A Model of Consciousness

Enrique

This is a post from a different thread that is enough of a diversion from the main topic to start a new discussion. The following is a brief summation of a model of consciousness that I've presented previously at this forum, but since I seem to be getting interest and we have some new contributors, maybe you guys would like to talk about it. I certainly appreciate anyone's input as it helps me refine and expand these ideas.

In exactly what way consciousness emerged via evolution is a mystery, but we can be fairly certain about what had to obtain in order for it to be possible. Initially, electrical properties in aggregates of tissue such as the brain needed to be robust enough that a stable supervenience of electromagnetic field (EMF) was created by systematic electrical fluxing.

Quantum effects in molecules of the body are sensitive to trace EMF energy sources (similar to magnetoreception), creating a structural complex of relatively thermodynamic mass containing pockets of relatively quantum biochemistry integrated by sustained radiation.

EMF/quantum hybridization is likely responsible for our synthetic experience of qualia, how we perceive unfathomably minute and diverse fluctuating in environments as a perpetualized substrate, perturbed by its surroundings but never vanishing while we are awake and lucid, the essence of perceptual “stream of consciousness”.

Nonlocal phenomena are ever underlying the macroscopic substance of qualitative consciousness, its EMF properties as well as bulked matter in which nonlocality is partially dampened, and quantum processes in cells interface perception instantiated in bodies with nonlocality of the natural world which is still enigmatic to scientific knowledge.

Quantum features of biochemistry have likely been refined evolutionarily so that mechanisms by which relative nonlocality affects organisms, mechanisms of EMF/matter interfacing, mechanisms targeting particular environmental stimuli via functionally tailored pigments along with further classes of molecules and cellular tissues, and mechanisms for translation of stimulus into representational memory all became increasingly coordinated until an arrangement involving what we call ‘intentionality’ emerged, a mind with executive functions of deliberative interpretation and strategizing, beyond mere reflex-centric memory conjoined to stimulus/response.

Qualitative consciousness precedes the degree of unification we experience as humanlike awareness, for qualia can exist and perform a functional role in consort with quantum effects and additional gradations of nonlocal reality while an organism is almost entirely lacking the centralized control we would classify as intention.

Every facet of this consciousness theory is observable via research: quantum biochemistry in a thermodynamically physiological substrate that also includes more traditionally neuronal mechanisms, integrated by EMFs. All we require is to find the anatomical systems and classes of molecules involved, then correlate with subjectivity and the dynamics of nonlocality in general. Some of this will be psychology, some traditional chemistry, some quantum, and some will exceed what has thus far been discovered of nonlocal processes in nature by physical science.

Also key to the model is the assertion, yet to be verified, that many forms of quantum process such as entanglement and superposition produce qualia at a fundamental level. Essentially, it is intrinsic of matter to perceive and feel, or at least contain fragments of perception and feeling, and these quantum resonance properties will be as objective as shape and size.

Aryamoy Mitra

In exactly what way consciousness emerged via evolution is a mystery, but we can be fairly certain about what had to obtain in order for it to be possible. Initially, electrical properties in aggregates of tissue such as the brain needed to be robust enough that a stable supervenience of electromagnetic field (EMF) was created by systematic electrical fluxing. — Enrique

EMF refers to an electromotive force; are you denoting the emergence of one, or merely abbreviating an Electromagnetic Field?

Quantum features of biochemistry have likely been refined evolutionarily so that mechanisms by which relative nonlocality affects organisms, mechanisms of EMF/matter interfacing, mechanisms targeting particular environmental stimuli via functionally tailored pigments along with further classes of molecules and cellular tissues, and mechanisms for translation of stimulus into representational memory all became increasingly coordinated until an arrangement involving what we call ‘intentionality’ emerged, a mind with executive functions of deliberative interpretation and strategizing, beyond mere reflex-centric memory conjoined to stimulus/response. — Enrique

How are you substantiating, if at all, these assertions? Relative Nonlocality is not a notion pertinent to evolutionary concepts. I'm not educated enough to meaningfully apprehend your statements on representational memory, though.

