it's being made from a 'third-party' perspective. In other words, you're making a judgement about what you think are the deficiencies of 'religious practices', based on your knowledge or belief about the shortcomings of other people's endeavours to practice them. — Wayfarer

Absolutely, I recognise that, but my point is that it's no less true then for science. A neuroscientist possessed of the expansive and detailed knowledge of his subject might feel he's accounted for human consciousness. You, a non-practicing neuroscientist, then say "neuroscience cannot account for human consciousness" based only on your third party knowledge of other people's endeavours to practice neuroscience.

I don't see what's different that allows you to make claims about the understanding neuroscience can/cannot acquire as an outsider, but I couldn't make similar claims about the understanding religious practice can/cannot acquire without actually doing it.

But the point about the scientific perspective is that it is third-person by design. It is what any observer will see, all things being equal. It presumes the subject-object relationship i.e. ‘I see it’.

If I were to say that ‘neuroscience cannot account for consciousness’ I would not be taking issue with the neuroscientist with regards to her domain of knowledge, but making a philosophical point about the brain-mind relationship which might be outside the domain of neuroscience as such. I don’t think neuroscience claims to understand the philosophical question of brain-mind relationship as it is not necessarily a scientific question.

The point about the perspective of a spiritual practitioner is that it is not objective in the sense that science is. Let’s say it involves a shift in perspective from the ego-logical to an other-oriented perspective. There might be a cathartic experience of seeing through or beyond oneself that is profoundly life-altering but not necessarily scientifically verifiable

But the point about the scientific perspective is that it is third-person by design. It is what any observer will see, all things being equal. It presumes the subject-object relationship i.e. ‘I see it’. — Wayfarer

I agree with this.

If I were to say that ‘neuroscience cannot account for consciousness’ I would not be taking issue with the neuroscientist with regards to her domain of knowledge, but making a philosophical point about the brain-mind relationship which might be outside the domain of neuroscience as such. — Wayfarer

True.

I don’t think neuroscience claims to understand the philosophical question of brain-mind relationship as it is not necessarily a scientific question. — Wayfarer

I think it does to an extent. Several neuroscientists think they'll be able to understand consciousness as a result of their studies. I can see, however, that this might well be more properly considered a philosophical question, so, with caveats, we're still broadly in agreement...

...until here.

The point about the perspective of a spiritual practitioner is that it is not objective in the sense that science is. Let’s say it involves a shift in perspective from the ego-logical to an other-oriented perspective. There might be a cathartic experience of seeing through or beyond oneself that is profoundly life-altering but not necessarily scientifically verifiable — Wayfarer

Now you seem to abandon the approach you took to scientific questions. Why cannot an outsider address the philosophical question of whether a spiritual practitioner does indeed "involve a shift in perspective from the ego-logical to an other-oriented perspective.", whether it could possibly have "a cathartic experience of seeing through or beyond oneself that is profoundly life-altering but not necessarily scientifically verifiable".

Both those question are philosophical ones, just like the question about whether neuroscience does or does not address consciousness is. Both can be asked without engaging in the actual practice itself, just by assessing the methods, what they bracket out, how they assess results etc. Just like we did to conclude that neuroscience takes a third-party approach and so can't deliver first person values.

Basically, I'm not (as I'm often mistakenly assumed to be) advocating that science can answer all of life's questions, I'm merely making the point that it's failure to do so does not lead to a conclusion that the non-science alternatives must therefore be the ones to do so. They may fail too. Their success or failure is completely independent of science's.

Imagine a florist who develops over many years of dedicated practice the insight that 'the world is a purple rose.' She explains that this truth only sounds like nonsense to those who haven't arranged ten million flowers with a pure heart. A critic tells her that surely arranging flowers is not the path to grand metaphysical truths and that this can only be a metaphor of some kind, or perhaps a poem that captures a mood. She retorts that this is a common misconception about flower-arrangement, and the inner meaning of the purple rose also reveals new dimensions of the mind, a trans-conceptual or non-discursive faculty that mostly lies dormant. She even admits that perhaps only some humans have this faculty and are capable of the Insight, but insists that arranging the ten million flowers is necessary for those who do have the faculty.

