Does Materialism Have an a Priori Problem?

RogueAI

Assume you know nothing about reality except that you exist and you have a conscious mind, and some materialists are trying to make their case to you (or you're just thinking through materialism yourself, and asking yourself questions): there's this physical stuff that exists, independent of you, you are made of it, and your mind and consciousness are produced by this stuff. Eventually, you would ask the materialists (or yourself) how all this works, and of course, you would get explanations that are all over the place: consciousness is an illusion, it's a product of information processing, it's everywhere in the physical universe. The materialists cannot agree on an answer. They also admit they've been working on this problem for a long time.

Is this lack of explanation a detriment to materialism? Obviously. We want to know how and why things happen. A theory that can't explain a fundamental aspect of reality like conscious awareness is a theory that's already in trouble. The longer the explanatory gap remains, the further in trouble the theory gets.

Idealism and dualism suffer too from explanatory gaps. However, in an a priori state of knowledge, we know that ideas and at least one mind exists, so to claim reality is made of mind(s)/thoughts begs a lot of interesting questions that don't have answers, but it has one crucial advantage over materialism: the existence of mind and ideas can't be doubted. The existence of external physical stuff can be. Idealism should be the default starting position.

Thoughts?

frank

Idealism should be the default starting position. — RogueAI

But is it intuitive that the trees and birds around you are made of mind stuff as if we're in a dream?

And what is mind stuff anyway?

I think the default will come from the culture you were born into. The destination is realizing that you don't have a vantage point to confirm either one, so ontological anti-realism.

RogueAI

↪frank

But is it intuitive that the trees and birds around you are made of mind stuff as if we're in a dream?

So, you're introducing dreaming into my a priori world, eh? That's fine. Suppose the person knows they dream. Wouldn't that give idealism an even bigger boost? After all, I create worlds populated by real-seeming people in my dreams, so isn't it entirely possible I'm still doing all that even when I think I'm awake? I think the knowledge of dreaming strengthens the idealist position. If world-building during sleep is a thing, than world-building during non-sleep (or what we think is non-sleep) is definitely on the table.

And what is mind stuff anyway?

That's a good question, but you can ask it about materialism too: and just what is this physical stuff anyway? A bunch of fields in a superposition that collapses when someone's looking? That's very bizarre. QM is extremely counter-intuitive. Why should a reality made of independent-existing physical stuff be dependent on observers?

But again, this is where idealism has an advantage. We can ask "what is matter," we can ask "what is mind," but in the end, we know mind exists. We can't be wrong about that. We know that the stuff the idealist says reality is made of exists. I think that's a big advantage for idealism

I think the default will come from the culture you were born into. The destination is realizing that you don't have a vantage point to confirm either one, so ontological anti-realism.

Yes, but I'm talking about what *should* be the case. Idealism *should* be the default position, even if it's not.

javi2541997

↪RogueAI

I guess you want to explain that there is no doubt that mind/ideas exist, but The complex situation born when we put everything in practice so the theory gets complexity.
If materialism has a prior problem probably could be. Therefore, I guess this depends a lot of how you were raised in the home/country you were born in. Because the ideas or mind are there, yes, but they are so stimulated in our reality. For this reason, I guess this is why we literally see the same reality in different perspectives. Then, I guess this is the problem of materialism.
Which is the significance we can put in materialism and physics through our ideas? Interesting.

Dharmi

I said somewhere else that materialism means nothing. In the Wittgensteinian and Derridean sense, but also just in terms of empirical reality.

What we empirically experience is not 'material stuff' but merely qualities of experience. Someone, somewhere, sometime, decided to call these qualities 'material' but there's no actual reason to do so. And as far as I know, nobody has ever given a reason to do so.

Qualities exist, what they are called is, as far as I can tell, irrelevant. The real question is: are these qualities true, and real? And that's the problem of universals. If these qualities aren't genuine, nothing is. Because reality exists only in relation to qualities in experience juxtaposed to other qualities. Hence, nominalism is nihilism. Only Platonism (in the broad sense) can make sense of our qualities of experience.

