I am no more obliged to respect another than I am myself; — Mww

Obligation? No. That's a Kantian notion. I asked if you would grant that morality derives from respect. You're not behaving morally, nor immorally, if you are acting only out of obligation. Acting morally is not doing what you must, but doing what is good.

I think, to use these terms, morality derives respect (care) for oneself by one habitualizing (non-reciprocal) respect (care) for others. — 180 Proof

I won't disagree. Much of what I do involves showing children how to look after each other so that they look after themselves.

I asked if you would grant that morality derives from respect. — Banno

I answered to the best of my interpretation of your question:

No, I would not. It is my philosophical contention that morality is given, as a pure subjective human condition, hence not derivable. I qualified my answer with......the loss of self-respect being the greatest possible affront to morality......which indicates respect presupposes morality itself, its form be what it may.
—————-

You're not behaving morally, nor immorally, if you are acting only out of obligation. — Banno

Correct, insofar as, deontologically speaking, obligation is necessary but not in itself sufficient, for acting morally, for there must still be practical reasons for being obligated, that are not mere inclinations. Being aware of your predispositions on the topic, I won’t burden you with the theoretical predicates. Just the kinda guy I am, doncha know.

Being aware of your predispositions on the topic... — Mww

Thank you for your consideration.

Do you actually think that moral issues can be adequately addressed without reference to the person's intention?
— baker

Queer, that you could garner this from my post. — Banno

It's a point on which I'd like to see where you stand, because it's not clear where you stand on the issue of intention.

Surely you’d grant that morality derives from respect for others, not for oneself... — Banno

Surely you mean that morality derives from respect for _specific_ others, and not for just anyone.
Those specific others being usually one's parents, teachers, other people of importance in one's life.

Much of what I do involves showing children how to look after each other so that they look after themselves. — Banno

How do you do that?
Can you give some examples?

- - -

I think, to use these terms, morality derives respect (care) for oneself by one habitualizing (non-reciprocal) respect (care) for others. — 180 Proof

I'm not sure if I'm understanding you correctly ... but what you're saying seems to describe a person whose self-respect depends on how they treat others. Is this correct?

And if something is morally valuable, then it is morally good and if something is morally disvalued then it is morally bad. These are conceptual truths about morality and cannot seriously be disputed. — Bartricks

Is there a case where that which is deemed good has been made so via a confrontation with that which is bad? And if so, doesn't that make bad good? And wouldn't good and bad then be relative?

Thus, moral norms and values are composed of the prescribing and proscribing and valuing activity of an external mind. And for reasons that I will leave for later discussion, that mind will be the mind of God. — Bartricks

That reminds me of a discussion in the other thread about "law is law" and the issue of "Natural Law." Some understandings we have about good and bad seem to be innate to our being. Sure, we have our aberrations, but generally speaking, we know better. As a universal pantheist (as opposed to universal panentheist) I've got not problem with calling it "God."

Is there a case where that which is deemed good has been made so via a confrontation with that which is bad? And if so, doesn't that make bad good? And wouldn't good and bad then be relative? — James Riley

I am talking about what moral goodness and badness are, in themselves. And the conceptual truth (which doesn't really get us anywhere by itself, but just clarifies what we're talking about) is that for something to be morally good is for it be valuable, and for something to be morally bad is for it be disvaluable. And what it is for something to be valuable is for it be being valued, and similarly for something to be morally bad is for it to be being disvalued. As valuing is something minds alone do, having moral value involves being valued by a mind (the mind of God, it turns out).

So your question seems to be whether God could value something because he dis-values it. Well, I suppose it is psychologically possible for a mind to do that. One can value something and dis-value one's valuing of it. One can love hating something, or hate loving something, for instance. And so I suppose it it possible to love something because one also hates it.

However, if one hates something because one loves it, then one's attitudes express a degree of self-loathing. And I think we can safely assume that God does not loathe himself, as that would be to manifest some kind of internal disharmony and it is hard to see why an omnipotent being would put up with being like that.

So, we can, I think, safely assume that where moral value is concerned, if something is morally valuable it is not morally valuable 'because' it is also morally disvaluable. But I haven't thought about it enough to be sure. (And I am not sure why you think it implies relativism....I mean, I think moral relativism is true, but I don't see why 'this' implies it).

That reminds me of a discussion in the other thread about "law is law" and the issue of "Natural Law." Some understandings we have about good and bad seem to be innate to our being. Sure, we have our aberrations, but generally speaking, we know better. As a universal pantheist (as opposed to universal panentheist) I've got not problem with calling it "God." — James Riley

I am not sure what universal pantheism is, but unless it is another label for my view, it is refuted by the case I have given.

