My ontology is pluralist, I suppose (but also a cop-out of sorts). There is a vast variety of individual things and substances. I think metaphysical pluralism can account for differences in time and space as well as differences in kind, which monism and other taxonomical accounts rarely offer. This also entails nominalism and individualism.

If you had no intentionality or "aboutness", there would be nothing to produce the effects, or being more accurate, there would be too many factors coming in to distinguish anything from anything else. — Manuel

Agreed, but there's perfectly adequate models of intention in neuroscience.

I'm speaking of the mental, what you are seeing right now, as you read these letters and whatever examples come to mind as you think of a reply. You are saying that this is caused by neurons — Manuel

No (although it is). Right now I'm asking you to explain why you think it isn't. You seem to have offered nothing but your incredulity at moment. I mean, it seems completely implausible to me that electron go through both slits at once (or whatever it is they do, I'm no physicist), but I don't refute the physicist with that argument.

there's much more to speech than what can be accounted for by looking at Broca's area — Manuel

Yes. Fortunate then that Broca's area is networked to thousands of other areas responsible for modelling those other aspects.

There is much more complexity in manifest reality than what can be said by appealing to causes in the brain... There seems to be a massive gap in our knowledge when we go from the brain to our picture of the world... Also "knowing a tree", "speaking of trees", "classifying trees" aren't explained by anything in current brain science. — Manuel

This just seems like a bare assertion. Can I ask what your expertise or understanding is in neuroscience against which you're measuring the complexity of manifest reality to reach such a conclusion?

Agreed, but there's perfectly adequate models of intention in neuroscience. — Isaac

Intentionality is assumed in these models. While it is perfectly true that the mental is a physical phenomena, I think it's a big mistake to forget that the brain is a construction of the mind as well. It goes both ways. We have to stipulate what the brain is, what parts of the body are directly relevant to the brain and so on. For example, are the eye's part of the brain?

It is crucial to remember that we also have another structure that resembles the brain, but is not conscious:the gut brain, containing as much as 500 millions neurons. But as we know, the gut brain is not conscious.

No (although it is). Right now I'm asking you to explain why you think it isn't. You seem to have offered nothing but your incredulity at moment. I mean, it seems completely implausible to me that electron go through both slits at once (or whatever it is they do, I'm no physicist), but I don't refute the physicist with that argument. — Isaac

Absolutely. And I have said many times that the consciousness arises from the brain. I've never denied it. If you think that seeing a tree and all that goes into such an act, such as belief, perception, categorization, psychic continuity and so forth is explained by saying, it's because of actions in the brain, you've said almost nothing. Priestley, Reid and many others knew as much already hundreds of years ago, if not much before that, so it isn't particularly new.

If you think that by studying the brain, we will understand not only seeing trees, which includes all of what I mentioned (categorization, psychic continuity, etc.) then I think you're mistaking different aspects of reality. You have to assume these things before doing any science.

This just seems like a bare assertion. Can I ask what your expertise or understanding is in neuroscience against which you're measuring the complexity of manifest reality to reach such a conclusion? — Isaac

I think it is an evident mistake to think that you need to do neuroscience to do philosophy of mind at all. If what you say is true, then Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Russell, Strawson, etc. haven't done anything.

But then this boils down to different assertions: I say that the complexity of manifest reality cannot be explained by neuroscience, we simply know way too little. We don't know how something as simply as C. Elegans does anything and we've mapped all 302 neurons. A human being is a bit harder than a worm: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK154158/

But then you'll reply that all this will be explained by neuroscience, that I am only making an assertion. That manifest reality is explained by processes in the brain is another assertion, which again, says almost nothing about all the stuff we do with our minds. So, we're stuck.

Then the only option available is for you to study neuroscience. I'll focus on manifest reality. There need be no clash, I don't think.

My ontology is pluralist, I suppose (but also a cop-out of sorts). There is a vast variety of individual things and substances. I think metaphysical pluralism can account for differences in time and space as well as differences in kind, which monism and other taxonomical accounts rarely offer. This also entails nominalism and individualism. — NOS4A2

Interesting, but where is the cop-out? I don't see it.

I tend to enjoy William James quite bit when he talks about this things, but I'm more sympathetic to monism.

What do you mean by individualism in this account?

There is agreement. There is disagreement. And the simple fact that neither one matters, itself does not matter. For they both proceed apace as if they did. And that is all that matters.

Damn man, that's actually a very nice quote, not gonna lie. :)

Damn man, that's actually a very nice quote, not gonna lie. — Manuel

Thank you, and a tip 'o the hat to a mocha venti on a long drive back from the big city. :blush:

I prefer the not so easy question: what is necessarily not there? — 180 Proof

:up:

My ontology is likewise mostly negative: not so much about the kinds of things that there are, but about the kinds of things it wouldn't make any sense for there to be -- things that make no experiential difference in the world, or things that are simultaneously one way and also a contrary but equally real way depending on who you ask -- with the kinds of things there are being something or another in the complementary set to that, to be answered more specifically by science rather than philosophy.

