Proposition one states that the position of Individual Moral Subjectivism falls under the meta-ethical framework of cognitivism, which is a view in philosophy that ethical statements express propositions. A proposition is simply a statement which is capable of being true or false (it has truth value; is truth apt). — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes, I know. But I didn't say 1 was false, did I? I said 2 was false.

You're building a commitment to moral realism into individual moral subjectivism. That's just confused.

So what I am proposing is that moral statements such as "Genocide is wrong" express a proposition similar to non-evaluative statements such as "The sky is blue". I'm saying that both these kinds of statements have the property of being either true or false. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

I know. This is not in dispute. Individual moral subjectivism, moral naturalism and moral non-naturalism all take moral statements at face value: that is, as truth-apt propositions.

What they are not committed to is the claim that some of those statements are true. That's an additional claim, one that then makes the relevant subjectivist, naturalist or non-naturalist into a 'moral realist'.

The theory that water is made of tiny molecules is not equivalent to the theory that some water exists. The theory that unicorns are horse-type creatures with naturally growing spirally horns coming out of their foreheads is similarly not a theory about what exists. And the theory that moral properties are reducible to an individual's subjective states is also not a theory about what exists.

Realism also makes the claim that moral statements have a truth value, and that some of those truth values are true, but, in addition, realism also claims that such truth values exist objectively, as in a mind-independent property of the world. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

No, you're conflating moral realism with objectivist moral realism. Look, this is all just a labelling matter of no importance to the issues under debate. But we might as well get clear about how to use these terms.

Moral objectivism is the view that the truth conditions of moral statements are objective properties of some kind or other. Naturalism and non-naturalism are both kinds of moral objectivism.

Moral subjectivism is the view that the truth conditions of moral statements are subjective properties of some kind or other. Individual subjectivism, inter-subjectivism and divine command theory are all kinds of subjectivism.

Moral realism is the view that some moral propositions are true. So you can have individual subjectivist moral realism, inter-subjectivist moral realism, divine command moral realism, naturalist moral realism and non-naturalist moral realism.

The reason you're conflating moral realism and moral objectivism is that most contemporary moral realists are also moral objectivists. Why? Because individual and inter-subjectivism are stupid views that no-one who knows their beans takes seriously.

Now, I stress that all of this is really beside the point. For these are just labelling matters. This is what matters, what the OP is about, and what you need to address:

Individual and inter-subjectivist views about morality are stupid (as is generally recognized among the experts, but not among the public). Why? Because moral norms do not appear to be norms we ourselves are issuing. The view that they are, in fact, norms we ourselves are issuing is as stupid as the view that the outside world is a figment of one's imagination.

The same applies to non-cognitivist or expressivist views. Expressing a subjective state is a different linguistic activity to describing it. But the same information is conveyed. As with individual subjectivism, there is simply no evidence that expressivist views are true, and plenty that they are not. Those who endorse them do so because - by their own admission - they lack moral intuitions (and this, combined with staggering arrogance, then leads them to conclude that we're at root expressing ourselves when we use moral language, not attempting to describe the world).

Moral Naturalist views are stupid too, because it is stupid - indeed, insane - to think that the natural world can issue instructions to us and value things.

Moral non-naturalist views are equally stupid, perhaps even more stupid. For it is equally insane to think that non-natural properties can issue instructions to us and value things. And to posit such things becuase one acknowledges that natural properties cannot do such things makes the non-naturalist possibly even more stupid than the naturalist.

As most contemporary metaethicists defend either some form of expressivism, or naturalism, or non-naturalism, we can conclude that contemporary metaethics is stupid. And note too, the battalions that defend these views are of roughly the same size, and so the majority of the philosophical community does, in fact, agree with me.

So far you have not said anything to address my claims. Rather you have argued that some form of individual subjectivism is true and gave two arguments. One of those was unsound and question begging. The other also had those features but even if it didn't would have established the truth of a different view from the one you were using it to defend.

