LOL--there are three disconnected formal sentences there (though not expressed strictly formally at that):

S entails S*

If S then S*

If S & S# then S*

There's not even any formal logical argument of any sort there.

How is that you believe there is no formal method for justification of physicalism yet you claim to be a physicalist? — m-theory

If you're asking how that's possible, it's because physicalism isn't a thesis about or that depends on formal logic in any procedural way,

Aside from that, I don't take formal logic to be a justification for much outside of strictly formal logical concerns (and then it's still relative to the particular species of logic at hand). Formal logic is purely an invented language for thinking and talking abstractly about relations, where much of it is a game of extrapolation, an erector set resting on the basics of the invented language.

Man I don't have time to link you to all the author's that have made formal arguments for physicalism.

I thought your quibble was whether or not there is any deductive(a priori) method for justifying physicalism.

You should probably browse the entire article or skip to the references and begin browsing there for examples of the tradition of physicalism and formal logic.

Man I don't have ability to link you to any author who has made formal arguments for physicalism. — m-theory

-fixed-

You should probably browse the entire article or skip to the references and begin browsing there for examples of the tradition of physicalism and formal logic. — m-theory

Aka the wild-goose-chase-that-will-hopefully-lead-to-you-just-forgetting-about-the-ridiculous-claims-I-made gambit.

I am sorry but it does not make sense to say that physicalism has nothing to do with formal logic.
A great many physicalist philosophers have attempted to justify physicalism with formal logic.
That is just a fact my friend.
Sorry.

Do you think we are passive conduits of experience to our self, that the act of presentation is something that we only can experience as an observer. Or do you think that our experiences are representative and that we are in some sense responsible for what we experience as that which we represent to our self. — Cavacava

While I think sensory apperception is a thing, I don't think cognitive apperception is: When one of our senses receive an impulse, there is a moment where information exists only as activity in ones nerve system. I don't think this information is perceived though (we are talking milliseconds, here), because the action potential didn't reach the relevant processing centers in the brain yet.
When sensory information reaches the brain, it passes through a region of the midbrain called the optic tectum. This region is responsible for object location. Then it moves further along the brain, to reach a region called the visual cortex, which is responsible for object identification. Object identification relies on our previous experiences, and as such, it's necessarily based in ones own subjectivity.

When physics predicts results that have not been empirically verified it is because these predictions exist as a result of the formal logic.
This was what lead to the acceptance of GR in particular, the formal logic predicted things that were eventually empirically verified.
It more like a two way street.
We make formal logic models, and then verify them from observation and vice versa. — m-theory

Right, but observation can also disconfirm. If GR had been contradicted, then the math wouldn't have mattered. So unless there is some deep reason for math and observation to always be in agreement, provided the physicists do the right math, then it's not formal.

I am not sure I follow here...

I get from this that you are saying that having a model does not entail there will be an empirical verification of that model.

So I suppose that you are suggesting that because I am deducing that if there is certainty beyond logical doubt and that this will entail an effective procedure that this will not necessarily become empirically verified or may even become falsified?

Is that right?


.

I am sorry but it does not make sense to say that physicalism has nothing to do with formal logic. — m-theory

And indeed, no one said this.

A great many physicalist philosophers have attempted to justify physicalism with formal logic. — m-theory

So you say, but you can't give a single example.

I guess you win then.

Robots might possess qualia. According to the "Integrated Information Theory" of consciousness, robots are conscious. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory

According to the "Integrated Information Theory" of consciousness, robots are conscious. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory — Michael Gagnon

'Robot' doesn't come up on that page. (Well, according to the robot that searched it.)

I genuinely cannot figure out how physicalism overcomes this problem since intentional content is one of the things most apparent to us and it is clearly not physical. — Rawrren

I've seen definitions of physicalism which state that, roughly, everything which exists is either physical or supervenes on the physical. So, intentional (i.e. content-laden) mental states needn't provide a serious problem to physicalism, provided said states are understood to supervene on the physical.

You mean there is no objective method. Subjectively, I know that mental phenomena exist, because I experience it. That's how I can know with certainty that nobody else can be a solipsist, to the extent one takes solipsism seriously. — Marchesk

I don't see how this follows. Solipism is the belief or thesis that one's own mind is the only existing mind in the world. That you are certain that you have mental states (and thus a mind) in no way rules out that someone else may be a solipsist (it would only certify that they are incorrect in their solipsist belief).

provided said states are understood to supervene on the physical. — Arkady

Yeah, but what exactly does it mean to supervene? According to Chalmers, physicalism require logical supervenience, which rules out strong emergentism and nonreductive forms of physicalism.

Yeah, but what exactly does it mean to supervene? According to Chalmers, physicalism require logical supervenience, which rules out strong emergentism and nonreductive forms of physicalism. — Marchesk

I am not particularly acquainted with the various flavors of supervenience (indeed, I already consider it to be a logical relation, so I'm not sure what distinction "logical supervenience" holds). Could you give an outline of Chalmers's position? Presumably, in order for his view to provide a problem for physicalism, he holds that mental states are "strongly emergent" from physical states, else the point is moot (I'm also not sure what "non-reductive" means here. Much philosophical confusion seems to have arisen over issues of whether A is "reducible" to B.).

