My point is, it is a reasonable line of inquiry, and that's all I ever claimed it to be Tim. There is always that which is implicit within the explicit. Background assumptions are vast. I very clearly did demarcate where my reasoning extended out from Collingwood's, so you can appreciate where I would be a little sensitive to the imputation of mischaracterization.

the idea that "absolute presuppositions are basically beliefs that function in a certain way," is as close to being dead wrong while still breathing as you can get — tim wood

This is dead wrong. Per the critical piece I cited. It is a reasonable line of inquiry within the parameters of Collingwood's writings, which do not extend that far, but certainly don't contradict the position.

There's nothing wrong with being wrong, only in not learning from it.....

Ah, no. R.G. Collingwood's (RGC) ideas on metaphysics are simple and powerful. It is a shame to misunderstand them and get them wrong. At the same time they also have that quality of newness that makes any idea first encountered seem a little strange until got used to. And it is a challenge to capture them in short summary. — tim wood

You were the person who steered me toward Collingwood's essay a few years ago. I know it had a big impact on both of us. My first reaction when reading the original post in this thread was "No, that's not what Collingwood said at all." I was going to write something, but you got there first and what you wrote is better than mine would have been.

Which means I don't have to do anything. Yay!!

And just for good measure, here is from the Stanford Encyclopedia

Collingwood’s denial that absolute presuppositions have truth values informs a commitment to a kind of explanatory pluralism according to which the choice between different kinds of explanation does not depend on whether they capture pure being but on whether they are fit for purpose. He illustrates this explanatory pluralism by imagining a scenario in which a car stops while driving up a steep hill. As the driver stands by the side of the road a passerby, who happens to be a theoretical physicist offers his help. The car, he explains, has stopped because

the top of a hill is farther removed from the earth’s centre than its bottom and … consequently more power is needed to take the car uphill than to take her along the level. (EM 1998: 302)

A second passerby (who happens to be an Automobile Association man) proffers a different explanation: he holds up a loose cable and says “Look here, Sir, you are running on three cylinders” (EM 1998: 303). The first explanation invokes the sense of causation that belongs to the theoretical sciences of nature, sense III. The second explanation invokes the sense of causation that belongs to the practical sciences of nature, sense II. The choice between these explanations, for Collingwood is determined by the nature of the question asked. As he puts it:

If I had been a person who could flatten out hills by stamping on them the passerby would have been right to call my attention to the hill as the cause of the stoppage; not because the hill was a hill but because I was able to flatten it out. (EM 1998: 303)


In other words, the absolute presupposition is distinguished specifically with respect to its possible enaction, which is exactly what my whole OP revolves around.

The letters are black, the page is white, yes, that's black letter.

Confusing - conflating - belief and presupposition in RGC's thinking simply a mistake. — tim wood

What I got out of the essay, whether or not Collingwood actually meant it that way, is that people are likely not to be aware of the suppositions underpinning their beliefs. That lack of awareness leads to misunderstanding and disagreement that are almost insurmountable.

And just for good measure, here is from the Stanford Encyclopedia — Pantagruel

You seem a person who wants a pulpit to preach from, but without interest in the Bible, usually regarded as heresy. Which is odd because apparently you own a copy. If you cannot nor will not get it into your head that beliefs and presuppositions are not the same thing at all, then you don't get it.

On the other hand, if you just wish to depart from presuppositions, then it's at least appropriate to make the departure itself and the point of departure plain. But maybe we can get to essentials here.

I think RGC would accept the argument that any science is built up on a foundation of what he calls absolute presuppositions. And these, as you now perfectly well, are not questioned as to their truth, but are instead the conditions of the truth of the science that uses them, cf, causation, mentioned above. Nor, usually, does the science make explicit what its absolute presuppositions are, and many scientists - certainly many instructors of science - don't even suspect there existence as such. Which permits the question to you: if science is beliefs, does that make beliefs (a) science? Do you hold that the two terms, are convertible?

f you cannot nor will not get it into your head that beliefs and presuppositions are not the same thing at all, then you don't get it. — tim wood

The SE interprets Absolute Presuppositions explicitly as being essentially operational beliefs from a very unambiguous example in the Essay on Metaphysics.

The beliefs may not be explicit, but the actions are. People may not know what they believe, but they do act. And when they act, they are "realizing" their fundamental beliefs, whatever those are...

Perhaps you are getting hung up on the terminology? I try to go with the "overall sense" within the context of the work.

very unambiguous example in the Essay on Metaphysics. — Pantagruel

Would you cite that for me, please? Or something similar? I just want to know what is being used as an unambiguous example of an absolute presupposition.

I’m wondering if I know it by another name, is all.

