You may call me a hair-splitter, but how do you know we won't understand the answer to the hard question, once we found it? We may NEVER find it, but it's not guaranteed that it is beyond our cognitive capacity to understand it, once the answer is given or found. — god must be atheist

We don't understand gravity. We can describe it with equations, but that doesn't mean we understand it. Newton, who discovered it, was baffled by this, as was Locke, Hume, Schopenhauer, Russell, etc.

As Newton said: 'It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact... That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else...is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.

We've just accepted this fact and moved on. Why do I say that it's a mystery how consciousness emerges from brain? We have no idea how non-mental stuff could possibly lead to mind. Suppose in the future someone says, regions X, Y and Z in the brain are responsible for consciousness, if they aren't functioning, we can't be conscious. How could a region in the brain possibly explain this blue sky I am seeing? This hypothetical theory can't answer that.

Basic biology can answer it. — god must be atheist

You can speak of chemical reactions, muscle contractions and so on, but questions of will aren't illuminated by this.

I don't think human comprehension can be tested by human questions. Human knowledge, yes, it can be, but not comprehension. — god must be atheist

This might be the answer.

We don't understand gravity. — Manuel

And we don't need to understand it, either. You seek meaning where there is no meaning. This is a mindset problem, not a philosophical problem.

You are correct, in part. It's true that we don't need to understand it. But Descartes, Locke, Newton and the like expected understanding. They thought they understood how bodies worked: like a giant mechanical clock, the universe was thought merely to be a massive mechanistic machine. But Descartes realized that mechanical philosophy cannot explain mind, which is why he postulated a second substance. We are born with mechanistic, meaning, based on direct contact, intuitions that make sense to us.

And it was generally accepted, until Newton showed that our intuitive notions of mechanism, were false of the world. He could not believe that gravity worked the way it did, because it did not make any sense. And till' the end of his life he sought to reintroduce some mechanical aspect that could explain gravity intuitively. He failed in that, but that's what he wanted.

So it was clearly a philosophical problem. And you still listen people saying "we don't understand quantum mechanics, or why brain produces mind - yet." all the time! But as you said, there is nothing to understand, only something to describe. It's still a (mistaken) explicit goal.

I continually demonstrate life doesn't cause suffering, so your rebuttals are irrelevant unless they specifically deal with issue of causality and prove that life causes suffering. If it doesn't cause suffering, then ending life to end suffering is an idiot move.

Here's another analogy for you. A painting has paint, therefore the painting causes paint. — Benkei

I did address causality here:

I also mentioned (and you didn't address) that what your argument is really trying to address is the empirical question of whether each individual case of suffering in a person's life can be ameliorated and gotten rid of. Obviously I think that is near improbable to zero. Besides which, combined with the deontological approach, that might not even matter as a consideration being that you are making unnecessary risky decisions on another person's behalf in the first place- putting them in (what we know to be from empirical evidence) a lifetime's worth of enduring negative experiences and having to overcome them. I think whether or not positive experiences are involved too, doesn't negate the fact that this negative experience/overcoming "game" is being unnecessarily bestowed upon a future person (on their behalf) in the first place. — schopenhauer1

So if you actually read it, you can parse out several ideas. I will do it for you since you refuse:
1) It's an empirical question of if suffering exists to varying degrees and levels in a human life.
2) You think that the individual cases of sufferings in life can be ameliorated completely. I don't. I think that individual cases of suffering will probably never be gotten rid of.
3) Being that life will never be a paradise/charmed life, whatnot, and that it is unknown how much and what kinds of suffering there are in a human life, then it would be wrong to make the unnecessarily risky decision on another person's behalf, putting them in a lifetime's worth of well-known and unknown forms of negative experiences.

My argument isn't addressing an empirical question. That's you just raising a straw man. The argument is about properly identifying what causes suffering and it isn't life.