To me this is about the notion of Direct Experience. How does one florist convince another that she too has had the Direct Experience of the world as a purple rose? Locke discussed the 'Inner Light' and Adorno wrote critically of the 'jargon of authenticity.' An outsider might call it poetry that won't confess that it's poetry but rather insists that it's a trans-scientific knowledge (metaphysicks, but with an emphasis on lifestyle.)

How does one florist convince another that she too has had the Direct Experience of the world as a purple rose? Locke discussed the 'Inner Light' — j0e

Agreed! This theory is so important and interesting. As you explained could come from empiricism as Locke developed. It is not only about how someone can convince others of purple rose but how the other part will accept it. This is why I guess is so important here the power of belief and beliefs themselves. There will be people that doesn’t matter how good arguments you put in the table, they will not accept it...

That's a good example. I think intuitively we'd all want to say that the woman in question was suffering from some mental health issues and would possibly benefit from psychiatric help.

There's been a tendency to exempt religions on the grounds of numbers (that many people can't all be mad). I'm inclined to go along with that approach, but in doing so we've pinned religious acceptance to empirical claims (the question of how many people share the feeling) and that takes us away from what people like @Wayfarer want to say about religious investigations, I think.

But yeah, personally, I don't really see any other way out of it. There's no denying the difference between some lunatic believing in their own fantasy world and a religious claim is the number of people ho go along with it, and that does make claims about the success of religious practice empirical, otherwise the lunatic gets their fair shake too.

What I think neither side want is for my claim that one should rub trifle in their hair every day to achieve enlightenment, to sit alongside the claim that one should attend church, meditate, wear a hijab or whatever. And it's not the degree of justificatory narrative around the claim. Anyone who thinks I couldn't come up with whole libraries of justificatory narrative for the trifle rubbing clearly hasn't read enough Terry Pratchett.

That's the trouble with talk of objectivity and of subjective experience: it doesn't help anything. — Banno

And then there is the issue of power struggles between people. We could say that notions of subjectivity and objectivity are born of, created by the power struggle. But even if you do away with notions of subjectivity and objectivity, the power struggle remains, you're still a person in a power hierarchy, and you still have to look out for yourself.

Tying this to our earlier exchange about losers and winners: Feeling like a loser seems to go hand in hand with operating within the dichotomy subjective-objective. I'm not sure what would apply for those who see themselves as winners (possibly they also operate within said dichotomy). Much less can I imagine what it's like not to operate within this dichotomy at all.

They are not so much stated beliefs as sentiments; to be seen in music and art, not dissected by philosophers. — Banno

I agree. Although religious apologists sometimes go to great lengths to present them as objectively empirically testable propositions.

By having confidence in yourself, believing that you exist for a reason, that you're a worthy person, and so on. Yes, cheap self-help slogans, I know. But I'm earnest about this.
— baker

I think you are right that religion offers some people these things. — j0e

No. I'm saying one has to have those things, or else getting involved with religion is going to squish one.

I don't agree with Marx entirely, and personally I think humans can get just as entangled with conspiracy theory sans the supernatural for the same 'opium.' Perhaps even Marxism is the opium of the intellectuals, etc. I quote this to make the point that 'mythos and ritual that makes us feel good (but only if one really believes and practices a certain lifestyle)' is not so far from what an atheist might say.

I'm sometimes amazed by high-calibre thinkers like Marx, Weber, or Nietzsche because they don't account for the cunning of religious people. Instead, they talk of religious people as if a page from De Imitatione Christi were a template for them.

Doing a religious practice can never convince a person who doesn't already believe.
— baker

I lean toward agreeing with you, but I can imagine exceptions to this rule, depending on the practice. — j0e

Of course, it's possible to jump to conclusions, even encouraged sometimes.
I've seen this in Buddhism, for example, where there was a subtle pressure to conclude, after a few "good" meditation sessions, that the Buddha was enlightened and that the practice of meditation was the one true path to enlightenment.

By having confidence in yourself, believing that you exist for a reason, that you're a worthy person, and so on. Yes, cheap self-help slogans, I know. But I'm earnest about this. It's a contextual reply to your question.
A philosophical quest for the truth, for "knowing how things really are" can sometimes turn into a self-perpetuating obsession that makes one's life miserable. It can start off out of a poor self-image, or it can result in one (and then further perpetuate it and itself).
— baker

I've no idea how this addresses what I said. Perhaps you could expand. — Isaac

I'm trying to give a context for approaching religion, a context that tries to make sure that one's involvement with religion isn't going to become something ill.