Enrique

EMF refers to an electromotive force; are you denoting the emergence of one, or merely abbreviating an Electromagnetic Field? — Aryamoy Mitra

I mean electromagnetic field.

Rigorously, Quantum Nonlocality is a formalization of the measurement statistics associated with a QM system (constituents of which, for instance, may preclude the explanatory utility of local hidden variables). When you're invoking the phrase 'nonlocality of the natural world', are you being metaphorical - or literal? — Aryamoy Mitra

To my knowledge, nonlocality has been scientifically modeled to a minimal extent. What comes to my mind is causal connections that transcend Newtonian locality in objects and forces, as if reality has a wormholelike foundation so saturated with nonlocal processes that it is more akin to what I call a coherence field, a supraspacetime substrate of wavelike currents that synchronize matter, move across large distances almost instantaneously, and can transmit through matter as if it is stationary by comparison. Body and mind can feel and perceive this nonlocality just like eyes see color and ears hear sound, and like the senses as conventionally construed, some of this awareness is conscious, some semiconscious, and some unconscious.

My theory is that it is trillions of pockets of quantum biochemistry within the body which enable an organism to experience this nonlocality, in mechanisms resembling magnetoreception. Chemical reactions that involve tunneling, superposition, entanglement and coherence are like microscopic nonlocal machinery functioning to link with the nonlocal causality permeating nature behind the scenes of our five senses.

That's my intuition, the truth has yet to be modeled by science.

are you suggesting that one elicit the Electromagnetic Fields generated by one's neuronal impulses - manipulate them, and discern whether they act as determinants to one's state of mind? — Aryamoy Mitra

I'm suggesting that the electromagnetic field of the brain and body is the binding agent of consciousness. We perceive and feel sensations with our quantum and thermodynamic biochemistry, and the organic emf makes this chemistry seem like a unified medium, an experiential field that biochemical processes occur within. Perception is the additiveness of quantum biochemistry within an emf substrate, amounting to extremely complex superpositions of entanglement systems within entanglement systems which take effect in both bottom up and top down ways. This quantum/electromagnetic hybridization is especially prevalent in the nervous system, and responsible for brain waves as registered by an EEG.

One can interpret this proposition, but how might one commence an endeavor to verify it? Qualia are neither empirically amenable, nor traceable by scientific edifices (with a few exceptions, perhaps, in neuropsychological constructs). — Aryamoy Mitra

Exactly, by neuropsychological constructs, but subjects must report their personal experiences in a detail that has not yet been approached, and entirely new classes of molecule will probably need to be discovered before we solidly grasp quantum features of qualia and qualitative perception.

I'll stop to see what you guys think of that, and then maybe we can get into more specifics where you're interested or willing.

Wayfarer

↪Enrique

One question that casually comes to my mind is whether fields are only electro-magnetic. I mean, electromagnetic fields were discovered specifically through the investigation of matter and the interactions of charged particles, observation of which enabled scientists to measure them and calculate the forces involved. But what if there are other kinds of fields - mental fields, if you like - whose nature has not been discovered, because they don’t show up in the physical interactions of material bodies? Maybe whatever binds the component functions into the subjective unity of experience is not electro-magnetic but psychic in nature. But then, science is not likely to discover that, because there’s no physical analogy for it, whereas electromagnetic fields are at least plausibly analogous to such a field, should there be one.

I know, kind of a left-field idea but thought I put it out there.

Enrique

Maybe whatever binds the component functions into the subjective unity of experience is not electro-magnetic but psychic in nature. But then, science is not likely to discover that, because there’s no physical analogy for it, whereas electromagnetic fields are at least plausibly analogous to such a field, should there be one. — Wayfarer

Since standing electromagnetic wave signatures as measured by EEG are so closely tied to states of awareness, and these states correlated with biochemistry, it seems to me that the primary agent binding cellular anatomy into an integrated stream of consciousness within the brain is probably electromagnetic force exerted upon microscopic quantum nonlocalities such as superpositioned entanglements.

