"Since God’s intellect is the sole cause (as we have shown) both of the essence and of the existence of things, it must necessarily differ from them both in regard to their essence and to their existence. — Valentinus
Therefore God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived as constituting the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect of essence and in respect of existence, and it cannot agree with it in anything except name, and this is what we set out to prove. One may make the same argument about will, as anyone may easily see." — Valentinus
Spinoza was not panpsychist. — Valentinus
So we cannot say God's intellect is the same as nature. — Eugen
So God's intellect has nothing to do with what we call consciousness, feeling, will, etc. — Eugen
I've seen some videos and read some materials and they all say he believed everything was animated. On the other hand, God (the whole nature) has no consciousness. This sounds pretty much like panpsychism to me. — Eugen
1. As I understand, Spinoza was a panpsychist, so does his metaphysics encounter the combination problem? — Eugen
2. In his view, God is nature, it possesses infinite consciousness (plus other infinite attributes), but it is not conscious and it has no will. Isn't this self-contradictory? — Eugen
3. Causation: these attributes don't interact with each other. So a rock hitting you doesn't cause you to think ''Damn rock! I'm hurt...", but a previous thought does. How could someone defend this statement? — Eugen
Attributes of Mind & Body belong to substance and not to the modes themselves. "Everything" is not conscious; rather mind can be attributed to any mode as "the idea of its body" as (the conception, or logic, of) its functioning, or purpose, attributed by a sufficiently complex body which complementarily – in parallel – is itself the 'conscious' "mechanism of mind". Like wave-particle complementarity, mind-body dual-aspects of modes are complementary descriptions, or concepts, (available to the human mode) attributed to modes that do not inhere in any mode. No "panpsychism", so no "combination problem".1. As I understand, Spinoza was a panpsychist, so does his metaphysics encounter the combination problem? — Eugen
I believe you're mistaken.2. In his view,God is nature, ...
S is an acosmist (Maimon, Hegel) and not a pantheist (or pan-en-theist or pan-en-deist) or philosophical materialist. Pandeist? :chin: Anyway, to wit:Spinoza's formula is Deus, sive natura and not 'natura deus est'. — 180 Proof
(Emphasis is mine.)... But some people think the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus rests on the assumption that God is one and the same as ‘Nature’ understood as a mass of corporeal matter. This is a complete mistake. — Spinoza, from letter (73) to Henry Oldenburg
Not at all.... it possesses infinite consciousness (plus other infinite attributes), but it is not conscious and it has no will. Isn't this self-contradictory? — Eugen
Plural-aspect ontology (re: summarized in Ethics section I Of God – parallel Attributes of Mind & Body discussed in section II).3. Causation: these attributes don't interact with each other. So a rock hitting you doesn't cause you to think ''Damn rock! I'm hurt...", but a previous thought does. How could someone defend this statement? — Eugen
The only problem with Spinoza's metaphysics is one that plagues almost all other Western speculative systems, namely that Spinoza proposes a kataphatic (rather than apophatic) ontology, or 'reified' absolute (à la Anselm). Though he denies ontological 'transcendence' by conceiving of immanent ontological distinctions (e.g. attributes & modes) without requiring separate ontologies (i.e. ontological transcendence), Spinoza's ontological immanence is itself 'positive' – kataphatic – as conceptualized sub specie aeternitatis (re: eternal-infinite attributes & infinite/finite modes-affects ... of substance), presupposing a perspective of 'existential transcendence' with respect to reasoning sub specie durationis, which seems to me a fundamental inconsistency in a 'metaphysics of non-transcendence'. For me, Spinoza's project ought to have (instead of kataphatically conceptualizing 'the necessarily real') apophatically conceptualized the 'necessarily not-real', and then stopped there with the proviso: whatever is not transcendent, or not impossible (i.e. unreal), is always, under specifiable sufficient conditions, possible.4. Please tell me if there are other big problems with his metaphysics
Spinoza doesn't claim it is the same. That is a statement you attribute to him. — Valentinus
Spinoza outlines the connection to human experience through the propositions concerning modes and the distinction between causing oneself or being caused by another. In general, the "hard problem" would require subtracting from substance and then asking how to add it back again. — Valentinus
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/You will have to show from what text you derive that interpretation. It seems like a misunderstanding of how Spinoza agreed and disagreed with Descartes on various issues. — Valentinus
That's truly hard to bite. So stabbing your toe could be considered a thought causing another thought, namely ''Damn this needle''. I simply cannot see how this works.If you want a historical angle on it, I think in context the big problems he's speaking about are the mind body problem, God's relationship to substance, God's freedom, good and evil, and whether God's an agent - in historical/political context I think he's as much a radical Jewish theologian and political activist as a metaphysician. — fdrake
1. In his view, every element possesses an infinite of attributes, including consciousness. So every atom that you contain is somehow alive. “all [individual things], though in different — Eugen
You're saying that all people in a country are conscious, but the country isn't. Why not? — Eugen
One way to understand Spinoza's worldview is as an Enlightenment Era update to ancient notions of Panpsychism. However, the scientific knowledge, his model was based on, is now quite outdated. That's why, although I too hold an all-is-mind philosophy, I don't claim to be a panpsychist, in the Ancient Greek, or 17th century Enlightenment, or 20th century New Age sense. Instead, I have tried to update those old mind-is-prior-to-matter concepts in the light of modern Information Theory and Quantum Physics.1. As I understand, Spinoza was a panpsychist, so does his metaphysics encounter the combination problem? — Eugen
All I can say about this is that Spinoza didn't make videos to convey his philosophy. ("Ok, boomer!") :roll:↪180 Proof I truly appreciate your complex answer, though I must admit my philosophical language is very limited, so I couldn't understand everything you wrote.
Nonetheless, absolutely every video and material written says Spinoza thought everything was conscious. — Eugen
I don't understand this question.The problems still remain for me:
1. How come small conscious entities form larges conscious entities?
How come a crowd of persons is not itself a person? Or trillions upon trillions of cells in a person but she is not also a cell? Or a barrel of apples isn't itself an apple?2. If 1 is true, and everything is a whole, how come that whole isn't conscious itself?
How come walking "arises from" still legs? Or strawberry flavor "arise from" tasteless atoms? Or songs "arise from" breathing? Or stars "arise from" nebulae of helium gas? Or smoke "arises from" :fire: ...3. How come consciousness arises from a non-conscious thing?
Substance (i.e. "God") is not conscious insofar as consciousness is intentional... — 180 Proof
if you're trying to criticise Spinoza, — fdrake
I'm not arguing crowds are conscious, I don't think they are, but I think that's an argument against panpsychism. I'm just saying that I've repeatedly heard/read that in Spinoza was a panpsychist (even on Wikipedia) and that in his view everything has consciousness. I've also sent you a quote from Spinoza saying: “all [individual things], though in different degrees, are...animated”1I thought we'd be able to take it for granted that something which emerges from a collective of agents isn't necessarily conscious - like countries weren't. If you need more examples to block the syllogism, a handshake of agreement emerges from the actions of two agents, but is not conscious. Is that a clearer example? — fdrake
How come walking "arises from" still legs? Or strawberry flavor "arise from" tasteless atoms? Or songs "arise from" breathing? Or stars "arise from" nebulae of helium gas? Or smoke "arises from" :fire: ... — 180 Proof
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