That's a good example. I think intuitively we'd all want to say that the woman in question was suffering from some mental health issues and would possibly benefit from psychiatric help. — Isaac

Eh.

There's been a tendency to exempt religions on the grounds of numbers (that many people can't all be mad).

What I'm doing is that I try to establish a healthy and safe distance toward religion. I'm not defending it.

But yeah, personally, I don't really see any other way out of it. There's no denying the difference between some lunatic believing in their own fantasy world and a religious claim is the number of people ho go along with it, and that does make claims about the success of religious practice empirical, otherwise the lunatic gets their fair shake too.

That's where one's self-confidence comes in and intuitively deciding that some claims aren't worth one's time, or are otherwise none of one's business.
One will simply crash and burn if one wishes to give all claims a "fair hearing" or approach them scientifically, testing them or requesting evidence for them.

But the point about the scientific perspective is that it is third-person by design. It is what any observer will see, all things being equal. It presumes the subject-object relationship i.e. ‘I see it’. — Wayfarer

While in religion/spirituality, "you" are the object of your investigation.
Noone can do that for you, nor can you do it for anyone else.

I'm trying to give a context for approaching religion, a context that tries to make sure that one's involvement with religion isn't going to become something ill. — baker

I can sort of see that. Just not sure why you're doing it in reply to my posts.

That's where one's self-confidence comes in and intuitively deciding that some claims aren't worth one's time, or are otherwise none of one's business.
One will simply crash and burn if one wishes to give all claims a "fair hearing" or approach them scientifically, testing them or requesting evidence for them. — baker

Are they really the only options you see? Either a gut feeling guess or a full blown scientific investigation? What about a rough, informed-but-not-expert, examination of the general picture?

in religion/spirituality, "you" are the object of your investigation.
Noone can do that for you, nor can you do it for anyone else. — baker

Yes, no one can do it for, you nor can you do it for anyone else. Absolutely right.

But neither of those negations have any bearing on the matter of whether you can do it for you. Maybe you can't do it for you either, maybe no one can do it for anyone.

I can sort of see that. Just not sure why you're doing it in reply to my posts. — Isaac

It's not just in reply to your posts. It's something I've been working out for myself. Maybe someone else benefits as well.

Are they really the only options you see? Either a gut feeling guess or a full blown scientific investigation? What about a rough, informed-but-not-expert, examination of the general picture?

I think that in some matters, esp. in religion, those are the only options.
Also, why would you need that kind of rough, informed-but-not-expert, examination of the general picture?

But neither of those negations have any bearing on the matter of whether you can do it for you. Maybe you can't do it for you either, maybe no one can do it for anyone.

Of course. Such are the prospects of any practice.
(But as long as one doesn't believe in eternal damnation, things aren't that bad.)

Could you sketch out where you see the problem with such prospective failure?

No. I'm saying one has to have those things, or else getting involved with religion is going to squish one. — baker

OK. Well I could see it working both ways. People need community, or most people do. I can imagine just being accepted by some group could rescue someone. Then the doctrines may flatter the group, and they can all believe it together (that they are saved, enlightened, pure,...)

I'm sometimes amazed by high-calibre thinkers like Marx, Weber, or Nietzsche because they don't account for the cunning of religious people. Instead, they talk of religious people as if a page from De Imitatione Christi were a template for them. — baker

In The German Ideology, though, you'll find a Marx's criticism of religion's cunning philosophical forms. Nietzsche's analysis of asceticism in GofM is highly complex (he seeings himself as a late stage of that mutating asceticism.) That said, I agree that in general secular thinkers can neglect the cunning you mention. It's all too easy to chatter on the level of cartoons and stereotypes. Pet theory: the sophistication or complexity of one's theory is mirrored by its internal vision of its opponent.