But as far as coherence fields more generally, they doubtless have psychic properties which extend beyond the brain itself and interact with it via nonlocal causation. So electromagnetic fields may be one of a wide variety of coherence fields types. I think science will be able to eventually discover all kinds of coherence fields that have not to this point been classified for various reasons, and this will greatly enrich our technology and comprehension of psychology.

Manuel

Also key to the model is the assertion, yet to be verified, that many forms of quantum process such as entanglement and superposition produce qualia at a fundamental level. Essentially, it is intrinsic of matter to perceive and feel, or at least contain fragments of perception and feeling, and these quantum resonance properties will be as objective as shape and size. — Enrique

Does your model follow certain aspects of Penrose's and Hammeroff's theory?

It's hard to say if quantum processes produce consciousness. It's plausible. We now know that physical stuff is far more sophisticated than what is initially apparent in common sense thought, so in some vague sense, the potential for consciousness and for everything else, can be found at bottom level of the universe. On the other hand, it may not be necessary for these new properties to arise.

If it turns out that it is not the case and that consciousness arises much later in evolution, then we have to look at the issue by way of emergence, which is a real phenomenon, but one that doesn't say much. There's also a huge leap between experience, such as the type of experience we attribute to say birds and self-consciousness, where we can reflect on this experience. That's also a very hard problem. At this stage, it's worth pursuing all options.

Wayfarer

I think science will be able to eventually discover all kinds of coherence fields that have not to this point been classified for various reasons, and this will greatly enrich our technology and comprehension of psychology. — Enrique

What would be the instrument that does that, if it is not psyche?

Enrique

Does your model follow certain aspects of Penrose's and Hammeroff's theory? — Manuel

The Orch-Or theory of Penrose and Hameroff as I grasp it seems to propose the qualitative as a cycle of coherence states occurring in microtubules, comprised of superpositions punctuated by wave function collapse. I agree that qualitative perception probably involves cyclical processes, feedback loops and such, but from what I read the microtubule mechanism has been discredited.

My theory claims that emfs blended with the superpositioned entanglements of molecular complexes are responsible for qualitative perception. What better explanation for qualia than the same wave synthesis mechanism that produces a visible spectrum? Solves the biochemistry to qualia translation problem rather simply: most matter has qualialike features at a very basic level.

The challenge will be to find these molecules that participate in highly organized additive (superpositioned) wavelength and which are also sensitive to emfs. I imagine the mechanism will be a synchrony of the electromagnetic fields generated by neuron synapsing with more conventional biochemistry in glial cells or the soma.

There's also a huge leap between experience, such as the type of experience we attribute to say birds and self-consciousness, where we can reflect on this experience. — Manuel

I'm guessing that a bird's brain generates qualitativity in much the same way as our rather closely related human brains - emf/superposition hybridizing within a coordination of lobes - though the specifics of biochemistry are of course somewhat different.

What would be the instrument that does that, if it is not psyche? — Wayfarer

The psyche will be proven to arise from physical principles, though this physical science of the future may be a collaborative synthesis with psychology and spirituality that we in the present day can barely fathom. I hope so!

T Clark

In exactly what way consciousness emerged via evolution is a mystery, but we can be fairly certain about what had to obtain in order for it to be possible. — Enrique

I think the mechanisms for consciousness presented in this post are highly unlikely. To tell the truth, I don't understand what the descriptions mean. I doubt that quantum mechanics has anything special to do with consciousness beyond it's influence on all small scale phenomena. If you are going to provide novel theories of mental phenomena, you should provide references that support your beliefs.

Manuel

What better explanation for qualia than the same wave synthesis mechanism that produces a visible spectrum? Solves the biochemistry to qualia translation problem rather simply: most matter has qualialike features at a very basic level. — Enrique

I can't go too deeply into technical matters, cause I'll get lost. So I'll try to keep it fairly basic, if that's OK with you. I can see the attractive appeal of linking "wave synthesis mechanism that produces a visible spectrum", but this presents several issues, quite apart from what mechanisms may be involved in such an act.