Point 1. Irrelevant, doesn't change what causes suffering and what doesn't.
Point 2. Irrelevant, doesn't change what causes suffering and what doesn't. Also, at no point have I said all suffering could be prevented or ameliorated.
Point 3. Irrelevant, doesn't change what causes suffering and what doesn't.

So, no, at no point has any of your points addressed the fact that life is merely a necessary cause for suffering, not a sufficient cause and certainly not a proximate cause.

Here's another analogy for you. Pollution is bad and terrible for nature but if there was no nature, no pollution, so let's get rid of nature.

The argument is about properly identifying what causes suffering and it isn't life. — Benkei

Um, so how is that not an empirical question? This I am admitting.. We would have to observe what suffering there is, and what causes it.

So what is your point Benkei? I am directly answering your ideas about proximal cause, etc.
Even if we were were to empirically observe what causes each individual case of suffering, I contend that life contains many cases of suffering (via empirical evidence), and it cannot be ameliorated easily.

What can prevent all cases of suffering? Let me see.. Preventing birth. I don't need to know each case of suffering to know that all of it can be prevented with one non-action.

Um, so how is that not an empirical question? — schopenhauer1

Because it's sufficient to establish that it isn't life and after that I don't care, because suffering is particular. And if life doesn't cause it, there's no moral case to be made against having babies.

Because it's sufficient to establish that it isn't life and after that I don't care, because suffering is particular. And if life doesn't cause it, there's no moral case to be made against having babies. — Benkei

I don't buy it. If the same state of affairs is almost always (by empirical evidence) coupled with any X particular cases that cause suffering, why does it matter proximate cause if it is ALWAYS accompanied by some cases X? Then why would this fact of its causal necessity not be factored in?

If every time you did X, Y negative happened, why would it matter which particular Y, we know that X will lead to Y? And Y (cases of suffering) ALWAYS accompanies X (by empirical evidence).

Are you trying to make a case that, there is a possible world where Y is not accompanied by X? If so, is that really our world? Hence my emphasis on empirical evidence rather than simply possibilities.

Of course you're not convinced, you've believed this nonsense for years.

If life doesn't cause suffering, then my decision to create life doesn't cause suffering, then there's no moral obligation against creating life because I don't cause any suffering.

Your complaint about the state of affairs is the same as complaining because I dealt the cards with poker, my dealing of the cards caused you to lose. We both know this isn't the case, while still acknowledging it's only possible to lose because I dealt the cards.

As I've repeatedly stated, you don't understand causality. That's really the only problem here.

Are you trying to make a case that, there is a possible world where Y is not accompanied by X? If so, is that really our world? Hence my emphasis on empirical evidence rather than simply possibilities. — schopenhauer1

Don't raise another straw man. That all life at some time experiences suffering is not the subject of debate and totally irrelevant. All games involve losing but the game doesn't cause you to lose.

Don't raise another straw man. That all life at some time experiences suffering is not the subject of debate and totally irrelevant. All games involve losing but the game doesn't cause you to lose. — Benkei

This is the crux of our disagreement. I am saying that we should not force others to play a game where they sometimes (and sometimes a lot) will lose. And loss here isn't just losing some change, but many varieties, complexities, and degrees of suffering.

I'm not forcing anyone. Nobody exists when I make the decision.
Edit: this is in any case a tangent to my point that I still haven't caused suffering so there's still no moral obligation.

You are not addressing the argument that if Y always follows from X, then if you don't want Y, X.

You are trying to do a switcharoo where I am aggregating all instances of Y and you keep on trying to parse it back out to each instance of Y. Each instance of Y is contained in Y.

Each instance of suffering is contained in life. Life is caused by birth. If b is caused by a, you can prevent b by not causing a.

you can prevent b by not causing a. — schopenhauer1

@Benkei's argument is not about what it is possible to do, but about what one is morally obliged to do. It is not a sufficient argument to merely show one can bring x about by doing/abstaining from y, you must also show that it is the node at which one ought to intervene.