Because moral norms do not appear to be norms we ourselves are issuing. — Bartricks

Moral norms (when it comes to the "big" issues like assault, rape, murder, child abuse, theft and so on) are dictated by necessity: that is by the need for basic social harmony, and so are broadly cross-cultural.

The more nuanced, and hence potentially contentious, moral questions (like what should be the age of sexual consent, alcohol consumption, autonomy, voting, and many, many other questions about what is or is not socially acceptable) may be very different at different times and places,

In either case they are issued by people, individually or collectively, in the form of the law, and the established moral conventions we all (mostly) abide by.

Oh so it’s question begging when I say exactly what you say?

Why? Note, the issue is not 'whether' this is so, for it so clearly is. The question is 'why' it should be — Bartricks

Interesting.

Idk how you never tire of trolling. It was funny at first but it’s getting old now.

Just argue something. Stop lamely declaring - without argument - that my case is 'garbage'. If you can't argue anything, at least insult me better

So, Hugh, if I tell myself to do x, it is necessarily right for me to do x?

Look, this thread isn't about individual subjectivism about morality. For that view is so stupid only those with no philosophical training in ethics think it is true (hence why so many here are do convinced of it).

Like I say, individual subjectivism about morality has about as much to be said for it as individual subjectivism about cakes.

Like I say, individual subjectivism about morality has about as much to be said for it as individual subjectivism about cakes. — Bartricks

Yeah, and about as much as this piss-poor "response" has to say about what it is "responding" to.

Actions are done by individuals. The question about whether their actions are morally right or not has nothing to do with the question about their action's origins.

What can the rightness or wrongness of actions be assessed against? If you want to say it's reason, then the question becomes "whose reason" and "justified by what premises"? I doubt you have a cogent answer for that.

Address the op or go away Hugh.

This view is stupid because it amounts to the view that the lifeless natural world can issue directives to us. — Bartricks

Your "critique" of naturalism is stupid. Moral naturalism doesn't claim that moral injunctions come form "the lifeless (sic) natural world" but from the natural dispositions of social humans. Precursors to this can be readily observed in the behavior of higher social animals; natural empathy and concern for others of one's own kind.

No, you are simply misunderstanding naturalism. The view that moral prescriptions come from individuals is individual subjectivism, not naturalism (as I have defined it).

Naturalists identify moral properties with objective natural properties.

Objective natural properties can't issue prescriptions and nor is any collection of them itself a prescription. Thus the view is false and stupid.

That holds just as true for sociological facts if we include those among natural facts. So, if we say that moral rightness is one and the same as some sociological fact, then either that fact has to issue a prescription (which is stupid) or the fact and the prescription are being identified with one another - which is a category error and a very stupid one at that.

You yourself are just very confused - too confused to be able to understand my response above, no doubt - and are conflating dispositions to get the impression of, and believe in, moral norms and values with the norms and values themselves. Hence why you are going to keep rabbiting on about animals and the development of moral beliefs and think that by thereby doing you are providing some kind of support for something. It's a tedious rookie mistake.

I have argued in this thread that you are speaking garbage. My argument was:

Note it’s not a question of “whether” you’re speaking garbage, for that is so obviously the case, it’s a question of “how” one can speak so much garbage seriously. So no it’s not question begging. Look up the definition bud! — khaled

Which is clearly not question begging by your standards.

Why? Note, the issue is not 'whether' this is so, for it so clearly is. The question is 'why' it should be — Bartricks

This view is stupid because it amounts to the view that the lifeless natural world can issue directives to us. That's literally mad. — Bartricks

Moral Naturalist views are stupid too, because it is stupid - indeed, insane - to think that the natural world can issue instructions to us and value things. — Bartricks

You are a fuck'n fool, Buttlicks.

Ethical naturalism, in ethics, the view that moral terms, concepts, or properties are ultimately definable in terms of facts about the natural world, including facts about human beings, human nature, and human societies. (underlining mine)

From here

It's not the "lifeless natural world", idiot, and it's not a matter of being "issued directives". but of understanding the origin of ethics, and being able to define ethical concepts in terms of facts about us as individuals and societies.

