"...there is something implicitly disparaging to the education in itself if solipsism is right."

I have been accused of such things haha. I'm pretty sure the study of philosophy can withstand my theories.

Nonetheless, any materialist would admit we don't know exactly how qualia work. — GLEN willows

Materialists would say Qualia don’t exist. Not that we don’t understand how they work. They would say that the feeling of sight or taste is an “illusion” somehow (whatever that means).

There is no direct proof of where they are in the brain. But they are in the brain. — GLEN willows

How, exactly? Let’s take vision for example. Are you suggesting a “vision chemical” in the brain? Well, we understand vision pretty well and there is no such thing. Are you maybe suggesting a “vision center”? Again, no such thing. There is no one part of the brain responsible for processing vision. Nor is there any pert of the brain that connects all our senses. But in waking life they seem connected. It feels as if you’re a little guy sitting behind your eyes getting fed sights sounds and tastes. There is no location like that in the brain.

I just think it could lead to a very long thread, for this topic alone. — GLEN willows

You say that like it was a bad thing...

true. I'll come back later and revisit.

"Materialists would say Qualia don’t exist."

Maybe I should have said "consciousness" instead of qualia, to be more clear. Materialists come in different versions but I'm using the folk psychology term consciousness to describe a feeling, but not an entity. Do you believe words like "hope" and love" describe real things? If so, you'll have to define what you mean by "real."

"There is no direct proof of where they are in the brain. But they are in the brain.
— GLEN willows

How, exactly?"

If I knew that I'd publish a paper and win the Nobel Prize. I feel like we're repeating ourselves here. I've admitted that there are feelings, qualia, that we experience. I've admitted no one knows quite how it works, including you. What more can be said?

What more can be said? — GLEN willows

Whether or not these feelings/qualia are different from the chemicals correlated with them. You think they aren't. I think that's ridiculous. For one, if what you're saying is true, we would have needed to have a good grasp of neurology before we even came up with words like "love" or "anger". But clearly that's not the case. So clearly the words are not referring to the chemicals.

I feel like we're repeating ourselves here. I've admitted that there are feelings, qualia, that we experience. I've admitted no one knows quite how it works, including you. — GLEN willows

But if you want to say that the qualia are not different from the chemicals causing them then we DO know how they work pretty well.

Do you believe words like "hope" and love" describe real things? — GLEN willows

What else would they describe? "Not real things"? You admit they exist so I think the word "real" in "real things" here is redundant.

"....if what you're saying is true, we would have needed to have a good grasp of neurology before we even came up with words like "love" or "anger". But clearly that's not the case. So clearly the words are not referring to the chemicals."

Why? We didn't understand science back then, let alone neuroscience, so we made up words to describe what we were feeling. Again we've discussed folk psychology already right?

"But if you want to say that the qualia are not different from the chemicals causing them then we DO know how they work pretty well."

Saying we know qualia are part of the neurochemicals of the brain (which I think is clearly proven by the fact that altering the chemicals. or operating on the brain, changes the qualia) doesn't mean we know exactly how it works. It's like saying we know how a watch works by watching the hands move.

"What else would they describe? "Not real things"? You admit they exist so I think the word "real" in "real things" here is redundant."

I think we need to circle back and define our terms. When you say something is real, what do you mean? Or maybe I should say "exist."

Alrighty! So Davidson (and I think Spinoza before him?) seemed to want consciousness to be a real causal agent, but also somehow separate from the brain. Is that correct? These are his theses?

1. Mental events cause physical events.
2. All causal relationships are backed by natural laws.
3. There are no natural laws connecting mental phenomena with physical phenomena.

And they also argued for panpsychism?

Why? We didn't understand science back then, let alone neuroscience, so we made up words to describe what we were feeling. — GLEN willows

So the words describe feelings correct? Not chemicals? And those cannot be the same thing. Or else we would not have made words that refer to one and not the other. "Love" refers to a feeling, not a chemical, by virtue of the fact that we came up with the word without knowing what chemicals are.

