I hear you, but the way you've posed the question provides an opportunity to frame responses.

So in your view, the advent of self-consciousness involves an apple tree, a talking snake and a pissed off deity? — counterpunch

Do you know what 'hermenuetics' means?

Do you know what 'hermenuetics' means? — Wayfarer

I know what it is supposed to mean. But perhaps you should say what you mean by it!

I know what it is supposed to mean. — counterpunch

If you knew what it meant, you wouldn’t ask such questions.

If you knew what it meant, you wouldn’t ask such questions. — Wayfarer

I was hoping for something a little more productive. I was trying to give you a taste of your own medicine. It's bitter, because you're bitter in your sub rosa defence of a Biblical account of human origins. The difference between us is - I offend you incidentally as I seek to understand reality. You offend me deliberately to confound any other explanation but your own.

It's not hermenuetics that suggests a God concept occurred to primitive man; and that the nature of human intelligence is paranoid suspicion, as opposed to reason. The Mitochondrial Eve is the most recent common matrilineal ancestor - and she occurs about 200,000 years ago - before the occurrence of a truly human mode of thought. That so, how do we explain the universality of intellectual intelligence? Intelligence cannot be grounded in a random genetic mutation selected for by natural and sexual selection - because our common ancestor did not have this trait.

So it has to be something else; and when we take into account the nature of human intelligence - like you, a supposedly grown up, modern day and not unintelligent person, subscribing to the "scrumping for consciousness" hypothesis - it's not reasonable to call that reason. When we look at the history of humankind, and anticipate our most likely future - reason is clearly not the central faculty at work. Reason is some poor relation at the feast laid out by paranoid superstition - invoked by the simple question that Cicero, William Paley and Richard Dawkins grind upon - the "Who made this?" question.

That idea of a Creator God could be transmitted among people, and is clearly able to grip the human mind in a very profound way - such that, even now, in the modern world, given a rational explanation, you cannot let go of it. That's very difficult to explain in terms of reason as a random genetic mutation - selected for by natural and sexual selection. Even putting aside that fact no such genetic trait could be universally transmitted among all people because the Mitochondrial Eve occurs long before human intellect occurs, humans are not reasonable creatures. It must have been psychological evolution, and there's no other idea - with such great power, within reach by dint of a small and natural leap than the answer to the question: Who made all this?

Reason is some poor relation at the feast laid out by paranoid superstition.... — counterpunch

It is indeed true that one of the things dissolved in the acid of Darwin’s dangerous idea, is philosophy itself. Unfortunately, the same acid it takes the sense of irony along with it (like COVID does to taste), so those propounding it can’t sense the acrid fumes. :-)

I'm sorry truth offends you, but your behaviours prove my arguments.

I would have thought, according to you, that such ‘proof’ could only consist of blows. If you are offended by reasoned argument, then I’m sure there’s something more at work here than simply the instinct to survive.

sub rosa defence — counterpunch

What is that, by the way? I googled the term, nothing comes up.

Also 'scrumping' - that yields:


scrump
/skrʌmp/
verbINFORMAL•BRITISH
gerund or present participle: scrumping
steal (fruit) from an orchard or garden.
"I remember Gordon scrumping apples from the orchard next door"

It's not hermenuetics that suggests a God concept occurred to primitive man; — counterpunch

That is true. That is evolutionary rationalism, applied to the human condition. Hermenuetics, as you may not be familiar with it, is 'the branch of knowledge that deals with interpretation, especially of the Bible or literary texts.' It's much more discussed in Contintental than in Anglo-American philosophy.

I would have thought, according to you, that such ‘proof’ could only consist of blows. If you are offended by reasoned argument, then I’m sure there’s something more at work here than simply the instinct to survive. — Wayfarer

That's nonsensical; and betrays a paranoia I will explain to you.

You think Nietzsche was right, that man in a state of nature was some amoral brute, and that the strong were fooled by the weak. But that's not true. The human animal is a moral, social creature; and could not have survived otherwise.

We lived in hunter gatherer tribal groups - for millions of years, and if chimpanzees are any measure - we shared food, defended the tribe and groomed each other. ...

Nietzsche's idea of natural ethics in the will to power is simply false. And the inversion of values he identified was not the strong fooled by the weak but the innate moral sense imbued in the organism, and in the kinship structures of the tribe - made explicit when hunter gatherer tribes joined together to form societies and civilisations.

Don't seek to cast me as an agent for the ubermensch - because that's absolutely not what this is. It's what your paranoid superstition cannot but fear, but try letting reason take the wheel.