The 'string' upon which these 'pearls' rest.

Dharmi

But is it intuitive that the trees and birds around you are made of mind stuff as if we're in a dream? — frank

Absolutely. It isn't to you? What made you believe reality is just what you see?

ontological anti-realism. — frank

Discussed above. Emphasis added.

The real question is: are these qualities true, and real? And that's the problem of universals. If these qualities aren't genuine,nothing is. Because reality exists only in relation to qualities in experience juxtaposed to other qualities. Hence, nominalism is nihilism. Only Platonism (in the broad sense) can make sense of our qualities of experience. — Dharmi

NOS4A2

↪RogueAI

the existence of mind and ideas can't be doubted.

Both can be seriously doubted because every time we look we see nothing of the sort. The idealist still has the herculean task of showing us where the mind ends and the body begins, but has consistently failed to do so.

frank

So, you're introducing dreaming into my a priori world, eh? That's fine. Suppose the person knows they dream. Wouldn't that give idealism an even bigger boost? After all, I create worlds populated by real-seeming people in my dreams, so isn't entirely possible I'm still doing all that even when I think I'm awake? I think the knowledge of dreaming strengthens the idealist position. If world-building during sleep is a thing, than world-building during non-sleep (or what we think is non-sleep) is definitely on the table. — RogueAI

Yes, I've had dreams that left me wondering for years about my ability to build worlds, and so led to my half-assed interpretation of Kant: that we're projecting outward the world that we subsequently respond to as if it's mind independent.

I found that this line if thinking works great for trees and birds, but not for the people I love. I wonder what Kant said about that.

Yes, but I'm talking about what *should* be the case. Idealism *should* be the default position, even if it's not. — RogueAI

Ok, I'll totally agree with that, mainly because I like the way it sounds.

frank

Absolutely. It isn't to you? What made you believe reality is just what you see? — Dharmi

Well, even in a dream I act like a materialist, so...

Isaac

Idealism should be the default starting position. — RogueAI

Irrelevant. Physicalism is the default starting position.

frank

Physicalism is the default starting position. — Isaac

For psychopaths maybe.

Dharmi

↪frank

Lol nobody acts like a materialist. Materialism hasn't been proved.

frank

Lol nobody acts like a materialist. Materialism hasn't been proved. — Dharmi

A dualist then.

Dharmi

↪Isaac

Because the people who believe in it haven't thought through how facile it is. Not because it's some sort of neutral position. There's no neutrality. Even a neutral position in a debate between people for genocide and against genocide (or anything else, just an example) is a position. Neutrality is a position.

Dharmi

↪frank

Which is just another assumption. Cartesian Dualism comes from mechanical philosophy. Already assuming materialism. You have access to nothing whatsoever outside of your own mentation.

frank

You have access to nothing whatsoever outside of your own mentation. — Dharmi

How do you know that?

Dharmi

↪frank

Because nobody does. All things are experienced from the first person subjective experience. Unless you're claiming you do, in which case, that's something that carries a burden of proof.

frank

Because nobody does. All things are experienced from the first person subjective experience. Unless you're claiming you do, in which case, that's something that carries a burden of proof. — Dharmi

I'm trying to to point out that a mind independent world is the setting for your narrative.

You need material as the counterpoint to ideas. See what I mean?

Dharmi

↪frank

No. That's just plainly false. The world is entirely mental. In a dream world, it's 100% mental. It's no different in the other case.

There's no need for a mind-independent world, if the world itself is mentation.

frank

The world is entirely mental. In a dream world, it's 100% mental. It's no different in the other case. — Dharmi

This is a conclusion an idealist comes to, but it's not the starting point. It can't be.

You have to start by comparing thought to material in order to conceive of either. They're a package deal conceptually.