If "Love" referred to a neurotransmitter, we would have needed to know what neurotransmitters were before coming up with the word correct? But since that's not the case "Love" must not refer to a neurotransmitter.

Saying we know qualia are part of the neurochemicals of the brain (which I think is clearly proven by the fact that altering the chemicals. or operating the brain, changes the qualia) — GLEN willows

That doesn't follow. If I have a machine that makes ice-cream, and I change the settings of the machine to make different ice cream, that doesn't mean the ice cream is part of the machine. Now replace "Machine" with "Brain" and "Ice-cream" with "Qualia". Terrible example probably but I'm about to have lunch so I don't wanna spend too much time on this.

doesn;t mean we know exactly how it works. — GLEN willows

But if qualia are no more than chemicals, then we do know exactly how they work no?

When you say something is real, what do you mean? Real like a table? Real like a unicorn? Real like a character from a book? — GLEN willows

Real like a table.

We came up with many words without knowing the science behind them, come on.

So are you saying if you use a word and describe it as a thing, that means it exists?

And if love is real like a table, then it must have material substance, right?

And if love is real like a table, then it must have material substance, right? — GLEN willows

No. Though that's exactly what a materialist would say!

But first off, what do you mean by "material substance". Because as I said all the way at the beginning the category seems to just keep widening and widening. Must we be able to touch and see the thing for it to be a material substance?

You seem to think that's a bad word Lol!

So you don't mean real like a table? A table has material substance. We already discussed what material substance means. But regardless, you said love is real like a TABLE, which you can touch. Can I touch love?

Sorry I added a bit to the last comment so...

"We already discussed what material substance means. But regardless, you said love is real like a TABLE, which you can touch. Can I touch love?"

I say yes to all your assertions. They are reasons to see it as repugnant, but not reasons to reject the theory. — GLEN willows

I am not rejecting it whatsoever, of course. I consider it, in its strongest form as technically irrefutable and rejecting it is as fallacious as conjecturing it. I was just pointing out that since as a hypothesis it already has consequences, as a conjecture (or more boldly assertion) people will be divided on how strongly they subscribe to that theory. Essentially, I am trying to remain skeptical, but not indifferent, to consistent propositions that we can neither inductively confirm, nor refute. It is a slightly hypocritical position, because honestly, I have my partialities. But I keep them at bay for the discussions herein.

Awesome response thanks. I may have run across an argument against solipsism myself, and more broadly against any "unrefutable" theory. Someone could argue "I have a theory that states there's an invisible intangible giant blob of jello floating above my head. Can you prove thats not true?" And you couldn't, given the conditions stated. So that shows an argument can be irrefutable while at the same time being just plain ridiculous (you might decide to avoid that person in the future however).

But my contention is that many phil. theories THEMSELVES lead to solipsism. I've read more than once "if Descartes (or anybody's) theory of the existence of the world is wrong, you're left with a solipsistic void." It implies failure. Yet if there really isn't an outside world, but there IS an inside world, a la the cogito, then how is that NOT solipsism?

Anyway, I respect your opinion, and I could be wrong. Good nice Canadian response huh?

So the words describe feelings correct? Not chemicals? And those cannot be the same thing. Or else we would not have made words that refer to one and not the other. "Love" refers to a feeling, not a chemical, by virtue of the fact that we came up with the word without knowing what chemicals are. — khaled