That's why proximity matters. All things being equal, the most proximate cause carries the burden of responsibility in order to preserve as much freedom and autonomy as possible. If we start accruing responsibility for any node at which we could intervene our burden becomes rapidly unbearable.

I think you are overmining the idea that morality has to be equal to legality. It doesn't. Veganism may be true, it doesn't mean it should be enforced by the government. Thus I wouldn't use "Because I was born" as an excuse in court. But certainly in a moral sense, I can ask whether you want to cause the conditions for which all instances Y suffering onto another being will occur, and if the answer is no, then I would point to antinatalism being something to consider. Morally, it is not good to unnecessarily create the conditions for suffering for another person (nothing is being mediated for that person to begin with to cause a lesser harm for a greater, for example).

Another example is being an asshole or an internet troll. That's not illegal, but in a minor way, may be immoral in some sense if one bases morality on character, deontological or even consequentialist terms.

You are not addressing the argument that if Y always follows from X, then if you don't want Y, X. — schopenhauer1

Because this isn't true and I don't like to repeat myself. Restarting the same isn't a new argument. There's plenty of life happening right now where not only suffering is absent but entirely blissful. So Y does not always follow X, if it did, or would be a sufficient cause, which it isn't.

There's plenty of life happening right now where not only suffering is absent but entirely blissful. So Y does not always follow X, if it did, or would be a sufficient cause, which it isn't. — Benkei

So what. If even only half the time, or part of the time it was suffering, if you want to prevent any condition where suffering will occur for another person, and add to that the empirical part of knowing that there are known forms of inescapable suffering and unknown (to the parent) forms of suffering for what the child will suffer, that cannot be mitigated easily, then yes antinatalism would be the best claim.

I can't force you to see the claim as something you yourself should follow. However, I can make the argument which itself is sound. You can prevent another person from suffering X suffering (the suffering incurred in a life) by preventing birth. That is not even an argument but a fact. The argument would come in as to whether this is particularly moral or not. I think your reasoning here that it is not in the realm of morality because it is not the proximal cause is weak at best because if one is looking to prevent all the forms of suffering that occur for a person in a lifetime, than this would not satisfy it. If this does not bother you than nothing the antinatalist would say would convince you.

I also have my own spin which is the "dignity" of the future child may be considered violated because an unnecessary step of put in conditions of being caused to suffer and game-playing (the game of life) was enacted for the child where one did not have to do this. I did have an debate with Khaled about what dignity entails. As I look at it more, it is more about degrees of harm one is causing unnecessarily. For example, waking up a life guard to save a drowning child is a degree of harm that is not sufficiently overlooking the lifeguard's dignity. However, if I forced the lifeguard into a lifetime of lifeguarding school to get the most positive result overall, that would be overlooking his dignity. Starting a life on someone else's behalf due to the lifetime of conditions of possible harm occurring would be overlooking the child's dignity because one is now looking at outcomes (seeing a new being play the game of life) rather than caring about preventing the harms on the child itself.

if you want to prevent any condition where suffering will occur for another person, ..., then yes antinatalism would be the best claim. — schopenhauer1

No. Antinatalism would be the most effective means (in that case). Even if we ignore the patent absurdity of someone wanting to prevent any condition where suffering will occur for another person and had no other objective, for some odd reason, just being the most effective means to an end does not make it the 'best' morally.

The most effective means of preventing rape might be to castrate all men, doesn't make it the 'best'.

Take a look at the wide range of moral intuitions in the 'fat man' dilemma (on the main page at the moment). Even when killing the fat man is deliberately set as the only means to prevent mass suffering, people's intuitions are still mixed as to whether it is therefore the best course of action morally.

We're just back to square one. You have this odd objective - remove all suffering, no matter how minor at all costs. You've found a method by which it can be done (one which most people are at least a little repulsed by), and you sneer at any other moral imperative (such as the greater good, or community values). All of which is fine, but then acting like you're the injured party when people don't agree is just wierd. You've got a bizarre premise which hardly anyone shares, a favoured method which even many psychopaths would still baulk at, and a lack of any of the other usual moral sentiments that humans seem to have... it really shouldn't come as a surprise that you get this amount of push back.

