I am no more obliged to respect another than I am myself; — Mww
I asked if you would grant that morality derives from respect. — Banno
You're not behaving morally, nor immorally, if you are acting only out of obligation. — Banno
It's a point on which I'd like to see where you stand, because it's not clear where you stand on the issue of intention.Do you actually think that moral issues can be adequately addressed without reference to the person's intention?
— baker
Queer, that you could garner this from my post. — Banno
Surely you mean that morality derives from respect for _specific_ others, and not for just anyone.Surely you’d grant that morality derives from respect for others, not for oneself... — Banno
How do you do that?Much of what I do involves showing children how to look after each other so that they look after themselves. — Banno
I'm not sure if I'm understanding you correctly ... but what you're saying seems to describe a person whose self-respect depends on how they treat others. Is this correct?I think, to use these terms, morality derives respect (care) for oneself by one habitualizing (non-reciprocal) respect (care) for others. — 180 Proof
And if something is morally valuable, then it is morally good and if something is morally disvalued then it is morally bad. These are conceptual truths about morality and cannot seriously be disputed. — Bartricks
Thus, moral norms and values are composed of the prescribing and proscribing and valuing activity of an external mind. And for reasons that I will leave for later discussion, that mind will be the mind of God. — Bartricks
Is there a case where that which is deemed good has been made so via a confrontation with that which is bad? And if so, doesn't that make bad good? And wouldn't good and bad then be relative? — James Riley
That reminds me of a discussion in the other thread about "law is law" and the issue of "Natural Law." Some understandings we have about good and bad seem to be innate to our being. Sure, we have our aberrations, but generally speaking, we know better. As a universal pantheist (as opposed to universal panentheist) I've got not problem with calling it "God." — James Riley
And I am not sure why you think it implies relativism....I mean, I think moral relativism is true, but I don't see why 'this' implies it — Bartricks
I am not sure what universal pantheism — Bartricks
or they mean simply that we are born with a disposition to believe or sense certain acts to be right/wrong or good/bad. Which may be true, but is beside the point when the issue is what the rightness/wrongness or goodness/badness 'is'. — Bartricks
I think God would not disvalue or hate anything. — James Riley
Universal Penentheism would have a God over gods. Compare: Universal Pantheism allows for all Gods and if any one wants to be top dog, okay. My lay understanding of physics dictates that it's all true, and not, at the same time (and not) and that is what brings me to Pantheism over Panentheism. — James Riley
That's me, the birth disposition part. A — James Riley
And, by definition, it would not be besides the point. — James Riley
It only exists independent of bad in the relative perspective of those who are just trying to sound deep and hope that combination of sounds might do the trick. — James Riley
But the mind whose values constitute moral values would also be the mind whose attitudes consititute the norms of Reason more generally, and thus would be Reason. And that mind would also, by dint of that fact, be omnipotent and omniscient. — Bartricks
like I say, the argument I have given demonstrates that view to be mistaken. — Bartricks
If philosophers have some special capabilities in reason then you should take seriously that fact that virtually all of them disagree with your conclusion. — Isaac
This doesn't seem to be how people usually think and act, though.I'd put it this way: people care for – respect themselves – in so far as they develop habits for caring for – respecting – others.
That which is hateful to you, do not do to anyone.
— Hillel the Elder, 1st c. BCE — 180 Proof
They're ignorant of the argument I have presented — Bartricks
And for reasons that I will leave for later discussion, that mind will be the mind of God. — Bartricks
I'd put it this way: people care for – respect themselves – in so far as they develop habits for caring for – respecting – others. — 180 Proof
So what? For most of human history people didn't "usually think and act" like 'the Earth is round' or 'diseases are caused by germs' or 'marital rape is wrong'. Moral philosophy, while informed by human capabilities and defects, does not – logically should not – appeal to popularity tradition authority or ignorance. People can learn, culture develops, but only when viable alternatives to what they've "usually" done are persuaively proposed. Btw, Rabbi Hillel's "golden rule" is, of course, eminently pragmatic whereas, IMO, by comparison Rabbi Yeshua's has been more of a ... "stumbling block" (due to it's inherent vagueness).This doesn't seem to be how people usually think and act, though. — baker
Agreed. Like philosophy, in which we love – seek – wisdom, we seek goodness even though its a horizon we can never reach. After all, morals are not needed by saints just as philosophy is not need by sages.So, to the extent you reference the moral person as being habitually moral, I would agree, but just qualify that is the ideal or the aspiration and doubtfully attainable. — Hanover
Raised and educated in a Catholic milieu steeped in Judeo-christian biblical study, though I've been a nonbeliever since my teens, my "affinity to Jewish" thought (e.g. Hillel the Elder, (the Talmud), Maimonides, (the Zohar), Spinoza, Buber, Levinas, S. Weil, A. Heschel, E. Wiesel, et al) is bone-deep and dialectical.It would follow therefore from your references that the tzadik is one who has habitualized the morality as described by Hillel, and so I'm wondering if all of this is the source of the philosophy you've propounded here because you do seem to have an affinity to Jewish doctrine.
Has a professional philosopher annoyed you or been mean to you or something? — Bartricks
Professional philosophers are expert reasoners. — Bartricks
Yep. More than once. But I don't hold grudges. — Isaac
Then I'll ask again. Are metaethicists not professional philosophers? Or do you have some definition of idiocy that does not exclude being an expert reasoner? — Isaac
you sound like grudge central to me. — Bartricks
that's what the vast bulk of contemporary metaethicists do. They defend stupid views very cleverly. — Bartricks
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