One would be that by staying at the visible spectrum, we are putting aside non-visual qualia, such as sound and taste. It's quite hard, if not impossible, to try and figure out how what we hear resembles anything in nature. With sight, the issue seems to be easier (but maybe it is not): the color red resembles that apple I see.

So what mechanism would have to be invoked that solves the problem of non-visual qualia?

I'm guessing that a bird's brain generates qualitativity in much the same way as our rather closely related human brains - emf/superposition hybridizing within a coordination of lobes - though the specifics of biochemistry are of course somewhat different. — Enrique

I think this could very well be plausible. Of course, we have no way of testing this, but there appears to be no logical contradiction here. Self consciousness, however, is particularly sophisticated with human beings. It brings forth, to my mind, significantly more complexity than experience by itself, which is also very hard to grasp theoretically.

Enrique

One would be that by staying at the visible spectrum, we are putting aside non-visual qualia, such as sound and taste. It's quite hard, if not impossible, to try and figure out how what we hear resembles anything in nature. With sight, the issue seems to be easier (but maybe it is not): the color red resembles that apple I see. So what mechanism would have to be invoked that solves the problem of non-visual qualia? — Manuel

The idea is that all qualia are various kinds of superposition amongst large collections of waves or wavicles, and the range of possibilities is vast. So sound, touch, taste, smell, sight, feel are all at base different types of quantum resonance composed of diverse matter.

we have no way of testing this — Manuel

Not yet, though researchers will find ingenious ways to accomplish it.

Enrique

I think the mechanisms for consciousness presented in this post are highly unlikely. To tell the truth, I don't understand what the descriptions mean. I doubt that quantum mechanics has anything special to do with consciousness beyond it's influence on all small scale phenomena. If you are going to provide novel theories of mental phenomena, you should provide references that support your beliefs. — T Clark

I can give you a reference that a poster at this forum pointed me towards, written by a very well-respected science author, Johnjoe McFadden: https://aeon.co/essays/does-consciousness-come-from-the-brains-electromagnetic-field . It proffers similar concepts related to the role of emfs.

T Clark

I can give you a reference that a poster at this forum pointed me towards, written by a very well-respected science author, Johnjoe McFadden: — Enrique

I found the article very unconvincing, but it is at least a source to back up your ideas and give them some credibility. I must admit, it don't get the whole "hard problem of consciousness" thing. For me, consciousness appears to be an emergent phenomena that arises through the interaction of physical and biological processes in the same way that life arises from chemistry. What's the big deal?

Manuel

Not yet, though researchers will find ingenious ways to accomplish it. — Enrique

Perhaps. But it would make more sense to try and establish how other people have experience first. We take it for granted, but we can't find a way to test it, i.e. I can't get into your or anybody else's head. I

Manuel

I must admit, it don't get the whole "hard problem of consciousness" thing. For me, consciousness appears to be an emergent phenomena that arises through the interaction of physical and biological processes in the same way that life arises from chemistry. What's the big deal? — T Clark

I tend to agree very much with that view.

I only would add that I think there are many hard problems: gravity, life, matter, etc.

You don't have a personal "hard problem" in philosophy, meaning a question that is particularly difficult that you'd like to understand?

T Clark

I tend to agree very much with that view. — Manuel

It seemed to me that McFadden's article and your explication were both based on the idea that we need some sort of special explanation for consciousness. That, for me, is just another way of describing the "hard problem." Maybe I misunderstood.

You don't have a personal "hard problem" in philosophy, meaning a question that is particularly difficult that you'd like to understand? — Manuel

I believe that reality is a function of an external universe of some sort processed through our particular human bodies and minds. If that's true, is it possible for us to know, understand, perceive anything outside those limits?

