Based on all this, your position seems to be deontological of the negative ethics variety, which is about where mine is too :up: . That is to say, the concern lies in what not to do (preventing force of autonomy if possible, preventing unnecessary harm if possible, etc.).

Based on all this, your position seems to be deontological of the negative ethics variety, which is about where mine is too :up: . That is to say, the concern lies in what not to do (preventing force of autonomy if possible, preventing unnecessary harm if possible, etc.). — schopenhauer1

I have to strongly agree, at least for the second part.
For your first sentence, maybe so. But I´m not sure, I have forgot so much of the philosophy, that I have read in my life.

For your first sentence, maybe so. But I´m not sure, I have forgot so much of the philosophy, that I have read in my life. — Antinatalist

In moral philosophy, deontological ethics or deontology (from Greek: δέον, 'obligation, duty' + λόγος, 'study') is the normative ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or wrong under a series of rules, rather than based on the consequences of the action.[1] It is sometimes described as duty-, obligation-, or rule-based ethics.[2][3] Deontological ethics is commonly contrasted to consequentialism,[4] virtue ethics, and pragmatic ethics. In this terminology, action is more important than the consequences. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontological_ethics

@schopenhauer1

In any event, the wording would only matter to deontologists. The asymmetry argument is of no use to a pure consequentialist?

In any event, the wording would only matter to deontologists. The asymmetry argument is of no use to a pure consequentialist? — Down The Rabbit Hole

No it can certainly be used by a consequentialist. The least amount of suffering is preventing birth, and there's no downside to the absence of good in reference to non-existence.

For your first sentence, maybe so. But I´m not sure, I have forgot so much of the philosophy, that I have read in my life.
— Antinatalist
In moral philosophy, deontological ethics or deontology (from Greek: δέον, 'obligation, duty' + λόγος, 'study') is the normative ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether that action itself is right or wrong under a series of rules, rather than based on the consequences of the action.[1] It is sometimes described as duty-, obligation-, or rule-based ethics.[2][3] Deontological ethics is commonly contrasted to consequentialism,[4] virtue ethics, and pragmatic ethics. In this terminology, action is more important than the consequences.
— https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontological_ethics — schopenhauer1

Thank you. That was at least quite familiar. But perhaps I should revise things that I´ve read years ago and now forgotten. And in moral philosophy in general are of course things and ideas that I don´t know, but maybe I should.

As I say, if someone dies they are deprived of life's pleasure. Is it only different for the unborn because they are not someone? Because that is what Benkei is saying. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Deprivation is not the right word.

Something, which doesn´t exist doesn´t suffer from deprivation.
Then again, if someone who already exists will be killed, it´s extreme violation against her/his sovereignty and autonomy.
And if you think not having a child is morally as same level as murdering someone, think again.


But, let´s assume that having a child is a good thing. Absolutely good thing, in any circumstances.

If this is true, it might not result in the duty of producing as much life for the Earth as possible, but it would undoubtedly be a supererogatory – a Mother Theresa-like – act. Therefore, it is a considerably immoral deed for social workers or anyone else to persuade potential heroin addict mothers to use contraception or even to terminate their pregnancies!

But, the epistemic state of people being as it is, we cannot plead to the value of creating life with such speculative arguments.

The absence of pain that could have occurred, is always good. The absence of pleasure for someone who does not exist but could, is neutral. — schopenhauer1

This comes from conflating the state with the personal opinion of someone.

If we’re comparing states, the absence of a good state is bad and the absence of a bad state is good.

If we’re comparing “how would someone feel”. The absence of a bad state and a good state are neutral in this case (since there is no one to feel anything)

You get an asymmetry when you mix them up. You can get the opposite asymmetry by mixing them up the opposite way.

So some conclusions might be:
A universe devoid of people with pain is just a "good" state of affairs.
A universe devoid of people with pleasure is just a "neutral" state of affairs. — schopenhauer1

Even if we accept these (which I still don’t), it doesn’t help his argument. You can’t get AN from this.

Thus nudging the lifeguard to wake up is not to the degree of violating dignity or unnecessary suffering prevention that forcing the lifeguard into a lifetime of teaching lifeguarding lessons would be doing. — schopenhauer1

Sure. But then you’d have to argue that having children IS of that degree. And you haven’t done so yet.

Even if we were to "know" the greatest good would come from this, the dignity threshold has been violated — schopenhauer1

You need to show this.

Certainly, there is a balanced calculus that has to be made regarding how much unnecessary suffering and dignity violation is happening. — schopenhauer1

You need to show that the calculus would conclude that “having children is bad enough an imposition to get wrong”. To simply assume it is question begging.

