but part of the process is the destruction and recycling of the original body. — Aoife Jones
Is there any reason to deny that the person who steps out of the machine at the other end is the person who steps into it. — Aoife Jones
Yeah, in other words what makes you "you" is physical continuity of self-experience and not 'mere identity' of atomic or neural patterns. (Locke, Shoemaker, Parfit) An original and a copy – e.g. territory and map – are not 'the same'; the only "perfect" 1:1 copy – instantiation – of an original is the original itself. (Korzybski)It is obvious that the person stepping out of the machine never experienced going into it, and the person going in has no experience of getting out. Therefore they are not the same people. — Sir2u
but part of the process is the destruction and recycling of the original body. — Aoife Jones
That's not obvious to me. — InPitzotl
Sure. Let's backtrack.So please enlighten me how it was possible. — Sir2u
Call this statement A. I find this statement acceptable. In fact, a person isn't comprised of the same molecules over time; the act of living involves the exchange of molecules (and atoms) with the environment.The "person" is not just the total of the atoms that are arranged to form them. — Sir2u
Call this statement B. I also find this statement acceptable. A person as an agentive entity will in the "approximate now" have experiences. The person through time will notably acquire knowledge and experiences in the form of memories that are shaped by those experiences.The person is the result of the years of experiences and knowledge acquired. — Sir2u
It's here where I see problems. The first statement here conflicts with statement A; it seems to suggest that a person is just the total of the atoms arranged to form them.Person #1 walked into a machine, but never walked out of the other machine. Person #2 is not the same person as Person #1 because he has been reconstructed in in the shape of Person #1 but in a different place and from different molecules. — Sir2u
No it does not. That is why it was stated that a person is NOT JUST the sum of the particles that make up the person, but it is obvious that they are included.It's here where I see problems. The first statement here conflicts with statement A; it seems to suggest that a person is just the total of the atoms arranged to form them. — InPitzotl
Also, given the problem statement in the original post, it's quite reasonable to presume that Person #2 would have the same memories as Person #1; i.e., that Person #2 would have the same acquired knowledge and "remembered" experiences as the person who stepped into the machine (Person #1). Under that reasonable presumption, your second statement conflicts with statement B; Person #2 would be a result of the same experiences and knowledge that Person #1 (again being the person who entered the machine) had. — InPitzotl
Also, I find the "different place" thing a bit confusing. — InPitzotl
perhaps you're missing a time element in your analysis? — InPitzotl
Would it matter if it wasn't the same person as long as they were convinced they were? — Aoife Jones
Actually, no, it's not obvious. Why is it obvious to you?That is why it was stated that a person is NOT JUST the sum of the particles that make up the person, but it is obvious that they are included. — Sir2u
But being made up of molecules does not entail being a particular set of molecules. A river is made up of molecules, but is certainly not a particular set of them.The memories and experiences are not all of it either, a person is made up of both molecules and memories. — Sir2u
Applying the principles above, Person #2 has a distinct point of view from you, so you and Person #2 are different identities. Person #2 remembers being person #1, so Person #2's personal identity connects to the past entity you're calling Person #1 in the same way my identity right now connects to the identity of that guy that walked into the kitchen in the last post. Therefore, per this principle, Person #2 does have the experience of going into the machine.Therefore they cannot be the same person because Person #2 does not have the experience of going into the machine. — Sir2u
But a person is a living being not a sculpture.Another part of you is actually changing as you grow old, your reconstructed body would be brand new but aged according to the old one. In the art world that would be called a fake. — Sir2u
The physical state-2 of Mary "waking up" is a direct consequence of, or change from, the physical state-1 of Mary "going to sleep" (re Ship of Theseus) whereas, on the other hand, two 3D printer "teleport" to Shanghai & Frankfurt two (immediately neuro-divergent, therefore non-exact) physical copies of the original Mary who was 3D scanned in Atlanta, where she remains after the scanning is done, so that are then three distinct "Marys" at three separate locations simultaneously (re: maps (copies) =|= territority (original)).Why is teleportation any different from going to sleep and waking up after an interval? — Aoife Jones
No it wouldn't if I couldn't subjectively experience or tell the difference.Would it bother you to discover that every time you have gone to sleep your identity has been lost and it is a replica that wakes up?
Absurd.Would you try to stay awake for as long as possible or would that be an absurd response?
Why is teleportation any different from going to sleep and waking up after an interval? — Aoife Jones
The biologists tell us we're in a state of constant renewal and that after a time we're all new parts, like the ship of Theseus. So its a problem with footprints in reality. What do you say? Are you you one year to the next? Or someone else? . — tim wood
Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking?In both cases what decides the identity of the person is memory. — TheMadFool
In both cases what decides the identity of the person is memory. — TheMadFool
But nothing is shown wrong by your question. Per the principle they are both "you". But being separate beings, they are different from each other. There's nothing contradictory about it; just as your body has been copied, so has your identity been copied. Now there are two.Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking? — SolarWind
Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking? — SolarWind
Embodied psychological continuity (Locke, Parfit); different discontinuous brains-bodies, different discontinuous continuities (i.e. divergent selves). The only complete, perfect, exact copy is, after all, the original, otherwise it's just a copy. Identical twins are different persons, no? — 180 Proof
No worries. Context, like timing, is everything.Sorry but I don't catch your drift. — TheMadFool
No worries. Context, like timing, is everything. — 180 Proof
"Of course this is wrong. If the 3D printing process created two persons, both believing being original, which one would you be after awaking?"
— SolarWind
Yes, there will be two bodies and two minds presumably but both would be the same person. If you disagree you have a heavy burden on your shoulders which is, to be blunt, to inform us, possibly prove, what you mean by person i.e. what makes you you? — TheMadFool
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