Basically what you're doing is pointing to your head and talking about the rich inner mental world that you can never describe. Why bother? — Zophie

how am I describing it if it cannot be described? if it cannot be described, how is it possible me to conceive of the fact that "memory is necessary for knowledge"? if the processes inside my head cannot be described, how is it possible for me to say, without a reasonable doubt that "I, the knower, am necessarily distinct from the transient objects of knowledge which come and go inside my mind"? It wouldn't be possible, and for this reason, we must contend that, our "rich inner world" (at least in part) can be denoted using words, at least so long as the processes or entities inside of it have an aspect which remains unchanged over time (this is the precondition for denotation). That is to say that the structure of the mind is logical, and can be known, logically. This is not an absurd idea, for the mind, or rather, the subject, by its very nature, possesses the inherent ability to know itself.

Where are you getting the idea that the mind cannot be grasped using concepts from?

:chin:

from my shelves:

• Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. James Hoops
• Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein
• The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Ernst Cassirer

also, perhaps:

• The Beginning of Infinity, David Deutsch
• The Mathematical Universe, Max Tegmark

My biggest question of his metaphysics right now is how is it that Will can have many "wills"? — schopenhauer1

How is it that the ocean can have many waves? How is it that the sky can have many weather-events? How is it that a cloud can have many shapes? How is it that a face can have many expressions? How is that the territory can have – be described by – many maps? ...

Why is it also that there is representation in the first place, if all is ultimately Will?

Why is it also that there is wave-perspective in the first place, if every wave is ultimately ocean?

Q: Why do people think it's necessary to understand the nuances of language and propositions to understand the essence of the mind?
A: Propositions are a convenient unit of analysis because they can be true or false.

That is to say that the structure of the mind is logical, and can be known, logically. — TheGreatArcanum

And what is to be done with the intrinsic circularity of such a system?

And what is to be done with the intrinsic circularity of such a system? — Mww

circular reasoning is fallacious if and only if the subject and the predicate of the proposition in question are not co-dependent aspects of the same entity.

Specifically, I’m looking for my information on the immateriality of subjectivity because I find both Kants philosophy to be primitive in this sense. — TheGreatArcanum

Have you checked-out Kant's Metaphysics? For instance: How are the synthetic a priori propositions possible?

Systems. Antecedent to propositions constructed by it.

Have you checked-out Kant's Metaphysics? For instance: How are the synthetic a priori propositions possible? — 3017amen

Yes, and I think that I have successfully answered this question.

Systems. Antecedent to propositions constructed by it. — Mww

not sure what you're getting at here.

Kant's Metaphysics — 3017amen

Mentioned.

Dismissed as......primitive.

Kant's Metaphysics — 3017amen
Mentioned. — Mww

Have you checked-out Kant's Metaphysics? For instance: How are the synthetic a priori propositions possible? — 3017amen
Yes, and I think that I have successfully answered this question. — TheGreatArcanum

Guys!

I'm sorry I must have missed that one?

How are the synthetic a priori propositions possible? — 3017amen

a synthetic proposition is a proposition which is not true by definition.

an a priori proposition is a proposition which does not have its origin in perception.

a synthetic a priori proposition is a proposition which is not true by definition and does not have its origin in perception.

answer: a priori propositions are possible because the mind in itself is immaterial and possess the inherent ability to know itself, meaning, of course, that the mind, in using propositions to conceive of its own structure or essence, is formulating a priori propositions. they cannot originate in perception because that which is immaterial is necessarily transcendent of perception, which necessitates space.

further, synthetic propositions are possible because the subject possess the inherent ability to synthesize concepts into conceptual wholes which did not formerly exist (this is the essence of freedom).

so, in short, synthetic a priori propositions are possible because the subject in itself is immaterial, and also, free (in the sense that a subject, by its very nature, has free will).

the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself — TheGreatArcanum

This is the what a system of thought does, considered in itself. There are no propositions, hence no circular reasoning involved therein, but are deriveable from it by means of it.

When I asked about the intrinsic circularity contained in the system, you answered with the circularity possible from the illogical employment of the system.

