My contention is that, in the Philosophical Investigations (3rd Ed.), Wittgenstein ("Witt") is ultimately making a point about the individual ethics (virtue) of our philosophical methods. My claim is that he is advocating how to proceed from our individual position in a way that is rigorous, thorough, reflective, considerate, and rational in the face of our feeling that there is no other way to start than with the goal of certainty imposed on a universal theory of reason--a metaphysical or positivist solution to skepticism which removes any obligation by us (philosophers and general humanity).

As an Ordinary Language Philosopher ("OLP”, explained in another post of that name), Wittgenstein is using the method of imagining examples, in context, of what we say about, for example: meaning, intending, mental processes, etc. (either in what he says, or in the words of his positivist Interlocutor), so that the reader might see for themselves the subsequent claims he makes of what are our ordinary criteria (roughly, how it works/what it implies) for those words/terms (he will call them Begriffen—translated as “Concepts”—but they are not concepts, like “ideas”). This is not a “theory of language”, but a method for insight into ourselves.

A lot of modern philosophy is still stuck between Descartes’ realizations and the Enlightenment's confidence, striving for a logical, rational, scientific certainty. It assumes a relation between us and “reality”, or “meaning”, and then pictures how philosophy can ensure communication or (moral) action (or doesn't care anymore). What Witt sees is that this desire to solve skepticism with knowledge, ahead of the moment where we are in a situation where things break down, is the fear of the human—their uncertainty, failings, irresponsibility, lack of ability to agree—to skip over any part we might have, in order to have an answer for our doubts, or a method that provides certainty, say, that is a justified theoretical picture of meaning, language, and human action.

I would classify Wittgenstein with Descartes and Hume as those who begin their investigation of moral judgements from their (an individual’s) position, although OLP is making a universal claim for all of us, verified by your ability to also see it (as I discuss in my other post). Because the inquiry starts with our first impressions and unexamined assumptions, it is naturally going to be involved in confusions and false starts. In pointing out the directions that do not work for philosophy and revealing its illusions and traps, Wittgenstein is not saying what does work is going to be any easier or clear (like that language is now justified by agreement). Anyone mistaking this initial position as certainty or universality, apart from the need to dig deeper and see our own faults, runs the risk of being prejudiced, arrogant, ideological, or dogmatic (as you may see in the quotes below, Witt is sensitive to the pitfalls in the face of skepticism, possibly from his being Jewish and a homosexual fighting in the war against fascism).

But avoiding the forced perspective, to dictate the terms of our knowledge, is to take upon ourselves an ethical obligation in our search to understand; conducting better philosophy by being a better person, seeing ourselves as part of the work. Witt points out we must avoid what we are inclined to do in the face of human limitation:

[They] want to say there can't be any vagueness...the ideal 'must' be found in reality. Meanwhile [they] do not as yet see how it occurs there, nor do [they] understand the nature of this 'must'. [They] think it must be in reality; for [they] think [they] already see it there. — Wittgenstein, PI #101 (my emphasis in bold)

(I changed 'we' to 'they' so the passage can be read in terms of Witt’s characterization of what those who desire certainty (they) want.)

Following his investigation of a myriad of imaginings and examples of when people say: ideal, perfection, purity (#107), concrete, reality, must, etc., Witt is making a claim that people misconstrue our concepts in desiring certainty. The “must” here being our demand upon our knowledge for logic/certainty (an ideal without vagueness); “reality” is what we imbue with this certainty (as justified, etc.); and the “how” is by projection of our ideal as “reality”. We jump to the conclusion that our narcissistic projection of what is ideal (certain) is a part of the world, called “reality”. But notice (through my highlights) that it is only something we “want” to say, something we are compelled to want, but only inclined to do, and that we need not go down that road. That we could see how this compulsion works, but we have not “as yet” turned to look at what is occurring (in ourselves). We “think” we see the certainty we want in reality, in the sense that we imagine it as a quality of the world.

Witt is wrestling with (even within himself) staying open-minded and paying attention to the particulars.

...we [philosophers] do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough. — Wittgenstein, PI p. 212 (all emphasis added)

After many examples of what we imply when we say “seeing”, Witt is admonishing us not to take our first impression as correct; not to equate “seeing” with “understanding”, as if both always happen right away.

An example of this is when philosophers do a reading of another philosopher. Some people take Wittgenstein as making statements, rather than claims contingent on your following along. Worse, some people grab at words and their first impression of what they take as theoretical propositions, and jump to conclusions or dismiss him altogether based on their assumptions or, worse, the preconceived objectives they have no intention of changing. Are these people just innocently misunderstanding? Could the reason they jump to that end be harmful or dangerous as well?

The forms of expression we use [are (see note)] designed for a God, who knows what we cannot know... we lack the effective power... — Wittgenstein, PI #426

We "cannot know" and lack "power", unless we think we ARE a god---the important part being what I left out: I substituted [are] for what in the text is really “seems to have been" (emphasis added), and who does it “seem” to? someone who conjures up pictures that “fix the sense unambiguously” (ibid). Witt discusses 'aspect-blindness' (p. 213 PI) as a descriptive analogy of the inability of some people to see the aspect of humanity in others (having an attitude to them that they have a soul, p. 178); to wish that knowledge could replace our relation and responsibility, answerability, to the Other.

But Witt says (I take it, here, personally, seriously):

In… actual use...we go by sideroads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed. — Wittgenstein, PI #426

Maybe he is too naive; the highway straight to certain knowledge is closed for humans, but not people who think they are gods, with their omnipotence and power to create (reality/theories of rationality) and to destroy (our human condition of responsibility in the face of our knowledge’s limitations); or maybe using the straight highway makes others inhuman to us, making us inhuman(e), unethical in our search for knowledge.

So Witt is imploring us to "go by side roads”; to look first (rather than “see” immediately what you want) and investigate how everything (every “concept”) works differently (and in each “use” Witt says) with each situation (with a context which may need to be drawn out to the extent that matters) seen as an event (in time, with a history, as Nietzsche’s examples teach us).

More than knowledge or an idea of rationality, a philosopher needs virtue (as Cicero and Aristotle and Emerson will call it). They need reasonableness and to be understanding (rather than assume they understand at first glance); to see someone and their writing (and their terms) from their point of view (empathetic reading), as it relates internally to itself, rather than whitewashing that relation just because words can make sense without a context. In “What is Called Thinking?”, Hedeigger talks of letting the thing come to us (hearing its “call” to us), rather than grasping at it (as Emerson will say is our most unhandsome part ) with our criteria for what we want it to be, particularly negatively so we can refute/dismiss/ignore it. Is any philosopher always right? If not, is there then nothing to be learned from them? (Marx, Hegel, Heidegger, early Wittgenstein?)

Dogmatism in philosophy, along with ideology in politics, cuts off the investigation and conversation before they can even begin. In learning about each other, we learn about, and better, ourselves.