Thanks.

It is in the excerpt from the Standford Encyclopedia I posted, illustrating how absolute presuppositions link to 'performative belief.'

So I guess you want to explain that we can only have the belief hypothesis when some methods and objectives are actually true. — javi2541997

Not necessarily true, but belief requires a reason to believe. Like any form of memorizing, it requires effort, and effort is only made when there is a reason to make it.

What about people who hold irrational beliefs - say paranoid psychotic delusions - that couldn't possibly derive from some type of memory process (because such belief content lies outside of previous experience)? — emancipate

False memories are common. That's what I described as self-deception. When what you remember happened, contradicts what another person remembers to have happened, then one or both of you are wrong. But they are still memories, even if they are mistaken.

Metaphysical thinking is scientific and vice-versa; both are based upon and in search of absolute presuppositions. And an absolute presupposition is one which is actually believed as such. — Pantagruel

These are the absolute presuppositions Collingwood describes for science:



And this is what Collingwood says about them.



I think this shows the difference of what @tim wood, Collingwood, and I mean when we say absolute presupposition from what you do. It's not a fact. It's not true, but it's not false either. It has no truth value. If you want to call that a belief, ok, but it's misleading.

R.G. Collingwood's recasting of metaphysics from its Aristotelian origin suggests a kind of metaphysics of belief.

Collingwood describes how all thinking is analytical/experimental. Metaphysical thinking is scientific and vice-versa; both are based upon and in search of absolute presuppositions. And an absolute presupposition is one which is actually believed as such. — Pantagruel

I can't see how this relates to Aristotle's well-known hylomorphic (matter-form) dualism. The underlying logic of this metaphysics is that the mind knows the forms immediately through intellecual intuition. The form is in some sense the essence or what a particular thing truly is. When the intellect (nous) apprehends a form as a formal or logical truth, it does so in a way which is not mediated by the senses. The apprehension yields 'general truths' because universals subsume many particulars under a single form. And so on. None of which has anything much to say of beliefs, as such.

Like any form of memorizing, it requires effort, and effort is only made when there is a reason to make it — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. We have here the "hope" of wanting our live to improve. Everything needs an effort but previously we do need to have beliefs and then believe in... As you perfectly said previously.
More than a reason I guess is important how to perceive our feith. Sometimes hope and belief are upon the reason itself.
Probably the reason could say to you "do not do it because it is impossible" but the beielfs and feith say to you "let's do it we have another chance"

I think this shows the difference of what tim wood, Collingwood, and I mean when we say absolute presupposition from what you do. It's not a fact. It's not true, but it's not false either. It has no truth value. If you want to call that a belief, ok, but it's misleading. — T Clark

It's not. Collingwood is quite clear. It's a functional entity. Read the example from the Stanford Encyclopedia (which is from Essays in Metaphysics). Read the section of applicability to different schemas of physics. Whatever "absolute presuppositions" are, they are certainly real components of our psyche. If you don't like the word "beliefs" because of some connotations that you insist on applying to that term, I understand. They are "fundamental orientations" to which we are epistemically and practically committed.

My approach is outside the scope of his inquiry, but not contradictory. I would hope, both complementary and complimentary.

Let's lay the dispute about what is and isn't said by Collingwood to rest right here.

"the metaphysician discovers what absolute presuppositions have been made in a certain piece of scientific work by using the records of that work as evidence"

Absolute presuppositions are

1. held by individuals
2. have logical, epistemic and practical consequences with respect to specific inferences or actions

To me, this not only clearly belief, I would go so far as to say it exemplifies belief. It describes core or foundational beliefs, which are so fundamental that, by their very nature, they resist excavation. If you don't like my definition of belief, that's another matter. My post is predicated on this position. It represents an "absolute presupposition" of my conceptual framework. :)

The underlying logic of this metaphysics is that the mind knows the forms immediately through intellecual intuition. — Wayfarer

Collingwood takes Metaphysics to its Aristotelian origin, which literally simply meant "everything in his works which came after the writings on physics". His conception of metaphysics is from the "ground up" and doesn't pertain to this particular Aristotelian tenet. This is a red herring in the context of this thread. Read Chapter 1 of the Essay on Metaphysics.

“....the metaphysician’s business is not to propound them, but to propound the proposition that this or that of them is presupposed...”

These “absolute presuppositions” hold congruent with the categories, insofar as any ontological or epistemic proposition is grounded by them a priori, without exception.

1.) is necessity; 2.) is reality; 3.) is causality; 4.) is possibility.

Thanks, . That’s what I wanted, from Collingwood himself, not a reference which gives me examples of what they do but does not tell me what they are.

