but part of the process is the destruction and recycling of the original body. — Aoife Jones

The interesting part is there's no reason that would be required.. realizing that, I'd say no, I'm me.. now in your scenario assuming the memory and brain configuration (it's so much more complicated.. I'd hope lol but let's just assign "consciousness" as that) is the exact same.. there wouldn't be anybody to claim to be you at that point so.. you know it really depends if you view a human being as anything more than a blob of sentient meat or not.

Edit: This question seems oddly familiar to another one about a hypothetical planet-to-planet transporter system. It was suggested that an atom (or group of atoms) being truly transported from one place in spacetime to another is different from a new atom (or group of atoms) being created with 100% of the same properties and configuration. One is true teleportation, whereas the other is essentially a glorified fax machine.

"You" are your consciousness and "your body" is what you control, you could be given an entirely new body and you'd still be "you".

The biologists tell us we're in a state of constant renewal and that after a time we're all new parts, like the ship of Theseus. So its a problem with footprints in reality. What do you say? Are you you one year to the next? Or someone else? .

Is there any reason to deny that the person who steps out of the machine at the other end is the person who steps into it. — Aoife Jones

The "person" is not just the total of the atoms that are arranged to form them. The person is the result of the years of experiences and knowledge acquired. It is obvious that the person stepping out of the machine never experienced going into it, and the person going in has no experience of getting out. Therefore they are not the same people.

It is obvious that the person stepping out of the machine never experienced going into it, and the person going in has no experience of getting out. — Sir2u

That's not obvious to me.

Welcome to TPF.

It is obvious that the person stepping out of the machine never experienced going into it, and the person going in has no experience of getting out. Therefore they are not the same people. — Sir2u

Yeah, in other words what makes you "you" is physical continuity of self-experience and not 'mere identity' of atomic or neural patterns. (Locke, Shoemaker, Parfit) An original and a copy – e.g. territory and map – are not 'the same'; the only "perfect" 1:1 copy – instantiation – of an original is the original itself. (Korzybski)

edit:

:up:

The brain changes every time it encounters information through senses—just reading your post changed my brain. So no. A copy of you is not you. Because the very second onwards it became a copy of you it started changing in its unique way.

It depends on what "you" we're talking about. From the perspective of the "you" stepping into the machine, every resulting copy is you. But as soon as more than one version steps out, they all diverge.

The answer is “no” by virtue of each specimen occupying its own space and time. Your copy is someone else.

Why is teleportation any different from going to sleep and waking up after an interval? Would it bother you to discover that every time you have gone to sleep your identity has been lost and it is a replica that wakes up? Would you try to stay awake for as long as possible or would that be an absurd response?

but part of the process is the destruction and recycling of the original body. — Aoife Jones

What constitutes me as being "I" is my unique perception of existence, so no, the person who left the machine, even if he is equal in appearance, personality, aesthetics, method, etc... would not constitute "I", because as you well put it, it is necessary to "destroy" one in order for the other to "exist".

There's no "transferring" of information, only "replicating" information.

However, if your question comprises only the perception of other beings in question to me, then yes, I would still be "I", but only in the external; the view of others.

No. Because you are not the body. You are the spirit soul. The body is just a suit. A costume. A shirt. It's a throwaway. The true person is the spirit soul.

That's not obvious to me. — InPitzotl

So please enlighten me how it was possible.

Person #1 walked into a machine, but never walked out of the other machine. Person #2 is not the same person as Person #1 because he has been reconstructed in in the shape of Person #1 but in a different place and from different molecules. Person #2 walked out of the machine but had never walked into it.

So please enlighten me how it was possible. — Sir2u

Sure. Let's backtrack.

The "person" is not just the total of the atoms that are arranged to form them. — Sir2u

Call this statement A. I find this statement acceptable. In fact, a person isn't comprised of the same molecules over time; the act of living involves the exchange of molecules (and atoms) with the environment.

The person is the result of the years of experiences and knowledge acquired. — Sir2u

Call this statement B. I also find this statement acceptable. A person as an agentive entity will in the "approximate now" have experiences. The person through time will notably acquire knowledge and experiences in the form of memories that are shaped by those experiences.