Violating unnecessary suffering prevention: Yes
Violating dignity using people for aggregate: Yes
Violating dignity, forcing a game on them: Yes — schopenhauer1

If you could save person A from untold suffering for 30 years by forcing person B to play League of Legends for 4 hours with toxic teammates that make him want to tear his hair out, would you do it?

I would at least find that permissible. Even though it meets the 3 criteria above. So it’s not like having all 3 guarantees that “violating dignity” wins out.

If you could save person A from untold suffering for 30 years by forcing person B to play League of Legends for 4 hours with toxic teammates that make him want to tear his hair out, would you do it? — khaled

Maybe. But then we are just talking about degrees of meeting the threshold.

I would at least find that permissible. Even though it meets the 3 criteria above. So it’s not like having all 3 guarantees that “violating dignity” wins out. — khaled

But I explained earlier that it isn't binary but a matter of degrees meeting a threshold.

Yes, the calculus does have to be worked out because intuitively I can say the waking of the lifeguard doesn't meet it while kidnapping the the lifeguard for a lifetime does. Thus, the situation you provided does not necessarily violate it, as it doesn't meet the threshold. The violation happens only after the threshold is met.

This comes from conflating the state with the personal opinion of someone. — khaled

It's not conflating.. it is about state of affairs in regards to non-existence (no human), it is person-contexted in regards to already existing.

The point is, "absence of good" is only bad when there is actually a person affected by this. Not so with the absence of suffering (the asymmetry).

Even if we accept these (which I still don’t), it doesn’t help his argument. You can’t get AN from this. — khaled

I think that Benatar may agree and hence it's the interlocking of all the asymmetries and empirical evidence that really is the force behind the argument. The initial asymmetry is sort of the foundation where the other arguments come from. We must first believe that suffering is bad person-independent.. Which he thinks is intuitive that suffering existing counts more than goodness not existing.

But I explained earlier that it isn't binary but a matter of degrees meeting a threshold. — schopenhauer1

But you argue for a binary position. Having kids is wrong. Period.

The violation happens only after the threshold is met. — schopenhauer1

And you haven’t shown that the threshold is met in the case of birth. If that’s your intuition that’s fine, but it’s not a common one.

The point is, "absence of good" is only bad when there is actually a person affected by this. Not so with the absence of suffering — schopenhauer1

Absence of suffering is also only good when there is a person actually affected by this. Idk where you’re getting otherwise.

But you argue for a binary position. Having kids is wrong. Period. — khaled

No that is true.. but that is after the threshold is met.. Degrees that reach a threshold.

And you haven’t shown that the threshold is met in the case of birth. If that’s your intuition that’s fine, but it’s not a common one. — khaled

I think it can come from common intuitions, it's just people don't think to apply them to common intuitions that other things often apply to. So the intuitions are common, this particular application of it is not.

Absence of suffering is also only good when there is a person actually affected by this. Idk where you’re getting otherwise. — khaled

But that is the axiom which the asymmetry is based.. that suffering not occurring (if it could have) is always good. So the objection that this means that a bunch of things not occurring is "good" I guess would be yes for Benatar.

No that is true.. but that is after the threshold is met — schopenhauer1

Don’t you also say that having a child already meets the threshold in every case?

So the objection that this means that a bunch of things not occurring is "good" I guess would be yes for Benatar. — schopenhauer1

No because I would add “a bunch of good things not occurring is bad”. A no for Benatar.

No because I would add “a bunch of good things not occurring is bad”. A no for Benatar. — khaled

So yes, I should say that suffering not existing is always good.. even if there was no person to benefit from this good. Good things not occurring is not good (or bad) unless there is a person for which there is a deprivation.

Don’t you also say that having a child already meets the threshold in every case? — khaled

Yes, it always meets the threshold.. I am not saying individual cases of having children (it always meets the threshold) but comparing procreation with other actions that have force or harm involved. Though I could argue actually that unnecessary harm which counts (in respect for the individual being born) rather than aggregate harm (in which case it can be considered "necessary" in a certain way, but then violating dignity/not respecting the individual/autonomy).

Yes, it always meets the threshold. — schopenhauer1

Where do you get this? That’s the main point. You don’t have a real argument unless you can argue for this premise. It’s crucial.

Where do you get this? That’s the main point. You don’t have a real argument unless you can argue for this premise. — khaled

Right, and I did answer you previously:

Yes, the calculus does have to be worked out because intuitively I can say the waking of the lifeguard doesn't meet it while kidnapping the the lifeguard for a lifetime does. Thus, the situation you provided does not necessarily violate it, as it doesn't meet the threshold. The violation happens only after the threshold is met. — schopenhauer1

I... don’t understand.