Later you can declare one to be illusive.

Dualism is the default.

Dharmi

↪frank

It wasn't the default for the vast majority of people in history. Dualism was created after Descartes couldn't reconcile his Dark Age Christian conception of the soul with the new scientific mechanical philosophy.

So you can assert that, but in the history of philosophy it's plainly untrue.

frank

It wasn't the default for the vast majority of people in history. — Dharmi

Western monistic idealism recognizes matter and thought. Matter is supposedly an emergent property of mind per Plotinus.

This clearly shows a dualistic frame in which one side has been declared illusive as I described.

Name an idealistic view, and I'll show you the same scheme.

Joshs

↪frank

You have to start by comparing thought to material in order to conceive of either. They're a package deal conceptually. — frank

Which is why phenomenologisits argue that idealism and empiricism are two sides of the same coin, and both depend on dualist assumptions.

Dharmi

Western monistic idealism recognizes matter and thought. Matter is supposedly an emergent property of mind per Plotinus. — frank

Yes.

This clearly shows a dualistic frame in which one side has been declared illusive as I described. — frank

And? It seems like you're confusing word-concept here. Ontologically, there's no distinction. If you're talking epistemologically, yes. Obviously. The whole point of philosophy is trying to relate the individual with the world, in one way or another.

I don't deny materiality exists, but I obviously believe it's derived from mind. My system is Vedantism: Qualified non-dualism.

Isaac

Because the people who believe in it haven't thought through how facile it is. Not because it's some sort of neutral position. — Dharmi

I never claimed it was neutral. It is, however, the default. You're born a physicalist (or at least you are one by six months, which is the furthest back any meaningful investigation goes). By three you've already assumed other minds. By five you're expecting complex physical and social rules to be consistent across separate events.

Any later adoption of idealism or even (arguably) dualism is in rejection of that which you assumed at least up to late teenage years.

So, without good cause to reject that which has served you up to that point, your adoption is just a pretence.

Dharmi

↪Isaac

That's just not the case. The vast majority of premodern societies were idealistic, spiritistic, animistic. It's just plainly false that physicalism is the default. It's a culturally, socially constructed deviation from the vast majority of people in the vast majority of historical time.

To say nothing about modern idealism, like British Platonism, Berkley's Idealism, German Idealism etc.

frank

Which is why phenomenologisits argue that idealism and empiricism are two sides of the same coin, and both depend on dualist assumptions. — Joshs

Exactly.

I don't deny materiality exists, but I obviously believe it's derived from mind. My system is Vedantism: Qualified non-dualism. — Dharmi

So you start with recognizing a duality: mind and matter. You then arrive at monism by declaring one side to be dependent or illusive, right?

Dharmi

↪frank

We recognize the illusion of materiality, and we go beyond it to the absolute truth of consciousness. Plato's Allegory of the Cave.

Do we start in illusion? Of course.

frank

Do we start in illusion? Of course. — Dharmi

Right. You have to eat a meal with the lord of illusion before you kill him. Actually I know nothing about Hinduism (sorry!)

Dharmi

↪frank

No, it's not that everything is illusion. That's a very common misunderstanding. The illusion is our identification with what is false. Materiality, our false sense of self, and all misunderstandings which arise from the three aspects of material nature: Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

That's all. It's not saying reality itself is an illusion, it's saying reality is something greater and the illusion is thinking it is "as is."

Also, you don't have to be sorry. I had a dialogue with someone who really truly didn't understand or care to understand for many hours on this point, and at least you're honest about your understanding being limited. That's good enough. Even many Hindus are ignorant of the orthodox Vedic understanding.

frank

Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. — Dharmi

I see. I actually do know what these are (I think). They're the gunas. On a sine wave, rajas is a rising curve, sattva is the point of 0 slope and tamas is the downward curve.

Rajas and Tamas are actually the same thing from different points of view.

Does Materialism Have an a Priori Problem?

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