I do have some further thoughts on how to think about the relationship between something being, something doing, something being experienced, something being done-unto, and something experiencing, all in terms of function, but that's not really a question about which kinds of things do or don't exist, just what it means to exist at all.

What do you mean by individualism in this account?

I think a pluralist and nominalistic account of the world leads to individualism in the political sphere. The individual is the only valid classification worth considering, mainly because the existence of groups and other taxonomies can be seriously questioned.

Ah, there is much that can be said about these matters. I'd tend to agree that thinking in terms of the individual is most parsimonious and classification in general can be fiendishly difficult and very much up to debate. If this is on the right track, as I suspect it is, how do you move from one individual to another?

As for pluralism, is there a minimum in terms of how many entities you allow or does this not enter into your worldview?

What is depends on what you are doing.

One makes bread by sifting flour and mixing it with yeast and heating the result. A cook who doubts the existence of flour and yeast will get nowhere.

But ontology encourages just such doubt. Hence, ontology is antithetical to cooking.

A similar argument can be offered for anything useful. Hence, ontology is antithetical to anything useful.



To continue the Carollian reference,

'But oh, beamish nephew, beware of the day,
If your Snark be a Boojum! For then
You will softly and suddenly vanish away,
And never be met with again!'

One ought beware that one's ontology is not a boojum. A system, a taxonomy of being, a pluralism of individuals; in each case, what will never be met with again? When one treats ontology as a list, some stuff is necessarily not there.

One makes bread by sifting flour and mixing it with yeast and heating the result. A cook who doubts the existence of flour and yeast will get nowhere.

But ontology encourages just such doubt. Hence, ontology is antithetical to cooking. — Banno

Quite. One wonders where ontology is useful, apart from in philosophy circles.

I understand that view. I don't necessarily think it need entail someone doubting the existence of flower or cooking. Not if your a realist about experience. Maybe someone like Dennett might take some issue with that. Rosenberg certainly would, for him it's only bosons and fermions. I don't think a life of bosons and fermions is interesting by itself.

The idea is not so much a list, but carving out what belongs where. Frodo belongs to fiction, that doesn't mean he is not a real fictional character. Likewise, H20 is what science describes, but it's not what we encounter when we deal with water in our everyday, which is what belongs in manifest experience.

As to what doesn't belong at all. That's a good question. Which is why I'm seeking different views on the matter. But again, I see where you are coming from.

It's an excellent OP. What you will elicit is a list of philosophical errors.

And so it begins.

Quite. One wonders where ontology is useful, apart from in philosophy circles. — Tom Storm

AI. Ethnoscience. Common sense understanding.

What do we say about numbers or ideas?

That's overwhelmingly possible. But I learn, hopefully. :)

Oh, it'll be great fun to watch.

See how the evil vampire who is actually a nerd living in his mother's basement reins in ontology to the needs of his individualistic worldview.

See how the evil vampire who is actually a nerd living in his mother's basement reins in ontology to the needs of his individualistic worldview. — Banno

All I want is to give structure to my ignorance. It's clear that you obviously know your philosophy quite well.

All I can say is enjoy.

A cook who doubts the existence of flour and yeast will get nowhere. — Banno

Doubt does indeed stop a lot of people from doing things. But there is a whole 'nother class of people who don't let a little thing like doubt stop them from whatever.

See how the evil vampire who is actually a nerd living in his mother's basement reins in ontology to the needs of his individualistic worldview.

Maybe one day you’ll learn to face my ideas instead of the little effigy you’ve constructed in your fantasies. Until then consider my name as your trigger-warning.

Maybe one day you’ll learn to face my ideas... — NOS4A2

There's nothing to face.

Yet here you are evoking my name. What bothers you about my individualistic worldview, so much that you need to call me names?

love

We have to stipulate what the brain is, what parts of the body are directly relevant to the brain and so on. — Manuel

It is crucial to remember that we also have another structure that resembles the brain, but is not conscious:the gut brain — Manuel

What is it that you think stipulating/remembering these two issues helps with?

If you think that seeing a tree and all that goes into such an act, such as belief, perception, categorization, psychic continuity and so forth is explained by saying, it's because of actions in the brain, you've said almost nothing. — Manuel

Who said anything about explaining it by saying 'because of actions in the brain'? Your contention was that no-one could give you an example of...

how a brain state produces a qualitative state, such as seeing the sky or a tree. — Manuel

You did not ask how the entire process works. If I asked how a car works, a description of the fuel, the engine, the wheels...etc is usually taken to suffice. It's not usual to say that this description is inadequate because it doesn't go into the sociol-political history of the motor manufacturing industry. You're using 'explain' in a very weird way which seems reserved entirely for talk of the connection between brains states and mind.

