1. Either nonexistence is a mark of greatness OR Existence is a mark of greatness [premise]

Start at the beginning. Why would anyone accept this premise? It's not as if we have covered all the logical ground just by capitalising the disjunction, since maybe neither is a mark of greatness, since greatness, in the sense required by the argument, simply has no marks. The problem with all arguments for god's existence is that you need to give people more reason to accept the premises than to reject the conclusion, and that is an uphill struggle.

Let's see... if one admits that existence and non-existence are predicates, and that a subject of all perfections can be conceived, then said subject must either have the perfection of existence or that of non-existence.

Why? Because, unless we hold the view that the proposition «God exists» is neither true nor false, but meaningless/nonsensical, either the proposition «God exists» is true, or the proposition «God does not exist» is true.
Since «God exists» means, according to the argument, «The subject of all perfections exists», then if «God exists» is true, then necessarily existence, which is one of God's predicates, must be a perfection when it is asserted of God.

Likewise, if «God does not exist» is true, then the predicate «non existence» must be a perfection when it is asserted of God.

I forgot to respond to this statement of yours:

Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.

But if God is nothing and can't be anything at all, doesn't that imply that «God does not exist» is true? But I thought your view was that both «God exists» and «God does not exist» were meaningless, neither true nor false.

At any rate, if «God does not exist» is a true proposition, then non-existence must be a perfection and we get into the same difficulties.
Would you say the statement «The round square does not exist» is true, or would you say it is meaningless?

For most Eastern philosophy infinite perfection is a state that humans can attain. It's not a substance that your mind turns into a person, like you've been doing. You assume that moral perfection is different from virtue and you turn moral perfection into a substance and then into a person

Let me clarify (even thought I already did since my first post):

I am not talking about «moral perfection», but rather, as I stated at the beggining of the argument, about: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.», or if you prefer: «A simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.». I am using the term «perfection» in this sense given by Leibniz. So no, I am not talking about a state one can attain.

So no, I am not talking about a state one can attain. — Amalac

But I am! Is the greatest thing possible a person or a state? Your logic has assumptions

In order to defend your "argument" you have to prove there is something greater than human virtue and the rewards (since the human goal is happiness) of it. Prove something greater is even possible

Amalac's argument has philosophical assumptions because not only is the existence of God not proven by his method but the idea of God being a real, consistent concept, has not even been truly defended.

Technically you're correct.

But the whole point of my argument, which you are missing or ignoring, is that your type of exceedingly abstract argument, which is typical of the paradigm to which all traditional ontological arguments subscribe, completely misses the point that it is inherently impossible for the arguer, a human being, to have "a concrete personal experience of divine thinking." Only the occurrence of such an impossible experience by a human being would constitute a legitimate, concrete verification of the existence of that abstract divine being which he falsely claims to be able to prove.

But I am! Is the greatest thing possible a person or a state?

It seems you misunderstand the argument. It doesn't state that God and perfection are synonyms, rather it states he is the subject of all perfections. A perfection is a quality/predicate, and some perfections, such as existence, can also be asserted of things other than God.
Perhaps you think I hold that view because I mentioned Aquinas' idea that God is, literally, truth; but I mentioned it only to point out to the user I was responding to that his conception of God is not the only possible one, I don't hold that Aquinas is right or wrong nor am I defending his views.

Amalac's argument has philosophical assumptions because not only is the existence of God not proven by his method but the idea of God being a real, consistent concept, has not even been truly defended.

You are right about that, one should prove that the idea of God is possible first.

If you want to read a proof (or at least attempt of proof) of that, lookup Leibniz' proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible (the one he showed to Spinoza).

It doesn't state that God and perfection are synonimous, rather it states he is the subject of all perfections. A perfection is a quality/predicate, and some perfections, such as existence, can also be asserted of things other than God. — Amalac

But the subject of all perfection is God and that is core to your argument. Whether it is a reasonable philosophical concept in itself has not been defended by you. Instead:

lookup Leibniz' proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible — Amalac

You should provide the argument yourself in your own words instead of sending people on a goose hunt

it is inherently impossible for the arguer, a human being, to have "a concrete personal experience of divine thinking.

Like I said, the argument does not depend on that «experience», if you could tell me why you think it does, that would help.

Only the occurrence of such an impossible experience by a human being would constitute a legitimate, concrete verification of the existence of that abstract divine being which he falsely claims to be able to prove.

