There are no material objects. Idealism neatly solves the mind-body problem.

I meant mind. Stop nitpicking. — khaled

It's not nitpicking. You confused a mental state with a mind. That's a huge mistake. It's a category error. You should be ashamed of yourself.

What sensible property do electrons have? Or photons of light? Or quantum wave functions? — khaled

The first two have shapes, and I have no idea what a quantum wave function is.

Btw, which premise in which of my arguments are you trying to challenge?

A sizeable population of the people IN the philosophy departments would agree that there is no such problem. Dennett for one. — khaled

Me too. So?

False. Whether minds are lumps of something sensible is what is in dispute. We can both agree lumps of ham don't have minds. — khaled

Ham, bone, gristle, blood, whatever. Same applies. But well done for missing the point.

It makes sense to wonder how heavy a piece of paper is, but not how heavy light is. Even though both are sensible objects. In the same way, minds can be sensible, and also be such that it makes sense to wonder what they think, but not what rocks think. — khaled

Straw man. I did not claim that a sensible object has all the sensible properties. But it at least makes sense to wonder what other sensible properties it might have. So, I tell you that a hibbledip has a square shape. It now makes sense for you to wonder what colour it has, what texture it has, and so on. If it is transparent, then it does not have a colour. But it still made sense to wonder what colour it had.

By contrast, it makes no apparent sense to wonder what sensible properties a mind has.

If it did make apparent sense to wonder about such matters, then philosophy of mind wouldn't exist.

I could claim that nothing is harmful at t1 (moment of death, which is premise 2).
— khaled

Yes, you could couldn't you.
— Bartricks

Yes I could. And with as much evidence and credibility as you use for your argument: None. — khaled

No, because all you'd be doing is saying something. And that's not evidence. By contrast, my argument appeals to a self-evident truth of reason, one that is discussed to this day (it's known as the 'existence condition' and it probably made its first appearance in the works of Epicurus).

This seems to be something ignorant narcissists have a problem with: they can't distinguish between things they say and self-evident truths of reason, for at some level they think they're god and all they need to do is say 'no' and it will be so.

We were talking about sensible objects. Not extended objects. So there ends your line of reasoning. To say "extended object" is to already assume it's divisible. — khaled

It's open to debate whether sensible objects are extended, or exist as subjective states. The latter is an idealist position and if it is true, then minds are immaterial and my case is won. However, if sensible objects are extended objects, then it becomes a matter of debate whether minds are such objects. But again, congratulations on not understanding the dialectic.

No, I'm saying there could be things that are metaphysically impossible to divide. An electron is a good candidate. — khaled

Yes, I obviously agree that there are things it is metaphysically impossible to divide, namely minds. I don't know what an electron is. If it is an extended thing, then it is not a good candidate but a shit one. If it is not extended, then it may not be divisible. But then it would also be a shit example as it would provide no evidence against anything I am arguing. So, shit either way really.

Describe to me what you're imagining then. — khaled

Thinking while not being subject to any sensible experiences.

Quite. Here's how contemporary philosophers of mind generate the problem: "Let's assume that there are extended things - so, let's assume there exists a realm of things quite unlike minds. Now let's assume that everything is an extended thing. Now let's notice that this creates a real problem accommodating minds, given how they do not seem to be anything remotely like an extended thing, as well as a host of other problems, such as how on earth our minds could perceive the world, or have free will in it and so on. Now let's spend entire careers trying to solve these problems that we've generated by making stupid assumptions"

Silly. Explain how 'idealism' works (i.e. causes effects) without a (material or physical) mechanism.

I do not believe there is a single good argument for the proposition that our minds are our brains. By all means prove me wrong... — Bartricks

If the mind is not the brain, then why would consuming alcohol change the way the mind works - and change it more, the more one drinks? Why would one experience lowered inhibitions, increased clumsiness, impaired judgement and loss of memory if the mind were not a consequence of bodily functions? Does alcohol contain some sort of spiritual intoxicant - that effects the immaterial mind?