You could say we all are oversimplifying the brain function, and that neuroscientists are incapable of capturing enough signals therein. You could rightfully criticize that we are making conjectures stemming from the materialist explanation of reality, because of its utility to society. But you have very strong impartial commitments on the issue yourself. The synaptic connections that produce the person's neurological attitudes, including the emotion of love if they presently have such attachment, are one thing, and the synaptic connections that describe the person's conceptualization of love in the abstract, removed from their present emotion, in words or as notion, with self-deprecating generality, are a different thing. Feedback and self-learning by circular neurological pathways ("stored-program computer" style, but more elaborate) should be possible, at least theoretically. Another type of self-reference that supplements it is the indirect effect from observation of patterns of behavior and produced results. And finally, these days, inspection of the matter in the brain through artificial devices produces a more literal form of self-reflection through an external auxiliary loop, resulting in neuroscience itself. But the important point is, in principle, the states in the brain describing self-awareness would be distinct from the states that encode the emotions. The emotion, and the notion of that emotion (and conceptualization), could (probably somewhat impatiently we conjecture "would") relate to each other through neurological feedback, but need not have parapsychological mediation in the process. Honestly, we have no reason to think that it does not, but assigning value to different hypotheses in a pragmatic world is a style and an art.

But my contention is that many phil. theories THEMSELVES lead to solipsism. — GLEN willows

Having the least amount of presuppositions is the most rationally correct approach, indeed. But it is also the least useful in practice, and philosophy, albeit the most abstract of sciences, still has some interest in its utility in the pragmatic sense. It is very important philosophically to explain what the assumptions are and to investigate their significance, so I am not dismissive of solipism at all, but extreme reductionism results in absurdism. Ultimately, everything lies on some amount of blind conviction. For philosophical purposes, I contest even "cogito ergo sum" (even though I wont go there, because I know I will sound delirious), but like Hume, I don't live that way.

"I am not dismissive of solipism at all, but extreme reductionism results in absurdism"

Can you explain what you mean?

You seem to think that's a bad word Lol! — GLEN willows

Not really. Just want to know how you use it.

We already discussed what material substance means. — GLEN willows

No we haven't which is why I'm asking. Does we have to be able to see and touch the thing for it to be "material substance"? What are the exact properties of a "material substance"?

But regardless, you said love is real like a TABLE, which you can touch. Can I touch love? — GLEN willows

The options you gave me were: Table, Unicorn, or Fictional Character.

I didn't pick table because of touchability, I picked it because the other two don't exist (aka aren't real).

There are plenty of things that are real that you cannot touch. For example: Quantum wave functions. And emotions.

Sure but I don't see what that has to do with anything. The emotion of love is represented differently in the brain from the concept of love. Ok.... Now what?

We have gone over these things, why I think QM exists (testing), our differing opinions on qualia, and your frustration over what you see as the expanding definition of "material." All good discussions and I appreciate the exchange, I really do. But I really think we've covered it...and anyway I'm sure these will come up in later discussions. Right at this moment I have to go to bed. Great meeting you and great chatting. Hope to do it again.

how could anyone argue that consciousness ISN'T simply an integral aspect of the material brain - DESPITE the fact that the can't be explained scientifically? If they aren't - where are they? Isn't this still hopeless dualism — GLEN willows

the whole belief in a separate consciousness is based on folk psychology — GLEN willows

I'm quite sure you have this backwards. The reason you confound doctrinal materialism with brain physiological oriented scientism is to pretend to an explanation for the only thing we can be certain of, our selves.

I don't believe in dualism - b/c of the interaction problem. — GLEN willows

And that's the crux of the problem of dualism, we don't know how to logically relate our selves to a barely comprehensible illusory outside world with any of our theories. We are inventing absurd explanations out of ignorance.

But is this at all necessary? Isn't it possible that dualist hypotheses with connectivity CAN be constructed without anyone asking but where is this theory in space and how can I grasp it with my fingers?