Is this just another way of inquiring into the so-called is/ought gap? The truth is, to my reckoning, if there's a god and assuming fae is all-good, it follows that the is must be the way it should be and we're all wasting our time trying to, well, make things better.

However, if there's no god, our ideas on how the world should be matter for what is defintely falls short of the mark.

Don't seek to cast me as an agent for the ubermensch - because that's absolutely not what this is. It's what your paranoid superstition cannot but fear, but try letting reason take the wheel. — counterpunch

I am trying to understand what you're saying, but the parts don't all fit together. You say

We see the moral implications of those facts. Facts are not a separate magisterium to us, because we are imbued with an innate moral sense, in turn a behaviourally intelligent, evolutionary response to a causal reality. — counterpunch

So here, you're appealing to a naturalistic basis for morality, you're arguing that morality is 'naturally selected' for adaptive reasons. This is what I've been criticizing, but it's not because I don't like you - it's on philosophical grounds, the fact that evolutionary biology maybe doesn't supply such grounds, that the moral sense is not innate for evolutionary reasons.

Anyway, if it were the case that we're 'selected to see the facts', then why is there any room for disagreement? Why could there be any conflict? Because we're not scientically advanced enough yet? If that is so, it seems an ever-receding horizon; science has long since provided the means for weapons of mass destruction, but it has no voice about whether to build them or not, or how to resolve human conflict. Bertrand Russell pointed this out in the Epilogue to his History of Western Philosophy in the 1940's.

You also say:

This is the basis of a truth relation between the organism and reality that plays out on every level; the physiological, the behavioural, and for us - the intellectual level. — counterpunch

As if 'the intellectual level' is continuous with physiological and behavioural. That the ability to reason is like a claw, or a tentacle, or the beaver's ability to build dams. That is 'reductionist'. You know what 'reductionist' is, and the objections to it? Again, nothing personal here.

You think Nietzsche was right, that man in a state of nature was some amoral brute, and that the strong were fooled by the weak — counterpunch

I don't like Nietszche at all, I think he's tremendously over-rated. That's my personal view.

Let's try and get to some consensus about what we're actually disagreeing about. You're arguing that morality appears in h. sapiens in a purely natural manner - that it is advantageous from the point of view of natural selection. I asked you, and you said that it was. You're of course not at all alone in believing that. It's probably the majority view, the mainstream view. So I'm not taking shots at you personally, even though you seem to be taking it that way. I'm taking the position of those criticizing the view of evolutionary naturalism as a basis for ethics. But as soon as I do that, then the question is: 'so you believe in a Talking Snake?' You see the issue here? I think there's actually a kind of subterranean fault-line showing up in this debate, which you might not be aware of - that is why it pushes buttons.

So here, you're appealing to a naturalistic basis for morality, you're arguing that morality is 'naturally selected' for adaptive reasons. This is what I've been criticizing, but it's not because I don't like you - it's on philosophical grounds, the fact that evolutionary biology maybe doesn't supply such grounds, that the moral sense is not innate for evolutionary reasons - which means, you then say, that I must be supporting the Bible! I'm a closet Theist. Try and think about that dispassionately, because it's what has actually happened. — Wayfarer

Not exactly, no. I am arguing that a MORAL SENSE is naturally selected for adaptive reasons. Not any particular moral or ethical principal, but a sensitivity to moral implication, that is, according to Goodall, present in chimpanzee tribal dynamics. Your naturalistic fallacy objection does not apply to the evolutionary development of a moral sense. It applies to any specific 'ought' - such as, Nietzsche's naturalistic ethics.

Anyway, if it were the case that we're 'selected to see the facts', then why is there any room for disagreement? — Wayfarer

I have never used the phrase - 'selected to see the facts." I can only suspect what aspect of what I have actually said, this is intended to refer to. I have asked that you stop paraphrasing me. You don't understand my argument, and so cannot conceivably paraphrase it correctly.

Why could there be any conflict? Because we're not scientically advanced enough yet? If that is so, it seems an ever-receding horizon; science has long sinced provided the means for weapons of mass destruction, but it has no voice about whether to build them or not, or how to resolve human conflict. Bertrand Russell pointed this out in the Epilogue to his History of Western Philosophy. — Wayfarer

This makes no sense of anything I've said. You are pitching at a windmill in your mind. A windmill you think is my argument, but in reality, you're riding a donkey and your armour is made from pots and pans. It is quite that absurd to imagine that my argument is that we are some rule following robot as a consequence of some sort of evolutionary determinism, or something. That's not what I'm saying at all.