@Pfhorrest

You said:

"I’m very pleased to see a professional like him touting the right ends, especially after all the pushback I’ve gotten on this forum for supporting the radical idea that maybe all that really matters morally speaking is reducing suffering any kind."

I don't think it's just this forum. The idea that suffering is virtuous is deeply ingrained in western culture. Jesus is supposed to have said that those who are sad are blessed. It fits well with an ethic of sacrifice. You have to work hard to get ahead.

The alternative would be blatantly antiprotestant. It would be more taoist. You don't have to balance reward with the pain of toil. You can do without doing, or what not.

It would represent a big shift in worldview for some people. Most people?

Yeah I can see how it fits so well with a Protestant work ethic, and I wouldn't be radically surprised to see it live and common in the real world. I guess I expected a philosophy forum to have a higher percentage of people who aren't mired in that kind of irrationality, though.

@Pfhorrest I think religion will win in the end, irrational as it is.

I actually agree with you on the ever-presence of the PWE in Western culture. I think this speaks to the topic of my thread on Credibility and Minutia here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10642/credibility-and-minutia

Some forms of pain are necessary to build strength. And not only is exposure to certain types of pain necessary to build physical strength, exposure to different types of agony and despair are necessary to build strength of character. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you run into a viscious circle justifying why "strength of character" matters other than Aristotle said it. You can maybe throw in the other typical things associated with him- the ancient form of eudaimonia and some modern form like Maslow's hierarchy, but this too would be hard to justify as to why people other than yourself must endure anything. When it comes to other people, the "negative ethics" of preventing suffering may be more tied to their inherent dignity than the "positive ethics" of promoting character building. One major reason is that ethics around preventing suffering is the minimal amount of "judging what's best for other people" while still considering their inherent dignity or worth as people.

But you run into a viscious circle justifying why "strength of character" matters other than Aristotle said it. — schopenhauer1

It's not a circle, but there is the possibility of an infinite regress. Why is A good? For the sake of B. Why is B good? For the sake of C. Etc.. That's why Aristotle posited happiness as the ultimate end, to curtail that possibility of infinite regress.

In my discussion with Mr. Pearce, the question is whether agony and despair are ever good, in the sense of valuable. In my examples, we value these in some relations with others, as we inflict them onto others and it helps us to get what we want from them. Intentionally inflicting agony and despair is a pressure tactic. It was evident in President Trump's so-called great deal making ability.

But in a much more subtle way, these feelings are a natural part of our relations with others, (not intentionally inflicted on others, as my examples bring out the extremes), and they form a large part of what we call empathy. So for example, (another extreme), if a good buddy is suddenly killed accidently, one feels great agony and despair. This is part of the empathy we have, we feel another's pain. And when the other is the victim of circumstances beyond our control, there is an immense feeling of agony and despair.

The issue I see is that it appears to be the wrong approach, to rid ourselves of the internal cause of such painful emotions, rather than addressing the external conditions which are conducive to these feelings. The real wrong, bad, or evil in the world, is the external conditions which induce within us those painful feelings, it is not the feelings themselves. So moving to rid ourselves of those feelings is nothing more than addressing the symptoms rather than the illness itself. And if we could succeed in removing such emotions, it would just render us oblivious to the real evil in the world.

In other words, these goals proposed, provide us only with an illusion of a better life, because what is really necessary for that better life, more power over the external world (omnipotence), is not addressed. But this is an extremely difficult issue because it involves human relations.

It's not a circle, but there is the possibility of an infinite regress. Why is A good? For the sake of B. Why is B good? For the sake of C. Etc.. That's why Aristotle posited happiness as the ultimate end, to curtail that possibility of infinite regress. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I see what he did there, but then one can ask, "Is putting another person in a game of character-building to survive/flourish better, good in itself to do on behalf of someone else in the first place?"