Person #1 walked into a machine, but never walked out of the other machine. Person #2 is not the same person as Person #1 because he has been reconstructed in in the shape of Person #1 but in a different place and from different molecules. — Sir2u

It's here where I see problems. The first statement here conflicts with statement A; it seems to suggest that a person is just the total of the atoms arranged to form them.

Also, given the problem statement in the original post, it's quite reasonable to presume that Person #2 would have the same memories as Person #1; i.e., that Person #2 would have the same acquired knowledge and "remembered" experiences as the person who stepped into the machine (Person #1). Under that reasonable presumption, your second statement conflicts with statement B; Person #2 would be a result of the same experiences and knowledge that Person #1 (again being the person who entered the machine) had.

Also, I find the "different place" thing a bit confusing. I just walked from my kitchen to my desk. I had and acquired some experiences in my kitchen; now I am having experiences at my desk. But obviously I'm in a different place at my desk than I was when I was in my kitchen. I don't think you're presuming I'm a different person at my desk than the person in my kitchen moments ago, but according to the argument you just gave, you're arguing that Person #2 is different than Person #1 because Person #2 is in a different place... perhaps you're missing a time element in your analysis?

There's a recent television show called Counterpart where an experiment ends up duplicating our world exactly. The other world is linked to ours through the lab, where the scientist meets his duplicate, and things begin to diverge from there. An organization on both worlds is setup to perform various experiments where one world is the control to gain new knowledge. But things start to take a dark turn as people start messing with their other lives, and the organization turns into a spy agency.

The very first Existential Comics has a good take on this: https://existentialcomics.com/comic/1

It's here where I see problems. The first statement here conflicts with statement A; it seems to suggest that a person is just the total of the atoms arranged to form them. — InPitzotl

No it does not. That is why it was stated that a person is NOT JUST the sum of the particles that make up the person, but it is obvious that they are included.

Also, given the problem statement in the original post, it's quite reasonable to presume that Person #2 would have the same memories as Person #1; i.e., that Person #2 would have the same acquired knowledge and "remembered" experiences as the person who stepped into the machine (Person #1). Under that reasonable presumption, your second statement conflicts with statement B; Person #2 would be a result of the same experiences and knowledge that Person #1 (again being the person who entered the machine) had. — InPitzotl

Therefore they cannot be the same person because Person #2 does not have the experience of going into the machine.

Also, I find the "different place" thing a bit confusing. — InPitzotl

You went to maybe a million different places in your journey to the kitchen, but it was the same set of molecules that went along with you, not a completely new set.

perhaps you're missing a time element in your analysis? — InPitzotl

I left that part out so at not to confuse people. But I guess that your journey to the kitchen was not instantaneous and you changed very few molecules even though the distance covered was god knows how many microns in length. If you had instantly appeared a thousand miles away made up of completely different pieces, even managing to retain the memories walking into the machine, you would not have actually done the act of walking into the machine. The memories and experiences are not all of it either, a person is made up of both molecules and memories.

Another part of you is actually changing as you grow old, your reconstructed body would be brand new but aged according to the old one. In the art world that would be called a fake.

Would it matter if it wasn't the same person as long as they were convinced they were? — Aoife Jones

I think that they’d need a lot of convincing that they weren’t.

That is why it was stated that a person is NOT JUST the sum of the particles that make up the person, but it is obvious that they are included. — Sir2u

Actually, no, it's not obvious. Why is it obvious to you?

The memories and experiences are not all of it either, a person is made up of both molecules and memories. — Sir2u

But being made up of molecules does not entail being a particular set of molecules. A river is made up of molecules, but is certainly not a particular set of them.

From a subjective perspective, we can easily say we're different persons because we have different points of view. I see what I see not what you see, and vice versa. We can also claim to have an identity across time due to memories of points of view; I remember seeing what that guy who stepped into the kitchen in the last post saw, you do not. So I'm the same guy that stepped into the kitchen in the last post. You aren't that guy.

Everything I described matches the heart of what these teletransporters (and apparently 3d printers now?) are wanting to get at... personal identity. Were it not for such inconvenient philosophical devices, our identities would simply be tied to our bodies that age from birth to death. But those bodies are living beings; furthermore, we're energy hungry mammals. As such, it's incredibly reasonable to say that this identity-having, identity-maintaining thing that goes from birth to death, which is what we're talking about, is a slow moving stream of molecules, not a lump of them.