Idealism begs many questions that of course I have no answers to. However, the mind-body problem is more than just a lack of explanation.

Exactly.

Spinoza dissolved the MBP in the mid-17th century without resorting to an 'occult conflation – confusion – of ontology with epistemology' (i.e. idealism, immaterialism, etc).

:up:

What's the solution? In your own words.

I explained in the OP.

I do not believe there is a single good argument for the proposition that our minds are our brains. By all means prove me wrong, but note that this:

Premise: Brain events cause mental events
Conclusion: Therefore mental events are brain events

is a stupid argument. The conclusion doesn't follow (obviously). If you add this premise - If A causes B, then A is B - then the conclusion will follow. But that premise is clearly false. — Bartricks

You're making that stupid argument. Alcohol causes brain event, which causes mental event. Therefore mind is brain. It just so obviously doesn't follow I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it does.

A causes B, does not mean A 'is' B. I mean, by your logic, my mind is alcohol. After all, drinking alcohol causes mental events.....therefore alcohol is mental events. Therefore my mind is, what, the bottle?

Note: if you think 'alcohol causes changes in my mind, therefore my mind is alcohol' is a good argument, then I can't argue with you as you're below the threshold level of intelligence needed for coherent debate to occur.

Likewise if you think 'alcohol causes changes in my brain, which then causes changes in my mind, therefore my mind is my brain' is a good argument (obviously).

Not "solution" but dissolution ...

One substance with two aspects – a Thought-aspect and Extension-aspect (synchronized) in parallel, or complementary descriptions of the dynamics of each other (i.e. 'ideas of movements' & 'movements of ideas', respectively). "Mind" does not control "Body" or vice versa; they are complementary attributions (i.e. coin-faces) and not separate substances (i.e. different coins) which is the cartesian premise of the MBP.

Interesting.

I don't say or suggest that the mind is the brain. Rather, the mind is the content and consequence of the functioning of the brain. That's why, when we drink alcohol - it effects the mind. Because it effects the brain. So either, what you are saying, when you say:

I do not believe there is a single good argument for the proposition that our minds are our brains. — Bartricks

...is trivial, because you only seem to be saying something that you're not actually saying. Or, you're wrong. If you accept that the mind is the content, and consequence of the functioning of the brain, then what you're saying is trivial. But if you're saying that the mind exists independently of the brain - as you seem to be saying, then you're wrong, because of the effects of alcohol on the mind.

The first two have shapes — Bartricks

Not really. https://wtamu.edu/~cbaird/sq/2014/02/07/what-is-the-shape-of-an-electron/

Btw, which premise in which of my arguments are you trying to challenge? — Bartricks

This:

Although I have not assumed that a sensible object must have all the sensible properties, it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?). — Bartricks

Quantum wave functions, electrons, and many other things in the physics of small things have no sensible properties (color, smell, taste, shape). Yet we call them physical. Unless you want to distinguish between physical and sensible now, and claim something like "electrons are not sensible objects"

But typical of you to miss the point and require me to remind you...

A sizeable population of the people IN the philosophy departments would agree that there is no such problem. Dennett for one.
— khaled

Me too. So? — Bartricks

Then you are lying or were lying:

But by all means just contradict me, just note that unless I am correct then it is inexplicable why there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview. — Bartricks

You claim that there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview, I reply that most people don't think there is such a problem, then you reply that you don't think there is just a problem? If you didn't think there was such a problem why would you point out that there are people who do. What kind of argument is that?

I did not claim that a sensible object has all the sensible properties. — Bartricks

Nor did I. Nor is that required for what I said. You just missed the point.

to a self-evident truth of reason — Bartricks

It is not something one arrives at by reason. Whether or not one experiences pain at the moment of death is an empirical question. No contradictions arise if the answer is "yes" or if the answer is "no" that are not just definitional.

This seems to be something ignorant narcissists have a problem with: they can't distinguish between things they say and self-evident truths of reason, for at some level they think they're god and all they need to do is say 'no' and it will be so. — Bartricks

The irony is too funny....

