In exactly what way consciousness emerged via evolution is a mystery, but we can be fairly certain about what had to obtain in order for it to be possible. Initially, electrical properties in aggregates of tissue such as the brain needed to be robust enough that a stable supervenience of electromagnetic field (EMF) was created by systematic electrical fluxing. — Enrique
Quantum features of biochemistry have likely been refined evolutionarily so that mechanisms by which relative nonlocality affects organisms, mechanisms of EMF/matter interfacing, mechanisms targeting particular environmental stimuli via functionally tailored pigments along with further classes of molecules and cellular tissues, and mechanisms for translation of stimulus into representational memory all became increasingly coordinated until an arrangement involving what we call ‘intentionality’ emerged, a mind with executive functions of deliberative interpretation and strategizing, beyond mere reflex-centric memory conjoined to stimulus/response. — Enrique
EMF refers to an electromotive force; are you denoting the emergence of one, or merely abbreviating an Electromagnetic Field? — Aryamoy Mitra
Rigorously, Quantum Nonlocality is a formalization of the measurement statistics associated with a QM system (constituents of which, for instance, may preclude the explanatory utility of local hidden variables). When you're invoking the phrase 'nonlocality of the natural world', are you being metaphorical - or literal? — Aryamoy Mitra
are you suggesting that one elicit the Electromagnetic Fields generated by one's neuronal impulses - manipulate them, and discern whether they act as determinants to one's state of mind? — Aryamoy Mitra
One can interpret this proposition, but how might one commence an endeavor to verify it? Qualia are neither empirically amenable, nor traceable by scientific edifices (with a few exceptions, perhaps, in neuropsychological constructs). — Aryamoy Mitra
Maybe whatever binds the component functions into the subjective unity of experience is not electro-magnetic but psychic in nature. But then, science is not likely to discover that, because there’s no physical analogy for it, whereas electromagnetic fields are at least plausibly analogous to such a field, should there be one. — Wayfarer
Also key to the model is the assertion, yet to be verified, that many forms of quantum process such as entanglement and superposition produce qualia at a fundamental level. Essentially, it is intrinsic of matter to perceive and feel, or at least contain fragments of perception and feeling, and these quantum resonance properties will be as objective as shape and size. — Enrique
I think science will be able to eventually discover all kinds of coherence fields that have not to this point been classified for various reasons, and this will greatly enrich our technology and comprehension of psychology. — Enrique
Does your model follow certain aspects of Penrose's and Hammeroff's theory? — Manuel
There's also a huge leap between experience, such as the type of experience we attribute to say birds and self-consciousness, where we can reflect on this experience. — Manuel
What would be the instrument that does that, if it is not psyche? — Wayfarer
In exactly what way consciousness emerged via evolution is a mystery, but we can be fairly certain about what had to obtain in order for it to be possible. — Enrique
What better explanation for qualia than the same wave synthesis mechanism that produces a visible spectrum? Solves the biochemistry to qualia translation problem rather simply: most matter has qualialike features at a very basic level. — Enrique
I'm guessing that a bird's brain generates qualitativity in much the same way as our rather closely related human brains - emf/superposition hybridizing within a coordination of lobes - though the specifics of biochemistry are of course somewhat different. — Enrique
One would be that by staying at the visible spectrum, we are putting aside non-visual qualia, such as sound and taste. It's quite hard, if not impossible, to try and figure out how what we hear resembles anything in nature. With sight, the issue seems to be easier (but maybe it is not): the color red resembles that apple I see. So what mechanism would have to be invoked that solves the problem of non-visual qualia? — Manuel
we have no way of testing this — Manuel
I think the mechanisms for consciousness presented in this post are highly unlikely. To tell the truth, I don't understand what the descriptions mean. I doubt that quantum mechanics has anything special to do with consciousness beyond it's influence on all small scale phenomena. If you are going to provide novel theories of mental phenomena, you should provide references that support your beliefs. — T Clark
I can give you a reference that a poster at this forum pointed me towards, written by a very well-respected science author, Johnjoe McFadden: — Enrique
Not yet, though researchers will find ingenious ways to accomplish it. — Enrique
I must admit, it don't get the whole "hard problem of consciousness" thing. For me, consciousness appears to be an emergent phenomena that arises through the interaction of physical and biological processes in the same way that life arises from chemistry. What's the big deal? — T Clark
I tend to agree very much with that view. — Manuel
You don't have a personal "hard problem" in philosophy, meaning a question that is particularly difficult that you'd like to understand? — Manuel
It seemed to me that McFadden's article and your explication were both based on the idea that we need some sort of special explanation for consciousness. That, for me, is just another way of describing the "hard problem." Maybe I misunderstood. — T Clark
I believe that reality is a function of an external universe of some sort processed through our particular human bodies and minds. If that's true, is it possible for us to know, understand, perceive anything outside those limits? — T Clark
Interesting. We have essentially the exact same "hard problem". I frame it in terms of "things in themselves", but it's the same problem, in essence. — Manuel
I must admit, it don't get the whole "hard problem of consciousness" thing. For me, consciousness appears to be an emergent phenomena that arises through the interaction of physical and biological processes in the same way that life arises from chemistry. What's the big deal? — T Clark
I think consciousness is considered a difficult problem in philosophy because for hundreds of years it has proven impossible to explain how chemistry which is essentially nonexperiential produces the experience of "what it is like" to be someone. — Enrique
I think consciousness is considered a difficult problem in philosophy because for hundreds of years it has proven impossible to explain how chemistry which is essentially nonexperiential produces the experience of "what it is like" to be someone — Enrique
I think the analogy to consciousness is a good one. I think people are blinded because consciousness is so personal. It must be special. But it's not. — T Clark
I must admit, it don't get the whole "hard problem of consciousness" thing. For me, consciousness appears to be an emergent phenomena that arises through the interaction of physical and biological processes in the same way that life arises from chemistry. What's the big deal? — T Clark
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.
The easy problems are easy precisely because they concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions. To explain a cognitive function, we need only specify a mechanism that can perform the function. The methods of cognitive science are well-suited for this sort of explanation, and so are well-suited to the easy problems of consciousness. By contrast, the hard problem is hard precisely because it is not a problem about the performance of functions. The problem persists even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained.
As Darwin said: "Why is thought, being a secretion of the brain, more wonderful than gravity, a property of matter? It is our arrogance, it is our admiration of ourselves…"
— Charles Darwin — Manuel
But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?
[To William Graham 3 July 1881]
Darwin also said
But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?
[To William Graham 3 July 1881] — Wayfarer
I think I've figured out what the solution is going to look like, but the research is still to be performed that will identify exactly what molecules, anatomical systems and nonlocal phenomena are involved. — Enrique
Arithmetical proofs, and logical arguments, and many of the other aspects of mental operations, are not phenomena, phenomena being 'appearance'.
I reacted against that other Darwin statement because it's classical materialism, 'the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile'. If that were true, then the same 'horrid doubt' should apply, because if to accept something purely on the basis of chemical necessity is to reject the sovereignity of reason. — Wayfarer
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