Of course, it's possible to jump to conclusions, even encouraged sometimes.
I've seen this in Buddhism, for example, where there was a subtle pressure to conclude, after a few "good" meditation sessions, that the Buddha was enlightened and that the practice of meditation was the one true path to enlightenment. — baker

I expect more of that the 'good stuff' I reluctantly admit as possible. I had a religious phase long, long ago, that I look back on with embarrassment. I was young and looking for some Meaning, and in retrospect I see in those I was with a mixture of charlatans and sincere seekers (I could say 'marks,' but they were getting some value for their time and money.)

That's a good example. I think intuitively we'd all want to say that the woman in question was suffering from some mental health issues and would possibly benefit from psychiatric help. — Isaac

It seems a little wacky to me too. But perhaps our florist is happy. Then I'd classify it as more of the usual human vanity. The woman probably obeys traffic rules and is nice to babies. It's only when you get her started on flowers that she's harmlessly mad. A very nice person recently told me she believes in fairies. She's a hard-working single mother. I nod sympathetically. I like her too much to try and take it from her.

There's been a tendency to exempt religions on the grounds of numbers (that many people can't all be mad). I'm inclined to go along with that approach, but in doing so we've pinned religious acceptance to empirical claims (the question of how many people share the feeling) and that takes us away from what people like Wayfarer want to say about religious investigations, I think.

But yeah, personally, I don't really see any other way out of it. There's no denying the difference between some lunatic believing in their own fantasy world and a religious claim is the number of people ho go along with it, and that does make claims about the success of religious practice empirical, otherwise the lunatic gets their fair shake too. — Isaac

I think this connect to the OP. It's as if people are doing some ritual of claiming to believe. Did the average Trump voter really believe the election was stolen? I like the pragmatist idea that belief is enacted. A Catholic can show up and mouth the Apostolic creed, put a tithe in the basket, try to be nice. The ritual actions have a low cost. Contrast this with a suicide bomber (and Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling reminds me of such things, a father sacrificing his miracle son for God, going against norms and common sense to prove his faith.)

What I think neither side want is for my claim that one should rub trifle in their hair every day to achieve enlightenment, to sit alongside the claim that one should attend church, meditate, wear a hijab or whatever. And it's not the degree of justificatory narrative around the claim. Anyone who thinks I couldn't come up with whole libraries of justificatory narrative for the trifle rubbing clearly hasn't read enough Terry Pratchett. — Isaac

I haven't read Prachette, but I like your example. A single madman is a joke. A few is a cult. Many are a religion. At the same time there's the sublimation (or neutralization) of a religion that makes it relatively harmless, in the short run at least.

That's where one's self-confidence comes in and intuitively deciding that some claims aren't worth one's time, or are otherwise none of one's business.
One will simply crash and burn if one wishes to give all claims a "fair hearing" or approach them scientifically, testing them or requesting evidence for them. — baker

I agree with this very much. We just can't give every claim an equal hearing.

Although religious apologists sometimes go to great lengths to present them as objectively empirically testable propositions. — baker

...and then have their arguments torn to shreds.

But the point about the scientific perspective is that it is third-person by design. It is what any observer will see, all things being equal. It presumes the subject-object relationship i.e. ‘I see it’.
— Wayfarer
While in religion/spirituality, "you" are the object of your investigation.
Noone can do that for you, nor can you do it for anyone else. — baker

:ok:

I understand Baker's quote. It just seems to stretch the meaning of 'investigation.' The notion of 'Direct Experience' is an epistemic disaster. Think of the strong criticisms of sense-data empiricism. This stuff is private by definition, so it makes an absurd foundation for science, however initially plausible. Instead we have to start with (theory-laden) observation statements.

Granted there are journeys into the interior, the self making sense of the self, we can still talk about what 'self' is supposed to mean here and how language works. I think the issue is trying to be philosophical and rational and at the same time gesturing beyond rationality. It's as if the mystic can't leave behind the desire to be recognized as some sort of scientist of the interior, hence metaphors like 'truth' and 'knowledge' for something that's also called 'mythos' or 'gnosis.'

One issue is that a science of the the interior is only possible with the assumption of similarity, but such an assumption cannot be justified via Direct Experience.

The notion of 'Direct Experience' is an epistemic disaster. Think of the strong criticisms of sense-data empiricism. This stuff is private by definition, so it makes an absurd foundation for science, however initially plausible. Instead we have to start with (theory-laden) observation statements. — j0e

Actually in religious disciplines there is, or should be, a distinction between 'experience' and 'realisation'. It is rarely recognized but you do find it in Buddhism.