It's open to debate whether sensible objects are extended, or exist as subjective states. — Bartricks

False dichotomy. They can not be extended and also not be subjective states. See: Quantum wave function. Or even electron.

It's you who doesn't understand.

I don't know what an electron is. — Bartricks

Not surprised...

But then it would also be a shit example as it would provide no evidence against anything I am arguing. — Bartricks

It goes against premise 2 of argument 8. There are sensible objects that are not divisible. So it is not true that if a sensible object exists that it is infinitely divisible. Is it clear enough for you now?

I'm seriously getting tired of having to remind you where the argument is. All the while you accuse me of not understanding the dialectic.....

Thinking while not being subject to any sensible experiences. — Bartricks

And you think this is possible without a brain?

If you accept that the mind is the content, and consequence of the functioning of the brain, then what you're saying is trivial. But if you're saying that the mind exists independently of the brain - as you seem to be saying, then you're wrong, because of the effects of alcohol on the mind. — counterpunch

See my earlier comment.

Although I have not assumed that a sensible object must have all the sensible properties, it must have at least one (else in what possible sense is it 'sensible'?).
— Bartricks

Quantum wave functions, electrons, and many other things in the physics of small things have no sensible properties (color, smell, taste, shape). Yet we call them physical. Unless you want to distinguish between physical and sensible now, and claim something like "electrons are not sensible objects" — khaled

How does that challenge my premise? If they don't have sensible qualities, then they're not sensible objects, duh.

You claim that there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview, I reply that most people don't think there is such a problem, then you reply that you don't think there is just a problem? If you didn't think there was such a problem why would you point out that there are people who do. What kind of argument is that? — khaled

Well, you need to be above a certain level of intelligence (quite low, embarrassingly) to realize that everything I said was true and consistent.

Nor did I. Nor is that required for what I said. You just missed the point. — khaled

No, you missed the point. You need to say something that challenges a premise.

It's open to debate whether sensible objects are extended, or exist as subjective states.
— Bartricks

False dichotomy. They can not be extended and also not be subjective states. See: Quantum wave function. Or even electron. — khaled

No it isn't and no they can't. An electron is extended, and a Quantum wave function is something you need to say more about. For if it is a 'function' then it is not a thing at all, but, you know, a function.

But then it would also be a shit example as it would provide no evidence against anything I am arguing.
— Bartricks

It goes against premise 2 of argument 8. There are sensible objects that are not divisible. So it is not true that if a sensible object exists that it is infinitely divisible. Is it clear enough for you now? — khaled

No, because if what you're talking about is an unextended indivisible thing, then it won't be a counterexample to anything I've argued, because I'm arguing that minds are unextended things.

Here's how we're arguing:

Me: Ps are Qs because they are Rs and all Rs are Qs.

You: But you're wrong because Ts are Rs.

Me: Yes, Ts are Rs. How does that do anything to challenge what I said? I said Ps are Qs, because Ps are Rs and all Rs are Qs. How does pointing out that there are Ts that are Rs challenge that Ps are Qs?

You: because it does.

Me: Erm, it doesn't.

How does that challenge my premise? If they don't have sensible qualities, then they're not sensible objects, duh. — Bartricks

Right, so to keep your hypothesis intact you will make it so that "sensible" is different from physical/material. So electrons are no longer sensible, even though they are a subject of study in physics.

Well, you need to be above a certain level of intelligence (quite low, embarrassingly) to realize that everything I said was true and consistent. — Bartricks

It's consistent but misleading. I didn't say it's inconsistent. I said you are likely lying. Why else would you say "there is thought to be a problem accommodating consciousness within a naturalistic worldview" when you yourself don't see that problem. Either you're lying about not seeing the problem, lying about it being thought that there is such a problem or.... what? Why else would you say that sentence? Are you making some sort of argument from popularity? "Some people think there is a problem here, which is evidence that I am correct. Note I personally don't think there is a problem here, but I will cite it as evidence anyways". That's idiotic if that's what you're doing. Consistent, but idiotic.

An electron is extended — Bartricks

No it isn't and I've provided a link.