Sure but I don't see what that has to do with anything. The emotion of love is represented differently in the brain from the concept of love. Ok.... Now what? — khaled

The point was that you appear to think of two different references "the feeling of love" and "the synaptic activation of love" as referring to different phenomena, because they are differently expressed. I was remarking that this is not necessarily so. If it is correct that self-reflection manifests as a second order mental activity in a separate set of synaptic connections, there could be any number of synaptic expressions (and linguistic expressions) referring to the one unique original mental process, if those references are produced through different congnitive loops - internal cerebral loop, sensory loop of immediate observation of behavior, sensory loop of aided observation of the underlying physical causes. You are essentially asking, how can "the king" and "Arthur" refer to the same thing, if obviously they embody different ideas. That is because the same referrent is designated through different perspectives. And, if my neuroscience hypothesis is correct, those perspectives are second-order synaptic expressions, different from each other and the expression of the original phenomena, but amorphous. As a side note, not all animals can come to the realization that they are their image in the mirror. (Edit: I meant, that they are the object perceived through the image in the mirror. I hope that we wont have to start an argument over the semantics of the "image".) Thus, understanding that multiple references acquired though different cognitive pathways have the same referrent is an evolved feature of select number of species. (I think dolphins and guerillas or chimps, I am not sure.)

But is this at all necessary? Isn't it possible that dualist hypotheses with connectivity CAN be constructed without anyone asking but where is this theory in space and how can I grasp it with my fingers? — magritte

I would claim that if a proposition is not elaborated in terms that can be experienced, witnessed somehow, we cannot truly call it a hypothesis. I concur that it may be presumptive to insist that the terms refer to material aspects of life, but if they do not, the only way in which the proposition can be corroborated (on earth anyway) is through spontaneous agreement of intuition. Which doesn't appear to be all that effective for the philosophy on dualism, because it remains a divisive subject. If the proposition is not elaborated, it can be part of the discourse, in the positive or in the negative, but since it cannot be asserted even in principle, it is not a hypothesis. Second, a theist or a spiritualist is not claiming a hypothesis, but making a conjecture, even an assertion. According to my views, even materialists do that all the time - make conjectures based on unproven assumptions - but they are at least compelled to do so from emancipated forces in the external world. (And I don't mean just empirical evidence, but also sustained practices, biological dispositions.) I fail to see the motivation of a dualist to decide against the other choices - solipsism, intersubjective idealism, panpsychism and pantheism and claim dualism in particular. There doesn't seem to be enough particular arguments for it stemming from experience, in contrast to the other choices. It appears to be based on personal bias. Thirdly, if a hypothesis of dualism makes no physically tangible claims, then I fail to see how it distinguishes its description even conceptually from solipsism. I am not saying that all variants are like that. But certain flavors of dualism, particularly theistic dualism, are not even trying to be definite. (They rely on an "either you get it, or you don't" style of persuasion. Granted, life is like that in the end, based on intuition, but apparently the message does not translate well to everybody, so we have a problem for the philosophical debate.)

how could anyone argue that consciousness ISN'T simply an integral aspect of the material brain - DESPITE the fact that the can't be explained scientifically? If they aren't - where are they? Isn't this still hopeless dualism.

Your comments later in your post seem to suggest that you don't think that dualism is a problem. That tells me your definition of 'proof" differs from mine and most philosophers, I would wager.

— GLEN willows

the whole belief in a separate consciousness is based on folk psychology
— GLEN willows

Are you familiar with the phrase "folk psychology" as used by Patricia Churchland?

"I'm quite sure you have this backwards. The reason you confound doctrinal materialism with brain physiological oriented scientism is to pretend to an explanation for the only thing we can be certain of, our selves."

You could be making a good point it here, just not really getting it - my bad. Could you rephrase it a bit?

"But is this at all necessary? Isn't it possible that dualist hypotheses with connectivity CAN be constructed without anyone asking but where is this theory in space and how can I grasp it with my fingers?"

So are you saying a connection between mind and body can exist without any empirical proof?

Thanks for this

"It appears to be based on personal bias. Thirdly, if a hypothesis of dualism makes no physically tangible claims, then I fail to see how it distinguishes its description even conceptually from solipsism."

I'd be a little less polite and add "...or how it distinguishes its description even conceptually from..." ANY theory with no proof, including any conspiracy theory you could concoct. ps - I will NOT discuss that topic here, just using it to make a point.