Collingwood's position is that the entire notion of ontology as a theory of pure being is erroneous and a mistake.

Agreed, as far as I give ontology any consideration at all.

“..... and the proud name of an ontology which professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding....”
(CPR, A247)

Yes. We have here the "hope" of wanting our live to improve. Everything needs an effort but previously we do need to have beliefs and then believe in... As you perfectly said previously.
More than a reason I guess is important how to perceive our feith. Sometimes hope and belief are upon the reason itself.
Probably the reason could say to you "do not do it because it is impossible" but the beielfs and feith say to you "let's do it we have another chance" — javi2541997

I've never seen the word "feith" before, and I'll assume that you mean "faith".

I believe it is very important, in any understanding of belief, which is not to be a misunderstanding, to apprehend the role of faith. Faith relates to the effort required to produce or create a belief. If we take belief for granted, as something which just naturally occurs without requiring effort, then we overlook the necessity of faith. From this perspective we'd have no approach to the cause of belief, thinking that beliefs just pop into existence spontaneously. But when we (correctly) see that belief requires effort, just like memorizing requires effort, then we can apprehend this effort as the cause of belief.

I think that faith relates to the effort required to produce belief. It is the confidence which we have in our efforts, that the efforts will produce results, be successful. But there is a real issue with losing faith, disillusionment, which happens if the goals start to appear as impossible, and the faith starts to look like a false faith. The significance of faith and effort, in the role of producing belief, is the reason why Plato associated belief, and intelligible objects in general, with "the good", rather than with "the truth". Assuming "x is good" leads to effort, while assuming "x is true" often leads to disillusionment.

I've never seen the word "feith" before, and I'll assume that you mean "faith".

@Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry. English is not my native language sometimes I make some grammar mistakes.

Yes I am agree with you. It is interesting how you you put feith previously to belief. I think you are right in this point. As much as we need the effort to improve our memory we need exactly faith to improve the beliefs. Here we see that the premises change again but to better.
We do the effort of having faith in x. Then, we start making a belief in x. Subsequently, "we believe in x"

So this is the chain which starts everything. I guess without feith nothing can starts.

I mean "faith" sorry I made the same mistake.

I think that faith relates to the effort required to produce belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Insofar as this might be interpreted as a fundamental commitment I'd agree. We don't just "get to believe" - there is more to it than that.

Thanks, ↪T Clark. That’s what I wanted, from Collingwood himself, — Mww

I suggest you read the paper. It's easily available on the web. It's long, but the part that means the most to me is in the beginning, so you don't have to read the whole thing.

My approach is outside the scope of his inquiry, but not contradictory. I would hope, both complementary and complimentary. — Pantagruel

To me, the most important insight of Collingwood's essay is that absolute presuppositions are not facts. They are not true or false. They are useful or not useful in the particular situation in which we find ourselves. As I see it, we choose absolute presuppositions, either consciously or, more likely, unconsciously. I'm not sure if Collingwood would agree with that.

If you leave that part out, as you seem to have, the whole thing falls apart.

To me, the most important insight of Collingwood's essay is that absolute presuppositions are not facts. They are not true or false. They are useful or not useful in the particular situation in which we find ourselves. — T Clark

Right. They are much more basic than facts. They constitute the viewpoints from which facts are perceived:

...different sets of absolute presuppositions correspond not only with differences in the structure of what is generally called scientific thought but with differences in the entire fabric of civilization.
(RGC, EM, ch 7, part 2)

Found it, thanks.

If I believe I am writing this now, how is that a memory? It may become a memory, but only because it was first a belief. — Pantagruel

You don't merely believe that you are writing ( if you are writing) you are aware of the fact; you know ( leaving aside ridiculous forms of skepticism) that you are writing. Later, when you remember that you were writing, the real (but seemingly unlikely) possibility that you have misremembered what you were actually aware of doing at the time comes into play. So, as I see it belief does not precede memory, but sustains it.

What I got out of the essay, whether or not Collingwood actually meant it that way, is that people are likely not to be aware of the suppositions underpinning their beliefs. That lack of awareness leads to misunderstanding and disagreement that are almost insurmountable. — T Clark

How could it make sense to deny that suppositions are beliefs?

The underlying logic of this metaphysics is that the mind knows the forms immediately through intellecual intuition. — Wayfarer

This, that the mind knows the forms immediately through intellectual intuition, is itself an "absolute presupposition" or in other words a foundational belief underpinning a worldview. If I hold this view, I believe in the veracity of what I take to be my intellectual intuition.

Spinoza also believed in intellectual intuition, and that underpins his whole philosophy, while Kant rejected the idea, and Hegel tried to resurrect it.