Therefore they cannot be the same person because Person #2 does not have the experience of going into the machine. — Sir2u

Applying the principles above, Person #2 has a distinct point of view from you, so you and Person #2 are different identities. Person #2 remembers being person #1, so Person #2's personal identity connects to the past entity you're calling Person #1 in the same way my identity right now connects to the identity of that guy that walked into the kitchen in the last post. Therefore, per this principle, Person #2 does have the experience of going into the machine.

Another part of you is actually changing as you grow old, your reconstructed body would be brand new but aged according to the old one. In the art world that would be called a fake. — Sir2u

But a person is a living being not a sculpture.

Why is teleportation any different from going to sleep and waking up after an interval? — Aoife Jones

The physical state-2 of Mary "waking up" is a direct consequence of, or change from, the physical state-1 of Mary "going to sleep" (re Ship of Theseus) whereas, on the other hand, two 3D printer "teleport" to Shanghai & Frankfurt two (immediately neuro-divergent, therefore non-exact) physical copies of the original Mary who was 3D scanned in Atlanta, where she remains after the scanning is done, so that are then three distinct "Marys" at three separate locations simultaneously (re: maps (copies) =|= territority (original)).

Would it bother you to discover that every time you have gone to sleep your identity has been lost and it is a replica that wakes up?

No it wouldn't if I couldn't subjectively experience or tell the difference.

Would you try to stay awake for as long as possible or would that be an absurd response?

Absurd.

Why is teleportation any different from going to sleep and waking up after an interval? — Aoife Jones

Good point! I see no difference between the two. In both cases there's an interval, one between going off the sleep and waking up and the other between being disintegrated at one end and reconstituted at the other. In both cases what decides the identity of the person is memory. If the 3D printing process could be made to mimic sleep it would effectively make the two processes identical; perhaps we could wait for a customer/user to fall asleep first before using the 3D printing process.

The biologists tell us we're in a state of constant renewal and that after a time we're all new parts, like the ship of Theseus. So its a problem with footprints in reality. What do you say? Are you you one year to the next? Or someone else? . — tim wood

true. Environmental influences on our DNA. I'd say part of me is the same and part of me is someone new. But it also differs from day to day how I feel.

In both cases what decides the identity of the person is memory. — TheMadFool

Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking?

In both cases what decides the identity of the person is memory. — TheMadFool

Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking? — SolarWind

But nothing is shown wrong by your question. Per the principle they are both "you". But being separate beings, they are different from each other. There's nothing contradictory about it; just as your body has been copied, so has your identity been copied. Now there are two.

Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking? — SolarWind

Yes, there will be two bodies and two minds presumably but both would be the same person. If you disagree you have a heavy burden on your shoulders which is, to be blunt, to inform us, possibly prove, what you mean by person i.e. what makes you you?

Embodied psychological continuity (Locke, Parfit ...); different discontinuous brains-bodies, different discontinuous continuities (i.e. divergent selves). 'Identical twins' are different persons, no?

Embodied psychological continuity (Locke, Parfit); different discontinuous brains-bodies, different discontinuous continuities (i.e. divergent selves). The only complete, perfect, exact copy is, after all, the original, otherwise it's just a copy. Identical twins are different persons, no? — 180 Proof

Sorry but I don't catch your drift. What is the definition of a person? In asking that I request you remain faithful to the common man's, the non-philosopher's, intuitions on the matter.

Sorry but I don't catch your drift. — TheMadFool

No worries. Context, like timing, is everything.

No worries. Context, like timing, is everything. — 180 Proof

Thanks for the advice.

You didn't answer my question though. What is a person?

"Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking?"
— SolarWind

Yes, there will be two bodies and two minds presumably but both would be the same person. If you disagree you have a heavy burden on your shoulders which is, to be blunt, to inform us, possibly prove, what you mean by person i.e. what makes you you? — TheMadFool

I cannot answer what makes me me, but I am sure that it is not possible to fall asleep and wake up in two bodies.

If you would have two bodies being a double agent would be an easy game. :)