So, your miserably impoverished "critique" of naturalistic ethics fails before it even farts in its pathetic attempt to get off the ground.

Proposition one states that the position of Individual Moral Subjectivism falls under the meta-ethical framework of cognitivism, which is a view in philosophy that ethical statements express propositions. A proposition is simply a statement which is capable of being true or false (it has truth value; is truth apt). — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Yes, I know. But I didn't say 1 was false, did I? I said 2 was false.

You're building a commitment to moral realism into individual moral subjectivism. That's just confused. — Bartricks

I didn't say that you said proposition one was false, did I? I was simply trying to provide clarity for the entire set.

I don't understand how claiming that some moral statements are true commits me to moral realism. I understand that in accordance with the traditional philosophical accounts of truth, namely the correspondence theory of truth, which says that the only true propositions are propositions that correspond with a fact of the world. In this sense, true propositions are necessarily confined to views such as realism and objectivism which only seem to provide satisfactory models within the confines of empiricism, naturalism, etc. Though I agree, such frameworks seem to produce the most accurate descriptions for the way the world really is and in a way that is true independent of the proposition itself, I do not think they produce the same satisfactory results with regards to evaluative propositions.

Evaluative propositions seem to be capable of expressing things beyond that which is physical, natural, material or concrete, and it is here where realistic models struggle, if not fail utterly, to provide satisfactory descriptions. Such propositions seem to be the physical vehicles which transport abstractions or other such non-physical entities between beings of similar sentience. Aside from Platonic forms, or Aristotelian and other subsequent attempts to fit such entities into a realist framework, such approaches, on the whole, seem to unravel upon crossing over to the metaphysical threshold. I think this is because, unlike with more concrete ontologies, meta-ethical semantics require a different approach and one in which certain exceptions may be made with regards to the rules which govern non-evaluative, non-material and non-empirical language.

When we use non-evaluative language to express a proposition, we are describing the way something is; a fact about the world. For example, if I say, "The earth is round," I am referring to the earth, which is concrete, and by assigning a quality to it, such as with it's shape in this example, I am able to say something capable of being true or false and by virtue of Earth's physical and material qualities, I am able to point to a feature of physical reality and objectively provide an empirical account for why the statement, "The earth is round," is true by virtue of corresponding to reality itself.

On the converse, non-evaluative language, such as if I were to say, "Torture is wrong," what I am expressing is a feeling or opinion about torture. When I say "Torture is wrong," what I mean is something like, "I disapprove of torture," or "I have a preference against torture". Since moral language seems to express the speaker's beliefs, it seems that me being against torture is what makes my statement true when I say "Torture is wrong." Though it is fallacious to reason, "I believe x, therefore x is true" using descriptive language that assesses the state of the natural world, as with other fields of knowledge, it seems to work for ethics for this reason.

I'm not quite sure which theory of truth best reflects my views on evaluative statements, perhaps coherentist or deflationary, but nonetheless I think that we can say that it is a psychological fact that we believe a statement is true. Even if I held the belief that the Earth was flat, and that statement could be proven false, it is still a fact that I held the belief that the world was flat.

I don't understand how claiming that some moral statements are true commits me to moral realism — Cartesian trigger-puppets

It's just the definition of moral realism. Moral realism 'just is' the view that moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true.

Evaluative propositions seem to be capable of expressing things beyond that which is physical, natural, material or concrete, and it is here where realistic models struggle, if not fail utterly, to provide satisfactory descriptions. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

Moral realism is not a view about the truth conditions of moral propositions. You seem to be using 'moral realism' to denote some kind of moral naturalist realism.

Like I say, moral realism is the view that some moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true.

But I don't know why we're discussing this - of what relevance is it to what I have claimed in the OP?