Can’t mix the two, in building a new philosophy.

a synthetic a priori proposition is a proposition which is not true by definition and does not have its origin in perception. — TheGreatArcanum

Exception taken as noted: Is 'perception' tantamount to self-awareness? And of so, what is self-awareness, a metaphysical, or as you so well articulated, an immaterial entity?

a priori propositions are possible because the mind in itself is immaterial and possess the inherent ability to know itself, meaning, of course, that the mind, in using propositions to conceive of its own structure or essence, is formulating a priori propositions. they cannot originate in the perception because that which is immaterial is necessarily transcendent of perception, which necessitates space. — TheGreatArcanum

No exceptions taken there. However, what about the proposition : All events must have a cause. Assuming that is a classic synthetic a priori proposition, can you put that into context?

And, what are you thinking is transcendent of perception?

synthetic a priori propositions are possible because the subject in itself is immaterial, and also, free (in the sense that a subject, by its very nature, has free will). — TheGreatArcanum

If I could paraphrase, is that another way of saying that each individual has volitional existence and/or their own sense of same (subjective truth)?

This is the what a system of thought does, considered in itself. There are no propositions, hence no circular reasoning involved therein, but are deriveable from it by means of it.

When I asked about the intrinsic circularity contained in the system, you answered with the circularity possible from the illogical employment of the system.

Can’t mix the two, in building a new philosophy. — Mww

I think that it's best to break this all down into unambiguous terms.

This is the what a system of thought does, considered in itself. — Mww

meaning that the essence of the subject involves the formulation of thoughts;

further, it must be noted that thoughts are abstract representations (concepts) of actually existing beings (whether spatial or non-spatial), or even representations of relations between actually existing beings (concepts of concepts). These representations are called propositions.

There are no propositions — Mww

It is a presumption to say that there are no propositions, especially whilst formulating propositions; that is, whilst formulating a collection of words (or symbols) that represent objects or concepts which has meaning to one or many subjects (i.e. a proposition).

There are no propositions, hence no circular reasoning involved therein, but are deriveable from it by means of it. — Mww

we've established that one cannot use propositions to make the claim that propositions do not exist, so this next point about "no circular reasoning is involved therein" is inconsequential. of course, propositions are derived from thinking, as you claim, but the thinker is not derived from propositions.

When I asked about the intrinsic circularity contained in the system, you answered with the circularity possible from the illogical employment of the system.

Can’t mix the two, in building a new philosophy. — Mww

the subject possesses the inherent ability to reference its own memory and thereby reference itself. the fact that I must reference myself to speak about self-reference is not illogical at all, because, as I said, self-reference is only fallacious if the entity in question is not, by its very essence, a self-referential entity, which I am, so there is no fallacy. These two must be mixed if philosophy is to progress, that is to say that we must create a system of logic which accounts for the fact that to be a subject is to be a self-referential entity.

Exception taken as note: Is 'perception' tantamount to self-awareness? And of so, what is self-awareness, a metaphysical, or as so well articulated, an immaterial entity? — 3017amen

perception involves spatial relations, self-awareness does not involves spatial relations. self-awareness involves the subjects inherent understanding (in each present moment so long as it exists) that it possesses the potential to create change (within itself). there are several essential aspects to subjectivity, which are necessary for self-awareness. these will be elucidated in my upcoming book.

No exceptions taken there. However, what about the proposition : All events must have a cause. Assuming that is a classic synthetic a priori proposition, can you put that into context? — 3017amen

I do not like defining things in terms of causes because the term is ambiguous, and one must also distinguish between physical causes and mental causes, because they are not the same, for one involves spatial relations and the other does not. The mere existence of physical causation is an assumption, yet hitherto, philosophers have thought it reasonable to ground their philosophies in the supposed truth that "all events must have a (physical) cause." According to my understanding, this proposition must be changed to "all events must have a mental cause," and this is because subjectivity in itself is transcendent of space. This means that all physical causes are mental causes in disguise.

And, what are you thinking is transcendent of perception? — 3017amen

the essence of subjectivity in itself is transcendent of perception.