In Buddhism, we distinguish between spiritual experiences and spiritual realizations. Spiritual experiences are usually more vivid and intense than realizations because they are generally accompanied by physiological and psychological changes. Realizations, on the other hand, may be felt, but the experience is less pronounced. Realization is about acquiring insight. Therefore, while realizations arise out of our spiritual experiences, they are not identical to them. Spiritual realizations are considered vastly more important because they cannot fluctuate.

The distinction between spiritual experiences and realizations is continually emphasized in Buddhist thought. 1 — Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche

Note that the word 'experience' is a transitive verb - 'experience' implies the experiencing subject and an object of experience. Whereas in non-dualism, which arises from 'absorption' (samadhi), that implicit division of self-and-other is no longer a given. That is why 'realisation' is the term that is often used in connection to the states of awareness associated with those practices. That is the distinction being made by Kyabgon Rinpoche.

metaphors like 'truth' and 'knowledge' for something that's also called 'mythos' or 'gnosis.' — j0e

Gnosis is 'higher knowledge', it is not mythos, although to be sure various forms of gnosticism have produced intricate mythological worlds. But it is always supposed that the source of that mythology is insight into a higher reality and the mythical re-telling a way to communicate that rather than a literal description. Actually that goes back to Armstrong's point about the distinction of logos and mythos - to interpret mythos literally is to mistake it for logos, which it isn't.

As I think we've discussed previously, one glaring problem in all this, the elephant in the room, is that in modern philosophy there is no 'higher' - there's no axis against which that can be calibrated. I'm afraid that's always going to be an insuperable barrier.

But it is always supposed that the source of that mythology is insight into a higher reality and the mythical re-telling a way to communicate that rather than a literal description. Actually that goes back to Armstrong's point about the distinction of logos and mythos - to interpret mythos literally is to mistake it for logos, which it isn't. — Wayfarer

What is 'height' here? What makes one judgment or proposition higher than another ? Is it generality? That the statement speaks of larger structures in existence? Is it an intensity of feeling? Such a magnanimity, serenity, love? I have no objections to the idea that certain metaphysical judgments 'light up' for those in the right 'place' for them (lifestyle, what they've been through.) Also no objections to the existence of the esoteric. I guess the issue is boundaries, how to treat the esoteric. Is there a performative contradiction in reasoning about something that hides?

On the logos/mythos thing, I see a spectrum. Cognition seems fundamentally metaphorical to me (Lakoff's work, for instance.) I'm with you and Armstrong on the sophisticated reading of spiritual texts as non-literal analogies or just as texts of undecidable status that help people.

As I think we've discussed previously, one glaring problem in all this, the elephant in the room, is that in modern philosophy there is no 'higher' - there's no axis against which that can be calibrated. I'm afraid that's always going to be an insuperable barrier. — Wayfarer

I think you can find some philosophers/philosophies where that's true, but for the most part it doesn't seem accurate to me. Just about every thinker has some story in which there are good guys and bad guys. IMO, you are just throwing all 'atheist' philosophy (I mean that with a non-religious attitude) into the same Flatland bin.

What is 'height' here? What makes one judgment or proposition higher than another ? Is it generality? That the statement speaks of larger structures in existence? — j0e

That's the question. Here's a quote from Edward Conze, an irascible Buddhologist from mid last century:

The "perennial philosophy" is ...defined as a doctrine which holds [1] that as far as worthwhile knowledge is concerned not all men are equal, but that there is a hierarchy of persons, some of whom, through what they are, can know much more than others; [2] that there is a hierarchy also of the levels of reality, some of which are more "real," because more exalted than others; and [3] that the wise men of old have found a "wisdom" which is true, although it has no "empirical" basis in observations which can be made by everyone and everybody; and that in fact there is a rare and unordinary faculty in some of us by which we can attain direct contact with actual reality--through the Prajñāpāramitā of the Buddhists, the logos of Parmenides, the Sophia of Aristotle and others, Spinoza's amor dei intellectualis, Hegel's Vernunft, and so on; and [4] that true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents.

It is within this context that the figure of 'the sage' is understandable, 'the sage' being one who understands, and so exemplifies, these qualities.

