It seems clear that you are using a different definition of "object" than the one rigorously employed within the discipline of semeiotic. Again, anything that is denoted by a sign--real or fictional, existent or imaginary--is an object in that technical sense. — aletheist
And in your example of fictional writing, there are no objects denoted. — Metaphysician Undercover
The author simply builds up images of characters — Metaphysician Undercover
If this were true, then the author could not create those "images of characters" in the first place, and we could not think or talk or write about them afterwards. — aletheist
The possible objection that we must first understand what a man or a unicorn is to know how to apply "man-picture" or "unicorn-picture" seems to me quite perverted. We can learn to apply "corncob pipe" or "staghorn" without first understanding, or knowing how to apply, "corn" or "cob" or "corncob" or "pipe" or "stag" or "horn" as separate terms. And we can learn, on the basis of samples, to apply "unicorn-picture" not only without ever having seen any unicorns but without ever having seen or heard the word "unicorn" before. Indeed, largely by learning what are unicorn-pictures and unicorn-descriptions do we come to understand the word "unicorn"; and our ability to recognize a staghorn may help us to recognize a stag when we see one. — Goodman, Languages of Art
Proofs in mathematics are said to be discovered, as they are logical possibilities that arguably would exist even if no one discovered them. — Janus
It seems clear that you are using a different definition of "object" than the one rigorously employed within the discipline of semeiotic. Again, anything that is denoted by a sign--real or fictional, existent or imaginary--is an object in that technical sense. — aletheist
The only signs that theoretically could signify something without denoting anything are pure icons, unembodied qualities that would only convey themselves as they are in themselves. Any sign that stands for something else denotes that other object. — aletheist
If this were true, then the author could not create those "images of characters" in the first place, and we could not think or talk or write about them afterwards. Again, the sign "Hamlet" denotes the fictional character in Shakespeare's play as its object. — aletheist
Didn't Russell rather skewer that approach? (On Denoting.) — bongo fury
Thus "the present King of France," "the round square," etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This in itself is a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe on the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round; etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred. — Russell - On Denoting
Proofs in mathematics are said to be discovered, as they are logical possibilities that arguably would exist even if no one discovered them. — Janus
I think it is natural to divide subjects between what is 'in the mind' and what is 'in the world'. What is 'in the world' is said to exist independently of any act of observation on the human's part - the vast universe with all of billons of galaxies, this earth and its solar system and so on. — Wayfarer
(My view is that realiity is experienced reality and that this even goes for the hard sciences. Nothing exists truly independently of any act of observation, or rather, whatever we think or say about 'what exists' implicitly implies the act of observation, which provides the conceptual framework within which any and all existence statements are made. Not seeing this is precisely the meaning of 'the blind spot' which had a very hostile reception when I mentioned it in June 2019. — Wayfarer
This question just confirms an ongoing failure (or refusal) to understand the technical definitions of denotation and signification within semeiotic.Why then did you insist on a distinction between "signification" and "denotation" in the other thread, when here you want any signification to be a denotation? — Metaphysician Undercover
That is not what I said. There is no such thing as pure signification (without denotation) in common usage. Likewise, there is no such thing as pure denotation (without signification) in common usage. Instead, in practice every sign both denotes its object (what it stands for) and signifies its interpretant (what it conveys about that object). This is most readily evident in a proposition, where the subjects (terms as names) denote the objects and the predicate (embodied as syntax) signifies the interpretant. The fundamental principle of semeiotic (following Peirce) as distinguished from semiology (following Saussure) is that a sign thus stands in an irreducibly triadic relation with its object and its interpretant, rather than there being only a dyadic relation between signifier and signified.So, you insist on a distinction between signification and denotation, then it turns out that there is no such thing as signification in common usage. — Metaphysician Undercover
Proofs in mathematics are said to be discovered, as they are logical possibilities that arguably would exist even if no one discovered them — Janus
That kind of dualistic thinking does seem to be "natural". — Janus
I would rather more simply say there is a distinction between what exists and is what it is independently of opinion. — Janus
it seems absurd to say, for example, that nothing existed prior to the advent of humans. — Janus
(Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271)The problem of including the observer in our description of physical reality arises most insistently when it comes to the subject of quantum cosmology - the application of quantum mechanics to the universe as a whole - because, by definition, 'the universe' must include any observers. Andrei Linde has given a deep reason for why observers enter into quantum cosmology in a fundamental way. It has to do with the nature of time. The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time loses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'.