You: But you're wrong because Ts are Rs. — Bartricks

You misunderstand as usual. No, the claim isn't that Ts are Rs. By your analogy the claim would be "But actually, not all Rs are Qs, there are Rs that are not Qs, such as electrons". Not all sensible objects (Rs) are infinitely divisible or have infinite parts (Qs).

But to you, it is definitional that if an object is sensible it has infinite parts. In which case you would have to argue that electrons aren't sensible objects, although they're physical. Most people use "sensible" to mean "physical" or "material". But in your system there is: Material stuff, Sensible (a subset of the former) stuff, and Immaterial stuff. It’s just too much. And you end up with “light is not sensible”

And more problematically, all your arguments conclude that minds are not sensible. But again, you have to distinguish between sensible and physical/material. So you can have it be that minds are not sensible but are still material (like an electron). So you don’t get “immaterial” anyways necessarily, even if your arguments make sense.

And I noticed you dropped the objection to the 4th premise of the 4rd argument (that if you are a sensible object everything you do traces to external causes). You would rather avoid responding to an argument than admit you have no response. Dishonest and pathetic.

Anyways, you seem incapable of responding to or even recognizing critiques of your position so I won't waste any more time trying to help you. Furthermore, you’re dishonest, so there is really no use. (Ohhhh boy here comes the dunning kruger :roll: )

You're making that stupid argument. — Bartricks

I don't buy that the argument is stupid. You're just nay-saying it. Let's look at why it's allegedly stupid:

Alcohol causes brain event, which causes mental event. Therefore mind is brain. It just so obviously doesn't follow I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it does. — Bartricks

Well, it doesn't follow. But that doesn't imply it's stupid to conclude it. I see something outside my window that looks like my car parked in my driveway. It doesn't logically follow that my car is parked in my driveway; but that's still a good reason to believe my car is parked in my driveway.

If the mind is a product of the brain, I would expect brain impairment to correspond with mind impairment. If it's not a product of the brain, I simply have no such expectations. But it appears that brain impairment correlates to mind impairment; so it "looks like" our mind is a product of our brain. That the mind is a product of the brain doesn't logically follow, but that it looks like the mind is a product of the brain is a perfectly fine reason to suspect that it is.

That sounds a lot like intellectual cowardice. By all means, prove me wrong!

Perhaps you think that there cannot be causation between different kinds of object, and thus if our brain events cause our mental events this would be evidence that brain and mental events must be events involving the same kind of object. — Bartricks

Probably the best analysis of the nature of the soul, ever written, is found in Plato's Phaedo. The idea that the brain is the cause of the mind, is very similar to the harmony theory. The material parts exist in a way which creates a harmony, and the harmony is the soul. But this theory is demonstrated as deficient because it cannot account for the reason why the parts exist in such a way as to be in harmony rather than dissonant.

So the theory needs to be inverted such that each material part, in itself, as an organized existent, is a harmony, and the cause of that harmony is something immaterial. This is what Aristotle takes as his starting point in "On the Soul". A living being is an organized material body. The cause of the organization, which manifests as the material body, is the soul. We can conclude therefore, that the soul, being prior to the material body as cause of it, is immaterial.

180 Proof see op — BartricksNothing but strawmen & sophistry, so the question remains:
Assuming it does, explain how an "immaterial mind" interacts with (its) material body. — 180 Proof:sweat: — 180 Proof

180, I'm surprised you don't know this, did you forget Physiology 101? Emotions are the nexus between the mind and matter. Next question (?).
LOL

Wrong again. Read my reply above to Rogue AI and, perhaps, you & @Bartricks will learn something. :sweat:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/513676

If loving you is wrong, then I want to be right LOL

But seriously, emotions are the nexus between the mind and matter. Have you studied pathology? The mind controls the body, yes?

Read the thread, what you're asking is incoherent (as usual).