As if 'the intellectual level' is continuous with physiological and behavioural. That the ability to reason is like a claw, or a tentacle, or tbe beaver's ability to build dams. That is 'reductionist'. You know what 'reductionist' is, and the objections to it? — Wayfarer

Try this. You have a list of instructions and a map, but you're holding the map upside down. You follow the instructions. Do you get to your intended destination? No, you do not. Why? Because your map is not correct to reality. It's upside down. There's a causal relation between the validity of knowledge, and human action, and the consequences of such action. And this is a continuation of the truth relation between the organism and reality, from the structure of DNA, to physiology, to behaviour - so too must intellectually intelligent human beings be correct to a causal reality to survive.

This is a well trampled area. There have been lot of thinkers pass through this neck of the woods. If you're going to attack my argument, try understand it before drawing in heavy weight philosophers that are not criticising the arguments I'm making. They are criticising the arguments they are making. I am aware of the arguments they have made, and the criticisms of those arguments. I may be traversing the same forest, but I am not on the same well worn path.

I tried earlier to describe how my argument picks its way between randomness and purpose, where I said:

There's an over-emphasis in my view, on the random blindness of evolution - which is not to say that random genetic mutation is not the basis upon which selection acts, nor to suggest that evolution has a purpose in mind. — counterpunch

And it's like you keep saying, that I do think evolution has a purpose in mind, and then you attack that position and ignore what I actually said. I do not suggest that evolution justifies any particular moral ought. I suggest evolution imbued human beings with a sensitivity to moral implication; a moral sense - that, with reference to Hume, allows that we see the moral implications of facts. Indeed, we cannot but see the moral implications of facts.

Is this just another way of inquiring into the so-called is/ought gap? — TheMadFool

I’m more or less asking what people generally think about that gap, yes: it’s real and the sides of it are very different, it’s not real and everything is “is”-like, it’s not real and everything is “ought”-like, or it’s real but both sides of it are similar.

I suppose I could agree with that, provided the idea of separate magisteria is not taken to suggest that there is a spiritual domain separate from the physical. As I see it human life is entirely dependent on physical actualities, but not completely determined by them (and the same may true, on a continuum of lesser extent, as to what determines animal life). Also it is not a matter of just two magisteria, but considerably different approaches are appropriate for every domain of inquiry.

I think you're missing the option 'one domain viewed from different perspectives'. — Wayfarer

Thinking on it, I'm going to resile from agreeing with this; there is no "one domain" that we can grasp, so it is really a baseless presumption to say that there must be, ontologically speaking, one overarching domain of reality.

The capacity to have a moral opinion is a consequence of evolution, and reducible, in turn - to the truth relation between the organism and reality. — counterpunch

The capacity to have a moral opinion would not have been possible without there having being an evolution of species, because the human species would not have have been possible without there having been an evolution of species. If that is all you mean by "the capacity to have a moral opinion is a consequence of evolution" then it is an uncontroversial claim.

As to the capacity to have a moral opinion being reducible "to the truth relation between the organism and reality" I don't know what that even means, it seems to be "not even wrong". Or it could be trivially true in the sense that we need a notion of truth and falsity in order to "have a moral opinion"; that is, to be able to judge that moral stances are right or wrong. It depends on what you mean, and that is far from clear.

In this thread I'm not trying to argue that my views are correct, but just to find out where other people's views fall, and it's clear that yours fall into what I intended option #1 to be. — Pfhorrest

It is not the topic of this thread, to be sure; but it would make an interesting topic fro another thread.

Do you know what 'hermenuetics' means?
— Wayfarer

I know what it is supposed to mean. — counterpunch

Beautiful. Do we have a "quotable quotes" thread?

it is really a baseless presumption to say that there must be, ontologically speaking, one overarching domain of reality. — Janus

...otherwise known as 'cosmos'....

I suggest evolution imbued human beings with a sensitivity to moral implication; a moral sense - that, with reference to Hume, allows that we see the moral implications of facts. — counterpunch

But Hume didn't propose any such idea. He is famous for framing the very is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that is behind the question posed by this thread.

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last [i.e. most important] consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason. — Hume

Agree that as h. sapiens evolved, so too did their sense of morality, and also agree that precursors to same can be observed in other primates. But the broader philosophical question revolves around the scope of naturalism, and the 'naturalist' project to account for human capabilities in naturalistic terms. I'm mentioning other philosophers, because I'm looking at the question philosophically, not through the lense of unquestioning naturalism, and Nagel is one philosopher in particular who has deeply explored this question. And the alternative to naturalist accounts is not reversion to simple Biblical literalism (e.g. believing in talking snakes). Religious accounts are to be interpreted metaphorically.