Preventing/reducing suffering seems to be the only ethical stance that avoids assuming others should deal with X thing, even if you yourself thinks it is valuable. It is much harder for people to eschew the idea of preventing suffering than it would be almost any other value (including the oft-praised "character-building" trope and "flourishing" when discussing virtue theories).

So in a truly ethical (and not mixed with some other concern such as political decision-making), one must ask, "Is this going to reduce or prevent harm to someone without unreasonably assuming what is "best" for another person"? Procreation, for example fails this test, because it does the opposite of prevent harm, and at the same time, thinks what is best for someone else.

I had a debate with another poster about waking up a lifeguard to save a drowning child. Technically, I did violate the lifeguard's sleep. They were "forced" to wake up, and I assumed what was "best for him" in that situation. But when balancing the reduction of harm with the aspect of not unreasonably assuming what is best for another person, I would think this does not meet that threshold. However, I do think that if I forced the lifeguard into a lifetime of lifeguard training because I thought the best outcome would result from his teaching others to be competent lifeguards, then that would be unreasonably assuming what is best for another person, even though it was reducing the most harm. So suffering/harm reduction isn't the only consideration. The dignity of the people involved, which includes not unreasonably forcing them into what you think is best for them is also a factor. Thus, one must balance these two considerations of harm reduction and violating people's dignity as their own decision-makers and autonomous people.

Preventing/reducing suffering seems to be the only ethical stance that avoids assuming others should deal with X thing, even if you yourself thinks it is valuable. It is much harder for people to eschew the idea of preventing suffering than it would be almost any other value (including the oft-praised "character-building" trope and "flourishing" when discussing virtue theories). — schopenhauer1

I don't think that this is a true claim. As Plato demonstrated pain and pleasure are categorical distinct. They are not simply the opposite of one another, such that pleasure is only derived by means of a delivery from pain. There are pleasures which do not have an opposing pain. Ethics may focus on bringing about such pleasures, and this would be completely distinct from preventing suffering.

So in a truly ethical (and not mixed with some other concern such as political decision-making), one must ask, "Is this going to reduce or prevent harm to someone without unreasonably assuming what is "best" for another person"? Procreation, for example fails this test, because it does the opposite of prevent harm, and at the same time, thinks what is best for someone else. — schopenhauer1

Preventing harm, whether it's to oneself or another ought not be the primary focus of ethics. The primary focus ought to be bringing about what is good. When we look at the future, we move toward what is designated as the "best" course of action, we do not make our decisions based on avoiding the worst. It is only when an extremely bad circumstance is imposing itself, that we must focus on avoiding it, but in most ordinary situations we are focused on bringing about the good. This is the same principle which Plato demonstrated, the good is not diametrically opposed to the bad. So avoiding the bad does not produce the good.

Ethics may focus on bringing about such pleasures, and this would be completely distinct from preventing suffering. — Metaphysician Undercover

My problem in the realm of ethics here is that it is forced on autonomous adults. As long as that is not the case, then character-building is perhaps "ethical" just as any self-help thing might be for people who prefer that. However, I don't see it as strictly "ethics" in terms of obligatory. I think it more properly belongs under a larger axiology though because it has to do with "value".

While it might be something we might recommend, to others, the negative ethics of preventing suffering when one clearly sees it, seems more obligatory. Once one gets into the realm of unnecesasry "force" onto autonomous beings (adults with usual faculties let's say) we are treading on not just amoral (yet axiological grounds), but actually unethical grounds.