Presumably you think that mental states are brain states?

What evidence do you have for this?

Imagine I have a metal detector. It detects metal really well. No matter how well it detects metal, that isn't evidence that everything - including the metal detector - is metal, is it?

So, we have science - science investigates the sensible world and it does so very well. But it would be silly to conclude on that basis that therefore everything is sensible.

Perhaps you will point out that brain states have been found to be strongly correlated to mental states. Okay, but the flashing and bleeping that my metal detector makes is strongly correlated to there being metal in its vicinity, but that is not evidence that the flashing and beeping are metal.

Perhaps you will say that, nevertheless, as we have been so successful at finding metal, and lots of things turn out to be made of metal (though to be honest, all the things that turn out to be made of metal appeared to be made of metal in the first place, all the metal detector did is tell us more about the metal) we should have as our working hypothesis that the metal detector itself is made of metal, indeed that by default everything is until we know better.

But even if that's true - and it isn't - it would be perverse to insist that something is metal that positively appears not to be. I mean, if you insist that something of that kind is metal, then all you've done is show that you are a dogmatist in possession of an unfalsifiable thesis.

Yet that's how things are with our minds and their mental states. They do not begin to appear to be sensible objects, and mental states do not appear to be states of a sensible thing.

Sensible objects have colours, shapes, sizes, smells, tastes. But my reason assures me that it is positively confused to think of my mind as having any of these qualities. So my mind does not appear to be a sensible object. It may still be, of course, for appearances are sometimes deceptive, including rational appearances. But where's the evidence? We cannot have - on pain of a radical and inescapable scepticism - as a working hypothesis that appearances are deceptive until we have reason to think otherwise. The reverse is true: we have resaon to think that appearances are accurate until we have reason to think otherwise. But if we listen to our reason and not convention, it tells us loud and clear that our minds are not sensible objects.

My reason also tells me that I have free will, yet tells me at the same time that I would not have free will - not of the robust responsibility-grounding kind that it insists I have - if everything about me traces to external causes. Yet if I were a sensible object, everything about me would trace to external causes. So my reason tells me, once more, that I - my mind, that is - am not a sensible object.

And on and on it goes - there are loads of these arguments (I think I have about 14). They're not decisive, admittedly. But each one counts for something - each one is some evidence, prima facie evidence, that our minds are not sensible objects.

What countervailing evidence do you have that our minds are sensible objects?

Hi Bartricks - if you read my opening post I positioned myself as a rooky philosopher, and my goal here is to learn (i.e. keep an open mind).

So my delivery might be a little rough, bear with me. Ok...first off I'll say that as a student of philosophy and science, both, I'm surprised at how little stock philosophers seem to put in the science involved with brain injuries and operations - including split-brain operations. In all of these, damage to the brain directly affects qualia. Can you explain that?

When you say "sensible object" you seem to mean something tangible, that can be touched. Is that correct? If so, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that qualia are clearly part of the brain and not separate "things" - either sensible or metaphysical.

...part 2

Bartricks: My reason also tells me that I have free will, yet tells me at the same time that I would not have free will - not of the robust responsibility-grounding kind that it insists I have - if everything about me traces to external causes.

most philosophers don't believe free will is possible, using THEIR reason (to use your words) so that point is debatable to begin with.

Bartricks: I would not have free will - not of the robust responsibility-grounding kind that it insists I have - if everything about me traces to external causes.

Why do you say this? What's your proof of that? If we have free will, but it IS part of the brain, what would the difference be?

I'd be a little less polite and add "...or how it distinguishes its description even conceptually from..." ANY theory with no proof, including any conspiracy theory you could concoct. ps - I will NOT that discuss that topic here, just using it to make a point. — GLEN willows

Some variants of dualism might be ontically distinguishable, albeit not in a way that can be corroborated. The differences might not be detectable on earth or might be perceivable only through the lenses of hypothetical psychic observer. I accept such notions, because like with solipsism, there is difference between the version of the proposed reality therein and the conventional ones, even if it fails to project into sensory experience. Such description is still irrefutable. I insisted originally that there are different categories of questions that we could ask to distinguish one theory from the rest - ontic, epistemic, ethical and antropological. Some are distinguishable only through some of these questions, but to me, all should be distinguishable in an unambiguous manner as ontic descriptions or they are synonyms to another theory.