Those who talk about things being 'innate to our being' are saying nothing clear. What do they mean? When one tries to pin them down one invariably finds that they either mean nothing at all - they were just trying to sound deep and hoped that combination of sounds might do the trick - or they mean simply that we are born with a disposition to believe or sense certain acts to be right/wrong or good/bad. Which may be true, but is beside the point when the issue is what the rightness/wrongness or goodness/badness 'is'.

And I am not sure why you think it implies relativism....I mean, I think moral relativism is true, but I don't see why 'this' implies it — Bartricks

I think God would not disvalue or hate anything. To the extent there is any hating or disvaluing going on, it is the relative perception of something other than God that is doing it. God's got no problem with that. In other words, we can try to do some platonic construct of the pure from which all else springs as an imperfect representation or shadow or reflection, and we can try to talk about good and bad, or valued and disvalued in those terms, but from an objective 10k feet, they are not separate. Indeed, they are complementary, one to the other, just as the tooth of the wolf chisels the leg of the deer, so too the leg of the deer chisels the tooth of the wolf. In the case of Christianity, Judas would have to be a hero, for without him, Christians would not have Christianity.

I am not sure what universal pantheism — Bartricks

Universal Penentheism would have a God over gods. Compare: Universal Pantheism allows for all Gods and if any one wants to be top dog, okay. My first struggle with the distinction came from here: https://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/UF/E0/02/21/49/00001/zaleha_d.pdf nd I'm not so sure I have it, but that's what I got. My lay understanding of physics dictates that it's all true, and not, at the same time (and not) and that is what brings me to Pantheism over Panentheism.

or they mean simply that we are born with a disposition to believe or sense certain acts to be right/wrong or good/bad. Which may be true, but is beside the point when the issue is what the rightness/wrongness or goodness/badness 'is'. — Bartricks

That's me, the birth disposition part. And, by definition, it would not be besides the point. It is the point. The point of relativity. If you want to talk about the essence of the "good" that makes something good, that's fine. But even that essence relies upon the bad to be good. It only exists independent of bad in the relative perspective of those who are just trying to sound deep and hope that combination of sounds might do the trick.

I think God would not disvalue or hate anything. — James Riley

You're doing things the wrong way around. Moral goodness and badness exist. Moral goodness and badness are valuings and disvaluings of things. Valuings and disvaluings are attitudes a mind is adopting towards things. Therefore, moral goodness and badness are made of the attitudes a mind is adopting towards things. If you don't want to call it God, that's fine. What's in a name?

But the mind whose values constitute moral values would also be the mind whose attitudes consititute the norms of Reason more generally, and thus would be Reason. And that mind would also, by dint of that fact, be omnipotent and omniscient.

So the mind whose attitudes towards things constitute moral values and disvalues is a mind who is demonstrably omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. If you have just decided in advance of inspecting the world carefully that any omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent mind that may exist in it would not disvalue anything, then all you have done is made yourself blind to any evidence to the contrary.

Universal Penentheism would have a God over gods. Compare: Universal Pantheism allows for all Gods and if any one wants to be top dog, okay. My lay understanding of physics dictates that it's all true, and not, at the same time (and not) and that is what brings me to Pantheism over Panentheism. — James Riley

Well, like I say, the argument I have given demonstrates that view to be mistaken. Morality is made of the prescriptions and attitudes of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent mind, that is what the argument - so, the evidence - seems to show. And that sounds inconsistent with pantheism as you have described it. Thus pantheism is false.

That's me, the birth disposition part. A — James Riley

Yep. Thought so.

And, by definition, it would not be besides the point. — James Riley

Yes. It. Is.

Here's my analysis of strawberry jam. strawberry jam is made of reduced strawberries and sugar.

Here's your point: "we are born with an inbuild disposition to like strawberry jam".

Er, even if that's true, it doesn't challenge anything - anything - in my analysis.

My analysis of morality: morality is made of the prescriptions and attitudes of God.

You: we have an inbuilt disposition to sense and believe in moral prescriptions and values.

Er, that doesn't contradict anything in my analysis. You might as well respond "It is raining". It's just irrelevant. I'm talking about morality, you're talking about dispositions to believe and sense it. Different. Things.

It only exists independent of bad in the relative perspective of those who are just trying to sound deep and hope that combination of sounds might do the trick. — James Riley

Once more, no. I have trouble understanding how anyone can reason like this - I mean, how on earth do you reach that conclusion? It's borderline madness.

