my point is that its seeming uniqueness, is not different. It is another case, just with a time displacement from conception to birth or whatever other place you want to consider "valid" (consciousness, self-consciousness, etc.). It doesn't change anything because of the displacement. — schopenhauer1
I can then make a case that because this is so unique, it defies things like, "waking up the lifeguard to save the drowning child" because in this case the person is absolutely being used for X reason and never for its own sake being that it doesn't exist yet. — schopenhauer1
we know that if child will born to this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard. And we also know that we make the decision for her/his life, the unborn child not having any kind of veto-prevention to ignition of her/his life, which she/he only has to live.
These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not creating human life to this world. — Antinatalist
I was looking for some support for that position. As it stands it's not a common intuition, nor have you given any reason why we should think this way. Putting the word 'just' in front of the thing you want to dismiss doesn't constitute an argument against it. — Isaac
If e can consider their dignity on the grounds that they will soon have such a thing then we can consider their interests on the same grounds. — Isaac
We currently feel that the non-existence of the subject is sufficient ground to treat infractions against their hypothetical will very differently to infractions against the actual will of an existent person. You feel we should change that intuition to treat them the same. I'm asking why you think we should. All you've provided so far is that you think we should, not why. — Isaac
we know that if child will born to this world, her/his life could be painful, perhaps she/he will suffer really hard. And we also know that we make the decision for her/his life, the unborn child not having any kind of veto-prevention to ignition of her/his life, which she/he only has to live.
These are sufficient arguments not to reproduce, not creating human life to this world.
— Antinatalist
— Isaac
Well no, they're not.
We know that if that child is not born we could also bring about much pain and suffering (in fact are much more likely to), so the pain/suffering argument doesn't work. — Isaac
We do make the decision without consulting the child but we make decisions for people without consulting them all the time in life and consider it perfectly acceptable in many circumstances, so that argument doesn't work either. — Isaac
I'm actually not sure what your problem with the idea of the cause being displaced from the consequent. You plant the device, and then it blows up later.. — schopenhauer1
Am I right that this is pretty much in line with your greatest objection? — schopenhauer1
Now with deciding something for someone against their will. The bad thing is a decision being made for you against your will. That can't happen to the non-existent child, they have no will. When will that bad thing happen - the decision being made against their will? — Isaac
No, not in the slightest. My objection is as above. When considering harms it is normal to weigh greater goods against them so that argument fails on its own. When considering dignity/autonomy there is no will to oppose at the time of the decision and no decision to be made once there's a will to oppose, so there's no consequence of one's actions to consider so far as dignity/autonomy is concerned. My actions now in conceiving a child will not result in a future situation where their will will be opposed in any but the normal ways we all accept already. — Isaac
The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).
I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means. — Antinatalist
But having a child or not having a child is not a trivial everyday task, which doesn´t have any severe influences.
It´s a question about human life. — Antinatalist
The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence of another individual or – to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter. — Antinatalist
The basic argument is as follows: we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence of another individual or – to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.
— Antinatalist
So I agree with this 100% but what they are going to do is say, "What is the foundation of this specific act"? They will say it is special pleading because in other cases, X, Y, Z causing harm or force on another is necessary... For example, would it be wrong to wake up a lifeguard to save a drowning child? It is "forcing" the lifeguard. — schopenhauer1
So my response for the foundations includes two rules:
Not violating dignity and Not creating unnecessary suffering. Both would violated in the case of procreation. — schopenhauer1
The bad thing is a decision being made for you against your will. That can't happen to the non-existent child, they have no will. When will that bad thing happen - the decision being made against their will? — Isaac
I would say birth. — schopenhauer1
There is now a will at that time, no? — schopenhauer1
A decision was made that (eventually) affected that person born at that time. — schopenhauer1
I don't agree that autonomy is not violated by thinking in terms of the average way we look at future tense. Someone will have X, Y, Z happen due to this prior decision. — schopenhauer1
The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).
I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means. — Antinatalist
we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence of another individual or – to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter. — Antinatalist
The essential in this case is what is good for the child. If we think, for example, not having child will cause despair for child´s potential parents, we then use child as a mean - as an instrument for something - not as something valuable in itself (Immanuel Kant).
I´m not Kantian, but I have to agree with his assertion of the principle that human beings should be treated as ends rather than as means. — Antinatalist
Well, I'll bear that in mind next time I ask a cobbler to fix my shoe - 'must not use him as means to an end'. Don't know how I'm going to get this sole re-stitched, but still, we can't go around ignoring the half-remembered edicts of dead eighteenth century Germans now can we? — Isaac
we have no moral right to cause something that radically changes the existence of another individual or – to be more precise: from non-existence to existence or vice versa (in other words, from a non-individual/+ non-existence into existence or vice versa is also regarded as a change here), or to directly affect the existence of another human being if it is not possible to hear this individual in the matter.
