Realising that you could talk proximally about things again, but with caveats, was a good step.

As I understand it propositional logic is only intelligible insofar as it is translated into some natural language or other. '∃' means 'there exists', ' es existiert' and so on.

So propositional logic is always formulated in terms of some natural language. Formal logic is the formalization of a natural language, an explication of the logic that underlies the language, using a set of symbols that represent logical concepts.

As I understand it propositional logic is only intelligible insofar as it is translated into some natural language or other. '∃' means 'there exists', ' es existiert' and so on. — Janus

...which is to understand that "intelligibility" as exactly "translated into some natural language"...

Logicians get paid to deal with the untranslated stuff. And hence:

So propositional logic is always formulated in terms of some natural language. — Janus

...is not quite right. Hence it doesn't follow that propositional logic is

an explication of the logic that underlies the language, — Janus

.

Logic does not underlie natural language. Indeed, effort and education is required in order to understand logic, and hence natural languages are presupposed by logic, in a performative sense. One needs to have a natural language in order to develop logic.

but with caveats — fdrake

This bit gets left behind.

So, what are those caveats? To my eye it would be the explication of the distinction between saying and showing.

I've been reading Badiou's Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy; Badiou wants to show that Wittgenstein was undermining philosophy; but he sees this as a bad thing, while I see it as glorious.

To my eye it would be the explication of the distinction between saying and showing. — Banno

It shows up in other ways too.

That what one sees depends on how one looks crops up in all kind of places. The distinction doesn't need to be drawn in terms of language either, surely. It isn't just a linguistic issue that an interface between two ontological regimes - like language and world, representation and reality, framework and what's studied - can be a distortion as well as a connection.

Acknowledging that there are such interfaces and distorting connections without undermining the access they grant seems the new realist space of problems. "Thank you critical tradition, yes there are access problems, and..."

and... — fdrake

...and what comes next might best be silence. Unless you have something else in mind?

...and what comes next might best be silence. Unless you have something else in mind? — Banno

If you stop hoping for big answers, you start asking smaller questions.

If you stop hoping for big answers, you start asking smaller questions. — fdrake

... if you start asking smaller questions, you will perhaps get better answers.

"Because God says" will answer any "Why...?". Is it a good answer?

...and what comes next might best be silence. Unless you have something else in mind? — Banno

Another offering: failure to resolve big questions is inevitable but still worthwhile to try.

... if you start asking smaller questions, you will perhaps get better answers.

Yes. And perhaps by attempting as big answers as you can, you will find how the questions inter relate.

Answering big questions is easy - as I showed above:

"Because God says" will answer any "Why...?" — Banno

Answering small questions - that's were you have to do the work. And it is where the consistency and coherence of logic comes into its own.

It's as if one wanted to complete the jigsaw without putting each individual piece in its place.

I disagree; there is an inherent logic in natural language which is formalized as propositional logic. Of course no one needs to have an explicit understanding of that in order to learn and speak a language, just as they don't have to have an explicit understanding of a language's in order to learn and speak it.

...there is an inherent logic in natural language which is formalized as propositional logic. — Janus

Well, I can't make sense of that. Language is made-up stuff, shared sounds with which we do things.

It follows that anything that was inherent - built-in, intrinsic, essential - to language would also be made up.

It makes sense that we introduced strictures on what sounds did what job. That's what grammar is, the way we choose to put sounds and symbols together. Logic is a form of grammar, a further set of strictures on what we do with words.

So I'll stand by my supposition that language precedes logic.

But then, I'm following a constructivist approach; perhaps you are thinking more in Platonic terms?

It's an interesting topic.

It was a move from making shit up to making shit consistent. — Banno

:up: :ok:

It was move from making shit up to making shit consistent

Is constructivism also inconsistent made-up shit?

I'm operating from the counterfactual, that linguistic philosophy was not treated as the mainstay, and instead analytic philosophy had its mainstay much earlier.


Also, what was the grand overarching goal of linguistic philosophy, and did it achieve it?

...then you have the difficulty of differentiating analytic philosophy and linguistic philosophy. Noether term has a hard and fast definition.

The linguistic turn was a change in method. If it had a goal at all, it was to elucidate philosophical problems by taking care with the language involved.