Conze contrasts this with the 'sciential' philosophy of the modern West:

In the West, a large number of philosophers discarded the basic presuppositions of the "perennial philosophy," and developed by contrast what for want of a better term we may call a "sciential" philosophy. That has the following features: [1] Natural science, particularly that dealing with inorganic matter, has a cognitive value, tells us about the actual structure of the universe, and provides the other branches of knowledge with an ideal standard in that they are the more "scientific", the more they are capable of mathematical formulation and the more they rely on repeatable and publicly verified observations. [2] Man is the highest of beings known to science, and his power and convenience should be promoted at all costs. [3] Spiritual and magical forces cannot influence events, and life after death may be disregarded, because it is unproven by scientific methods. [4] In consequence, "life" means "man's" life in this world, and the task is to ameliorate this life by a social "technique" in harmony with the "welfare" or "will" of "the people."

Is there a performative contradiction in reasoning about something that hides? — j0e

Actually, I googled that phrase, 'nature loves to hide', which lead me to splashing out seventy five bucks for a philosophy of physics book of that same title. Hasn't arrived yet. Hope I can understand it.

. IMO, you are just throwing all 'atheist' philosophy (I mean that with a non-religious attitude) into the same Flatland bin. — j0e

Well, I was speaking rhetorically, but I think in the secular academy it is assumed that the Universe is essentially energetic-material with no intrinsic value/purpose/meaning. There are exceptions, but I feel that in English-speaking academic philosophy, the assumed background is explicitly secular.

it is assumed that the Universe is essentially energetic-material — Wayfarer

Energistic-materal-informatic. Plato can't be eliminated.

That's the question. Here's a quote from Edward Conze, an irascible Buddhologist from mid last century: — Wayfarer

Great quote. There's some taboo-violation there, right? All men are not created equal. This is the dark side of Nietzsche too, with his idea of ranks of human beings. Becoming what one is, discovering one's fate, one's level. I say 'dark side' because it's taboo but I think intellectual types can't help relating to such elitist concepts. In that quote we get 'more real because more exalted.' But exalted remains undefined as a kind of raw superiority. The more real is what the better people say it is or how the higher man experiences the world. You can find this energy in Nietzsche running strangely alongside his Enlightenment materialism, and I think it's where Art (as a sacred concept) is involved. Art is the mysticism of the Romantic 'atheist.' What Russell types hate in religion they hate in Nietzsche, the perceived arrogance, the claim that some live by different rules.

Conze contrasts this with the 'sciential' philosophy of the modern West: — Wayfarer

Another great quote, and it does seem to describe the modern West.

Well, I was speaking rhetorically, but I think in the secular academy it is assumed that the Universe is essentially energetic-material with no intrinsic value/purpose/meaning. There are exceptions, but I feel that in English-speaking academic philosophy, the assumed background is explicitly secular. — Wayfarer

I think you are right that there's a metaphysical belief (vague but powerful) that nature is a dead machine. Secular religion just focuses instead on race, class, gender, freedom, environment, etc., but very passionately. But against the background of a disenchanted nature-machine.

Actually, I googled that phrase, 'nature loves to hide', which lead me to splashing out seventy five bucks for a philosophy of physics book of that same title. Hasn't arrived yet. Hope I can understand it. — Wayfarer

Should be fun! I just got Classics of Analytic Philosophy to make up for having read too much dirty, obscurantist continental stuff so far.

Plato can't be eliminated. — Zophie

Hey no argument from me! :up:

It seems a little wacky to me too. But perhaps our florist is happy. Then I'd classify it as more of the usual human vanity. — j0e

I would too.

The woman probably obeys traffic rules and is nice to babies. It's only when you get her started on flowers that she's harmlessly mad. — j0e

Not in my experience (the 'probably' bit). Most delusions cause some contingent problems for the people who suffer from them. The 'harmless belief in fairies' is of the less common kind by quite a long way.

The trouble with delusions is that they have to be tied in in some way to ones general web of beliefs and if they are delusions (ie difficult to marry with the rest of reality) then there's only really two ways to do that without suffering the pain of cognitive dissonance. One is to have the delusion gradually eroded until is sit somewhere with as few threads as possible connecting it to reality (fairies exists but we can't see then, hear them, smell them or detect them in any way and they don't cause anything, nor are they affected by anything...), or they can go the other way, infecting all the threads they touch by altering the neighbouring belief to fit better with the delusion. This just has more and more of an impact on the person's life as the condition progresses.