Apply it to strawberry Jam. Here's our conversation:

Me: strawberry jam is made of reduced strawberries and sugar.

You: we are born with an inbuild disposition to detect and enjoy strawberry jam. Therefore strawberry jam is relative.

Me: er, so? What's that got to do with what I said? And how does it imply that strawberry jam is relative?

You: some gibberish

But the mind whose values constitute moral values would also be the mind whose attitudes consititute the norms of Reason more generally, and thus would be Reason. And that mind would also, by dint of that fact, be omnipotent and omniscient. — Bartricks

That is where your reasoning is failing you. You are making the mistake of attributing moral values, attitudes constituting the norms of Reason, etc. to the omnipotent and omniscient mind, or what you are calling god. I have referred those play things to what I have called Natural Law, or the innate understanding of right and wrong that we are born with. They are not unlike love, or the arms and legs we are born with; that spring from an evolution that serves us (so far) rather well. But they are not empirical, or of God beyond being oppositional forces he has put in play. God would be above and beyond simple morality or other tools nature has given us to survive.

Once you see through your fascination with the toys, you will come down to earth, hard.

I'd put it this way: people care for – respect – themselves in so far as they develop habits for caring for – respecting – others.

That which is hateful to you, do not do to anyone. — Hillel the Elder, 1st c. BCE

like I say, the argument I have given demonstrates that view to be mistaken. — Bartricks

The issues with it don't go away if you ignore them.

Your argument for this rests upon that which is self-evident to reason being determined by the attention of professional philosophers - a class of people who your conclusions demonstrate have no special abilities in that regard and therefore no justification for trusting their support for one of your key premises.

Put yet more simply, If philosophers have some special capabilities in reason then you should take seriously that fact that virtually all of them disagree with your conclusion. If they do not have such abilities, then there is no reason to believe your key premise that moral prescriptions are not the prescriptions of individual humans.

Has a professional philosopher annoyed you or been mean to you or something? Professional philosophers are expert reasoners.

If philosophers have some special capabilities in reason then you should take seriously that fact that virtually all of them disagree with your conclusion. — Isaac

They're ignorant of the argument I have presented. Do you think they'd disagree with any of the premises? If so, which one?

I'd put it this way: people care for – respect themselves – in so far as they develop habits for caring for – respecting – others.

That which is hateful to you, do not do to anyone.
— Hillel the Elder, 1st c. BCE — 180 Proof

This doesn't seem to be how people usually think and act, though.
"Do unto others before they do unto you" and "He who casts the first stone is innocent" seem to describe people more accurately. Generally, respecting oneself doesn't seem to have anything much to do with respect for others by way of one being conducive to the other. If anything, people generally seem to conceive of respect for others coming at the cost of self-respect, so that one has to choose: either respect others and disrespect yourself; or respect yourself and disrespect others; but you can't have both.

They're ignorant of the argument I have presented — Bartricks

You have expertise in the field despite never having your argument looked at by another expert? How in the world did that happen?

And you really think if they looked at your argument they’d agree? What evidence do you have to support that belief? So far the handful of experts of the forum who have looked at it have disagreed so it’s not clear why you think experts at large would agree.

And if it counts for something, all the non experts have disagreed too. That’s very statistically unlikely. Especially given that even theists, idealists and dualists on here disagree with you. So it’s not like people have some emotional motive behind disagreeing. People of every school disagree. You’d think one of them might agree by chance but nope. The only thing that brings about that effect is total nonsense.

Instead of wasting your time on supposed dunning Krugerites like us why not simply ask one of your colleagues to look at your argument? Should be a piece of cake for a renowned expert.

Yes, I think that most professional philosophers would find the arguments I made in the op pretty interesting. But I have not said anywhere that I think they'd all agree they go through.

Virtually all of them disagree with the conclusion. As you said: Divine command theory is widely rejected. If all the expert reasoners reach a different conclusion from you that is excellent reason to think you made an error somewhere. That’s the most likely and rational conclusion.

And you haven’t argued for your position in the op for anyone to find an interesting argument. You said:

And for reasons that I will leave for later discussion, that mind will be the mind of God. — Bartricks

I'd put it this way: people care for – respect themselves – in so far as they develop habits for caring for – respecting – others. — 180 Proof

This reminds me of the Tanya doctrine of the three levels of morality among persons: the tzadik, the benoni, and the rasha (https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/361896/jewish/The-Benoni.htm). This draws the distinction between those who have habitually become so moral that they no longer have an evil inclination (the tzadik) versus the one who remains challenged by an evil inclination (the benoni) versus the one who purposefully does evil (the rasha). The tzadik though is not thought to really be an attainable goal for most, with only maybe one or two being in existence in any generation.

