conception; an assumption every bit as dogmatic as any allegedly metaphysical assertion about the essential nature of objects."

The distinction does not secure realism or antirealism. The point is to stave off pre-critical dogmatism until an argument is advanced one way or another.

What don't you understand?

Quite the reverse: it is the assumption that the difference between concept and object is always internal to the concept—that every difference is ultimately conceptual—that needs to be defended — StreetlightX

Who assumes this?

If you like, SX, another way of thinking about Berkeley's arguments is to say that he does assume that these two are distinct to begin with, shows how this leads to a contradiction, and so discharges the assumption that led to said contradiction. — The Great Whatever

But it only leads to a contraction if it is assumed that the two are not distinct. That's why it's a contradiction. Which means the claim that Berkeley assumes that there is a distinction is wrong. Once you establish a distinction between concept and object, the 'contradiction' disappears.