If I could paraphrase, is that another way of saying that each individual has volitional existence and/or their own sense of same (subjective truth)? — 3017amen

to be a subject is to be free, each subject, however, has a varying degree of freedom, and this is ultimately because the body has the potential to limit their freedom to think, act, and speak, and also, if there is no body, then they are limited by the number and nature of the concepts which are stored in their memory set.

the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself — TheGreatArcanum

meaning that the essence of the subject involves the formulation of thoughts; — TheGreatArcanum

Logical consistency requires that if the first is the case, then it follows that the second should read....the essence of the mind involves the formulation of thoughts. The subject is that to which the thoughts belong, the subject is not itself the process. The essence of the subject, though, is merely the manifold of his representations.

But hey........it’s your philosophy, do with it as you wish. Who knows; we might be witnessing another paradigm shift.

The subject is that to which the thoughts belong, the subject is not itself the process. — Mww

the process is contained within the essence of the subject and does not exist independently of it. for this reason, my thoughts are contained within my mind and not yours, or rather, within my mind and not within some external object outside of myself in the world. The subject is not identical to the process of thought just the same as the whole is not identical to one of its necessary parts.

The essence of the subject, though, is merely the manifold of his representations. — Mww

however, the essence of the subject is not entirely reducible to the manifold of his representations, this is because an aspect of the essence of the subject involves the potential to formulate representations and this is not a representation (a mere concept). this is because all representations are passive entities which do not possess the inherent ability to actualize potential and are thereby distinguished from subjects, which possess the inherent potential to actualize potentiality (through willing) for a purpose that is known by the subject at the time of willing.

But hey........it’s your philosophy, do with it as you wish. Who knows; we might be witnessing another paradigm shift. — Mww

i contend that even people who disagree with my philosophy are going to love my philosophy simply because of its poeticness and its originality.

It's from a lecture by Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism, which is available as a video on youtube and also as a pdf here. The passage quoted is a gloss on Aristotle's argument from De Anima, possibly the famous passage concerning the 'active intellect'.

the process is contained within the essence of the subject and does not exist independently of it. — TheGreatArcanum

The subject never even arises until or unless the system thinks about itself, insofar as the subject merely represents the first person nature of the system, by means of propositions the system constructs in accordance with its own rules.

Hence, the aforementioned intrinsic circularity.

The subject never even arises until or unless the system thinks about itself, insofar as the subject merely represents the first person nature of the system, by means of propositions the system constructs in accordance with its own rules. — Mww

this is not entirely true; there is a passive state of subjectivity (when thought is not active) and an active state of subjectivity (when thought is active), but the subject, while the active state is not instantiated, is not non-existent, but existent in a state of potentiality, in which every aspect of its essence (with the exception of a few; I'm sure you can guess which ones are active and which are not) are still existent. in this state, prior to reflection, that is, prior to thinking, the subject must have knowledge, otherwise it would be impossible for the subject to instantiate the active state of subjectivity through thought. that is to say that the subject has a quasi-unconscious non-representational a priori knowledge of its potential to create change within itself through thought. the subject doesn't need to represent itself using propositions to know that it exists, in other words, one doesn't need to say inside their "move your arm to grab that cup," they can do it without using language, and this is experimentally verifiable. In other words, one can move their arm and grab a cub while knowing the reason for their performing the action without using any words at all, so how can we say that knowledge is reducible to propositions if this is empirically the case?

how can we say that knowledge is reducible to propositional knowledge? — TheGreatArcanum

Dunno, which is why I would never say that. I, in fact, reject the notion entirely, under either a priori or a posteriori conditions.

As for the rest, I’ll have to think about it. Some seems right, some not so much. But I’m cognitively prejudiced, so there is that......

How is it that the ocean can have many waves? How is it that the sky can have many weather-events? How is it that a cloud can have many shapes? How is it that a face can have many expressions? How is that the territory can have – be described by – many maps? ... — 180 Proof

Right, but this is all world of representation. How is it that representation gets in the picture at all if all is Will? If you say "Maya" then, how did that get in the equation if all is Will?