Manuel

It seemed to me that McFadden's article and your explication were both based on the idea that we need some sort of special explanation for consciousness. That, for me, is just another way of describing the "hard problem." Maybe I misunderstood. — T Clark

No, I'm not convinced either that physics will tell us much about consciousness. But, I could be wrong so I like to follow different arguments, in so far as I can roughly understand them. I don't propose to have any answer, and what you suggest, in terms of emergence and biology, rings true to me.

I believe that reality is a function of an external universe of some sort processed through our particular human bodies and minds. If that's true, is it possible for us to know, understand, perceive anything outside those limits? — T Clark

Interesting. We have essentially the exact same "hard problem". I frame it in terms of "things in themselves", but it's the same problem, in essence.

T Clark

Interesting. We have essentially the exact same "hard problem". I frame it in terms of "things in themselves", but it's the same problem, in essence. — Manuel

If you mean what I think you mean when you say "things in themselves," I think we are talking about different issues. To me, the nature of "things in themselves" is dependent on the structure of our minds. I am involved in two discussions right now, one on Taoism and one on mysticism, which try to address "things in themselves." Taoism and other forms of mysticism are fundamentally human and don't get us beyond the limits I am talking about.

I think I've gone off on a tangent from the subject of the opening post.

SteveMinjares

Here is my assessment while trying to creat my own AI (Artificial Intelligence)

Consciousness is a series of impulses in “pursuit of gratification” and “avoidance of consequence” being the 1 and 0 of programming.

Consciousness purpose is to try to navigate the physical and emotional maze. And how intelligence reasons each action action.

Basic core of human programming is pursue gratification while avoiding moral dilemma.

Vessuvius

↪Enrique

It seems to me that your model of Consciousness is unduly broad in that it incorporates a variety of systematical frameworks, such as may each apply in a very narrow context and with ideas of Quantum Nonlocality being an example of this, that aren't themselves requisite, nor necessary a priori for the emergence of Conscious Thought. Your manner of phrase also, is not so much unusual as indefinite in its implication; for instance, you refer to the so-called 'stable supervenience of an electromagnetic-field as created by systematic fluxing', presumably when describing the voltage-based outputs and channels associated with both large and well-defined neural substrates that themselves serve as the foundation for all cognitive processes so far as we know. Yet, any corresponding subject is left unspecified in this case, in that one doesn't find or otherwise cannot decide what the field is meant to supervene upon so as to leave the phrase itself semantically incomplete. Moreover, neural-structures aren't electromagnetic, in that while a voltage-based component indeed applies, it doesn't follow that there applies a magnetic component as well, or at least its effect is so minimal as to not even exert a perceptible force when active, and the latter term may therefore be omitted outright in applications of neural-modelling. To cite another example of the deficiencies of your choice of phrasing and theoretical exploration, consider the following; you regard a sustained radiative exposure as per your own words, as allowing for the integration of conscious perception, but the only influence which this has is to increase the available degree of radiation to measurement within that area immediately proximate to the organism. Granted, the examination of such exposure within a clinical context could conceivably result in DNA breakage, and in consequence a later development of cancer as those genes which regulate various growth factors, and tumor suppression, cease to act in the way they should; none of which, however, necessarily pertains to Consciousness, let alone the exact mechanisms which give it rise. Thus, there is beget the question of what facts of life you think yourself to have stumbled upon besides so vague an outline as you have presented?

On a secondary note, you leave me with the impression of one who has a great potential to contribute to the furtherance of man's knowledge of the world, and just as well his own understanding of his place within its sphere, but who for lack of opportunity has been disallowed from gaining that betterment of education which is a most essential step in refining one's ideas so far as to receive in them a proper credence and exploration of the reality of things. To this end, I would mean to suggest that you seek out any number of formal research papers on the subjects of both Biochemistry, the neural-structures associated with Consciousness, among others, and thereby establish a much finer understanding of those sets of notions which you have since invoked so carelessly, albeit in that most noble pursuit of self-knowledge. And, bearing in mind the nobility of this pursuit, I suppose what carelessness you have hitherto shown may be excused.