Your florist may well start of harmlessly mad, but there's a strong chance that if here delusions ore not dealt with they'll creep into areas of her life that would be much better governed by the reality of the physical world than by a belief in the transcendent power of roses.

I think this connect to the OP. It's as if people are doing some ritual of claiming to believe. Did the average Trump voter really believe the election was stolen? I like the pragmatist idea that belief is enacted. A Catholic can show up and mouth the Apostolic creed, put a tithe in the basket, try to be nice. The ritual actions have a low cost. — j0e

Yes, this is much more like it. Certain beliefs are used as membership criteria for certain clubs, they're not really beliefs in the sense of tendencies to act as if... but merely part of a word game (or ritual enaction) that is played to create a sense of mutual belonging (and of course, exclusion of the other - the dark side).

The problem is, that these otherwise harmless tribal rituals are triggers for more vulnerable people to start the infection of reasonable beliefs that I described above as the course delusion often takes. The suicide bomber is usually someone who is sufficiently low in self-confidence that even the sharing of ritual behaviour and belief-talk is not enough to make them feel they belong to the group. Rather than abandoning the project, they seek to 'turn up the volume' on ritual behaviour and belief-talk, in the expectation that perhaps a louder version might finally do the job. It usually ends in disaster, of course, because the 'volume' of the ritual behaviour and belief-talk was not the reason they were feeling ostracised.

A single madman is a joke. A few is a cult. Many are a religion. At the same time there's the sublimation (or neutralization) of a religion that makes it relatively harmless, in the short run at least. — j0e

Yes. The vast majority of religious practice is just social-bonding ritual and as harmless as a knitting club on a societal scale, but then so's the alternative.

That's a good example. I think intuitively we'd all want to say that the woman in question was suffering from some mental health issues and would possibly benefit from psychiatric help.
— Isaac

It seems a little wacky to me too. But perhaps our florist is happy. Then I'd classify it as more of the usual human vanity. The woman probably obeys traffic rules and is nice to babies. It's only when you get her started on flowers that she's harmlessly mad. A very nice person recently told me she believes in fairies. — j0e

Yes, absolutely. I classify such utterances under "poetic ontology", "poetic epistemology", and other poetic suches. There's plenty of this in literature. It doesn't occur to me to think of the utterers of such utterances as having "mental health problems".

See the beans in my hand in my avatar? I grow them. There is something absolutely transcendental to growing food and other plants. I'm just very careful about what I say about this to whom and when. There are other gardeners who understand very well what I'm talking about. And I know there are people (some of whom garden) who have no clue what I'm talking about.

An aside. There is currently little reason to think psychological classification is reliable. Replication crisis.

Edit: Excepting cognitive psychology, probably.

The 'harmless belief in fairies' is of the less common kind by quite a long way. — Isaac

Maybe you're right. I'm just commenting from my anecdotal experience. My wife has clued me in to a culture (largely feminine) of soft but unironic paganism, a mishmash of all kinds of stuff, morning Tarot card readins, a little green witchcraft blended with the wisdom of some wise alien race, and so on. My sense is that some people just like a little bit of magic sprinkled on grocery store reality. On the other hand, I've seen mentally troubled addicts lose their grip on reality, with a paranoid streak in their delusions. Not fun stuff at all.

Yes, this is much more like it. Certain beliefs are used as membership criteria for certain clubs, they're not really beliefs in the sense of tendencies to act as if... but merely part of a word game (or ritual enaction) that is played to create a sense of mutual belonging (and of course, exclusion of the other - the dark side). — Isaac

:up:
Well put!

The vast majority of religious practice is just social-bonding ritual and as harmless as a knitting club on a societal scale, but then so's the alternative. — Isaac

True. I'm not really trying to defend religious practice. I want to live in Denmark or somewhere like it. I'm tempted to think that some kind of psychopathology of everyday life will always be with us. It's a secretion, some kind of ooze to stick humans into groups, which, as you say, can go terribly wrong.