Do you know what 'hermenuetics' means?
— Wayfarer

I know what it is supposed to mean.
— counterpunch

Beautiful. Do we have a "quotable quotes" thread? — Banno

You saw the question I was asked, right?

You saw the question I was asked, right? — Wayfarer

Indeed; I found the irony quite amusing.

But Hume didn't propose any such idea. He is famous for framing the very is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that is behind the question posed by this thread. — Wayfarer

I fucking well know that Hume posed the question. That's why I mentioned him. I do not disagree with Hume's observation - that people state facts, and then switch to ought mode.

I disagree with Hume's analysis of that observation.

For me, people do this because they are imbued with a moral sense by evolution, and cannot but see the moral implications of facts.

For Hume, I imagine, he believed morality to be God given.

My argument addresses the same question Hume asked, but draws a different conclusion.

How do you not get that?

If you don't get that by now - please leave me alone. You're wasting my time.

I fucking well know that Hume posed the question. That's why I mentioned him. I do not disagree with Hume's observation - that people state facts, and then switch to ought mode.

I disagree with Hume's analysis of that observation.

For me, people do this because they are imbued with a moral sense by evolution, and cannot but see the moral implications of facts.

For Hume, I imagine, he believed morality to be God given.

My argument addresses the same question Hume asked, but draws a different conclusion.

How do you not get that? — counterpunch

I didn't get it, because it's obviously very confused. And I'm happy to leave you alone.

I didn't get it, because it's obviously very confused. And I'm happy to leave you alone. — Wayfarer

I'm not at all confused. You are. You have just failed to appreciate a very simple premise after a protracted discussion of my argument. Perhaps if you hadn't been so aggressively averse at every moment of that discussion; had you opened your mind even a little, some of it might have sunk in and you wouldn't be so confused now, about what my argument actually is.

For Hume, I imagine, he believed morality to be God given. — counterpunch

No.

Hume was an atheist.

It is not the topic of this thread, to be sure; but it would make an interesting topic fro another thread. — Janus

I am currently discussing it in another thread (the one about identity politics and morality) with Isaac, and have ended up going over it (always with him) in many, many threads before, which is what prompted me to start this poll.

Oh and yeah...

provided the idea of separate magisteria is not taken to suggest that there is a spiritual domain separate from the physical — Janus

I didn’t mean that to be a requirement for option 1, though that would be one possibility for it.

it is really a baseless presumption to say that there must be, ontologically speaking, one overarching domain of reality. — Janus


...otherwise known as 'cosmos'.... — Wayfarer

otherwise known as 'cosmos'.... — Wayfarer

Sure, but the cosmos can never be an object of perception like a tiger, a cloud, a fish, a mountain, a star or a galaxy.

So 'cosmos' is just the idea of the totality of things, and we cannot say whether there is a cosmos apart from our ideas.

No.

Hume was an atheist. — Banno

Was he?

"One of the most hotly debated issues arising out of Hume’s philosophy is whether or not he was an atheist. Two methodological and historical caveats should be briefly noted before addressing this question. First, as already noted, many of Hume’s own contemporaries regarded him in these terms. Our own contemporaries have tended to dismiss these claims as coming from religious bigots who did not understand Hume’s philosophy. While there may be some basis for these concerns, this is not true of all of Hume’s early critics (e.g. Thomas Reid) and, even if it were, it would not show that his critics were wrong about this matter. Second, and related to the first point, Hume lived and wrote at a time of severe religious persecution, by both the church and the state. Unorthodox religious views, and more especially any form of open atheism, would certainly provoke strong reactions from the authorities. Caution and subterfuge in these circumstances was essential if difficulties of these kinds were to be avoided. (For this reason it is especially ironic to find religious apologists who confidently read Hume’s professions of orthodoxy as entirely sincere but who never mention the awkward conditions in which he had to express his views.) While conditions of suppression do not themselves prove a writer or thinker such as Hume had a concealed doctrine, this possibility should be seriously and carefully considered."

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/#WasHumAth

Seems unlikely, but even if Hume were an atheist, it wouldn't alter my point, which is that Hume probably attributed morality to God - whether extant or as a religious archetype, it was an objective conception of morality - as opposed to the innate moral sense I describe.

I suggest you read the conclusion of the section from which you quote. Arguably, he was a strong agnostic - but he certainly did not

believed morality to be God given. — counterpunch

I suggest you read the conclusion of the section from which you quote. Arguably, he was a strong agnostic - but he certainly did not — Banno

For Hume, I imagine, he believed morality to be God given. — counterpunch

Perhaps not.

Cheers.

You talk of a moral sense, but show an antipathy towards Hume. See Sympathy, and the Nature and Origin of the Moral Sentiments