What is the basis of this claim? The argument I mentioned (which is not Descartes', but anyway) holds that if existence and non-existence are predicates, and a subject of all perfections can be conceived, then it's non existence implies a logical contradiction. It has nothing to do with any «experience».

Your argument says "I can think of God so he exists". It doesn't seem strange to you that you believe you can tweek that idea into proving a priori a being's existence?

1. You said

For most Eastern philosophy infinite perfection is a state that humans can attain.

Notice what you are defining here isn't «God», but rather «perfection»

Then I replied:

I am not talking about «moral perfection», but rather, as I stated at the beggining of the argument, about: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.», or if you prefer: «A simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.». I am using the term «perfection» in this sense given by Leibniz. So no, I am not talking about a state one can attain.

and once again, I was refering to «perfection», not «God».

But the subject of all perfection is God and that is core to your argument. Whether it is a reasonable philosophical concept in itself has not been defended by you.

The subject of all perfections (plural) is how God is defined in the argument. There is a difference between saying the subject of all perfections and the subject of all perfection.
If you are saying that maybe the subject of all perfections isn't a «person», that's fine, it may be something else. I have no interest to defend the notion of a personal God as is presented in many religions.

You should provide the argument yourself in your own words instead of sending people on a goose hunt

It is not about «sending people on a goose hunt», I said merely that if you want to see a defense of the possibility of God's idea you can look it up, if you don't care about it, then don't look it up, that's fine.
Now, I could present his proof (or attempt at proof) with my own words, but it would not be as clear or as detailed as what Leibniz presented. I don't see what could be gained by me repeating what others have already expressed better than I can.

Notice what you are defining here isn't «God», but rather «perfection» — Amalac

Yet you go on to define your argument as proving perfection, not a person

There is a difference between saying the subject of all perfections and the subject of all perfection — Amalac

Is there?

If you are saying that maybe the subject of all perfections isn't a «person», that's fine, it may be something else. I have no interest to defend the notion of a personal God as is presented in many religions. — Amalac

Then all you are trying to prove is that perfection exist. I wouldn't argue that it does. But why are you using the word God then?

I don't see what could be gained by me repeating what others have already expressed better than I can. — Amalac

Because you are trying to present a proof and the core of the argument hasn't been presented. Now we know you are talking about perfection existing instead of a being. Maybe you need to explain what "perfection exists" means in the sense you speak of

Your argument says "I can think of God so he exists"

2. If you think that is equivalent to the argument, which was formalized by the user «TheMadFool», then this is clearly a strawman.

It doesn't seem strange to you that you believe you can tweek that idea into proving a priori a being's existence?

3. First of all, I am not advocating the argument, I am only mentioning it. I don't think it's conclusive.

Second, it doesn't seem strange to me (and even if it did, that's irrelevant). You may argue that it is impossible to prove the existence of anything a priori, but it is not enough to state that it is, you should also say why you think that is so, unless you don't care enough to do it.

Yet you go on to define your argument as proving perfection, not a person.

The argument, if valid, would prove that the subject of all perfections exists, not that «perfection» exists. The subject of all perfections is not the same as those perfections. Once again, see the argument as stated by «TheMadFool».

(...)But why are you using the word God then?

Because God is defined as the subject of all perfections in the argument, which is what it intends to prove, not «perfection».

I don't think it's conclusive. — Amalac

So your argument proves exactly what then?

You may argue that it is impossible to prove the existence of anything a priori, — Amalac

You have to provide an example of something proven a priori and one proven so conclusively

The subject — Amalac

Subject doesn't mean person in your usage. So you're saying you can prove, but not conclusively, that something perfect exists but not necessarily a person. Is that your position? Again, I said it could be a state, but do you reject that? And on what grounds?

As for the difference between «the subject of all perfections» and «the subject of all perfection», with the latter definition you are trying to equate God with perfection, and also seem to imply that there is only one perfection, which is not what the argument states.

Leibniz tried to say a person was the subject of perfection. Again, are you only saying there is a perfection in the universe?

So your argument proves exactly what then?

I never claimed it proves its conclusion (unless it's valid, which I don't claim), I only mentioned it because I wanted to see how people in a philosophy forum would refute it in order to clarify to what degree (if any) it is valid. I certainly don't rely on it nor advance it.

You have to provide an example of something proven a priori and one proven so conclusively

That is what the argument is trying to do.