↪fdrake Answering big questions is easy - as I showed above: — Banno

You're artificially limiting the scope of big questions. Eg. "How does perception work?" Trivialising the attempt at generality.

Yep.


You say it like it was a bad thing.

...then you have the difficulty of differentiating analytic philosophy and linguistic philosophy. Noether term has a hard and fast definition.

The linguistic turn was a change in method. If it had a goal at all, it was to elucidate philosophical problems by taking care with the language involved. — Banno

This gives me a mental-cramp and creates a ill feeling. Namely, reading this as if it were definitional based, one can claim that this is closer to pragmatism by how you talk about treating it as a method instead of a 'turn' in philosophy.

... and this doesn't even sound wrong on face value!

Pragmatists err in their disavowal of truth. It is true that I planted garlic yesterday for the spring crop. But a pragmatist might say that it's not true, only useful to some extent. Or they will say that "true" just means "useful".

None of this is helpful, and all of it is why the linguistic turn is not another name for pragmatism.

I disagree, most of what pragmatists wanted to accomplish has been already accomplished by linguistic philosophers, or it was some sort of natural tendency for the linguistic philosophers to somehow agree tacitly with the pragmatists(?)

Anyhow, seeing as this is going nowhere, I think, it makes sense to look into some sort of idea about what comes next? What's your take?

...most of what pragmatists wanted to accomplish has been already accomplished by linguistic philosophers — Shawn

Meh. Pragmatism predates the linguistic turn, so that's not right.

I think that's true for the most part. I don't see any use of mentioning pragmatism again.

What do you think comes after the linguistic turn?

So, the method of analysis in philosophy otherwise known as the 'linguistic turn', has dismissed 'representation' as a form of meaning. What else would you say, Banno, about other things the linguistic turn influenced inside the field of philosophy?

Well, I can't make sense of that. Language is made-up stuff, shared sounds with which we do things.

It follows that anything that was inherent - built-in, intrinsic, essential - to language would also be made up.

It makes sense that we introduced strictures on what sounds did what job. That's what grammar is, the way we choose to put sounds and symbols together. Logic is a form of grammar, a further set of strictures on what we do with words.

So I'll stand by my supposition that language precedes logic.

But then, I'm following a constructivist approach; perhaps you are thinking more in Platonic terms?

It's an interesting topic. — Banno

I'd agree that in a certain way language is "made up stuff". We might think that in the genesis of language the sounds chosen to signify things are arbitrary and in that sense made up. But the meanings of non ostensive words such as 'and', 'the', 'that', 'this', 'then', 'but', 'although', etc., etc., reflect the logic of action and identification; the logic of cognition itself. So, I would say it is the grammar being common (although not identical) across different languages which demonstrates a common structure of experience and thought.

I don't identify as a Platonist, but I think constructivism, while it gives us a part of the picture, is certainly not the whole story. I don't see it being a matter of "either/ or". I agree it's an interesting topic.

...sounds chosen to signify things... — Janus

Here's the referential theory of meaning again. Seems to be a key point of disagreement. I don't think that the meaning of a sentence is given by the things it signifies. Firstly, so few sentences signify anything. Secondly, we can get more of an idea of what is going on if we look at what is being done with the sentence rather than making up things it might stand for.

You made the claim

...there is an inherent logic in natural language which is formalized as propositional logic. — Janus

If this were so there would be no need for modal logic, nor for a seperate explanation of metaphor. But propositional logic is insufficient for these tasks.

...a common structure of experience and thought. — Janus

Well, yes, language is that structure. This doesn't support your contention so much as mine: that logic is a development of language.

Or implicit in your idea might be a private language of thought? Do you wish to argue for that?

Well, yes, language is that structure. — Banno

This is somewhat iffy. Because if one states the above, the implicit assumption is that somewhere meaning arises, as if through the conversation with an interlocutor.

Davidson says at the twenty-five years postmark after Rorty publishing his Linguistic Turn in the Method of Analysis of Philosophy:

Beliefs are true or false, but they represent nothing. It is good to be rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking that there are representations that engenders thoughts of relativism. — Davidson, 'The Myth of the Subjective'

Not if meaning is just what you do with words.

Not is meaning is just what you do with words. — Banno

Don't quite understand, what do you mean?