I can't help you.

there is a passive state of subjectivity (when thought is not active) — TheGreatArcanum

I would name this sensibility.

and an active state of subjectivity (when thought is active) — TheGreatArcanum

I would name this understanding.

that is to say that the subject has a quasi-unconscious non-representational a priori knowledge of its potential to create change within itself through thought. — TheGreatArcanum

I would name this consciousness.

subject doesn't need to represent itself using propositions to know that it exists, — TheGreatArcanum

Reification, or misplaced concreteness generally, and James’ (1890) psychologist’s fallacy in particular. Or so it seems. And if not that, then the logical mistake of using existence as a predicate. If a subject knows anything at all, whether from its propositions or otherwise, then its existence is given which makes knowing it exists, quite superfluous.
—————

the subject, while the active state is not instantiated, is not non-existent, but existent in a state of potentiality, in which every aspect of its essence (with the exception of a few; I'm sure you can guess which ones are active and which are not) are still existent. — TheGreatArcanum

So the mind has a process, which involves a series of steps, so to speak. At some point in that process, according to your theory, some steps are inactive because the subject is not actually thinking, per se. What happens to the input to a system, when it meets an inactive step? What comes out the other side, if its activity is blocked by an inactive step in the process? It sounds to me like you’re proposing the aspects of the subject are still there, but just not doing anything.

OK, so....there is an aspect in which the subject’s active state is not instantiated, meaning the subject is not engaged in thought, and I name it “sensibility”. It is that in which the matter of perceptions (theoretically, mind you) is found, and gives to the active, thinking subject its material, which I name phenomena. But as you can see, it is very far from inactive, for otherwise, we might perceive an object but never be given the means to henceforth think it as the representation of, e.g., “bulldozer”.

This is all quite reasonable, given that all sensations, traveling from the receptivity of organs responsible for each type along their specialized, dedicated nerves to the CNS, the empirical facts and therefore the absolute necessity of which we are never the least bit conscious.

Now....state of potentiality. Sounds at first rather far-fetched. Seemingly wants to be reduced to possibility, which just sounds better. But that reduction misses a very fine point that potentiality grants, and that is....there is no smell of frying bacon unless bacon is in fact frying. Experience tells us that the stuff frying is bacon, but potentiality tells us how bacon would smell if it fries. Your potentiality is not far-fetched at all; I just name it differently, as intuition.
—————-

even people who disagree with my philosophy are going to love my philosophy simply because of its poeticness and its originality. — TheGreatArcanum

Weeellllll....it isn’t all that original, and I don’t want my philosophy poetic. But your thinking is admirable nonetheless. You know.....cuz it adjoins my own enough to say so. Which only means we both might be so FOS our eyes are brown. (Grin)

No exceptions taken there. However, what about the proposition : All events must have a cause. Assuming that is a classic synthetic a priori proposition, can you put that into context? — 3017amen
I do not like defining things in terms of causes because the term is ambiguous, and one must also distinguish between physical causes and mental causes, because they are not the same, for one involves spatial relations and the other does not. The mere existence of physical causation is an assumption, yet hitherto, philosophers have thought it reasonable to ground their philosophies in the supposed truth that "all events must have a (physical) cause." According to my understanding, this proposition must be changed to "all events must have a mental cause," and this is because subjectivity in itself is transcendent of space. This means that all physical causes are mental causes in disguise. — TheGreatArcanum

TGA!

Well, let's see, in the context of physics (and metaphysics), most all theories, experiments and the like start with synthetic propositions because they can be tested and proven/disproven. So quite simply, that distinction involves physical causes or causation. There is no escaping that.

Now with respect to mental causation and philosophy/psychology, self-awareness seems like the concept in which to parse. For example, we have the metaphysical Will (Schopenhauer), that is a part of conscious existence. In contrast to pure instinct, we have self-aware, volitional Beings, moving through time and space (our existence), who are causing things to happen, and change. And we do that through consciousness (which its nature cannot be explained logically). So in a humanistic way, we have a sense of basic causation both immaterial and material.

And so to speak to your OP 'process of thought', if that simple example (causation) is ambiguous, how do we go about describing mental events? Are you referring to philosophical/metaphysical Idealism?

And, what are you thinking is transcendent of perception? — 3017amen
the essence of subjectivity in itself is transcendent of perception. — TheGreatArcanum

Can you please provide an example?