On the converse, non-evaluative language, such as if I were to say, "Torture is wrong," what I am expressing is a feeling or opinion about torture. When I say "Torture is wrong," what I mean is something like, "I disapprove of torture," or "I have a preference against torture". Since moral language seems to express the speaker's beliefs, it seems that me being against torture is what makes my statement true when I say "Torture is wrong." Though it is fallacious to reason, "I believe x, therefore x is true" using descriptive language that assesses the state of the natural world, as with other fields of knowledge, it seems to work for ethics for this reason. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

That's expressivism, not individual subjectivism. And it is false, indeed silly. It's obviously false - what actual evidence do you have that it is true? Actual evidence, not just painfully perverse re-interpretations of moral statements.

It doesn't appear to be true (wrongness seems to be something I recognise, not something I do). If it did appear to us to be true, then it would appear to us all that all we are using moral language to do is to boss each other around. If I say "Xing is wrong" I am just telling you not to do X becasue I disapprove of it (and we would recognise this). Well, then "get lost!" would be an appropriate response. Yet "get lost" as a response to "Xing is wrong" doesn't make sense.

It's not the "lifeless natural world", idiot, and it's not a matter of being "issued directives". but of understanding the origin of ethics, and being able to define ethical concepts in terms of facts about us as individuals and societies. — Janus

No it isn't. That isn't what the quote said. The quote said what I said. Do you have any expertise in this area, Hugh? Or do you not have the first idea what you're talking about?

The quote said what I said. — Bartricks

:rofl: This is now a whole other level of lame denial and confirmation bias. I'll leave you to your sad ruminations.

Exactly what I'd expect to come out of a Hugh Janus.

Here is how I defined naturalism:

The naturalist believes that the moral properties of rightness and wrongness and goodness and badness can be identified with objective natural properties. I say 'objective' because no contemporary metaethicist would defend individual subjectivism about morality (because it's really, really stupid). — Bartricks

Note, then, metaethical naturalism broadly construed does, or can, include individual and inter-subjectivist views (assuming, that is, that subjects are natural objects, which is something many - myself included - would deny). But because such views are unbelievably stupid and rejected by everyone who knows their beans, I defined naturalism as being the view that identifies moral properties with 'objective' natural properties.

It's just the definition of moral realism. Moral realism 'just is' the view that moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true. — Bartricks

That is the minimalist definition of realism, which is a contention between the moderate and robust forms of moral realism. As far as I am concerned, the minimal realist is compatible with subjectivism.

Most realists believe that moral statements are truth-apt, that some moral statements are true, and that moral statements are true in an objective sense. Anti-realists, such as subjectivists, deny at least one of these claims. I understand that there are some forms of realism (minimalist) that do not hold to the metaphysical thesis, however I feel that it is the fundamental difference between moral realism and moral anti-realism.

But I don't know why we're discussing this - of what relevance is it to what I have claimed in the OP? — Bartricks

You claimed moral subjectivism was false, did you not?

It's obviously false - what actual evidence do you have that it is true? Actual evidence, not just painfully perverse re-interpretations of moral statements. — Bartricks

Evidence that our beliefs are what we believe? I suppose it would have to be taken axiomatically. Do you not think it is true that you believe in your own beliefs?

It doesn't appear to be true (wrongness seems to be something I recognise, not something I do). If it did appear to us to be true, then it would appear to us all that all we are using moral language to do is to boss each other around. If I say "Xing is wrong" I am just telling you not to do X becasue I disapprove of it (and we would recognise this). Well, then "get lost!" would be an appropriate response. Yet "get lost" as a response to "Xing is wrong" doesn't make sense. — Bartricks

This is a misrepresentation of what I said. The truth of moral statements are dependent upon the individual subject they are indexed to. Moral subjectivisim gives moral statements a different meaning structure whereby a moral statement is indexed to the individual who made the statement, thus making it true if and only if it is interpreted accurately—that when we state a moral proposition we are actually expressing something about themselves. If you say "Xing is wrong" you are telling me that you would rather I not to do X becasue you disapprove of it. The statement "Get lost" is an imperative statement that expresses a command, so it wouldn't have a truth value.

You seem to be expressing quite a bit of your beliefs
on this matter. Is it true that you held these beliefs the moment you expressed them?