The duality of ‘self-and-world’ develops in infancy. — Wayfarer
I question that any notion of existence is coherent absent a subject to whom it is meaningful. — Wayfarer
It's the theorem that's discovered/created first. Then the search for a proof. Math is not just challenging others to solve a stated problem, although for many that is a competitive aspect highly desirable. — jgill
That is not what I said. There is no such thing as pure signification (without denotation) in common usage. Likewise, there is no such thing as pure denotation (without signification) in common usage. Instead, in practice every sign both denotes its object (what it stands for) and signifies its interpretant (what it conveys about that object). This is most readily evident in a proposition, where the subjects (terms as names) denote the objects and the predicate (embodied as syntax) signifies the interpretant. The fundamental principle of semeiotic (following Peirce) as distinguished from semiology (following Saussure) is that a sign thus stands in an irreducibly triadic relation with its object and its interpretant, rather than there being only a dyadic relation between signifier and signified. — aletheist
No, these words are examples of signs whose objects--that which they denote--are general concepts.Sure there is pure signification, in the case of any abstract use, a universal, like "temperature", "big", "good", "beauty" "green", "wet", and the list goes on and on. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, in each of these propositions there are two or three subjects denoting two or three objects, and the interpretant conveys something about the logical relation between those objects. The interpretant of each individual word is the aggregate of all the different propositions that include it, which we attempt to summarize whenever we write a definition of it.We use all these terms as a subject when we say things like "temperature is a measurement", "big is a size", "good is desirable", beauty is what the artist seek", "green is a colour". These are phrases of pure signification — Metaphysician Undercover
The category mistake is conflating different definitions of "object" and "subject" that apply in different contexts. An object is not necessarily something physical, and a subject is not necessarily something that we study. In semeiotic, an object is whatever a sign denotes, and a subject is a term within a proposition that denotes one of its objects.Because then we lose the capacity to distinguish between a physical object denoted, and a subject of study denoted. If these two are the same, as "object denoted", category mistake will prevail. — Metaphysician Undercover
Something is still missing — magritte
Then there is the issue of computer generated proofs. What kind of thinking is involved there? — magritte
A proof is strange, though. It’s abstract and untethered to material experience. “They’re this crazy contact between an imaginary, nonphysical world and biologically evolved creatures,” said the cognitive scientist Simon DeDeo of Carnegie Mellon University, who studies mathematical certainty by analyzing the structure of proofs. “We did not evolve to do this.”
No, these words are examples of signs whose objects--that which they denote--are general concepts. — aletheist
The interpretant of each individual word is the aggregate of all the different propositions that include it, which we attempt to summarize whenever we write a definition of it. — aletheist
An object is not necessarily something physical, and a subject is not necessarily something that we study. In semeiotic, an object is whatever a sign denotes, and a subject is a term within a proposition that denotes one of its objects. — aletheist
I know that you disagree, and at this point I find that comforting.I know that's what you think, but I disagree. — Metaphysician Undercover
There you go again, making stuff up to sound knowledgeable. That is not how "object" and "subject" are defined within semeiotic. I get it, you reject those definitions, so again we can stop wasting each other's time.An object is defined according to the law of identity, as unique, primary substance, but a logical subject is not unique, as secondary substance. — Metaphysician Undercover
These mathematical axioms require that a term signifies an object. Only Platonism can support this prerequisite. — Metaphysician Undercover
Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects. ....Mathematical objects are not the kinds of things that we can see or touch, or smell, taste or hear. If we can not learn about mathematical objects by using our senses, a serious worry arises about how we can justify our mathematical beliefs. ....Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.
and set theory, to begin with. These mathematical axioms require that a term signifies an object. Only Platonism can support this prerequisite. — Metaphysician Undercover
One example, please.
— tim wood
Set theory, and the axiom of extensionality. — Metaphysician Undercover
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