Some other caveats can demerit my earlier criticisms of dualism. You asked me, why we choose materialism over solipsism in practice. Those are not ontically equivalent theories, in effect, because of the solitude vs material coexistence issue, but they are epistemically indistinguishable, so we cannot really choose between them. But because they are producing different view on the virtues of other pursuits - moral pedagogy, the scientific method - we are implicitly committing to one or the other when following those pursuits. This presents another question. Facing the many hypotheses, some of them will be adopted in practice. They will become evident when we implement institutions like prescriptive ethics, the scientific discourse, the political discourse, etc, without actually discarding the alternative theories in principle. This is slightly different then what is happening in the physical sciences, where some objective criteria can be used to select between equivalent models of the empirical data. Criteria not involving the descriptive power of the theory (accuracy, completeness). The obvious pragmatic virtues of minimalism and simplicity can justify making a theory canonical or even dogmatic. Then, the less obvious quality of continuity from previous theories can also make such difference. I am mentioning this practice of arbitration, because since philosophy tackles more complex aspects, additional criteria are in play, such as ethical neutrality, purposefulness, etc. These are not arguments of the validity and soundness of the theory, but rather factors that decide whether society adopts the stance of its hypothesis when committing social energy. Hence, dualists can argue that their views, when compatible with the observed world and sufficiently clearly explained, should be chosen for their socio-political effects (ethically pedagoic and therapeutic qualities).

Another caveat that I should mention, which I already did in a recent thread, is that empiricism relies on intuitive convictions. Namely, in the soundness of reason (logic applies to the world), the objectivity of the sensory experience (we can corroborate and attest to empirical statements), the applicability of the inductive method (proper natural laws exist, i.e. reproduciblity remains consistent over time), the utility of statistics (statistical methods of inference are net positive effect to decision making at large). Within the materialist worldview these can be explained by Darwinism. The explanation has to be that the aptitude relying on those intuitions has supported the sustenance of the utilizing subjects and the inability or disinclination to use those instruments has resulted in some categorical extinction. Thus, like Hume, we cannot rationally or empirically justify the correctness of empiricism (even though we confirm it case by case through satisfactory outcomes), but we are compelled with innate conviction to rely on it, because this is our survival programming and nature's implicit answer. A non-empiricist, non-materialist, such as a dualist, would rightfully object that the disparagement of dualism is focused on its irrefutable presuppositions, whereas the blind convictions of empiricism get a free pass. There are multiple arguments that can defend the empirical perspective, but they are unfortunately frail. First, the scientific method is at least retrospectively confirmable, whereas certain kinds of dualism are completely untestable. This relies on the idea that precedent evidence is valuable, which a dualist might object as another inductive assertion. We could argue that the scientific method's intuitions are more compelling, literally, in the physical sense, in the Darwinian sense, in the biological sense, since they are not inferred, but are conferred by irrepressible external forces or inherited as irrepressible instincts for survival. Here, a dualist, especially a theist or spiritualist, could claim that their private beliefs are equally irrepressible for them and just cannot be conveyed logically. That doesn't exonerate ambiguity in my opinion, but for beliefs that are at least definite, each presupposition can be defended with a sense of irrepressible faith. This style of defense depends on the subjects ability to discern cognitive bias from inherent knowledge, which I doubt anyone can do. That is why I recommend at least skepticism on all matters of ideology, rather then unshaking devotion and commitment. Unfortunately, there is little more that can be said on the subject. We should barely hope that our collective efforts are in sensible agreement (fat chance) and we don't act counterproductively.