When we look at the future, we move toward what is designated as the "best" course of action, we do not make our decisions based on avoiding the worst. It is only when an extremely bad circumstance is imposing itself, that we must focus on avoiding it, but in most ordinary situations we are focused on bringing about the good. This is the same principle which Plato demonstrated, the good is not diametrically opposed to the bad. So avoiding the bad does not produce the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes I am perfectly fine if people want to pursue this or that axiological program. My beef comes in when it is forced onto others. Thus, ethics proper (not just axiological pursuits of "the good") if it is based on what is obligatory, seem to be balancing preventing harm/suffering while balancing not unreasonably forcing others into one's own agenda. Force being the key here. Thus for example, procreation is definitely a force because life itself is the agenda of the challenge/overcoming-challenge (you may spin it as a chance for character-building). That doesn't matter what you call it, it is a forced program that others have to follow. If that person doesn't feel this program was something they wanted, you have have now assumed an agenda that violated their own autonomous attitudes, feelings, experiences, etc.

The same would be said for the lifeguard.. If I was to force the lifeguard into character-buildign classes to make him a better lifeguard, that would be wrong. I can try to persuade him what was best.. but my idea of what "the good' is, just to me rings hollow as "ethics". Rather the stronger obligations are to force and unnecessary suffering prevention.

My problem in the realm of ethics here is that it is forced on autonomous adults. — schopenhauer1

I think you ought to distinguish ethics from law. Law is enforced, but law is not properly "ethics". Ethics is a code of principles for moral behaviour, and adhering to that code is a matter of choice. You might have people criticize you for being unethical, but so long as you break no laws in your unethical behaviour, ethics will not be forced on you. I believe it is fundamental to western ethics, that ethical behaviour is a matter of choice.

I think it more properly belongs under a larger axiology though because it has to do with "value". — schopenhauer1

I think you are moving in the wrong direction here, to make "value" the broader term than "moral". But that's my opinion, and this is a matter for debate. I place morality as the highest possible value, and all other values must fall in line behind this. This is the Platonic tradition of "the good". The modern trend however, is to place quantitative value (mathematics) as the highest value. Then morality is segregated as a distinct form of value which is fundamentally incommensurable with quantitative value. Now we are left with at least two distinct and in some ways incompatible and competing hierarchies of value.

While it might be something we might recommend, to others, the negative ethics of preventing suffering when one clearly sees it, seems more obligatory. Once one gets into the realm of unnecesasry "force" onto autonomous beings (adults with usual faculties let's say) we are treading on not just amoral (yet axiological grounds), but actually unethical grounds. — schopenhauer1

I agree, this is a fundamental problem with negative ethics, enforcement is required. As I see it, in the western world moral principles have evolved in a positive direction, away from the negative. The Old Testament has ten commandments, negative. The New Testament has one principle, love your neighbour, positive. I believe the transition to positive is a Platonic influence, identification of "the good" as the first principle. Guiding people towards the good, as a general principle discourages them from the bad, such that a listing and outlawing of every bad thing is not of foremost importance.

Thus, ethics proper (not just axiological pursuits of "the good") if it is based on what is obligatory, seem to be balancing preventing harm/suffering while balancing not unreasonably forcing others into one's own agenda. — schopenhauer1

The principle of "the good" is based in what is natural, not in some form of obligation. As living beings we have needs and wants, so we naturally seek what is apprehended as "good". Obligation is a result of relations with others, and we are required to adjust our perception of "good" accordingly.

Force being the key here. Thus for example, procreation is definitely a force because life itself is the agenda of the challenge/overcoming-challenge (you may spin it as a chance for character-building). That doesn't matter what you call it, it is a forced program that others have to follow. If that person doesn't feel this program was something they wanted, you have have now assumed an agenda that violated their own autonomous attitudes, feelings, experiences, etc. — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure what you mean by "force" here. Could you expound? I don't see how procreation is a force. But I would see two distinct types of force, an internal force which inclines one to act, which I would associate with "the good" as described above, and an external type of force, which if it isn't consistent with the internal force is a hinderance to action. The difficulty in moral philosophy is the effort required to create consistency between these two types of forces. Consistency facilitates good actions.