Could you give an outline of Chalmers's position? — Arkady

Physicalism is true iff everything is logically necessitated by physicis, such that a God-like being from the Big Bang could predict what sorts of things would emerge. As such, there can be no physically identical world which differs in any way from our world.

Strong emergentism would rule out God being able to predict consciousness, societies, evolution, etc in advance. Contrast this with the game of life, where the initial state plus the rules absolutely determine all patterns that emerge as the game unfolds.

Reductive physicalism would at least require that there are bridge laws reducing (or translating) domain A to domain B to C all the way down to fundamental physics. So even though we couldn't go from the mind to QM or GR, we could find laws bridging from neuroscience to biology, and from biology to chemistry, where it's obvious that chemistry has a very fundamental relationship to physics.

Nonreductive physicalism wouldn't permit such bridge laws. There would be no way for us to reduce sociology to evolutionary biology, or what not. We couldn't bridge from high level domains all the way down to physics.

That's my understanding. And it leads right into Chalmer's discussion of p-zombies.

Physicalism is true iff everything is logically necessitated by physicis, — Marchesk

The first problem with this is that physicalism doesn't require a belief in (strong) determinism. One can be a physicalist and believe that some events are acausal or ontologically probabilistic.

The first problem with this is that physicalism doesn't require a belief in (strong) determinism. One can be a physicalist and believe that some events are acausal or ontologically probabilistic. — Terrapin Station

Sure, but they need to be entailed by physics, even if there's a probability attached to it. QM doesn't posit entirely new things coming into existence, only that known existing properties have a probability wave when you measure for them.

Sure, but they need to be entailed by physics, — Marchesk

What does "entailed by physics" mean exactly? You're not saying something about the science of physics per se, are you? And otherwise, what does it mean to say that it needs to be entailed by the physical world?

What does "entailed by physics" mean exactly? You're not saying something about the science of physics per se, are you? And otherwise, what does it mean to say that it needs to be entailed by the physical world? — Terrapin Station

This is a philosophy forum, so no I'm not talking about the science of physics, I'm referring to what the metaphysical doctrine physicalism requires.

I'm referring to what the metaphysical doctrine physicalism requires. — Marchesk

How about referring to it, then, rather than referring to referring to it? In other words, how about saying what it means exactly?

How about referring to it, then, rather than referring to referring to it? In other words, how about saying what it means exactly? — Terrapin Station

It means exactly the same thing as saying that everything is made of XYZ. It's a statement of what ontologically exists, and by contrast, what does not. It's a statement about the fundamental building blocks of reality.

"Everything is math" would mean that math is the foundation of reality from which everything else is somehow formed. There can't be any exceptions to that for it to be true.

It means exactly the same thing as saying that everything is made of XYZ. — Marchesk

Well, that makes no sense. You know that I'm asking you what entailed by physics amounts to, right?

So an answer would have to fit "x is entailed by physics just in case _______" and the blank would be whatever the explanation is of what the phrase means.

So an answer would have to fit "x is entailed by physics just in case _______" and the blank would be whatever the explanation is of what the phrase means. — Terrapin Station

No, it means that if you knew everything about physics, you would know everything that could be made up of physics, whether it's realized in our universe, or not (maybe because some early quantum fluctuation didn't lead to the right conditions).

No, it means that if you knew everything about physics, — Marchesk

That's saying something about the science of physics per se, isn't it?

That's saying something about the science of physics per se, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

It's saying something about the nature of the physical world, since physicists aren't God.

It's saying something about the nature of the physical world, — Marchesk

So "If you knew everything about the physical world" then? I'm just clarifying because "physics" can be read (and probably should be) as being about the science.

The science could turn out to be wrong about a ton of things after all, couldn't it? And that could be the case no matter how we progress with our social practices that count as that science.

ton of things after all, couldn't it? And that could be the case no matter how we progress with our social practices that count as that science. — Terrapin Station

Jesus man, this isn't that difficult of a concept. Is everything made up of the stuff of physics, or not?

I understand that physicalism attempts to be successful in explanation the location of intentional states (e.g. thoughts/"I think") via whatever route it takes, behaviourism, functionalism etc. but what I can't understand is how a physicalist overcomes the location or even causation of intentional content (e.g. ... that a box is 2 x 2cm).

I'd imagine it's encoded in some network of neurons.

Jesus man, this isn't that difficult of a concept. Is everything made up of the stuff of physics, or not? — Marchesk

I don't think it's that simple. What counts as "the stuff of physics"? If you just mean whatever is currently posited by scientific models then how do you account for newly discovered things? If you'd said this before we'd even conceived of the Higgs boson or dark matter would it have then meant that these weren't physical?

Or maybe the "stuff of physics" is just whatever has a causal effect on the world? But then that would entail that something like interactionism is false by definition. Does that seem right?

See Hempel's dilemma.