Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.
It seems you misunderstand the argument. It doesn't state that God and perfection are synonyms, rather it states he is the subject of all perfections. A perfection is a quality/predicate, and some perfections, such as existence, can also be asserted of things other than God.But I am! Is the greatest thing possible a person or a state?
You are right about that, one should prove that the idea of God is possible first.Amalac's argument has philosophical assumptions because not only is the existence of God not proven by his method but the idea of God being a real, consistent concept, has not even been truly defended.
It doesn't state that God and perfection are synonimous, rather it states he is the subject of all perfections. A perfection is a quality/predicate, and some perfections, such as existence, can also be asserted of things other than God. — Amalac
lookup Leibniz' proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible — Amalac
Like I said, the argument does not depend on that «experience», if you could tell me why you think it does, that would help.it is inherently impossible for the arguer, a human being, to have "a concrete personal experience of divine thinking.
What is the basis of this claim? The argument I mentioned (which is not Descartes', but anyway) holds that if existence and non-existence are predicates, and a subject of all perfections can be conceived, then it's non existence implies a logical contradiction. It has nothing to do with any «experience».Only the occurrence of such an impossible experience by a human being would constitute a legitimate, concrete verification of the existence of that abstract divine being which he falsely claims to be able to prove.
For most Eastern philosophy infinite perfection is a state that humans can attain.
and once again, I was refering to «perfection», not «God».I am not talking about «moral perfection», but rather, as I stated at the beggining of the argument, about: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.», or if you prefer: «A simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.». I am using the term «perfection» in this sense given by Leibniz. So no, I am not talking about a state one can attain.
But the subject of all perfection is God and that is core to your argument. Whether it is a reasonable philosophical concept in itself has not been defended by you.
You should provide the argument yourself in your own words instead of sending people on a goose hunt
Notice what you are defining here isn't «God», but rather «perfection» — Amalac
There is a difference between saying the subject of all perfections and the subject of all perfection — Amalac
If you are saying that maybe the subject of all perfections isn't a «person», that's fine, it may be something else. I have no interest to defend the notion of a personal God as is presented in many religions. — Amalac
I don't see what could be gained by me repeating what others have already expressed better than I can. — Amalac
2. If you think that is equivalent to the argument, which was formalized by the user «TheMadFool», then this is clearly a strawman.Your argument says "I can think of God so he exists"
3. First of all, I am not advocating the argument, I am only mentioning it. I don't think it's conclusive.It doesn't seem strange to you that you believe you can tweek that idea into proving a priori a being's existence?
The argument, if valid, would prove that the subject of all perfections exists, not that «perfection» exists. The subject of all perfections is not the same as those perfections. Once again, see the argument as stated by «TheMadFool».Yet you go on to define your argument as proving perfection, not a person.
(...)But why are you using the word God then?
I don't think it's conclusive. — Amalac
You may argue that it is impossible to prove the existence of anything a priori, — Amalac
The subject — Amalac
I never claimed it proves its conclusion (unless it's valid, which I don't claim), I only mentioned it because I wanted to see how people in a philosophy forum would refute it in order to clarify to what degree (if any) it is valid. I certainly don't rely on it nor advance it.So your argument proves exactly what then?
You have to provide an example of something proven a priori and one proven so conclusively
Subject doesn't mean person in your usage. So you're saying you can prove, but not conclusively, that something perfect exists but not necessarily a person. Is that your position? Again, I said it could be a state, but do you reject that? And on what grounds?
I don't reject that the subject of all perfections could be a state. — Amalac
Since Leibniz was a christian, he probably did. But I am not trying to defend what Leibniz says, I only borrowed some of his definitions, and his proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible.Leibniz tried to say a person was the subject of perfection. Again, are you only saying there is a perfection in the universe?
the existence of a «perfection», rather the existence of «the subject of all perfections». — Amalac
Source: Leibniz' Monadology«It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.»
your argument is false precisely because you do not recognize that it must depend upon that experience in order to be true.
The basis for this claim is that the Cogito Sum performance, when executed by a human being in the first person, present tense mode, would be able to prove the existence of a Necessary Being IF AND ONLY IF it had access to a kind of thinking which was inherently closed, rather than open, to the possibility of complete cessation (i.e., a necessary or divine, rather than a contingent or human, kind of thinking) --which, unfortunately for your argument, it does not have access to and never will. — charles ferraro
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