Enrique

I must admit, it don't get the whole "hard problem of consciousness" thing. For me, consciousness appears to be an emergent phenomena that arises through the interaction of physical and biological processes in the same way that life arises from chemistry. What's the big deal? — T Clark

I think consciousness is considered a difficult problem in philosophy because for hundreds of years it has proven impossible to explain how chemistry which is essentially nonexperiential produces the experience of "what it is like" to be someone. The experiential elements philosophy of mind terms qualia aren't simply in the objects of perception themselves, they're in the brain or somewhere else, and are not merely neurons but much more complex. Something further exists, but what it is has long been a mystery.

I think I've figured out what the solution is going to look like, but the research is still to be performed that will identify exactly what molecules, anatomical systems and nonlocal phenomena are involved. I also consider solving the hard problem to be relatively typical as scientific progress, not anything constrained to the purview of philosophy as especially arcane or abstract, though Dennett, Nagel and more have made great thought experiments outlining some of the issues involved. The trick is seeing through the mind/body duality illusions which have been perpetuated.

T Clark

I think consciousness is considered a difficult problem in philosophy because for hundreds of years it has proven impossible to explain how chemistry which is essentially nonexperiential produces the experience of "what it is like" to be someone. — Enrique

I'm going to rewrite this:

I think ~~consciousness~~ life is considered a difficult problem in philosophy because for hundreds of years it has proven impossible to explain how chemistry which is essentially ~~nonexperiential~~ non-living produces ~~the experience of "what it is like" to be someone~~ living organisms.

Do you agree with that sentence? It wasn't so long ago that philosophers and scientists couldn't imagine life arising without some sort of outside influence - they called it "vital essence." That's pretty much gone by the wayside now. Although there is no final answer yet, scientists have hypothesized and are studying mechanisms by which non-living materials can create life. It's called abiogenesis.

I think the analogy to consciousness is a good one. I think people are blinded because consciousness is so personal. It must be special. But it's not.

Manuel

↪T Clark

You keep making good comments here. :)

I think consciousness is considered a difficult problem in philosophy because for hundreds of years it has proven impossible to explain how chemistry which is essentially nonexperiential produces the experience of "what it is like" to be someone — Enrique

You are correct, it is a hard problem. There are others too, mentioned by smart people:

As Darwin said: "Why is thought, being a secretion of the brain, more wonderful than gravity, a property of matter? It is our arrogance, it is our admiration of ourselves…"
— Charles Darwin

Or Schopenahuer: "The tendency to gravity in the stone is precisely as inexplicable as is thinking in the human brain, and so on this score, we could also infer a spirit in the stone. Therefore to these disputants [between 'spiritualists' and 'materialists'] I would say: you think you know a dead matter, that is, one that is completely passive and devoid of properties, because you imagine you really understand everything that you are able to reduce to mechanical effect. But… you are unable to reduce them… If matter can fall to earth without you knowing why, so can it also think without you knowing why… If your dead and purely passive matter can as heaviness gravitate, or as electricity attract, repel, and emit spark, so too as brain pulp can it think."

Finally Chomsky: "History also suggests caution. In early modern science, the nature of motion was the "hard problem." "Springing or Elastic Motions" is the "hard rock in Philosophy," Sir William Petty observed, proposing ideas resembling those soon developed much more richly by Newton. The ''hard problem" was that bodies that seem to our senses to be at rest are in a "violent" state, with "a strong endeavor to fly off or recede from one another," in Robert Boyle's words."

T Clark

↪Manuel

Good quotes. I'll keep them around for my next consciousness discussion.

Manuel

↪T Clark

:up:

Enrique

I think the analogy to consciousness is a good one. I think people are blinded because consciousness is so personal. It must be special. But it's not. — T Clark

Exactly why I said, "I also consider solving the hard problem to be relatively typical as scientific progress, not anything constrained to the purview of philosophy as especially arcane or abstract". So we agree.