But seriously, emotions are the nexus between the mind and matter. Have you studied pathology? The mind controls the body, yes? — 3017amen

A little Karma goes a long way. Are you unable to answer the question?
LOL

Anyways, you seem incapable of responding to or even recognizing critiques of your position so I won't waste any more time trying to help you. Furthermore, you’re dishonest, so there is really no use. (Ohhhh boy here comes the dunning kruger :roll: ) — khaled

How am I dishonest? And yes, obviously 'Dunning and Kruger'.

But to you, it is definitional that if an object is sensible it has infinite parts. — khaled

No, only if a sensible object is understood to be an extended object. So if materialism rather than immaterialism is assumed in respect of sensible objects. Of course, the word 'object' is a bit misleading if they are understood to be immaterial, as they're not so much objects as activities of a mind. But meh. The point, though, is that immaterial sensible objects wouldn't present any counterexample to my case, as I'm concluding that minds are immaterial. And electrons are extended in space and I'm not following any link you provide as it will not be to a philosophical paper, but a wikipedia page which, for all I can tell, will probably be written by you.

It is also not 'definitional' that an extended object has infinite parts, it is just clearly going to be the case. But well done for misusing words you Dunning Krugerite you.

And I noticed you dropped the objection to the 4th premise of the 4rd argument (that if you are a sensible object everything you do traces to external causes). You would rather avoid responding to an argument than admit you have no response. Dishonest and pathetic. — khaled

Where? I stand by that premise: if there are any extended things (and there aren't - see one of my arguments for a demonstration), then they have all come into being.

I don't buy that the argument is stupid. You're just nay-saying it. Let's look at why it's allegedly stupid:
Alcohol causes brain event, which causes mental event. Therefore mind is brain. It just so obviously doesn't follow I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it does.
— Bartricks
Well, it doesn't follow. But that doesn't imply it's stupid to conclude it. — InPitzotl

Alcohol causes mind to feel happy, therefore mind is alcohol. That's stupid, yes? That's the same argument.

1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind

1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind

Same argument. And it's stupid. And those who think it's a good argument are being stupid. Unfortunately you have to stop being that stupid to realize how stupid it is.

I see something outside my window that looks like my car parked in my driveway. It doesn't logically follow that my car is parked in my driveway; but that's still a good reason to believe my car is parked in my driveway. — InPitzotl

Er, that's not remotely the same argument. Again, I have trouble understanding how anyone can think it is. But then I have trouble understanding how anyone can think the original one is a good argument, so I suppose someone who thinks it is a good argument will likely think it the same as a completely different argument.

That sounds like quite a bad analysis. It doesn't sound up to much as it is. The best analysis was given in the OP of this thread, in my humble opinion (though admittedly, many of those arguments are due to other people, including Plato, Descartes, Avicenna, Berkeley).

Alcohol causes mind to feel happy, therefore mind is alcohol. That's stupid, yes? That's the same argument. — Bartricks

It's not the same argument.

1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind

1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind — Bartricks

Again, you're just nay-saying. You're phrasing this in terms of deduction; but we're applying evidence and induction. Variable substitution doesn't work in evidence. If I find a bloody knife on the floor next to the victim, there's a good chance it was the murder weapon. By contrast, if I find a bloody banana on the floor next to the victim, there's no chance it was the murder weapon.

The brain is the bloody knife. Alcohol is just a bloody banana.

Er, that's not remotely the same argument. — Bartricks

That's irrelevant. It doesn't logically follow. You were ranting about how things not logically following means it's stupid, and how you can't see how anyone would think it would logically follow. It never occurred to you that this was proper induction.

Now you're just covering yourself, and comparing bloody knives to bloody bananas.

1. Alcohol causes mind event
2 Therefore alcohol is mind

1. Brain causes mind event
2. therefore brain is mind
— Bartricks
Again, you're just nay-saying. — InPitzotl

No, I'm saying that they're exactly the same argument. Which they are. X causes Y, therefore X is Y. It's stupid.

But like I say, if you think they're not the same argument, then I'm not surprised you think one of them is a good argument!

That's irrelevant. It doesn't logically follow. — InPitzotl

Forgive me, but I don't think you have a clue what does and doesn't follow.