Where there did you argue that having children meets the threshold of “too much dignity violation”?

Where there did you argue that having children meets the threshold of “too much dignity violation”? — khaled

Now I don't understand. Procreation meets the threshold, similar to the lifeguard example.. I just cannot provide a concrete calculus (yet) of how these thresholds were met other than an intuitive understanding.

Procreation meets the threshold, similar to the lifeguard example. — schopenhauer1

Why? On the basis that both are “for a lifetime”?

I would say there are some things that are ok to force onto people for a lifetime because of the suffering doing so alleviates. Like taxes.

So “for a lifetime” doesn’t seem to be enough to unilaterally say that too much dignity is being violated.

Anyways, I have to go now. Will be back later.

Why? On the basis that both are “for a lifetime”? — khaled

Presuming the game of life should be played, or the challenge/overcoming challenge game.

I would say there are some things that are ok to force onto people for a lifetime because of the suffering doing so alleviates. Like taxes. — khaled

Sure.

So “for a lifetime” doesn’t seem to be enough to unilaterally say that too much dignity is being violated. — khaled

Right, an intractable game of challenges forced onto someone and cannot be escaped easily. Have you read some of my numerous other posts explaining the ways in which the "game of life" can be a harm?

Right, an intractable game of challenges forced onto someone and cannot be escaped easily. — schopenhauer1

Depending on the difficulty of said game, I will think it’s over or under the threshold.

I happen to think it’s often under the threshold. While you think it’s over the threshold.

We could agree to disagree, but you furthermore seem to want to establish some objectivity to your view. That it is a matter of fact that the game of life is over the threshold of acceptable impositions. That’s why I ask you to argue further to establish that.

We could agree to disagree, but you furthermore seem to want to establish some objectivity to your view. That it is a matter of fact that the game of life is over the threshold of acceptable impositions. That’s why I ask you to argue further to establish that. — khaled

I think even a threshold right there is met being that it is unknown for the person involved being such an immersive and intractable game for the person this would be happening to. Perhaps this is beginning to answer the calculus for the lifeguard forced teaching for life argument...How easy is it to leave the game? Here the argument would center on whether "life itself" can be considered a game.. An objection would be that because it cannot be escaped easily, and is the reason for all other games, it can't be considered a game. I think that debate can be hashed out.

Certain tasks have to be met (though it happens in any number of avenues).
De facto limits are involved (historical and cultural contingencies)
Challenges have to be met and overcome..

What if you want to "quit" the tasks de facto tasks involved? What happens if you don't want to encounter the particular contingencies that befall you?

T

No it can certainly be used by a consequentialist. The least amount of suffering is preventing birth, and there's no downside to the absence of good in reference to non-existence. — schopenhauer1

We can argue over whether or not the absence of good should be defined as a downside to being unborn, but considering that that good would be experienced should they be born, to a consequentialist it wouldn't matter.

We can argue over whether or not the absence of good should be defined as a downside to being unborn, but considering that that good would be experienced should they be born, to a consequentialist it wouldn't matter. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Not for a negative utilitarian: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism

We can argue over whether or not the absence of good should be defined as a downside to being unborn, but considering that that good would be experienced should they be born, to a consequentialist it wouldn't matter.
— Down The Rabbit Hole

Not for a negative utilitarian: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism — schopenhauer1

A NU or indeed anyone doesn't need the asymmetry to tell them that birth leads to suffering. The meat of the asymmetry is that the unborn are not being deprived, which would be no use to a consequentialist, as the consequence of not giving birth is absence of the good that would have been experienced if the unborn had been born.

as the consequence of not giving birth is absence of the good that would have been experienced if the unborn had been born. — Down The Rabbit Hole

Right but presumably harm is weighted as what counts or matters here.

Pearce is sticking around for an impressively long time. Most guest speakers do a runner after a few posts.

I'm finding transhumanism to be a very interesting idea. I'm oscillating between thinking it's a very good idea and it being complete horseshit.

Why not try for it in case its possible, right?

Why not try for it in case its possible, right? — Shawn

I'm just not convinced it's a desirable end. I'm new to the concept though an there are lots of variants and complexity. I often think we should have stopped at horse and cart technology. And sailing ships.

Also, what if transhumans, or post humans, don't do what we want them to do? Then transhumanism becomes an evil, and joins the long list of species-level fuck-ups we have since regretted.