Note, then, metaethical naturalism broadly construed does, or can, include individual and inter-subjectivist views (assuming, that is, that subjects are natural objects, which is something many - myself included - would deny). — Bartricks

You are thinking too simplistically: ignoring the fact that there may be objective truths about subjects and their subjective states.'Objective truth' does not mean 'pertaining only to objects' but 'truth which is independent of opinion'.

Of course your subjective beliefs are not necessarily objectively true, because they are not independent of (your) opinion, but it is objectively true that you hold them. Are you able to understand the difference there?

If you can get that it will help you get a much better grasp on the issues. At the moment you are hopelessly confused.

More from the Hugh Janus. Nothing you just said was correct or addressed the op.

You're a joke Tarbricks, it's been a bit of fun in this thread; a welcome diversion from serious philosophical debate, so thanks.

You're just confused. Realism in ethics, like I say, is the view that moral statements are truth apt and some of them are true. You are conflating realism with objectivism. But I have already explained this.
Anyway, it is all beside the point as this thread is not about moral realism, but about the stupidity of the metaethical theories known as ecpressivism, naturalism and non naturalism - the dominant theories of contemporary debate. None of them is essentially realist as they are not theories about what actually exists, but theories about what it would take for morality to exist. I have said this umpteen times now and it doesn't seem to be registering.

I have also explained why individual subjectivism - which is 'not' a subject of contemporary debate - is false. You have not responded to that criticism, but instead gave two unsound and question begging arguments, one for individual subjectivism and one for expressivism.

There are three forms of moral realism: a minimal form, a moderate form, and a robust form. Proponents of the robust form of moral realism are committed to three theses: the semantic thesis, the alethic thesis, and the metaphysical thesis; whereas, the proponents of the minimalist form of moral realism leave off the metaphysical thesis. This is a highly contentious matter between moral realists and makes defining moral realism problematic. Here is a link to back up my claims:

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/moral-anti-realism/

You're just confused — Bartricks

This may be true. However, I'm not the only one who defines moral subjectivism (or ethical subjectivism) in such terms that is compatible with a minimalist form of moral realism. What is more, this seems to be a matter of contention between proponents of moral realism. Here is an excerpt from the SEP link above:

5. Subjectivism

To deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory suffices to make one a minimal moral realist. Traditionally, however, moral realism has required the denial of a further thesis: the mind-dependence of morality. There is no generally accepted label for theories that deny both noncognitivism and the moral error theory but maintain that moral facts are mind-dependent. Here I shall use a term as good as any other (though one used not infrequently in other ways): “subjectivism.” Thus, “moral subjectivism” denotes the view that moral facts exist and are mind-dependent, while “moral objectivism” holds that they exist and are mind-independent. (Note that this nomenclature makes the two contraries rather than contradictories; the error theorist and the noncognitivist count as neither objectivists nor subjectivists.

An additional source defining moral subjectivism using almost the same terms:

https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_ethical_subjectivism.html

From the Wikipedia article:

Ethical subjectivism or moral non-objectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

1. Ethical sentences express propositions.

2. Some such propositions are true.

3. The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.

Additional sources:

Harrison, Jonathan (2006). Borchert, Donald M. (ed.). Encyclopedia of philosophy (2nd ed.). Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA. ISBN 0-02-865780-2. OCLC 61151356.

Richard Brandt (1959). Ethical theory; the problems of normative and critical ethics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. p. 153. ISBN 0132904039. LCCN 59010075.

Anyway, it is all beside the point as this thread is not about moral realism, but about the stupidity of the metaethical theories known as ecpressivism, naturalism and non naturalism - the dominant theories of contemporary debate. — Bartricks

I acknowledge that my original comment was somewhat tangential to the thesis of the OP, however, I did respond directly to specific claims that you made within it and you nonetheless made effort to defend those claims. You have done little else but quibble over definitions and assert that mine were false and yours (apparently) more accurate. You did little else but define a minimalist form of moral realism and ignore the fact that other forms exist and that their existence makes defining 'moral realism' not as obviously simple as you seem to be implying.