I think you ought to distinguish ethics from law. Law is enforced, but law is not properly "ethics". Ethics is a code of principles for moral behaviour, and adhering to that code is a matter of choice. You might have people criticize you for being unethical, but so long as you break no laws in your unethical behaviour, ethics will not be forced on you. I believe it is fundamental to western ethics, that ethical behaviour is a matter of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, I do think that distinction should be made as well. However, when I say "obligatory", I don't mean, liable by state prosecution. It's more following one's own intuitions to alleviate acute suffering when one sees it- a drowning child, a person in danger, etc.

I'm not sure what you mean by "force" here. Could you expound? I don't see how procreation is a force. — Metaphysician Undercover

So if I was to kidnap you and "force" you to follow a character-building life, that would be wrong. It overrides my good will to want to see what I think is best for you. Procreation is the same thing. The parents have a preference for the game of life, yet they presume that their preference should be enough justification to create more people who must follow this game of life (lest they die of immediate suicide or slow death of starvation/neglect). I call this de facto situation of having to play the game of life being "forced", because the only alternative is violent self-harm.

More broadly then, we have to not assume that our worldview is something others must take on (including the game of life itself). This would be a violation of someone's dignity as autonomous beings. Thus there is something deeper going on here than some "positive program" for things like self-improvement. Rather, what is a deeper ethic is not messing with other people unnecessarily, and preventing situations of unnecessary suffering if one can help it. Suggesting and persuading is about all that is permitted without going too far in the violation of someone else. Procreation falls under violating that threshold of violating autonomy as it is a definite unnecessary force and certainly causing unnecessary harm (unnecessary because there is no person to mitigate a lesser harm for a greater one, but purely creating conditions for all harm for that person).

The principle of "the good" is based in what is natural, not in some form of obligation. As living beings we have needs and wants, so we naturally seek what is apprehended as "good". Obligation is a result of relations with others, and we are required to adjust our perception of "good" accordingly. — Metaphysician Undercover

This I don't really understand because I can show you many cases where what people seek are any number of things and define those things as "good".

Compare these two statements:

True, I do think that distinction should be made as well. However, when I say "obligatory", I don't mean, liable by state prosecution. It's more following one's own intuitions to alleviate acute suffering when one sees it- a drowning child, a person in danger, etc. — schopenhauer1

This I don't really understand because I can show you many cases where what people seek are any number of things and define those things as "good". — schopenhauer1

You describe "obligatory" as following one's own intuition. But then you do not understand "good" in the sense of what one wants. Aren't they essentially the same thing? When you follow your own intuition you are doing what you want to do.

So if I was to kidnap you and "force" you to follow a character-building life, that would be wrong. It overrides my good will to want to see what I think is best for you. Procreation is the same thing. The parents have a preference for the game of life, yet they presume that their preference should be enough justification to create more people who must follow this game of life (lest they die of immediate suicide or slow death of starvation/neglect). I call this de facto situation of having to play the game of life being "forced", because the only alternative is violent self-harm. — schopenhauer1

Sorry, I just don't see it. If a person wants to have children, and follows one's own intuition, into this endeavour, then the person is doing what one feels obliged to do, or what one believes is good. I don't see how you can characterize this as force. If what you are saying is that the coming into being of a person is not something chosen by that person, therefore the person is forced into being, then I have no problem with this. There are many things about this existence which are beyond our capacity to choose, and are forced upon us. That's just reality, and like birth, death is forced on us as well. But there are very many things which are forced on us in between, because our powers of freedom to choose are very limited.

Rather, what is a deeper ethic is not messing with other people unnecessarily, and preventing situations of unnecessary suffering if one can help it. — schopenhauer1

I have a real problem with this sort of negative ethics, (don't do this, and don't do that), because it requires all sorts of definitions and criteria. How can you even speak of these matters in terms of "unnecessarily", and "unnecessary suffering"? We are talking about acts of free choice here, so everything chosen is unnecessary. But then we can't avoid "messing with other people" because we exist in relationships, and we can't avoid suffering because of that great magnitude of force which is beyond one's very limited capacity of free choice.