— Antinatalist
So you're positing that there is a non-existent individual? You see the contradiction there? — Isaac
Yep I agree. I was asking when a decision was made that went against there will, not when one was made that would eventually affect them. There's nothing morally wrong with making decisions that will eventually effect people, we do it all the time. — Isaac
But conceiving a child does not cause, in future, a decision to be made against someone's will.
The best you can say is that a decision is made (to conceive a child) which might be against the will of that child if that child existed at the time and could express a preference). But since that contains a contingent which clearly is not the case, the situation it mitigates never arises.
This is what I mean by equivocating between harms and force. You can't use the 'will happen in future' argument that is associated with harms when talking about force because that is not something that will necessarily happen in future. The harm will happen in future, but the force won't. — Isaac
But conceiving a child does not cause, in future, a decision to be made against someone's will. — Isaac
The decision was made which caused dignity to be violated at a future point. That is the point. — schopenhauer1
How was dignity violated at a future point? What is the dignity violating event that's happening at this future point? — Isaac
Time 1: No state of affairs exists where a baby is in a net that I set in the sand, hidden.
Time 2: A baby is in now in the net.
Time 1 caused the violation at Time 2. — schopenhauer1
I can explain this better with your oft-used kidnapping example.
What's bad about kidnapping a person to play a game (even if you think the game is brilliant and they'll really enjoy it) is that you're treating them as if they didn't have a will of their own. Their own choices of their own free will have a value over and above how 'right' or 'wrong' those choices are (sometimes).
But we can't apply this to conception because there's no person to have a will, to possess their own choices, until after we've conceived them. A non-existent being doesn't have a will or make any choices of their own.
Once born they will have a will and choices of their own, but we're not doing anything to violate them by then. It's a one-off decision and it's made at a time when there's no will to violate by making it.
We're deciding whether to bring a will into existence, so we can't possibly be violating that will at the same time as deciding whether to create it. — Isaac
At the time of birth, there is a person's will. That person does not exist in that situation by magic or fiat. Something put them in that situation. — schopenhauer1
Once that situation has started, the dignity was violated. — schopenhauer1
did this "will" have autonomy to be in the situation it finds itself in? No. — schopenhauer1
I don't think "dignity" just covers autonomy of will, but a basic unfairness or injustice that might be more fundamental (you don't need a will involved at point A, let's say). That is to say, finding yourself in a game you cannot escape, and that was not of your doing, is an injustice. — schopenhauer1
So this is about procreation as entrapment: To procreate (here meant broadly, to conceive and carry a pregnancy to term) is to set up a trap for another being. The evil is in doing so intentionally.Time 1: No state of affairs exists where a baby is in a net that I set in the sand, hidden.
Time 2: A baby is in now in the net.
Time 1 caused the violation at Time 2. — schopenhauer1
In this case, it's about the intention, and it's the intention that is evil. Setting a trap is already evil. The fact that nobody got trapped so far doesn't change the intention to set the trap, it doesn't undo the evilness of setting the trap.Maybe, but I was referring to the specific use schopenhauer1 made in his kidnapping for a fantastic game example. No-one harmed at all, but 'dignity' trespassed upon by ignoring the kidnaper's will. — Isaac
In this case, it's about the intention, and it's the intention that is evil. Setting a trap is already evil. The fact that nobody got trapped so far doesn't change the intention to set the trap, it doesn't undo the evilness of setting the trap. — baker
the focus on intention applies only insofar as people really carefully think through why they want to have children. (But which they usually don't seem to do, so the point is moot.) — baker
Agreed. And if the very situation itself was overall negative then we'd have a problem, but since it isn't we've no problem at all ... yet. — Isaac
NOpe.. but let's continue...This is just plain wrong though. — Isaac
You can't change the past. You're literally saying that a situation which occurred in the past changes once the kid is born in the future. — Isaac
That doesn't make sense. Autonomy only means anything when there is a will. The concept can't be applied to the pre-will possibility, you might as well apply it to a stone. Possibilities don't have wills. The act of conception is the act of creating a will, so it cannot possibly be judged against the autonomy of that will, nothing can will itself to be created nor will itself not to be, so there's no view on the matter to take into consideration (or unjustly not do so). — Isaac
These are like arguments people make with the definition of "is".. Was someone put in a situation that they could not control? Was this a substantial enough situation? Things like that.I don't think "dignity" just covers autonomy of will, but a basic unfairness or injustice that might be more fundamental (you don't need a will involved at point A, let's say). — schopenhauer1
Most people don't think so, so just saying it is isn't going to be sufficient. You've said before that you can make your case from common intuitions. This isn't one. — Isaac
"It's evil to act on evil intentions" -- this seems to be the basic argument for AN here.Neither are the point at hand though, which is the argument for hard antinatalism. — Isaac
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.