So, to the extent you reference the moral person as being habitually moral, I would agree, but just qualify that is the ideal or the aspiration and doubtfully attainable.

You then reference Hillel the Elder, who famously summarized the entire Talmud while standing on one foot: "What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow: this is the whole Torah; the rest is the explanation; go and learn."

It would follow therefore from your references that the tzadik is one who has habitualized the morality as described by Hillel, and so I'm wondering if all of this is the source of the philosophy you've propounded here because you do seem to have an affinity to Jewish doctrine.

This doesn't seem to be how people usually think and act, though. — baker

So what? For most of human history people didn't "usually think and act" like 'the Earth is round' or 'diseases are caused by germs' or 'marital rape is wrong'. Moral philosophy, while informed by human capabilities and defects, does not – logically should not – appeal to popularity tradition authority or ignorance. People can learn, culture develops, but only when viable alternatives to what they've "usually" done are persuaively proposed. Btw, Rabbi Hillel's "golden rule" is, of course, eminently pragmatic whereas, IMO, by comparison Rabbi Yeshua's has been more of a ... "stumbling block" (due to it's inherent vagueness).

So, to the extent you reference the moral person as being habitually moral, I would agree, but just qualify that is the ideal or the aspiration and doubtfully attainable. — Hanover

Agreed. Like philosophy, in which we love – seek – wisdom, we seek goodness even though its a horizon we can never reach. After all, morals are not needed by saints just as philosophy is not need by sages.

It would follow therefore from your references that the tzadik is one who has habitualized the morality as described by Hillel, and so I'm wondering if all of this is the source of the philosophy you've propounded here because you do seem to have an affinity to Jewish doctrine.

Raised and educated in a Catholic milieu steeped in Judeo-christian biblical study, though I've been a nonbeliever since my teens, my "affinity to Jewish" thought (e.g. Hillel the Elder, (the Talmud), Maimonides, (the Zohar), Spinoza, Buber, Levinas, S. Weil, A. Heschel, E. Wiesel, et al) is bone-deep and dialectical.

I'd focus more of the morality of subjectivity. Is it moral to embrace actions based only in your own experiences, or should you strive to tie them to an external, objective world?

The "Golden Rule(s)" seem tied only to inner experience of actions. We technocrats know better, your actions need quantifiable results!

Has a professional philosopher annoyed you or been mean to you or something? — Bartricks

Yep. More than once. But I don't hold grudges.

Professional philosophers are expert reasoners. — Bartricks

Then I'll ask again. Are metaethicists not professional philosophers? Or do you have some definition of idiocy that does not exclude being an expert reasoner?

Yep. More than once. But I don't hold grudges. — Isaac

Thought so. And you sound like grudge central to me.

Then I'll ask again. Are metaethicists not professional philosophers? Or do you have some definition of idiocy that does not exclude being an expert reasoner? — Isaac

Yes, some professional philosophers are metaethicists. And if this discussion was among professional philosophers it would not be at all like it is. There can be degrees of stupidity, you see. And stupidity can manifest itself in different ways.

I imagine you haven't read much contemporary metaethics, if any? If you understood my case and then read the literature, you'd recognise just how stupid most contemporary metaethicists are, despite their works being very sophisticated exercises in reasoning.

It takes great skill to defend a stupid view. And that's what the vast bulk of contemporary metaethicists do. They defend stupid views very cleverly. There are roughly three stupid alternatives to divine command theory: expressivism, naturalism and non-naturalism. They're incredibly stupid views. But they're approximately equally stupid. And most contemporary philosophers won't touch divine command theory with a barge pole, because they were told as undergrads that it is false because of 'Euthyphro' and so never think to revisit it. That, combined with the fact that most are hacks who are not really interested in what's true, but interested in showcasing their cleverness - which is precisely what the contemporary debate, dominated as it is by discussion of idiotic views - allows them to do.

See?

you sound like grudge central to me. — Bartricks

Thanks, I'll mention it to my therapist.

that's what the vast bulk of contemporary metaethicists do. They defend stupid views very cleverly. — Bartricks

So if it is possible for professional philosophers to defend stupid views cleverly you've still not given any ground for accepting their assessment of that which is self-evident to reason. It could be a stupid view defended cleverly.