You have yet to substantiate any of your claims. You conveniently ignore my more specific points such as my issue with the correspondence theory of truth, minimalist form of moral realism that also ignores the metaphysical thesis that a robust form of moral realism would commit to, or the question I raised asking whether or not you find the content of your own conscious mind to be true—such a thing that I would hold as my most certain knowledge and highest epistemic state.

I have also explained why individual subjectivism - which is 'not' a subject of contemporary debate - is false. You have not responded to that criticism, but instead gave two unsound and question begging arguments, one for individual subjectivism and one for expressivism. — Bartricks

It is pointless to attempt to argue one way or the other whenever we have yet to agree with how to define terms. I am seeking clarity with regards to a few claims that you have made and I'm happy to return to any other claims left on the table once some kind of convergence is made with the few. I'm interested to see how you respond with the sources I've provided you with. I assume that you would at least have to change your previous positions from "You are wrong" or "You are confused" to "Your sources are wrong" and "Your sources are confused".

This is partial reply because I am about to go up mountain.

However, I'm not the only one who defines moral subjectivism (or ethical subjectivism) in such terms that is compatible with a minimalist form of moral realism. — Cartesian trigger-puppets

OMG! i am not denying they're 'compatible'. Sheesh. I am saying that subjectivism does not include a commitment to moral realism. Blimey. This isn't hard. Subjectivism is a view about what morality is made of. It is not a view about what exists.

What is morality made of?

Subjective states.

Do those subjective states exist?

Yes = subjectivist moral realism

No = subjectivist moral nihilism.

See?

Now stop blithering on about moral realism. It is not a commitment of any of the views I outlined!!

Individual subjectivism - which is a view about what morality is made of, not about whether it exists or not - is false. So obviously false that it isn't taken seriously in the contemporary debate. That's why I defined 'naturalism' in a way that precluded it (naturalism, on my usage, is the view that moral properties can be identified with 'objective' natural properties).

You're clearly someone who prefers labelling things to actually assessing the credibility of the views that the labels are attached to.

This is my thread, yes? I defined my terms. So those definitions are the only ones you need to worry about. You don't need to educate me about how terms are used. A) you're clearly not qualified to do that as you keep misusing them and B) it doesn't matter how they are used, what matters is the credibility of the views that are being attached to.

The views that I have assessed to be stupid (and you can put any label you want on them) are these:

Moral properties can be identified with objective natural features. (A view I have - entirely conventionally - identified as 'moral naturalism')

Moral properties are non-natural properties (A view I have identified as 'non-naturalism')

There are no moral properties as such, rather when we make what appear to be moral statements we are actually doing something like expressing an attitude or issuing a directive (a view I have identified as 'expressivism').


Those are the views that I have said are stupid. I have argued they are stupid. Most contemporary philosophers agree with me that at least two of those kinds of view are indeed stupid, and thus most agree with me that the bulk of the views are stupid.

Are they stupid? If you think they're not, defend one. Show me that I am mistaken in what I have said about them.

Don't - don't - go on about moral realism.

I am a moral realist, ok. I understand what the term means in a way that you do not. I am one.

I've read the rest of your post. And yes, you are confused.
I have defined my terms and if you dislike my definitions that's your problem not mine. You haven't yet addressed anything I argued in the op. Do so and I will respond, but otherwise I really can't be bothered debating labels with you any more.

Thanks. I keep telling myself I'll read one SEP article a day, but some are pretty wrong and the random article button has sent me to some places so really don't care about. This'll be more up my alley.

Ah, good. Something worthwhile might come from this wretched thread.

For those tempted to comment on this OP, there is a clear, erudite summation of metaethics, in the SEP article. — Banno

I will not be led into temptation to comment on "the attempt to understand the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological, presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk, and practice" and so will be delivered thereby from considering the presuppositions and commitments of moral thought, talk and practice regarding evil.

That said, John Dewey.

P.S. Amen