Enrique

deleted

Wayfarer

I must admit, it don't get the whole "hard problem of consciousness" thing. For me, consciousness appears to be an emergent phenomena that arises through the interaction of physical and biological processes in the same way that life arises from chemistry. What's the big deal? — T Clark

Note the original essay by David Chalmers was Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

At issue is the nature of first-person experience, which according to the essay, is categorically different to the third-person description of neural activities and physiology. The key paragraph is:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

Chalmers acknowledges that you can provide a functional description of cognition:

The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a mechanism that can perform the function. The methods of cognitive science are well-suited for this sort of explanation, and so are well-suited to the easy problems of consciousness. By contrast, the hard problem is hard precisely because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained.

You could theoretically reproduce all the findings of cognitive science in symbolic form, such that an alien intelligence could interpret and understand them. But you could not reproduce the experience of being human in such an objective medium. It is not amenable to third-person reduction.

As Darwin said: "Why is thought, being a secretion of the brain, more wonderful than gravity, a property of matter? It is our arrogance, it is our admiration of ourselves…"
— Charles Darwin — Manuel

Darwin also said

But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?
[To William Graham 3 July 1881]

Manuel

Darwin also said

But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?
[To William Graham 3 July 1881] — Wayfarer

Sure. It's the phenomenon we are most intimately acquainted with, it's awesome. But I don't see how this quote contradicts his earlier point at all.

Wayfarer

↪Manuel

Arithmetical proofs, and logical arguments, and many of the other aspects of mental operations, are not phenomena, phenomena being 'appearance'.

I reacted against that other Darwin statement because it's classical materialism, 'the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile'. If that were true, then the same 'horrid doubt' should apply, because if to accept something purely on the basis of chemical necessity is to reject the sovereignity of reason.

I think I've figured out what the solution is going to look like, but the research is still to be performed that will identify exactly what molecules, anatomical systems and nonlocal phenomena are involved. — Enrique

I think it's like what Karl Popper calls 'the promisory notes of materialism'. 'We don't understand it yet, but we're making terrific progress, and we'll crack it in the end'. Francis Crick was sure it was within reach, and wrote his last book on that very premise, but I think it's un-crackable in principle.

The problem is not a technical issue but one of perspective. Scientific analysis relies on the ability to objectively frame a problem, to examine its parts and understand how they work together. But the nature of the mind (in philosophical terms, not in terms of cognitive science) is such that we're never able to 'objectify' it in that sense. I don't believe that obtaining insight into the real nature of the mind is dependent on the physical sciences whatever, it's not something we're progressing towards by painstaking assembly of data.

Manuel

Arithmetical proofs, and logical arguments, and many of the other aspects of mental operations, are not phenomena, phenomena being 'appearance'.

I reacted against that other Darwin statement because it's classical materialism, 'the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile'. If that were true, then the same 'horrid doubt' should apply, because if to accept something purely on the basis of chemical necessity is to reject the sovereignity of reason. — Wayfarer

I wouldn't think about it that way. I don't see any contradiction between brain secreting thought and reason being sovereign. You can think of emergence, if that helps. I probably, a while back shared this quote to you, maybe not. I think Priestley has is correct when he says (this is taken from another thread):

"It is said that we can have no conception how sensation or thought can arise from matter, they being things so very different from it, and bearing no sort of resemblance to anything like figure or motion; which is all that can result from any modification of matter, or any operation upon it.…this is an argument which derives all its force from our ignorance.Different as are the properties of sensation and thought, from such as are usually ascribed to matter, they may, nevertheless, inhere in the same substance, unless we can shew them to be absolutely incompatible with one another.”... this argument, from our not being able to conceive how a thing can be, equally affects the immaterial system: for we have no more conception how the powers of sensation and thought can inhere in an immaterial, than in a material substance..."

(Italics mine)

"...there [is] in matter a capacity for affections as subtle and complex as any thing that we can affirm concerning those that have hitherto been called mental affections."

So I don't have a conception of matter that excludes thought at all. This plays no contradictory role for me when I speak about Platonism, for example.

A Model of Consciousness

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