Subject doesn't mean person in your usage. So you're saying you can prove, but not conclusively, that something perfect exists but not necessarily a person. Is that your position? Again, I said it could be a state, but do you reject that? And on what grounds?

1. Yes, I mean subject as in «subject-predicate».

2. I never claimed I can prove anything, I only mentioned an argument that might, if valid, prove that God, defined as the subject of all perfections, exists. It is purely due to intellectual curiosity and epistemological interest.

3. I don't reject that the subject of all perfections could be a state.

I don't reject that the subject of all perfections could be a state. — Amalac

Ok. I asked that several times and now I have an answer. I think your argument works in a certain sense, in the sense of being consistent with the system of Hegel. (see: https://www.amazon.com/Hegel-Proofs-Personhood-God-Philosophy/dp/019879522X)

It doesn't prove anything a priori outside the mind imo. It proves something about the mind

Leibniz tried to say a person was the subject of perfection. Again, are you only saying there is a perfection in the universe?

Since Leibniz was a christian, he probably did. But I am not trying to defend what Leibniz says, I only borrowed some of his definitions, and his proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible.

But once again, the argument, if valid, does not prove the existence of a «perfection», rather the existence of «the subject of all perfections».

the existence of a «perfection», rather the existence of «the subject of all perfections». — Amalac

Depends how you mean by that. Why draw a distinction between perfection, perfections, and a subject of them? If perfection is the state of Nirvana, for example, these distinctions don't mean much perhaps

Because the subject of all perfections isn't the only subject that can possess a perfection. For example, we (according to the argument) possess the perfection of existence since we exist both as an idea in the mind and outside the mind, but unlike God we do not possess other perfections, such as wisdom and power.
And according to the notion of existence used in the argument from the eternal truths of Leibniz in combination with this argument, a unicorn does not have the perfection of existence, even though it does have the predicate «existence» ,and therefore it is limited to existing only as an idea in the mind. Or alternatively: it has the predicate «non existence», but not as a perfection, therefore it need not not exist as an idea in the mind. You can pick whichever you like.

«It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.»

Source: Leibniz' Monadology

Now hold on a second, if by state you mean a mental state, then the problem that I have with that view is that if a mental state could be the subject of all perfections, then it would also have to exist outside the mind, since otherwise the predicate existence would be limited, and therefore not be a perfection. But then it wouldn't be merely a mental state.

The point being that your argument is false precisely because you do not recognize that it must depend upon that experience in order to be true.

The basis for this claim is that the Cogito Sum performance, when executed by a human being in the first person, present tense mode, would be able to prove the existence of a Necessary Being IF AND ONLY IF it had access to a kind of thinking which was inherently closed, rather than open, to the possibility of complete cessation (i.e., a necessary or divine, rather than a contingent or human, kind of thinking) --which, unfortunately for your argument, it does not have access to and never will.

Aquinas wrote (I can quote too) "But the order of things is the best it can be, since the power of the first cause does not fail the potency in things for perfection." Really though, we learn of perfection subjectively and have a limited understanding of its objectivity. To try to list perfections and increase them to infinite in order to assign it to a subject is very suspect. To try to prove this subject exists as you create the idea of it is worse.

your argument is false precisely because you do not recognize that it must depend upon that experience in order to be true.

1.An argument may be invalid or valid, but not true or false. The conclusion of the argument, on the other hand, may be false. But that's not what you are trying to say, is it? You are trying to say it is invalid.

The basis for this claim is that the Cogito Sum performance, when executed by a human being in the first person, present tense mode, would be able to prove the existence of a Necessary Being IF AND ONLY IF it had access to a kind of thinking which was inherently closed, rather than open, to the possibility of complete cessation (i.e., a necessary or divine, rather than a contingent or human, kind of thinking) --which, unfortunately for your argument, it does not have access to and never will. — charles ferraro

2. No, it is not the case that the argument is valid if and only if the «cogito sum performance» had access to «divine thinking». All it needs is the tool humans use to think: logic. Unless you are going to call logic «divine».

3. If, on the other hand, you mean that God's existence cannot be proven a priori because we do not know God's essence (like Aquinas maintained) it is not enough to say that that is so, if you want your position to be convincing. Tell us how you know that we do not know God's essence.

To try to list perfections and increase them to infinite in order to assign it to a subject is very suspect. — Gregory

Why is it suspect? I'm all ears.

To try to prove this subject exists as you create the idea of it is worse. — Gregory

Again, why?