If you think that by studying the brain, we will understand not only seeing trees, which includes all of what I mentioned (categorization, psychic continuity, etc.) then I think you're mistaking different aspects of reality. — Manuel

What on earth would give you the impression that I think studying the brain can yield an understanding of all that? What, in fact, makes you think that any sane person would think that?

I think it is an evident mistake to think that you need to do neuroscience to do philosophy of mind at all. If what you say is true, then Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Russell, Strawson, etc. haven't done anything. — Manuel

You can do philosophy of mind without understanding neuroscience if you want to. My question had nothing to do with merely doing philosophy of mind. You made a specific claim - that neuroscience had no explanation of "knowing a tree", "speaking of trees", or "classifying trees". In order to see that a field has no explanation of something you must have conducted a fairly thorough survey of that field - I was just asking about the manner of that survey.

That manifest reality is explained by processes in the brain is another assertion — Manuel

Indeed, but not one anyone is, or would, make, I think. So we're untroubled by it's lack of support.

I'll focus on manifest reality. There need be no clash, I don't think. — Manuel

What happens when you look at an fMRI scan then? When your 'manifest reality' includes neural scans, psychological experimental data, EEG and microprobe readouts, saccade diagrams, the actions of lesion patients... What then? You talk as if cognitive scientists are non-human, that the stuff we look at is somehow apart from this 'manifest reality' and we have to, what, invent our own language so as to not pollute yours with what we've seen?

For you there is an experience of “seeing a tree” as distinct from the physical state of the brain at the moment. For Isaac “seeing a tree” is precisely the physical state of the brain at the moment.

Personally, I don’t find that anything “breaks” when you say that mental states are physical states. Example: “She slapped him because she was angry”, “She slapped him because <insert causal chain leading to slap here>”. Same thing.

So I prefer Isaac’s view. It doesn’t have to deal with the problems of dualism. Such as: if “seeing a tree” is an experience independent from the physical state, how does it influence it and seem influenced by it? Same with “anger”. How did the emotion move the arm (I would simply say that the emotion is precisely the neural event that moved the arm)? I also prefer minimalist ontologies so that probably plays a role.

If you think that by studying the brain, we will understand not only seeing trees, which includes all of what I mentioned — Manuel

If someone understands everything there is about the physical state of someone seeing a tree but has never seen a tree themselves, does that person “understand seeing trees”. I ask because this caused a lot of confusion on another thread. There are 2 uses of the word understand here. The former means comprehension of facts. The latter means having an experience. The former is used for example in “You don’t understand calculus”. The latter is used in “You don’t understand pain”.

What on earth would give you the impression that I think studying the brain can yield an understanding of all that? What, in fact, makes you think that any sane person would think that? — Isaac

Sorry. I was reading into what you were saying much more than what you did. I thought you were coming from a Churchland perspective. Alex Rosenberg would argue in this manner.

What happens when you look at an fMRI scan then? When your 'manifest reality' includes neural scans, psychological experimental data, EEG and microprobe readouts, saccade diagrams, the actions of lesion patients... What then? You talk as if cognitive scientists are non-human, that the stuff we look at is somehow apart from this 'manifest reality' and we have to, what, invent our own language so as to not pollute yours with what we've seen? — Isaac

I don't see the problem. When you look at an fMRI scan, you're trying to find connections between different activities in the brain and whatever the stimulus may be. Establishing that is far from trivial as you know.

The data given by such devices can offer interesting clues as to how the brain processes information, for example Stanislas Dehaene work, shows that it takes .500 seconds for something to register into conscious awareness half the time, this proves that the vast majority of what goes on in the brain does not reach consciousness. I think that's interesting.

Not at all. You don't need to invent any language. If you are speaking about seeing a tree, I can say I saw a tree and you can speak about into terms of neurophysiological processes in the brain.

Personally, I don’t find that anything “breaks” when you say that mental states are physical states. Example: “She slapped him because she was angry”, “She slapped him because <insert causal chain leading to slap here>”. Same thing. — khaled

I mean, you could do that. But it would be very strange. You'd eventually describe everything we do in neurophysiological language. I don't see how that helps us much by way of dealing with other people in ordinary life.

So I prefer Isaac’s view. It doesn’t have to deal with the problems of dualism. Such as: if “seeing a tree” is an experience independent from the physical state, how does it influence it and seem influenced by it? Same with “anger”. How did the emotion move the arm (I would simply say that the emotion is precisely the neural event that moved the arm)? I also prefer minimalist ontologies so that probably plays a role. — khaled

I agree with Strawson's Real Materialism: everything that concretely exists is physical, including experiential states. On this view there is no difference between a "physical state" and a "mental state", because the mind is physical. When we speak of mind, we are simply stressing the mental aspects of physical reality.

How would you describe this ontology, as in what entities would it postulate?

I don't follow.

sad

You'd eventually describe everything we do in neurophysiological language. — Manuel

No? Why would I do that?

When we speak of mind, we are simply stressing the mental aspects of physical reality. — Manuel

I could just do this as I have been.

But if this is what you think then why were you asking “how” neurons produce experiences?